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ABSTRACT
This is a study of constitutional and political development in Brunei 
Darussalam between 1944 and 1962. Responding to new forces unleashed by World 
War II, British planners in the Colonial Office embarked on a policy of promoting 
political progress in Brunei Darussalam with the aim of eventually introducing self- 
government, with the widest possible participation of the people of all communities. 
The thesis traces the origins of the Colonial Office's plan to introduce constitutional
V
government in Brunei Darussalam; examines the evolution of the plan taking particular 
account of the obstructive intrusion of certain post-war developments which inevitably 
delayed the fruition of a full political advancement; and analyses the interaction 
between the local ruling elite, the British Colonial administration, and the Partai 
Rakyat Brunei (People's Party of Brunei). In the event the Brunei Darussalam 
Constitution, promulgated on 29 September 1959, failed to give full satisfaction to a 
large section of the people, causing in the end a rebellion which broke out on 8 
December 1962. It also analyses the British plan to bring Brunei Darussalam in closer 
association with its neighbours in a loose federation. When this plan failed, the 
British put pressure oh Brunei Darussalam to enter the Malaysia Federation, which 
inevitably gave impetus to the rebellion. In the end, Brunei Darussalam not only did 
not join the Malaysia Federation, it also chose not to adopt a democratic form of 
government. Instead, when it resumed its full independence on 1 January 1984, 
Brunei chose to be governed by a Sultan under the concept of Malay Islamic 
Monarchy.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent history of Brunei, in particular the post-war period, is relatively 
underdeveloped area of research. To date there are only a handful of works of serious 
scholarship on this period. Among the more prominent works are those by Saunders, 
Ranjit Singh and Horton.1 Saunders, being the most recent, provides a useful account 
o f the political development of the Sultanate of Brunei from its origins to the 
achievement of independence. Based on primary, and secondary sources, his work 
provides a useful overview of the development of the State. Ranjit Singh's work is 
also similar in that it traces the development of the State between 1839-1983. Horton, 
on the other hand, focuses on the social, economic and political development of 
Brunei in the Residential period between 1906-1959. Other useful published works 
on the history of Brunei include those of Tarling, Brown, Haji Zaini, and Pehin Haji 
Jamil.2 The three major works mentioned above cover a wide period of time and 
hence lack depth in respect of the political and constitutional developments in the 
period between 1944 and 1962 which marked a turning point in the Sultanate's history. 
This period is of crucial importance to understanding of modem Brunei as political
’Graham Saunders, A History o f  Brunei, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 
1994; D.S.Ranjit Singh, Brunei 1839-1983: The Problems o f  Political Survival,; 
Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1984; A.V.M.Horton, The Development o f  Brunei 
During the British Residential Era 1906-1959: A Sultanate Regenerated, Unpublished 
PhD's Thesis presented to the University of Hull, 1985.
2Nicholas Tarling, Britain, the Brookes and Brunei, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford 
University Press, 1971; D.E.Brown, Brunei: The Structure and History o f  A Bornean 
Malay Sultanate, Monograph of the Brunei Museum Journal, Vol. 2, 1970; Haji Zaini 
Haji Ahmad, Pertumbuhan Nasionalisme di Brunei (1939-1962), Kuala Lumpur, ZR 
Publications, 1989; Pehin Haji Mohammad Jamil Al-Sufri, Liku-Liku Perjuangan 
Pencapaian Kemerdekaan Negara Brunei Darussalam, Brunei, Jabatan Pusat Sejarah, 
1992.
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developments in this period largely determined the shape of the modem political entity 
and its survival. Thus the main focus of this thesis is the political and constitutional 
developments during the period 1944 to 1962 which had an immense impact on the 
course of Brunei's political history. The developments are examined in a 
chronological sequence so as to provide an adequate basis for the analysis of this 
transitional period o f Brunei's history. The main sources for this study are the 
Colonial Office documents at the Public Record Office, Kew; official documents at 
the Museum Archive in Brunei; and personal interviews with some surviving 
personalities during the period under study.
This study begins by examining the formulation of the British wartime policy 
on the future constitutional and political relations with Brunei in particular, and the 
Borneo territories in general, and how the policy was implemented. Chapter Two 
traces the proposals for the Brunei Constitution and the drafting of the Constitutional 
Enactment. Chapter Three discusses the formation of a political party, the Partai 
Rakyat Brunei (PRB) or the Brunei Peoples' Party, and its ideas. The PRB demanded 
a Constitution which provided for a full democratic government and unification of the 
Borneo territories of Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak. However the British 
favoured a gradual transformation to democracy and rejected the PRB's Borneo union 
proposals and made public their own proposals in 1958. The British proposals for the 
"closer association" of the Borneo territories are examined in Chapter Four. The 
British proposals are important because they indirectly influenced the outcome of 
Brunei's Constitution and later the Malaysia Plan. Chapter Five discusses the 
constitutional negotiations between the Sultan and the British both in Brunei and in 
London which ended in an agreement to promulgate Brunei's first written Constitution
13
in September 1959. The promulgation and the main aspects of the Constitution are 
discussed in Chapter Six. The next two chapters examine the responses of the PRB 
both to the Brunei Constitution and the Malaysia Plan which culminated in a rebellion 
in early December 1962. The concluding chapter draws together the main points 
raised in the preceding chapters.
Before going into the thesis it is important to examine briefly the origins and 
development of the relations between Brunei and Britain until the outbreak of the 
World War II. Brunei's relations with Britain began officially in 1847 when both 
sovereign countries signed the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with the main aim 
of extending trade and suppressing piracy in the Borneo waters. On its part Brunei 
handed over Labuan Island to Britain as an incentive to win the latter's friendship. By 
doing so Brunei hoped to stabilise the political and economic situation which had 
deteriorated, partly due rivalry between Brunei's ruling elite and partly due to James 
Brooke's intervention in the Sultanate's politics. James Brooke, a British adventurer, 
had obtained the governorship of Sarawak, a small district in the southwest of the 
Sultanate, from the Sultan of Brunei in 1841.3 When the British friendship did not 
give protection - in fact it led to Brooke's encroachment on its territories - Brunei in 
1877 leased out an area covering almost the whole o f present State of Sabah to the 
Austrian Consul-General in Hong Kong, Baron von Overbeck, and a London 
businessmen, Alfred Dent. Overbeck also signed a similar agreement with the Sultan 
of Sulu, who had a claim over part of the area. Overbeck and Dent formed a 
company to run the government of the area, which became known as North Borneo. 
When the former withdrew from the adventure, Alfred Dent, in 1881, obtained a
3D.S.Ranjit, op.cit., 47-58.
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British charter to his company, which became known as the British North Borneo 
(Chartered) Company. If  Brunei's objective of leasing North Borneo to another 
European was to counterweigh Brooke's territorial aggrandizement, it failed. On the 
contrary, the granting of the British charter to the North Borneo Company started the 
scramble for the partition of the Brunei territories between Brooke and the Company. 
By 1885 Brunei lost all but five of its rivers or districts and Brooke was threatening 
to take Limbang.4 To prevent his Sultanate from being totally dismembered, Sultan 
Abdul Momin issued, just before he died in the same year, an amanat, or will, 
prohibiting any more alienation of Brunei's territories.5 His successor, Sultan Hashim, 
sought protection from Britain which was accorded under the Protectorate Agreement 
signed between the two countries on 17 September 1888. The main features of the 
agreement were: firstly, that Brunei "continued to be governed and administered" by 
its Sultan "as an independent State, under the protection of Great Britain"; secondly, 
that other than the question of the right of succession to the throne of Brunei, the 
protection conferred "no right on Her Majesty's Government to interfere with the 
internal administration of that State"; and finally, that
"the relations between the State of Brunei and all foreign States, 
including the States of Sarawak and North Borneo shall be conducted 
by Her Majesty's Government, and all communications shall be carried 
on exclusively through Her Majesty's Government, or in accordance 
with its directions; and if any difference should arise between the
4An account of the partition of Brunei during the second half of the nineteenth 
century is found in Nicholas Tarling, op.cit., and D.S.Ranjit Singh, op.cit, Chapter 3.
5For Sultan Abdul Mumin's will see D.E.Brown, "Sultan Abdul Mumin's will and 
related document", The Brunei Museum Journal, Vol. 3, 1974, pp. 156 - 170.
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Sultan of Brunei and the Government of any other State, the Sultan of 
Brunei agrees to abide by the decision of Her Majesty's Government, 
and to take all necessary measures to give effect thereto".6 
The Protectorate Agreement, which for the British served mainly to prevent 
intervention of other foreign powers in Brunei, failed to give adequate protection to 
Brunei as expected by Sultan Hashim. In 1890 Limbang district was annexed by Rajah 
Sir Charles Brooke of Sarawak. When Sultan Hashim evoked the Agreement the 
British not only failed to come to his aid but decided instead to approve the 
annexation. The Rajah had just returned from London when he made the move on 
Limbang which raised suspicions of a secret deal between him and the British 
Government.7 When Sultan Hashim protested against the British decision, he was 
reminded that he was obliged to abide by the British decision under the Treaty. 
Sultan Hashim, however, rejected the treaty, insisting that Limbang must not be 
separated from Brunei.8
Sultan Hashim's (and his Ministers) refusal to give his consent to the 
annexation was based on the grounds that not only was it against his predecessor's 
amanat, and it split the State into two enclaves, but, more importantly, Limbang was 
the richest and most populous of the remaining districts of Brunei. As one British 
officer observed five years after the annexation: "the loss of Limbang had not only 
crippled the resources of the [Brunei] Government, but also the trade and even the
6For the full text of the Treaty, see W.G.Maxwell and W.S.Gibson, Treaties and 
Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo, London, Jes.Truscott & Son Ltd., 
pp. 149-51.
7D.S.Ranjit Singh, op.cit., 83; N.Tarling, op.cit., p.405.
8D.S.Ranjit Singh, op.cit., p. 85.
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movements of the people".9 Under such conditions Brunei inevitably slid into political 
and economic instability. In order to solve the problem the British Government 
recommended in 1900 the termination of the Brunei Sultanate and partition of its 
territories between Sarawak and North Borneo. However, the Rajah o f Sarawak 
insisted that all the remaining Brunei territories should be incorporated into his 
Kingdom. But Sultan Hashim vigorously resisted any attempt to abolish his Sultanate 
and to strip him and his Ministers of power. He sought help from various people 
including writing to the British King in 1902, and appealing to Turkey and the United 
States in 1903. These developments together with a report of the presence of oil in
1903 probably changed the British Government's attitude towards Brunei. In May
1904 it appointed M.S.H.McArthur as the new Acting British Consul for Brunei and 
immediately sent him on a special fact-finding mission to the State. At the end of his 
six-month stay, McArthur recommended that Brunei should be brought under British 
administration with a British Resident as in the Malay States in Malaya.10 The British 
Government agreed, and in November 1905 McArthur returned to Brunei to secure an 
agreement with the Sultan. Beset by poverty and unrest, and threatened with 
absorption by Sarawak, Sultan Hashim had few alternatives but to put his seal on the 
document on 3 December 1905; and the Supplementary Agreement o f 1888 was 
ratified on 2 January 1906, when Sir John Anderson, the British High Commissioner 
for Brunei, signed the document on behalf of the British Government.
9Quoted from A.V.M.Horton, op.cit., p. 76.
10See M.S.H.McArthur, Report on Brunei in 1904, (Introduced and Annotated by 
A.V.M.Horton), Ohio, Ohio University, 1987.
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The main feature of the 1905/1906 Supplementary Agreement, intended to give 
"full" protection to Brunei, was the appointment of "a British officer to be styled 
Resident” whose "advice must be taken and acted upon on all questions in Brunei, 
other than those affecting the Mohammedan religion”.11 The British Resident (as he 
was known in Brunei) was the "agent and representative" of the British Government 
in Brunei. He was appointed by and responsible to the High Commissioner for 
Brunei. The latter officer was the Governor of the Straits Settlements; and, as for the 
Malay States, he was responsible for the general supervision of the administration in 
Brunei. The High Commissioner, whose office was in Singapore, was as responsible 
to the Colonial Office in London for the broad overview of the administration and 
policies. However, London never made important decisions without prior reference 
to the High Commissioner, who, depended upon the Resident for information and 
guidance.12
In Brunei, the British Resident was more than an adviser; he exercised the 
general functions of the administration, sat in the highest court in the State and drafted 
legislation. In fact he was the chief executive officer. The Sultan and his Ministers, 
although retaining their positions and prestige, lost much of their former functions and 
powers. The traditional Government based on territorial land ownership was abolished 
and replaced by a strong central Government. The most important body in the new 
Government was the State Council, which was recreated from the Sultan's advisory
"For the full text of the Treaty, see W.G.Maxwell and W.S.Gibson, Treaties and 
Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo, London, Jes.Truscott & Son Ltd., 
pp. 151-52.
12An account of the development of Brunei during the Residential period is in 
A.V.M.Horton, op.cit.
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Council. Presided over by the Sultan, the State Council had ten to twelve members, 
including the British Resident and the two Wazir13 - Pengiran Bendahara and 
Pengiran Pemanca.14 In 1920s the leader of the Chinese Community, Kapitan China, 
and in 1950s the Managing Director of the British Malayan Petroleum Company (later 
Brunei Shell Petroleum Company) were made members of the Council. The local 
members were appointed by the Sultan and approved by the British Resident. All 
internal matters affecting the State, including legislation, were referred to the Sultan- 
in-Council for approval. In theory, therefore, the Sultan-in-Council was the "supreme 
authority" in the State, but in practice it was no more than a "rubber stamp" of the 
British Resident because the Sultan and his Ministers were bound by the 1905/1906 
Agreement which required them to accept the British Resident's advice on all matters 
other than those of Islamic faith.15
In fact this "advice" clause was one of the main contentious issues between the 
Brunei ruling elite and the British Resident, and the Bruneis took every opportunity 
to try to amend it. In 1909, Sultan Jamal-ul-Alam complained that he was required 
to accept dictation rather than advice from the British Resident over the passing of the
13Senior ministers of royal blood. In the traditional government of Brunei there are 
four Wazir, but from early twentieth century to 1967 the positions of Pengiran 
Temenggong and Pengiran di Gadong became vacant.
14According to the list submitted by Pengiran Bendahara to the British Resident 
in 1907, the following persons had a constitutional right on the State Council: The 
Sultan, Pengiran Bendahara, Pengiran Pemanca, Pengiran Syahbandar, Pengiran 
Kerma Indra, Datu Perdana Menteri, Jawatan Abu Bakar, Tuan Imam , and Orang 
Kaya di Gadong. See Minutes of the State Council Meeting on 29 June 1907 in 
BA/FC/RBM/57, Minutes of State Council from 29 June 1907 to 31 August 1949.
15In the Malay States in Malaya the Residents had no jurisdiction over the matters 
affecting Islam and the Malay customs. See the Treaty of Pangkor, 1874 in 
W.G.Maxwell amd W.S.Gibon, op.cit., pp.28-30.
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land legislation and refused to cooperate in its implementation. However, the British 
authorities took a firm stand: from August 1910 the Sultan's monthly allowance was 
reduced to half and he was warned that unless he improved his behaviour he would 
be removed from his position. Since the Sultan and his Ministers had lost their 
personal income from ownership of land following the abolition o f the appanages 
system, they had no alternative but to acquiesce to the British Resident. In January 
1911, the Sultan's allowance was restored. Reporting on the improvement of the 
Sultan's behaviour the British Resident deduced that a "new era" had begun: the 
distrust between Resident and the Sultan and his Ministers had been overcome.16 The 
two Wazir, however, continued to be less co-operative, and from 1910 were 
"conspicuous absentees" from the State Council.17 As a result, their relative power 
and influence diminished and that of the Sultan bolstered by the British. However, 
Sultan Jamal-ul-Alam died in 1924 aged 35 and was succeeded by his eleven-year-old 
son, Pengiran Muda Ahmad Tajuddin. This virtually gave the British Resident a free 
hand in introducing reforms in Brunei at least until after the Second World War.
In order to raise efficiency the traditional administration based on territorial 
power of the traditional nobility was replaced by a centralised administration modelled 
along Western lines. In the early years, however, due to lack of finance Brunei shared 
administrative services with the Colony of Labuan. In fact it was not until 1922, 
when the revenues of the State became more stable, that a British Resident, 
independent of Labuan, was appointed to Brunei. Concurrently, Brunei was also 
administratively linked with the Straits Settlements and the Malay States through the
16A.V.M.Horton, op.cit., p. 131.
xlIbid., p. 139.
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High Commissioner in Singapore. Moreover, the British Resident himself was an 
officer of the Malayan Civil Service as also the other European officers in the State.18
The main problem faced by the British Residents in the early years was not 
only Brunei's meagre resources, but the fact that the revenue raised from cession 
monies on the territories ceded to the Sarawak Government and the British North 
Borneo (Chartered) Company, from payments of revenue farms, from trade monopolies 
and from rights of taxation given out mainly to the Chinese, went directly to the 
Sultan and his Ministers as personal income. In order to create a steady source of 
State revenue the British relieved the Sultan and his Ministers of the rights of taxation, 
established a national treasury and reformed the system of taxation. A large loan was 
obtained from the Federated Malay States to enable the Brunei Government to buy up 
the rights of taxation and to redeem the mortgaged cession monies and monopolies. 
The State was divided into five districts (later reduced to four) and in each district a 
Malay officer, styled Magistrate, was appointed to collect customs duties and poll-tax. 
For the same purpose each district was further divided into Mukims and wards and 
each were placed under the charge of a Penghulu and Ketua Kampong, respectively.
In addition to these measures a land reform legislation was introduced in 1909 
whereby all land not held under title became state land which could be disposed by 
the Government. As a result a number of large firms started rubber plantations which 
contributed to the revenue of the State. However it was not until the early 1930s that 
the State revenue reached a surplus level and the debt owed to the Federated Malay 
States was repaid. This was attributed to the revenue generated from the export of oil
18The British Administration in Brunei in the early years was very small. In 1941, 
for example, the number of the European officers including the British Resident was 
only seven. See A.V.M.Horton, op.cit., p. 304.
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found in Seria in the western part of the State in 1929 by the British Malayan 
Petroleum Company. In 1932 the export of oil began when crude oil was piped to 
Lutong in Miri (Sarawak) for refining, and by 1935 Brunei became the third largest 
producer of oil in the British Commonwealth.
As the revenues of the State improved, the Government was able to provide 
better social and welfare services. The Health Department created in 1929 was 
expanded resulting in great improvement in the health of the populace. The first 
census taken in 1911 revealed that the total population of Brunei was
Table 1: Brunei: Revenue per head, 1911-1960
Year Population Total Revenue 
(in $ Straits)
Revenue Per Head 
(in $ Straits)
1911 21,718 109,430 5.04
1921 25,454 165,890 6.49
1931 30,135 342,011 11.35
1947 40,657 4,389,974 107.94
1960 83,877 129,568,762 1,544.75
Source: Compiled from Brunei A nnual Reports
21,718; by 1947 the population had increased to 40,657 and by 1960 to 83,877.19 In 
1927 it was recorded that almost 42 per cent of babies bom in the Brunei Town failed 
to survive their first year and by 1947-8 the rate had declined to less than 14 per 
cent.20 Apart from the great improvement in health the increase in population was also
19L.W.Jones, Report on the Census o f  Population taken on 10 August 1960, 
Kuching, Government of Sarawak, nd., p. 21.
20A.V.M.Horton, op.cit., pp. 286-287.
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attributed to an increase in the number of immigrants, particularly the Chinese who 
worked in the oil industry. In 1911 the Chinese only made up 3.1 per cent of the 
population, by 1947 they had increased to 20.4 per cent and by 1960 to 26 per cent.21
Table 2. Brunei: Population bv Ethnic Grouping 1911-1960
GROUP 1911 1947 1960
Malays 11,554 16,748 45,135*
Kedayans 4,931 6,732
Dusuns 1,069 2,759
Belaits 1,097 716
Tutongs 1,667 2,431
Ibans nil 1,332
Chinese 736 8,313 21,795
Others** 101 1,353 16,947
TOTAL 21,718 40,657 83,877
Note: * "Malays and other indigenous".
** Indians, Europeans and others. 
Sources: Brunei censuss 1911, 1947 and 1960.
During the period before the discovery of oil little provision for education was 
made. Formal education began in 1912 when the first Malay vernacular school was 
built in the Brunei Town. In 1930 there were only 13 such schools with 688 pupils 
but by 1940 the number of schools increased to 23 with 1,776 pupils.22 The
2IL.W.Jones, op.cit., pp. 21 and 28.
22For an account of the development of education in Brunei see: Matassin Haji 
Jibah, "Perkembangan Persekolahan Melayu di Brunei dalam Pentadbiran Sistem 
Residen 1906-1959", Brunei Museum Journal, Volume 5, 1983, pp. 1-26; and Haji 
Mohammed Noor bin Chuchu, "The Development of Education in Brunei 
Darussalam", Jum al Pendidikan, Volume 1, 1990, pp. 37-66.
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curriculum of the schools was based on that of the Malay vernacular schools in the 
Malay States, which included literacy in both Jawi and Romanized scripts, 
composition, arithmetic, geography, history, hygiene, drawing and physical exercise. 
A British Resident wrote in the Brunei Annual Report in 1918 that
"these [vernacular schools] do not aim at providing a high standard of 
education. They do, however, provide the children with elementary training and 
also teach them discipline, punctuality and personal cleanliness; qualities in 
which their parents are markedly lacking".23 
The aim of the education was reemphasised by another British Resident in 1930: 
"Nothing is taught which might tend to drive Malays from their fishing and 
agricultural pursuits".24 Understandably, there was little enthusiasm among parents to 
send their children to school. In fact it was for this reason that the Government 
passed legislation in 1929 making it compulsory for those living within two miles of 
the Brunei Town to send their boys between the ages of 7 and 14 to school.25 
However it was only ten years later that the law was enforced in other towns.26
23Brunei Annual Report, 1918, p. 4.
24Ibid., 1930, p. 20. Writing on vernacular education in 1920 William Maxwell 
believed that "the general policy of the FMS Government was ...to make the son of 
the fisherman or peasant a more intelligent fisherman or peasant than his father had 
been". See Philip Lok Fok Seng, The Malay States 1874-1895: Political Change and 
Social Policy, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 173.
25Brunei Annual Report, 1929, p.20.
26Ibid., 1939, p. 24.
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Table 3. Brunei: Expansion of Education 1915-1960
YEAR NUM. OF 
SCHOOLS
NUM. OF 
PUPILS
1912 01 40
1930 13 688
1940 23 1,776
1950 28 2,255
1960 52 7,164
Source: Compiled from Brunei Annual Reports
Besides the Malay vernacular schools there were also Chinese vernacular 
schools and English primary schools run privately. The first English school was built 
in Kuala Belait in 1932 and two more were built by 1941, one of them in Brunei 
Town. Since the schools were run by Christian Missionaries and charged fees the 
Malays were less attracted to send their children to these schools. From 1919 the 
Government sent two pupils each year to Labuan for English education. However the 
practice was discontinued after the war. Except briefly, when some were sent to 
Kuching (from 1951 to 1952), the State pupils had no English education until the first 
Government English school opened its door in 1953. In 1931 the younger brother of 
the Sultan and two sons of the Pengiran Pemanca were sent to the Malay College at 
Kuala Kangsar in Malaya. In fact they were the first members of the Brunei royal 
household sent to ordinary schools. From 1930 the Government also sent two pupils 
selected from those who had completed their Standard Seven in their vernacular 
schools each year to Sultan Idris Teachers' College (SITC) at Tanjong Malim in 
Malaya. By 1941 there were twelve teachers who had received training and by 1953 
there were 58. As will be seen, this group of trained teachers, although small, played
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an important role in nurturing Malay nationalism in Brunei. In 1938 they formed an 
association called the Persatuan Guru-Guru Melayu Brunei (PGGMB) or the Malay 
Teachers' Association. They also played an important role in the formation of 
Kesatuan Melayu Brunei (KMB) or the Brunei Malay Association in the following 
year. Although both PGGMB and KMB were socio-cultural in their aims and 
objectives they provided the foundation for political associations after the war.
The economic and social progress under the British administration was abruptly 
halted by the Japanese invasion of the State on 16 December 1941. The British 
administrators including the British Resident were interned in Kuching when they 
refused to serve under the Japanese administration. The Japanese retained the existing 
administrative structure and a handful of local officers were asked to continue in their 
posts under the Japanese Military officers. The Sultan and his traditional Ministers 
remained in their positions although they had no more powers than they had during 
the British Residency. There was also no evidence that the State Council ever met 
during the Occupation. Throughout the Occupation the Japanese administration was 
fully geared towards the war efforts. Although the Japanese were able to resume some 
production at the oil wells in Seria, which had been damaged by the British under 
their "Oil Denial Scheme" before the arrival of the Japanese, the war demands 
prevented the revenue being spent on social and economic developments in the State. 
However it was not until towards the end of the war, when the Allied Forces 
blockaded the surrounding sea, that the people experienced hardship when the import 
of food and basic materials were affected. The Japanese were relatively benevolent 
particularly towards the Malays. Many of the young men, who included the future 
leaders of the State, were recruited into the propaganda organs of the Japanese. A few
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were sent abroad for higher education. For instance, Sheikh Azahari bin Sheikh 
Mahmud was sent to Bogor in Indonesia to study veterinary surgery and Pengiran 
Yusuf bin Pengiran Abdul Rahim to Hiroshima to study Japanese Language and 
Education. Several others were sent to military training camps in various parts of 
Borneo for anti Western indoctrination. But Japanese rule itself came to an end with 
the surrender o f August 1945, allowing the British to return.
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CHAPTER 1
PLANS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: 1944 - 1948
Following the Japanese invasion of Brunei and other British colonial 
possessions in Southeast Asia in 1941-1942 the British were determined to regain their 
lost territories and re-establish their pre-war position. However, new forces unleashed 
by the war had necessitated reappraisal of their pre-war colonial policy in the region. 
The first part of this chapter thus examines the formulation of British colonial policy 
for post-war constitutional and administrative reforms undertaken during the wartime 
in regard to the Borneo territories of Brunei, Labuan, North Borneo and Sarawak. 
This is followed by an examination of the implementation of the plans after the 
Japanese surrendered in 1945.
1.1 British Wartime Policy and Planning January 1944 - June 1945
After Singapore, the heart of the British power in Southeast Asia, fell to the 
Japanese on 15 February 1942, officials in the Colonial Office began formulating a 
policy for post-war constitutional and administrative changes in Malaya and the 
Borneo territories.' There were two factors which greatly influenced British policy
'For discussions on the origins of the British Wartime policy see A.J. Stockwell, 
British Policy and Malay Politics During the Malayan Union Experiment 1942-1948, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society Monograph No. 8, 1979 
and Albert Lau, The Malayan Union Controversy, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 
1991.
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makers in London: first, the British public were critical of British pre-war colonial 
policy in the region which was partly blamed for their defeat by the Japanese, and 
second, the Americans, who saw the Europeans colonies and dependencies as obstacles 
to their political and economic interests in the area, believed that the European 
colonies should be liberated and given opportunities for self-determination in the spirit 
o f the Atlantic Charter of August 1941.2
On 6 January 1944 the British War Cabinet appointed a committee from among 
its members to consider a memorandum submitted by the Secretary of States for the 
Colonies on the question of the constitutional policies to be followed in Malaya and 
in the Borneo territories on their liberation from the Japanese, and to make 
recommendations for post-war constitutional and administrative changes.3 It had been 
decided that the re-establishment of the administrative machinery in the territories was 
to be brought about through a transitional military government, thus necessitating a 
directive for military planners to enable them to conform with civil policy and 
facilitate the introduction of constitutional changes.4 In its first meeting on 22 March 
1944 the Committee approved the general lines of the policy laid out in the Colonial
2For discussion on American’s policy on colonies during the Second World War 
see Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay 1941-1945: The United States and the 
Decolonisation o f  the British Empire, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979.
3The State Secretary for the Colonies' memorandum is on CAB 98/41,
CMB (44) 3.
4CO 825/35/2/55104/1/1943, Aide Memoir, 11 February 1943.
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Secretary's memorandum.5 In regard to the Borneo territories the Committee 
concluded that
"the restoration of the pre-war constitutional and administrative systems in the 
four territories will be undesirable in the interests of security and of our 
declared purpose of promoting social, economic and political progress in 
Colonial territories".6
In order to achieve these purposes it recommended that the administration of the 
British North Borneo (Chartered) Company, established in 1881, should be terminated, 
and the administration assumed by the British Government after payment of 
compensation to the Company. The British Settlement of Labuan was to be 
incorporated in the new Administration for North Borneo. The Committee also 
recommended that the Sultan of Brunei and the Rajah of Sarawak be invited to 
conclude new treaties with the British Government at the earliest opportunity. 
According to the treaty the British Monarch would assume full jurisdiction in the 
States enabling the British Monarch to legislate for these territories under the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act. The new treaty was intended to secure the acceptance by the Rajah 
of Sarawak of a resident British Adviser whose advice must be sought and acted upon 
in all substantial matters of policy and administration.7 The Secretary of State did not 
anticipate that either the Rajah of Sarawak or the Sultan of Brunei would raise any
5CAB 98/41, C.M.B. (44), Minutes of the first meeting of War Cabinet 
Committee on Malaya and Borneo, 22 March 1944.
6CAB 98/41, CMB (44) 258, Report of the Committee on Policy in Regard to 
Malaya and Borneo, 18 May 1944.
1Ibid.
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difficulties over the cession of jurisdiction to the British Monarch.8 The Committee 
also recommended that
"the purpose of political progress requires also that self-government in Brunei 
and Sarawak should not merely develop towards systems of autocratic rule but 
should provide for a growing participantion in the Government by people of 
all communities in each territory".9
The Committee did not envisage a closer union of the Borneo territories. It 
believed that the basis for closer union between the Borneo territories, at that stage, 
hardly existed because the territories were still comparatively undeveloped and they 
had few racial or other affinities. Nevertheless it envisaged continuity of policy and 
administrative action could be assured from the outset under the direction of the 
Governor-General at Singapore, whose appointment it recommended.10 The officer 
concerned would be a high British Authority for the whole area - Malaya and the 
Borneo territories - without any direct administrative functions within any of the 
territories concerned, but with direct supervisory control over the chief officers of all 
those territories. He would in any event have particular duties in securing co­
ordination on the civil side of all measures relating to the defence of the area.11 In 
effect, the appointment of the Governor-General was a substitution for a constitutional
8CAB 98/41, C.M.B. (44), Minutes of the first meeting of War Cabinet 
Committee on Malaya and Borneo, 22 March 1944.
9CAB 98/41, CMB (44) 258, Report of the Committee on Policy in Regard to 
Malaya and Borneo, 18 May 1944.
]0Ibid.
” CAB 98/41, CMB (44) 3, Future Constitutional Policy for British Colonial 
Territories in Southeast Asia - Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 14 January 1944.
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union of Malaya and the Borneo territories with Singapore as the centre which was 
mooted in the Summer of 194212 but which was later found impracticable because the 
territories had "little direct intercommunication and trade between each other and they 
are racially disunited". Instead was recommended for the establishment of the 
Malayan Union, comprising all the Malay States and the British Settlements of Penang 
and Malacca; a separate Crown Colony of Singapore; and the retention of Borneo 
territories as a separated entities.13 However, in its recommendation in May 1944 the 
Cabinet Committee declared that "the promotion of closer union [of the Borneo 
territories] should be a continuing matter of our policy".14
On 31 May 1944 the British War Cabinet approved, provisionally, the 
Committee's recommendations on future policy for Malaya and the Borneo territories 
and agreed that the Secretary of State, with the understanding that no publicity for the 
policies was involved, would issue directives to British officials planning for Civil 
Administration in Malaya and the Borneo territories after liberation; to open 
confidential discussions with the Court of Directors of the British North Borneo 
(Chartered) Company with a view to the transfer of sovereign rights of North Borneo 
to the British Government, and with the Rajah of Sarawak, who was residing in
12CO 825/35/55104/1942, A Post-War Settlement in the Far East: Need for a 
define Policy, September 1942.
l3CO 825/35/55104/1/1943, item 2, Memorandum on plans for constitutional 
reconstruction in the Far East, 20 March 1943.
14CAB 98/41, W.P. (44) 258, Policy in regard to Malaya and Borneo - Report by 
the Committee, 18 May 1944.
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Britain, for a new Agreement on the lines proposed in the recommendations of the 
Cabinet Committee.15
Meanwhile, it had been decided that the Borneo territories were not to be 
brought under the British Southeast Asia Command but under the American Southwest 
Pacific Command Area. As a result in July 1943 a Combined Civil Affairs Committee 
was set up in Washington to draw up agreement on the civil administration after the 
liberation of the territories from the Japanese. In its Charter, the Anglo-American 
Committee stated that
"when an enemy-occupied territory of the United States, the United Kingdom 
or one of the Dominions is to be recovered as the result of an operation 
combined or otherwise the military directive to be given to the Force 
Commander concerned will include policies to be followed in the handling of 
Civil Affairs as formulated by the government which exercised authority over 
the territory before the enemy occupation".16 
Thus, this meant that in Brunei the directive should come from the British Residency; 
in Sarawak from the Brooke Raj and in North Borneo form the Chartered Company 
Directorate. Following this in May - July 1944 a Memorandum on policy in Borneo 
was prepared jointly by the Colonial Office and the War Office and transmitted to 
Washington, conveying in general terms that the administration of the Borneo 
territories should be entrusted to a Civil Affairs staff mainly comprising British 
officers; that the Borneo Planning group had been assembled in London to prepare for
15CO 825/43/55104/15/1944, W.M. (44) 70th. Conclusions, Extract from a Meeting 
of the War Cabinet held on 31 May 1931.
l6Quoted from F.S.V.Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East
1943-46, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956, p. 146.
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such an administration; and that the Military directives to the Force Commanders 
concerned should include instructions on those lines. Further detailed statement of 
policy was sent to Washington in February - March 1945 emphasising that
"the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, British Borneo, should also give such advice 
as may be necessary concerning His Majesty's Government's long-term plans 
for reconstruction, in order that, as far as possible, the measures of the military 
administration may be co-ordinate therewith. He should at the discretion of 
the Allied-Commander-in-Chief ...be authorised to communicate direct with 
London on questions which do not affect the Allied Commander-in-Chiefs 
responsibilities for the military administration of British Borneo".17 
Despite the problems of authority on Civil Affairs, planning for civil 
administration in the Borneo territories continued under the Borneo Planning Unit 
(BPU) established by the Colonial Office in October 1943. The BPU was headed by 
its Chief Planner and Chief Civil Affairs Officer, C.F.C.Macaskie, a former Chief 
Justice and deputy Governor of North Borneo. He was among a handful of officials 
from the Borneo territories who had escaped internment by the Japanese.18 Among 
the tasks of the BPU were preparing a list of civil personnel to fill essential posts, and 
preparing schedules of relief supplies required until normal trade could be restored, 
and preparing a Borneo Manual during the period of the Military administration.19
]1Ibid.
]*Ibid., p. 145. The BPU was started with only five planners but towards the end 
of 1944 the total number of the planners had risen to fourteen.
19CO 865/8, item 2, Borneo Planning Unit.
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Under the BPU's plan, Sarawak, Brunei, Labuan, and North Borneo were to be 
brought under a single administrative unit called "British Borneo".20
Meanwhile confidential discussions between Colonial Office officials and 
representatives of governments of North Borneo and Sarawak began as soon as the 
Cabinet approved the long term policy on the future of the territories at the end of 
May 1944. The discussions with the Court of Directors of the North Borneo Company 
were slow because the Secretary of State was unable to decide on the financial terms 
demanded by the Court of Directors as he was precluded by the Cabinet directive from 
discussing the financial commitments with the Company. In December 1944 the 
Secretary of State hinted that unless some settlement was reached with the Company 
before the liberation of the territory, they (British Government) might have to annex 
the territory.21 The Sarawak Rajah on the other hand had shown great reluctance to 
enter discussions, and preferred to postpone the discussions until after liberation when 
the people of Sarawak could be consulted.22
Since the Sultan of Brunei was in the hands of the Japanese, no negotiations 
could take place. In November 1944 Macaskie suggested that preparation for him to 
negotiate the new treaty with the Sultan of Brunei should be considered.23 However, 
the Colonial Office felt that it was still "a little early to consider" the matter.
20CO 825/43/8/55104/10/1944, item 9, "Memorandum on the Borneo Planning 
Unit" by Macaskie, 24 May 1944, an enclosure in minute by Paskin, 26 May 1944.
21 CAB/41, C.M.B. (44) 2nd. Minutes of Second Meeting of the War Cabinet 
Committee on Malaya and Borneo held on 19 December 1944.
22CO 825/42/2/55104/1945, C.M.B. (45) 27th. Conclusions, Extract from 
Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held on 3 September 1945.
23CO 825/42/55104/3/5/1944, Minute by Macaskie to Bourdillion, 20 November 
1944.
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Moreover it did not "visualize it as one of the functions o f the Chief Civil Affairs 
Officer to conclude a new treaty with the Sultan".24 Instead it contemplated a similar 
procedure to the case of the Rulers in Malaya i.e. a special emissary o f the Secretary 
of State to negotiate the new treaties. Macaskie also recommended, in December 
1944, that North Borneo and the Fifth Division of Sarawak should be returned to 
Brunei and the new unit incorporated within the proposed Malayan Union.25 However, 
the Colonial Office was not enthusiastic about the idea which was concluded as "too 
complicated to pursue at the moment especially in view of the present uncertainty as 
to the future of our negotiations with the British North Borneo (Chartered) 
Company".26
Towards the end of 1944, however, it began to appear that the re-occupation 
o f the Borneo territories would be effected by the Australian army under the general 
control of the American Commander-in-Chief of the South West Pacific. Thus it was 
decided that the BPU should be materialised in preparation for an early departure to 
Australia.27 Thus in February 1945 the 50th Civil Affairs Unit (50 CAU) of the British 
army was created. At the same time an advance party left for Australia but Brigadier 
Macaskie and the main body of the planning unit did not leave until March.28
24CO 825/42/55104/3/5, item 2. Paskin to Macaskie, 7 December 1944.
25CO 825/42/55104/3/1943-1944, item 37, Macaskie to Wodeman, 4 December
1944.
26CO 825/42/55104/3/1944, item 38, Paskin to Macaskie, 12 January 1945.
27CO 825/43/55104/10, item 33, Note of Meeting held at the Colonial Office on 
21 November 1944.
28F.S.V.Donnison, op.cit., pp. 148-149.
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Meanwhile the Research and Civil Affairs Department of the Australian army 
established its own planning unit called the British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit 
(BBCAU). In fact the Department would have much preferred that the BBCAU be 
entirely Australian and doubted whether a British unit would fit in with the Australian 
command.29 However, as the date for liberation of the Borneo territories approached 
officers of the 50 CAU were individually posted to the BBCAU, and the former acted 
as a holding centre. In June the two units were placed under the command of 
Brigadier Macaskie, who himself came under the control of the Australian Land 
Headquarters through the Department of Research and Civil Affairs.30
1.2 The Military Administration June 1945 - July 1946
The liberation of Brunei was undertaken by the Ninth Australian Division, 
under the Allied Operation known as '’Oboe Six" which was aimed at securing the 
Brunei Bay area in order to permit the establishment of an advanced fleet base for the 
invasion of Japan and to protect existing oil and rubber resources.31 The Australian 
army landed simultaneously on Labuan Island and on the mainland north of Brunei 
Town on 10 June 1945. Unlike in Labuan, where the Japanese garrison of about five 
hundred fought "gallantly", the Australians did not meet any opposition in Brunei
29RHO, M ss  Pac. s71, (File 8 ) ,  item 8 , Macaskie Papers, "Notes for an 
Autobiography of a North Borneo Career", 20 September 1964, p .130.
30F.V.S.Donnison, op.cit., p. 178.
3lWO 203/2690, Lt. Gen. Sir L.J. Morshead, "First Australian Corps: Report on 
Operations during the Borneo Campaign, 1 May to August 1945".
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because most of the Japanese soldiers had already fled into the interior; and in just 
over a week the Australians were able to secure the whole State.32
On the same day the commander of the Australian army, acting under the 
authority vested in him by General MacArthur, issued a proclamation to establish 
Martial Law in which the commander assumed full jurisdiction over all persons and 
property throughout the British Borneo.33 Unlike in Burma, Malaya and Hong Kong 
where such proclamation established Military Administrations, in the British Borneo 
it established a state of Martial Law. This was due to decision had not been reached 
whether to bring the Borneo territories within Colonial Office responsibility.34
Brigadier Macaskie arrived in Labuan on 22 July to take charge as the Chief 
Civil Affairs Officer for the British Borneo but found that he was "allowed little say 
in controlling the operations of the unit"; he was subordinated to the Director of 
Research and Civil Affairs at the Australian army Headquarters in Melbourne.35 Each 
Civil Affairs establishment in a liberated areas was under the control of the local 
commanders.36 Following the Japanese Emperor's order for a general surrender on 15 
August 1945, Macaskie urged the formation of Military Administration for British 
Borneo.37 However the Australians were not enthusiastic about the idea which
32Macaskie, "Notes for an Autobiography ...", p. 131.
33Sarawak Museum, Box MM, Military Administration British Borneo, 
Proclamation N o.l, 10 June 1945.
34F.S.V.Donnison, op.,cit., p.181.
35Ibid., p. 182.
36Ibid, p. 184.
37RHO M ss  Pac s71, File 4, Brigadier Macaskie to General Wootten, 17 August
1945. Although the main Japanese forces in British Borneo surrendered to the 
Australian army on 10 September 1945, the Japanese recapitulation did not complete
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involved the severance of the Civil Affairs staff from the military headquarters and the 
establishment of a separate Civil Affairs chain of responsibility. As a compromise, 
on 22 August, the Australians agreed to bring all the Civil Affairs Detachments under 
the direct control of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Macaskie, who had established 
his headquarters at Labuan. However Macaskie still received orders from the 
Australian army Headquarters in Melbourne.
For administrative purposes British Borneo was divided into six administrative 
divisions: Brunei - Labuan Division comprised Brunei, Labuan, Limbang and Lawas 
districts.38 The immediate tasks of the Civil Affairs officers were to maintain law and 
order and to distribute relief supplies particularly food and clothing to the population 
which was "coming back into the town in thousands" on the liberation of the capital.39 
The Brunei Annual Report of 1946 described the condition of the population as being 
"in a shocking state of health", adding that "it can be no exaggeration to state that if 
the landing had not taken place when it did, thousands of people would have lost their 
lives through starvation and disease".40 Effectively this was a result o f blockading of 
the coast by the Allied Navy towards the end of the war which caused disruption of 
the Japanese shipping and trade; and Brunei, which depended for half of its rice on 
import, suffered.41
until 8 November when the Fujino Force gave up its resistance. See: F.S.V.Donnison, 
op. cit., p. 180.
38F.S.V.Donnison, op.,cit., p. 184.
39T.S.Monks, Brunei Days, Sussex, The Book Guild Ltd., 1992, p. 60.
40Brunei Annual Report, p. 8.
4'Towards the end of their rule in Brunei the Japanese forced farmers to surrender 
part of their harvests to them. As a result many people turned to sago for food.
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Following the unexpected surrender of the Japanese, the Labour Government 
which came to power in August 1945 proceeded with the plans drawn up by the 
Coalition Government it replaced. The new Government stressed:
"We do not want to sweep away all the old institutions in Malaya and Borneo 
(many of them were excellent), but we shall have missed a unique and historic 
opportunity if we fail to remove those barriers to political progress which 
undoubtedly existed".42 
On 3 September the new British Cabinet gave its final approval to the Malaya and 
Borneo territories policy provisionally approved by the War Cabinet on 31 May 1944. 
The integration of the British Settlement of Labuan and North Borneo, however, 
depended on the successful conclusion of the Colonial Office negotiations with the 
North Borneo (Chartered) Company in regard to the direct assumption of the 
administration in the State by the British Government. As regards Sarawak, the 
Cabinet, in view of the Rajah's "great reluctance to enter into discussions", invited the 
Colonial Secretary to consider "whether it would not be possible to bring to an end 
the rule of the Rajah of Sarawak".43
Unlike the changes of North Borneo and Sarawak, the Secretary of State 
thought that the proposed future changes in the status of Brunei were "comparatively
Interviews with various people in Brunei, January - May 1993.
42CO 825/42/2/55104, item 9, Draft Introductory Remarks which the Secretary of 
State might make, in explaining to the Cabinet the sense and purpose of his paper on 
policy in regard to Malaya and Borneo, ?late August 1945.
43CO 825/42/2/55104, item 13, Extract from Conclusions of a Cabinet Meeting 
held on 3 September 1945.
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minor importance", and presented "no difficulties".44 Probably it was for this reason 
that the Colonial Office had not given much thought on the steps which would be 
necessary in obtaining full jurisdiction from the Sultan of Brunei; but it contemplated 
the same procedure which had been planned for the Malay States: Sir Harold 
MacMichael, who had been appointed by the Cabinet to obtain new treaties with 
Malay Rulers, was to conclude a new treaty with the Sultan of Brunei after he had 
finished his work in the Malay Peninsula.45 A draft treaty had been prepared for the 
occasion.46
Moreover, when the Australian army arrived in Brunei in June, the Sultan, who 
had taken refuge in a remote village near the Sarawak border during the Allied 
bombing of Brunei Town, was reported "only too relieved to see the British return and 
there was no question of collaboration; on the contrary, His Highness and family 
detested the Japanese".47 In fact like his subjects the Sultan was under investigation 
for collaboration with the Japanese. If it was proved that he had been a collaborator, 
he was to be removed to Labuan.48 Not long after the arrival of the Australians the
44CO 825/42/55104, Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
on policy in regard to Malaya and Borneo, ?August 1945.
45CO 825/42/2/55104, item 13, Extract from Conclusions of a Cabinet Meeting 
held on 3 September 1945; ibid., Minute by A.T.Bordivile, 9 September 1945.
46CO 825/42/55104/3/5, item 3, Draft Agreement with the Sultan o f Brunei 
prepared by Hastings, n.d.
47RHO M ss Pac s71 (File 2) Kay to Macaskie, 20 June 1945. CO 531/31 (File 
14, sub-file 7), top secret, BS/42, "Special instructions regarding the Sultan o f Brunei" 
was destroyed under statute.
48WO 203/5293, item 1, Directive from SACSEA to ALFSEA, 21 July 1945. See 
also Appendix A of CO 855/56, British Borneo Military Administration Gazette, 1 
September 1945, Proclamation No. 1.
41
Sultan wrote to Captain T.S.Monks, the BBCAU's District Officer and Magistrate for 
Brunei, "expressing his continued loyalty to the British Crown, asking that these 
sentiments be passed on to the British Government in London". This, at least, as 
Captain Monk commented, "seemed to augur well for establishment o f good relations 
with the Sultan".49 Consequently, the proposed agreement with the Sultan, ceding 
jurisdiction to the British Monarch, became less urgent. The Colonial Office decided 
that action on the matter should be deferred until the British South-East Asia 
Command under Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten took control o f British Borneo from 
the Australian army.50 In fact the transfer of command formally took place on 10 
January 1946. By that time, however, Sir Harold MacMichael, had completed his 
mission to "re-negotiate' the treaties with the Malay Sultans and had been sent on 
another constitutional assignment to Malta.51 Since there were no other arrangements 
planned the renegotiation of the new treaty with the Sultan o f Brunei had to be 
postponed.
When the Australian Forces were withdrawn from British Borneo, the civil 
affairs administration was taken over by the British 50 CAU, now known as the 
British Military Administration (BMA). The Australian BBCAU was dissolved but 
due to great shortage of manpower many of its members volunteered to stay on until 
the administration of British Borneo was handed over to Civil Government.52 As
49T.S.Monks, op.cit., p. 95.
50CO 825/43/19/55104/20/1945, item 16: "Constitutional Documents required for 
re-establishments of Civil Governments in the Far Eastern Colonies", 20 October 1945.
51WO 203/4471A, Colonial Office to MacMichael, 17 December 1945.
52WO 203/5535, War Office to SACSEA, 10 January 1946; ibid., War Office to 
SACSEA, 19 December 1945; and War Office to SACSEA, 25 March 1946.
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under the BBCAU the Borneo territories were treated as a single entity (with Labuan 
remaining as its centre) but the divisions were regrouped into North Borneo Area and 
Sarawak Area with four divisions each. The Brunei - Labuan Division was under the 
North Borneo Area.53 Brigadier Macaskie was reappointed as the Chief Civil Affairs 
Officer of the BMA. His main tasks were to maintain law and order among the civil 
population, restore communications, public utilities and services and essential 
industries, organise the distribution of goods and advise and act on behalf of the local 
Commanders in their dealings with the civil population. He was also instructed to 
take necessary steps to establish as far as possible the essential framework of the 
administration within the liberated territories and lay the foundation o f future civil 
government.54
On 10 December 1945 the War Office told Lord Mounbatten the responsibility 
for the Civil administrations in the four territories in British Borneo should be 
assumed by the Colonial Office as soon as possible and to this end a target date of 1 
March 1946 for planning purposes had been agreed with the Colonial Office.55 
Meanwhile the negotiations between the Colonial Office and Vyner Brooke of 
Sarawak had resulted in an unexpected unilateral decision by the Rajah to cede 
Sarawak to the British Crown. The Rajah planned to return to Sarawak briefly at the 
end of March to secure agreement from the people in the territory and to confirm the
53F.S.V.Donnison, op. cit., p. 187.
54WO 203/5535, War Office to SACSEA, 10 December 1945.
55Ibid.
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cession was in accordance with their wishes.56 However, the negotiations with the 
Chartered Company for the transfer of sovereignty of North Borneo to the British 
Crown had not yet produced a breakthrough. The financial settlement remained the 
sticking point. The British Cabinet had ruled that British North Borneo must not be 
handed back to the Chartered Company and Civil Government could not be 
established until agreement had been reached.57 As the British Government wanted 
the hand over of all administrations in British Borneo to Civil Governments to take 
place at the same time, the 1 March target had to be postponed again.58 Subsequently 
the revision of Treaty with the Sultan of Brunei, which was considered not urgent, was 
deferred again, this time until after restoration of Civil Government in the State.59
By July 1946 all the four Borneo territories were restored to civil government. 
On 15 July a new Colonial Administration was established in Sarawak after Rajah 
Vyner Brooke formally ceded his authority to the British Crown. The negotiations 
between the Colonial Office and the Chartered Company ended with the abolition of 
the British North Borneo (Chartered) Company's Government and as in Sarawak a 
Colonial Administration was established on 15 July. On the same day Labuan was 
transferred to civil government and incorporated into the new colony. As regards 
Brunei, the Colonial Office decided the pre-war constitution with a British Resident
56WO 203/5535, War Office to British Military Administration (British Borneo), 
5 February 1946; ibid, War Office to SACSEA, 16 March 1946. For discussions on 
the cession of Sarawak to the British Crown see in R.H.W.Reece, The Name o f  
Brooke: The End o f  White Rajah Rule in Sarawak, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University 
Press, 1982.
57WO 203/5535, War Office to SACSEA, 16 March 1946.
58WO 203/5535, War Office to SACSEA, 25 March 1946.
59WO 203/5535, item 35, War Office to SACSEA, 1 March 1946.
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acting as adviser to the Sultan and his State Council was to be restored pending a new 
treaty with the Sultan.60 The Colonial Office had found "no suitable officer" to 
negotiate the new treaty with the Sultan and the matter had to be deferred again, this 
time until such time as the Governor-General of Malaya, Singapore and Borneo had 
taken office and could advise upon the question and also consider the possibility of 
the union of Brunei with the other British Borneo territories.61 In a simple ceremony 
held on 6 July 1946 Brigadier Macaskie read out the proclamation terminating the 
BMA in Brunei. At the same ceremony the Sultan affirmed his loyalty to the British 
Crown and pledged his full co-operation to the new British Resident, W.J.Peel, an 
officer in the Malayan Civil Service.62 On the same day the Governor-General, 
Malcolm MacDonald, assumed the post of the acting High Commissioner for Brunei. 
Before we proceed to examine MacDonald’s consideration on the future status of 
Brunei, we shall consider the political developments in the State.
1.3 Barisan Pemuda: "Brunei for Bruneis"
The return to civilian administration had slowly reduced tensions between the 
Brunei Malays and the Chinese population which had fomented during the Military 
Administration. In its endeavour to administer relief work and to bring the State back 
on its own feet again the Military Administration recruited some local civilians from
60WO 203/365, BMA (BB) to SACSEA, 11 July 1946.
61See: CO 537/2244, item 23, "Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
Colonies on the Future of Brunei", 24 December 1947.
62CO 537/1613, item 214A, Sultan to King, 6 July 1946.
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the Chinese population because they spoke English and were less suspected as 
Japanese collaborators. The Brunei Malays, who had been treated more favourably 
than the Chinese by the Japanese, were placed under investigation for collaboration 
and many were suspended from their jobs pending the outcome of the investigations. 
It has been suggested that the Chinese supplied names to the Military officers 
conducting the investigations in retaliation against the Malays.63 Fired by rumours that 
China would move to incorporate the territories of Nan Yang (South Seas), including 
the whole of Borneo, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, into its territory, the Chinese 
in Brunei overtly exhibited their enthusiasm by flying Chinese flags in their premises 
and spreading rumours that the Chinese troops would soon arrive in Brunei to bring 
the State under the Chinese rule.64
The Military Administration's pro-Chinese policy and the Chinese "arrogant 
behaviour" caused resentment among the Malays. The tensions between the Malays 
and the Chinese culminated in a clash between the two communities in front of the 
Brunei Town Fish Market on 24 March 1946.65 A witness said that the fight started 
after a Chinese customer and a Malay fish monger argued over the price of a fish.66 
However the fighting was quickly brought under control by the military police.
63Interviews with: Salleh bin Masri, March 1993; Marsal bin Maun, April 1993; 
Jamil bin Omar, April 1993.
64Ibid. The 1947 Census puts the total number o f Chinese in Brunei as 8,313 out 
of the total number of population of 40, 675. See L.W.Jones, Report on the Census 
o f  Population taken on 10 August 1960, Kuching, Government Printer, 1961, p. 28. 
Effects of the capitulation of the Japanese on the rise of Chinese nationalism in 
Sarawak see R.H.W.Reece, op.cit., pp. 158-160.
65Pehin Haji Jamil Al-Sufri, Liku-Liku Perjuangan Pencapaian Kemerdekaan
Negara Brunei Darussalam, Brunei, Pusat Sejarah, 1992, p.6.
66Interview with Pehin Begawan Khatib Haji Moksin bin Othman, March 1993.
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Although there were no fatalities the news of the fighting quickly spread to the Malay 
villages nearby. Several hundred Malays from Kampong Ayer (Water Village) on the 
banks opposite the Brunei River got into their boats and were heading to "crush” the 
Chinese in Brunei Town. Meanwhile, the Chinese assembled their men in readiness 
to put up a fight. However the clash was averted by the British soldiers who forced 
the Malays to turn back and immediately imposed a twelve hour-curfew. Three Malay 
youths were arrested and detained briefly for leading the fight.67
Following the Fish Market Incident the Malays began to realise that unless they 
were united and spoke with one voice their political influence would soon be lost to 
the Chinese who were educationally and economically more advanced. Hence on 12 
April 1946 a group of young Malays secretly assembled in a house belonging to 
Ya'akob bin Othman at Kampong Sungai Kedayan and decided to form an association 
called Barisan Pemuda (Youth Front) or popularly known as Barip. Because the 
Military Administration prohibited assembly of people or formation of an association 
the Barisan Pemuda was not registered until the return of the civil government in July. 
Among the office bearers elected were: Abdullah bin Jaafar (President); Pengiran 
Yusuf bin Pengiran Abdul Rahim (Vice President); Jamil bin Omar (Secretary- 
General); Hidup bin Awang Besar; Yassin Affandi bin Abdul Rahman; and Hashim 
bin Tahir.68
The members of Barisan Pemuda mainly consisted of young "educated" Malays 
who were school teachers, policemen or low grade officers in the Civil Service and
61 Ibid.
68Pehin Haji Jamil Al-Sufri, op.cit., pp. 6-7. For biographical notes see 
Appendix I.
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many unemployed.69 In fact the Front was an opposite to the pre-war Kesatuan 
Melayu Brunei (Brunei Malay Association), which comprised older generation and 
which the youths felt not aggressive enough in standing up for the rights of the 
Malays.70 Many of the young men who sponsored the formation of the Barisan 
Pemuda had been sent to military training camps set up by the Japanese (in Miri, 
Labuan and Kuching) mainly for anti-Western indoctrination. Their experience during 
the occupation thus shaped their political attitudes and thinking. In addition to the 
Japanese anti-Western propaganda the Brunei youths were also stimulated by the on 
going Indonesian war of independence against the Dutch.71
The Indonesian influence was markedly explicit among the members of the 
Barisan Pemuda, who like the Indonesian nationalists, greeted each other with "a fist 
and a shout: Merdeka! (freedom)". However despite this overt display of nationalism 
the association had no explicit programmes or concerted demand for self-government 
or independence for Brunei. Pengiran Yusuf, looking back after forty-seven years, 
said: "At that time independence was not our immediate priority; our main concern 
was to unite young Bruneis so as to form a front in safeguarding the rights of the 
Bruneis in their own homeland against immigrants".72 United under a slogan "Brunei
69In retrospect the highest education available to the Malays during the pre-war 
period in Brunei was standard five Vernacular school. The only post primary school 
available was a three-year teacher training in Malaya. See Introduction, pp.23-25.
70Interview with Pengiran Yusuf, April 1993.
71 The writer's various informants said that they used to follow Indonesian political
development including Sukarno's declaration of independence in 1945 and his speeches 
through the Indonesian radio which they received clearly in Brunei. They also said 
that school children used to sing Indonesian patriotic songs. When the Civil 
Government returned to Brunei Indonesian magazines and books were available.
72Interview in April 1993.
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for Bruneis", the youths demanded an end to the British Military Administration and 
restoration of the British Residency because they believed that under the latter Malays 
interests would be better protected.73 Thus in early May 1946 the military authorities 
in Brunei sent a message to the Colonial Office in London stating: "No administrative 
convenience solved by retention Brunei under BMA and definite desire by population 
for early return [to] Civil Government".74 The Colonial Office's decision to restore the 
pre-war system of British Residency in Brunei on 6 July and to defer the Agreement 
to acquire full jurisdiction from the Sultan were evidently influenced by these political 
developments.
On 16 July MacDonald arrived in Brunei, in his capacity as the new acting 
High Commissioner for the Sultanate, to assess the political situation. The Barisan 
Pemuda used the occasion to voice its demands and grievances. On one of the arches 
erected in the Brunei Town to welcome the Governor-General Front wrote: "Sole 
Right to the Sultan and his Subjects". W.J.Peel, the new British Resident, was not 
impressed and ordered the writings be changed to "Selamat Datang" or "Welcome", 
similar to arches built by the Brunei Malay Association and the Chinese and Indian 
Communities. But the members of the Barisan Pemuda refused to comply and warned 
that if forced they would bring the whole arch down as a symbol of protest. However 
the matter was resolved when the Sultan intervened and overruled the British 
Resident's order.75 In order to make its message clearer the Barisan Pemuda submitted
13Ibid.
74WO 203/5535, 32 INF BDE to ALFSEA, 8 May 1946.
75Pengiran Yusuf, who brought the matter to the Sultan, said he was not surprised 
at the Sultan's decision to overrule the British Resident and to side with the Barisan 
Pemuda because he knew that Sultan was also concerned at the rise of Chinese
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a petition to MacDonald calling for priorities be given to Malays in appointments in 
the Government Service. They also wanted Malays be trained to take over important 
positions in the State administration. Further they sought a ban on the flying of 
Chinese flags; and for the Union Jack to be flown only in the British Resident's office 
when he was present. In addition the Front urged the British to consider independence 
for Brunei and to guarantee its future status as a Malay Islamic Sultanate.76 The youth 
never received a reply from MacDonald. There seems to be no mention of the petition 
in the latter's letter to the Colonial Office following the visit, except the 
acknowledgment that there were "indications that young Malays are beginning to be 
apprehensive of a policy in Brunei which would result in Chinese influence at the 
expense of themselves".77 However, Sir Dato John Peel, recalls that he told a 
delegation from the Barisan Pemuda which came to see him with regards to the future 
of Brunei that "independence was much too early for Brunei at that stage".78
At the height of its popularity in the middle of 1946, the Barisan Pemuda 
claimed to have "a few thousand members" in Brunei and "a few more thousand 
supporters" in Labuan and North Borneo. When Salleh bin Masri, who took over the 
leadership of the movement in early July 1946 visited Jesselton towards the end of 
1947, he was given a rousing red carpet welcome.79 However, the Barisan Pemuda
influence in the State. Interview with Pengiran Yusuf, April 1993.
^Interviews with Salleh bin Masri, March 1993 and Pengiran Yusuf, April 1993.
77CO 537/1613, item 227, MacDonald to Colonial Office, 18 July 1946.
78Interview with Sir Dato John Peel, July 1995.
79There were two similar movements formed in the middle of 1946 in the 
neighbouring territories: Barisan Pemuda, Labuan and Barisan Pemuda, Jesselton.
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did not last long and was not able to transform itself into an effective political party. 
By August 1947 it seemed "to be on the wane".80
The British looked with distrust upon the "tiresome" youth movement. In a 
letter home in August 1947 Lady Datin R.Peel, the wife of the British Resident, wrote: 
"Our tiresome Malay Youth Association seems to be on the wane and John 
doesn't want anyone reviving it. ...We are glad for them to be getting into a 
decline and the conservative and more cooperative elements coming to the 
fore".81
In the following December she wrote again:
"The school teachers in the past have been the most violent politically of all 
the Government servants and keen members o f the Malay Youth Association. 
...The Society, which has a membership of thousands, appears to be defunct, 
another virus of which the State has been rid in John's time here".82 
It was not only that the movement was violent and communal in nature but more 
importantly it drew its inspiration from Indonesia. The British felt that if it was not 
checked it would in the long term endanger the British interests in the area. In fact 
on his private visit to Malaya in February 1947 Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin when asked 
by the press about the Indonesian war against the Dutch replied that "the people in
Like the Brunei's Barisan Pemuda the members of the two associations were 
exclusively Malays - Brunei Malays - and; in fact their formation were moved from 
Brunei. Interviews with Salleh bin Masri, March 1993 and Pengiran Yusuf, April 
1993.
80See note below.
8’The writer is indebted to Datin Lady R.Peel who kindly allowed the former to 
use her "Letters Home from Brunei" (type script).
*2Ibid.
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Brunei were fully aware of the struggle of the Indonesians for independence". He 
added that he did not "blame the Indonesians for fighting against the Dutch as the 
Dutch have long oppressed the Indonesian people".83 Furthermore, the movement was 
seen as an obstacle to the constitutional and political changes which had been planned 
for Brunei. Therefore the British felt every means had to be used to humble the 
"tiresome" youth movement. In the middle of 1947 Pengiran Yusuf, the Deputy 
President, and Jamil bin Omar, the Secretary-General, were sent back to Malaya to 
continue their teachers' training, which had been disrupted by the war. (When he came 
back in 1950 Pengiran Yusuf was posted to Temburong district, where he stayed until 
1954). Hidup bin Awang Besar, the Deputy Secretary-General and Hashim bin Tahir 
were among the leaders of the movement transferred to outer stations either in the 
Temburong district or Belait district.84 This ingenious tactics denied the Barisan 
Pemuda of its prominant leaders and as a result it lapsed into inactivity.
The decline of the youth movement could also be attributed to the British 
designs as well as to its own achievements. By the middle of 1947 all the Malay 
Civil servants, who had been suspended by the Military Government on suspicion of 
collaborations, had been reinstated. Salleh bin Masri, the leader of the Barisan 
Pemuda, claims that he was offered a senior post in the Education Department by the 
British Resident but declined on the grounds that he wanted to lead his movement.85 
At the same time the British administration became more attentive to Malay
83Straits Times, 28 February 1947. This report was sent to the Colonial Office.
See: CO 537/2244, item 2.
^Interviews with Hashim bin Tahir, April 1993; Yassin Affandi, December 1992 
and June 1993.
85Interview, March 1993.
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sensitivities in regard to Chinese power and influence in Brunei. These developments 
had, at least for the time being, satisfied the Malays. Moreover the rehabilitation 
programmes of the Government and the Oil Company had provided jobs to many 
young people which prevented them from being involved in political activities.
Furthermore the British had also taken steps to control and restrict the activities 
o f organised bodies in the State. In April 1948 the Sedition legislation was passed 
and this was followed in October 1948 by the Societies legislation. Besides 
preventing any activities which would incite feelings against any particular race or 
class or the administration, the Sedition Enactment was aimed at preventing import of 
"undesirable" publications, particularly from Indonesia, which had been the source of 
inspiration for many of youths in Brunei. But it was the Societies Enactment which 
caused the final blow to the Barisan Pemuda because the Enactment provided 
registration only to socio-economic and cultural bodies and not political bodies.86 In 
order to be able to function the Barisan Pemuda had to rewrite its constitution; and 
thus in early 1949 it emerged as the Angkatan Pemuda Brunei (APB), with aims of 
improving the socio-economic conditions of its members and promoting ancient 
cultures and traditions of the Sultanate.87 However, the APB failed to attract as many 
supporters as its predecessor. Nevertheless, the APB existed until it was succeeded 
by the Partai Rakyat Brunei in 1956. In the absence of a vocal body such as the 
Barisan Pemuda, the pre-war Persatuan Guru-Guru Melayu Brunei (PGGMB), or 
Brunei Malay Teachers' Association, which had been overshadowed by the activities
86The Sedition Enactment, 1948, BA/12116/1978; The Societies Enactment, 1948,
BA/12115/1978.
87Interview with Pengiran Yusuf , April 1993.
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of the former moved into the centre ground to become an important critic of the 
Government.
1.4 Brunei Administrative Associtaion with Sarawak
In January 1947 the Governors' Conference, which was chaired by MacDonald 
and attended by the Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak and the British Resident 
of Brunei, agreed that the proposed Treaty to secure jurisdiction from the Sultan of 
Brunei "should wait until the trouble in Sarawak and Malaya was over".88 The 
unilateral decision of the Rajah Vyner Brooke to surrender his Kingdom to the British 
Crown resulted in a stormy protest by the Malays in the territory who wanted to 
remain under the White Rajah rule. Similar protest had also occurred in Malaya as 
a result of the implementation of the Malayan Union plan in the middle of 1946.89 
The existence of the "tiresome" youth movement, the Barisan Pemuda, the British 
feared similar trouble in Brunei. However MacDonald stressed to the Colonial Office 
that "Brunei could not stand alone owing to difficulties of staff, etc., and should 
therefore be associated with either Sarawak or North Borneo". In effect he believed 
that "the ideal solution from the point of view of efficiency would be cession", but he 
was adverse to seeking to end the sovereign status of Brunei. Therefore he felt that
88CO 537/2244, item 1, Extract from Minutes of Governors Conference held on 
31 January 1947 at Jesselton.
89The trouble in Sarawak or anti-cession protest ended with the stabbing of the 
Governor, Duncan Stewart, in December 1949. For discussion on the Anti-Cession 
Movement See R.H.W.Reece, op.cit., Chapter IX. The trouble in Malaya ended with 
replacement of the controversial Malayan Union plan with the Federation Of Malaya 
Agreement. On the subject see: A.J.Stockwell, op.cit., and Albert Lau, op.cit..
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"the best solution would be that the Governor of either North Borneo or Sarawak 
should be the High Commissioner for Brunei".90
By April 1947 the trouble in Malaya began to subside as a result o f the British 
decision to scrap the Malayan Union and replace it with the Federation of Malaya 
Agreement. "The way is clear for us", MacDonald wrote to the Colonial Office, "to 
make progress concerning the future set-up in Brunei".91 Thus in May 1947 
MacDonald held discussions with Peel in Brunei, the Governor of North Borneo, 
E.Twining, and the Governor of Sarawak, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke. It was concluded 
that
"Brunei should not be left to stand on its own administrative feet. It is too 
small a State to transfer a sufficient number of good Administrative and 
Technical Officers to the higher grades of its public services, and therefore 
cannot by itself achieve a proper standard of Government. It should be 
associated with a larger administrative unit which can aid it in these matters".92 
At the same time, MacDonald proposed Brunei should remain a separate State because 
any suggestion of cession to the British Monarch or absorption into a Colony would, 
in his opinion, "be both impolitic and wrong, since it would be unlikely to be
90Mentioned in CO 537/2244, item 1, Extract from Minutes of Governors' 
Conference held on 31 January 1947 at Jesselton. It was also mentioned in the same 
file (A.N.Galsworthy's Minute of 22 April 1947) that MacDonald discussed the 
question of the administrative future of Brunei with the Colonial officials on 8 January 
1947.
91 CO 537/2244, item 3, MacDonald to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 
April 1947.
92Ibid ., item 5, MacDonald to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16 May 1947.
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acceptable to either the Sultan or his State Council or his subjects".93
Further MacDonald explained that the association he was proposing was on the 
basis that "a State under the protection of His Majesty is being joined for 
administrative and any other necessary purposes with a neighbouring British Colony, 
without any derogation in theory from the former's present constitutional position11.94 
Accordingly, he presumed that the Governor of the Colony concerned would become 
High Commissioner for Brunei; administrative and technical services o f Government 
of both territories would be joined in some way which enabled good officers to serve 
in Brunei. Brunei would pay for these and other aids. The general policy in both 
territories would be similar. The British Resident in Brunei would be under the 
authority of the Governor, who would direct policy in both territories. MacDonald 
suggested that Brunei should be associated with Sarawak rather than with North 
Borneo; among "the decisive" arguments being that Brunei was "surrounded and 
divided by Sarawak territory". He argued that if Brunei were associated with North 
Borneo, "very difficult political and administrative questions would arise". Anyway 
he envisaged in due course the three territories, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei 
should be brought under one administration, either on a unitary or federal basis. But 
MacDonald and his colleagues agreed that the "matter should be approached cautiously 
for various political susceptibilities - especially in Sarawak and Brunei - have to be 
treated tenderly, but we think that it should be possible to achieve our objective some 
time in the next five or ten years".95
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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The Governor-General asked authorization from the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies to start discussions on his proposals with the Sultan o f Brunei and members 
of his State Council. He expected that the Sultan and his Advisers would raise some 
objections to the scheme and that they might prove "formidable difficulties" but he 
was confident that he could get something on the general lines o f his proposals 
accepted.96
There were different views among the Colonial Office officials to the 
administrative changes proposed by the Governor-General. N.L.May, the Head of the 
Borneo Department, thought that there was "no obligation to discuss or negotiate the 
matters under the Agreement [of 1888] and Supplementary Agreement [of 
1905/1906]". He said the Sultan should be informed "as a matter of courtesy but, 
unless it is necessary to do so, I think it would be a mistake to make them the subject 
of discussions or negotiations". If  otherwise, he felt that consideration should be given 
to the question whether they should not also cover the modification of the Agreements 
so as to cede such jurisdiction to His Majesty as will enable him to legislate for the 
State under Foreign Jurisdiction Act to the fullest extent, in accordance with the 
Cabinet Committee’s decision in 1945.97 On the other hand G.Seel, the Assistant 
Under-Secretary, felt that in the light of experience in the Malayan Union, MacDonald 
was "right in proposing to be frank with the Sultan from the start". He said: "We are 
having to retrace our steps in Malaya in the matter of jurisdiction and I should have 
thought it wise to wait and see the final outcome of that before embarking on
96Ibid.
97CO 537/2244, Minute by N.L.Mayle, 23 May 1947.
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adventures elsewhere”.98 The Secretary of State agreed, and told the Governor-General 
that "it would be unwise at present to propose any changes in the agreement beyond
those required to bring it into line with what is now planned for protected states in 
Malaya".99
Following this MacDonald discussed the question of Brunei's future with the 
British Resident and the two Bornean Governors at the end of May and again when 
the latter came to Singapore at the end of June 1947. In October MacDonald 
informed the Secretary of State: "Unfortunately, my illness followed immediately and 
has prevented further action until now".100 He also informed him that they all agreed 
that it was not necessary to raise with the Sultan the question of the jurisdiction of the 
British Monarch in Brunei because they (the British Government) could achieve in 
practice all they desired under the terms of the existing Treaty; and thus he said,
"it is undesirable to raise questions which would involve amendments to [the 
1905/1906] Treaty, since this might tend to arouse an opposition party to our 
proposals and perhaps to defeat our proposals altogether".101 
MacDonald asked for the Secretary of State's agreement to his proposals which 
he wanted to put to the Sultan and his advisers. They were:102
(a) The Governor of Sarawak would assume the duties of High Commissioner
98CO 537/2244, Minute by G.Seel, 24 May 1947.
99CO 537/2244, item 6/8, Secretary of State to MacDonald, 29 May 1947.
100Ibid., item 14, MacDonald to Secretary of State 23 October 1947.
,07bid.
102Ibid.
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for Brunei, and as such would exercise the same powers as were exercised by 
the Governors of the Straits Settlements before the war and by the Governor- 
General since his appointment.
(b) The Governor-General would have the same relationship to Brunei as he 
has to the Malayan Union, Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo.
(c) The Resident in Brunei would come under the High Commissioner. His 
powers as Resident ...would be the same as that of Residents in Brunei in the 
past.
(d) The Heads of Sarawak Technical Departments e.g.Education, Health and 
Agriculture, would become also effective Heads of their respective 
Departments in Brunei. Whether this would be as advisers to His Highness or 
as formal executive Heads of Brunei Departments can be decided in the light 
of the Sultan's reactions. In either case Brunei would have immediately the 
benefit o f the help of these experienced officers.
(e) In addition, ...Brunei would secure in the near future the services of one or 
two good junior officers. In particular, the Sarawak service would provide a 
full time Education Officer to administer the Education Department in the State 
under the general supervision of the Director of Education.
(f) Brunei would have its own budget. It would pay the Sarawak Government 
for services rendered. For example, it would pay part of the salaries of 
advisers or departmental heads, and the whole salaries of the officers giving 
full time to its service.
The Governor-General said that he would emphasise to the Sultan that the proposals 
involved no change whatever in the independence of Brunei, in the sovereignty of its
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Sultan, its relation to Britain as the protecting power and the substantial advantages 
to the people of Brunei which the proposals envisaged as a result o f improved 
administration and technical services. He would also wanted to point out to the Sultan 
that these advantages could be gained in no other practical way.103
On 8 November 1947 the Secretary of State informed MacDonald that he 
approved of the proposal to explore the situation informally with the Sultan with a 
little modification: that the Heads of Sarawak technical departments could not be 
effective Heads of respective departments in Brunei; they could only act as advisers 
to the Sultan.104 He offered his own suggestions: Firstly, in order to avoid suspicion 
in the mind of the Sultan that the British were proposing to equate the position of 
Brunei, that of Singapore or North Borneo which were colonies, the Governor-General 
should explain to the Sultan that the High Commissioner would in respect o f Brunei 
stand in the same relationship to the Governor-General as would the High 
Commissioner for the new Federation of Malaya in respect of the protected States of 
Malaya. Secondly, the Governor-General should avoid from the outset any reference 
to changes in the status of the territory or treaty. He said
"if the Sultan is left to ask for assurance that no such changes are involved, 
which can, of course, be readily given, it seems to me that he is less likely to 
ask for an assurance that no such changes will be made in the future. A 
request for an assurance about the future would, of course, involve careful 
consideration. I suggest that changes might, for example, be described as being
] 03Ibid.
104CO 537/2244, item 15, Secretary of State to MacDonald, 8 
November 1947.
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purely administrative and necessitated by the post-war changes in the 
Governorship arrangements for the Malayan territories".105 
Finally, in order to avoid the misconception that Brunei would in practice become a 
Division of Sarawak, as the result of changes, the Secretary of State suggested that it 
might be preferable merely to say that there would be no change in the position of the 
Resident in relation to the Sultan.106
Towards the end of November 1947 MacDonald proceeded to Brunei and, 
along with the British Resident, presented his proposals to the Sultan. He reported: 
"On the first day I and Peel had a long conversation with the Sultan. I put the 
whole set of the proposals to him with no items excluded. I emphasized that 
the reason for them was administrative and that they involved no change in the 
position of Brunei or its Ruler. The Sultan agreed to the proposals without 
exception".107
On the following day MacDonald presented his proposals to the State Council, in 
which the Sultan was also present. He said:
"As a result of a long conference and of answers which Peel and I were able 
to give to the queries and doubts of some Members, Council agreed 
unanimously to the whole plan".108 
MacDonald told the Secretary of State that the "only point arising" from the talks, held
m Ibid.
X06Ibid.
107CO 537/2244, item 16, MacDonald to Secretary o f State, 24 November 1947.
mIbid.
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in the atmosphere which he described as "extremely friendly", was that "the Sultan 
and Members of the State Council all attach importance to the fact the position and 
authority of the British Resident in Brunei will not ...be changed". MacDonald said 
that the Sultan and Members of the State Council asked him to report to the Secretary 
of State "their unanimous and unqualified agreement" to the proposals.109
Following these successful talks MacDonald formally recommended his 
proposals for Brunei to be administratively associated with Sarawak to the Secretary 
of State. He suggested that the changes should take place on the date when he 
assumed Lord Killeam's duties as Special Commissioner of the United Kingdom in 
Southeast Asia. He thought this was the most suitable arrangement because the transfer 
of High Commissionership from himself to the Governor of Sarawak was represented 
as administratively convenient change following of his additional duties, this would 
minimise any possible suggestion by critics that change o f High Commissionership in 
Brunei had a deep and sinister political significance. MacDonald and Peel did not 
anticipate "any serious criticism of the proposals in Brunei when they were announced, 
except perhaps a few doubting voices, unless Anthony Brooke110 seeks to stir up 
trouble on the issue".111
On the basis of MacDonald's recommendations, on 24 December 1947 the 
Secretary of State drew up a memorandum for the Cabinet and Commonwealth Affairs
] 09 Ibid.
110Anthony Brooke was a nephew of the Third Rajah of Sarawak who led Anti- 
Cession Movement in Sarawak. He was the heir designate to the Sarawak Raj before 
his uncle ceded the State to the British Crown.
11’CO 537/2244, item 16, MacDonald to Secretary of the State, 24 November
1947.
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Committee to seek approval of the British Government on the new constitutional 
arrangement for Brunei and to arrange for the Governor of Sarawak to assume the 
High Commissionership for Brunei on 1 May 1948, when MacDonald assumed the 
duties of the British Special Commissioner for Southeast Asia.112 While preparations 
were made in London for issuing "official communique to the world press" after the 
British King's approval of the changes, in early January 1948, rumours were 
circulating within the State that "the Governor of Sarawak is to be appointed also 
Governor of Brunei".113 The reaction to the rumours was that some people were 
"asking why Brunei should be made subordinate to Sarawak". Following this, R.Hone 
(Secretary-General to the Governor-General) and his assistant, E.E.F.Pretty in 
Singapore, travelled to Brunei in the absence of MacDonald who was in London, to 
discuss the matter with Peel (the outgoing British Resident) and L.H.N.Davis (the 
incoming British Resident). They agreed that an early clarification was desirable. 
They suggested that the British Resident accompanied by Pengiran Bendahara as the 
Sultan's representative should tour every district in the state and explain the plan to 
all District Officers, Penghulu and Ketua Kampong. They were confident that if the 
people were assured that the plan would not entail application of Sarawak laws or 
posting of Sarawak native officers to Brunei it would be accepted and successfuly 
counter the existing rumours.114
112CO 537/2244, item 23, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
on the Future of Brunei", C.A.(47) 22, 24 December 1947.
113CO 943/1/59706/1948, item 7, MacDonald to Secretary of State, 10 January
1948.
u 4Ibid.
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The leakage was suspected "from the State Council and/ or Hassan" (the 
Sultan's Private Secretary).115 However the British Resident had said that some time 
after the Govemor-General's meeting with the State Council in November that he took 
precaution of sounding several members to ascertain whether, after reflection, any of 
them were having second thoughts on the proposals. He had no reason to think that 
there was still anything but full continued support for the plan from them and the 
Sultan.116 But the way the British officials reacted to the rumours raised some doubts 
of the claim that the Sultan's advisers were unanimously in favour of the Govemor- 
General's plan. In fact, at least one of them, Pehin Della Dena of Tutong, had written 
"a disquieting letter" [in regard to the proposed changes] to Pretty in December 
1947.117
In early March 1948, Davis, who had taken office as the new British Resident, 
made his tour of Brunei to announce and explain the changes. He was accompanied 
by the Pengiran Bendahara (Pengiran Muda Omar Ali Saifuddin - who was described 
by the British Resident as more popular than the Sultan), Pengiran Pemanca and 
Hassan bin Kulup, the Sultan's Private Secretary. When the rumours "had become 
wide spread" Davis decided to extend the audience from Chiefs and Village Headmen 
to government employees and members of the public. At the end of his tour Davis 
informed Hone in Singapore that:
"Announcement was regarded with considerable suspicion until it was
" 5Ibid.
ll6CO 943/1, item 109, Governor-General to Secretary of State, 10 January 1947.
ll7CO 943/1, item 30, "Report on Tour of Brunei to Announce Forthcoming 
Administrative Change" by the British Resident, L.H.N. Davis, 9 March 1948.
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explained emphatically that it does not involve political or financial subjection 
to Sarawak or its laws or transfer here of Sarawak Native Officers. This and 
other explanations have been carefully given in five main centres and I am 
satisfied that significance of changes is now understood and that former 
objections and doubts based on rumours and misapprehensions have been 
dispelled. Only sign of opposition has come from isolated members of now 
dormant youth association [Barisan Pemuda], notably school teachers, who 
have tried to suggest this announcement o f fait accompli is undemocratic. 
They have negligible following and population as a whole has accepted 
forthcoming advantages willingly and wholeheartedly".118 
However Marsal bin Maun, one of the spokesmen of the opposition, recalls that many 
people, particularly those in the civil service, did not want to speak out against the 
plan because they were afraid of repercussions. Despite the explanations given, he 
said, they were still suspicious of the motives of the British in associating Brunei with 
Sarawak. They would have preferred to be federated with Malaya.119 The mood of the 
people at that time was perhaps best summed up by Davis in the conclusion to his 
report:
"I should like to conclude with the opinion that had the change involved any 
closer association with Sarawak there would have been very real, though 
passive, opposition, not only from those doctrinaire opinions, but also from the 
older and more responsible members of the community. This is partly due to
118CO 931/1, item 29, Acting Governor-General to Secretary of State, 9
March 1948.
1 ^Interview with Marsal bin Maun, April 1993.
65
the historic distrust of Sarawak, which still exists to some extent, and partly 
to the deep rooted conservatism of the inhabitants of this State in the mass".120 
On 17 April 1948 the Sultan and the Governor o f Sarawak signed an agreement 
relating to employment of senior officers on the Sarawak Establishment by the 
Government of Brunei. These senior officers included the British Resident and the 
Assistant British Resident.121 As planned, on 1 May 1948, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, 
the Governor of Sarawak, assumed his duty as the British High Commissioner for 
Brunei, on the same day that Malcolm MacDonald took over as the British 
Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia. No document was signed or exchanged on 
that day except for the reading of the commission of appointment of Sir Arden-Clarke 
in front of Brunei's dignitaries in the State Court House. The Sultan called the 
occasion "a day of great historical event in the State of Brunei" and hoped that it 
would bring "distinctive progress, ...wealth and richness to the State".122 In his speech 
the new High Commissioner assured the people of Brunei that there was
"no question of Brunei coming under Sarawak or Sarawak coming under 
Brunei, or the interests of one being sacrificed to the interests of the other. 
...The administration of the two countries will remain separate. There is no 
change in the status of Brunei, which remains a Protected State with a High 
Commissioner. The State of Brunei will continue to have its own Sultan, its
l20CO 943/1/59706, item 29, Acting Governor-General to Secretary of State, 9 
March 1948.
,21The Brunei/Sarawak Agreement is found in BA/1258/1983.
]22Ibid., item 43, "Translation of Sultan's Speech", enclosure in Governor of 
Sarawak to Secretary of State, 18 May 1948.
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own Constitution, its own laws, its own budget, its own flag, and its own 
stamps".123
In other words the arrangement between Brunei and Sarawak that took place on that 
day was "a simple administrative change and ...(had) no political implications of any 
kind". As the High Commissioner for Brunei, Sir Arden-Clarke, promised that it was 
his duty and responsibility to safeguard the interests and welfare o f Brunei and its 
inhabitants and to provide for its future development and progress. He stressed: "This 
duty I shall do my utmost to discharge faithfully and impartially, not only when I am 
visiting Brunei but also when I am in Sarawak, where I shall be equally mindful of 
it".124
Despite this rhetoric, however, an important intermediate step towards the 
possible assumption of jurisdiction within the State of Brunei by the British Monarch 
was accomplished, and the way was open for the next phase, that of constitutional 
reform and a revision of the Treaties.
n3Ibid., Speech by His Excellency the Governor of Sarawak.
U4Ibid.
67
CHAPTER 2
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS 1948 - 1955
This chapter begins by examining the circumstances leading to the introduction 
of the written Constitution of Brunei following the Sultan's proposal in May 1953. 
This is followed by discussion of the work of the committee formed to ascertain the 
public opinion on the proposal. The last section examines the High Commissioner's 
draft Constitutional Enactment which was based on the committee's recommendations.
2.1 "The Sultan should be advised to grant a Constitution".
In December 1948 a Colonial Office official observed that "very little" was 
heard about the political and social developments in Brunei compared to Sarawak 
despite the fact that the oil industry in the former had "recovered remarkably well". 
He was wondering whether Sir Charles Arden-Clarke might "not yet have got into the 
habit of thinking in his dual capacity as Governor of Sarawak and High Commissioner 
for Brunei".1 It was agreed that the matters would be raised with the High 
Commissioner when he returned to England on leave in February 1949.2 Subsequently
'CO 943/1/59706, Minute by K.P.Ashton, 29 December 1948.
2CO 943/1/59706, Draft letter to the High Commissioner by K.P.Ashton, 29 
December 1948. Ashton said the letter was intended to draw out the High 
Commissioner's idea on a policy on Brunei particularly in the constitutional and local 
government field. But the letter was not sent because the Colonial Office decided to 
raise the matter when the High Commissioner returned to England in February. See 
ibid., Minute by K.P.Ashton 29 December 1948 and Minute by G.C.Whiteley, 29 
December 1948.
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Sir Arden-Clarke told the Colonial Office that "nothing much could be done until the 
M.C.S. officers in Brunei had been replaced by Sarawak officers."3
In October 1949 the new High Commissioner, C.W.Dawson, wrote to the 
Secretary of State, A.Creech Jones, informing him of "the unsatisfactory position" 
which existed in regard to the legislation currently in force and which might be 
enacted in future in Brunei. Dawson explained that before 1906, when the British 
Residency was established, no written laws appeared to have been enacted, other than 
the Treaties with Britain. Since then, he observed, laws began to be enacted in written 
form in the same enacting words: "it is hereby enacted by His Highness the Sultan in 
Council as follows:"; and each enactment was signed at the top by the British 
Resident.4 The High Commissioner was prepared to accept enactments in that form 
laws in the State if they were enacted by the Sultan in Council. But he found out that 
some enactments were passed in the absence of the Sultan. He doubted the validity 
o f such laws, arguing that the Sultan of Brunei was an autocratic sovereign, and "he 
alone (unless he delegates his powers) can make laws for the Government of his 
State".5 Dawson proposed that measures should be taken to remedy the "unsatisfactory 
situation", including the passing of an "interpretation and general clauses ordinance" 
by the Sultan himself in Council, making clear that the Sultan needed not be 
personally present in the State Council for legislation to be valid. Once the steps had 
been taken he believed that doubts on the validity of the enactments would be
3CO 943/1/59706/1, Minute by Ashton, 23 February 1949.
4CO 943/1/59706/1, item 1, C.W. Dawson to A. Creech Jones, 14 October 1949.
5 Ibid.
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removed. Subsequently, he proposed that, "the Sultan should be advised to grant a 
Constitution".6
Despite the recommendation by the High Commissioner for the matter to be 
considered urgently, the Colonial Office did not take action until the middle of 1950.7 
In August the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, James Griffiths, blamed 
"extraordinary pressure of work" in his legal adviser's office for the delay. But the 
assassination of Duncan Stewart, the Governor of Sarawak (and the High 
Commissioner for Brunei) who succeeded Dawson, in December 1949 by a member 
of the Sarawak Anti-Cessionist Movement, was also partly responsible for the delay. 
Nevertheless in his reply, Griffiths agreed that steps should be taken to remedy the 
legislative problems in Brunei as suggested by Dawson. However the Secretary of 
State said he was advised that since the legislative power was not conferred on the 
Sultan in Council by any written law, an "interpretation ordinance" was not an 
appropriate law by which to establish a particular method for the exercise of such 
power. The most suitable method he felt would be to make the necessary provision 
in any Constitution which be granted. But since the drawing up of a Constitution 
would take considerable time, he suggested, as an interim measure, that the Sultan 
should enact a law governing the exercise of his legislative powers which should 
expressly confer upon the Resident in Council the power to legislate if  the Sultan was
6Ibid.
7CO 943/1/59706/1, See Minute by J.C.McPetrie, 24 June 1950.
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absent or unable to act. This law could also give validation to laws enacted by the 
Resident in the past.8
The Secretary of State said he was "in full agreement with [the] proposal that 
the Sultan should be advised to grant a Constitution". However, he pointed out that 
it would be "desirable if possible to ascertain whether the power to grant a 
Constitution does in fact reside in the Sultan".9 Otherwise, he felt the Malay States 
precedent could be followed where in each case the Constitution was granted by the 
Ruler. The Secretary of State also raised the question of whether the interim measure 
he had suggested i.e. the Sultan delegate his legislative power to the Resident in 
Council if he should be absent or unable to act, would by itself meet the constitutional 
requirements or whether a more elaborate Constitution should later be enacted.10
In his reply in December, Sir Anthony Abell, the new High Commissioner, 
agreed with James Griffiths that drawing up a Constitution might take a considerable 
time because the Sultan's rights under the existing treaties, his competence to grant a 
Constitution and the character of the new treaty would have to be addressed. He said 
it was advisable to legalise the present practice and procedure for legislation in Brunei 
as a separate step in a process which should be completed by the establishment o f a 
Constitution.11 Sir Anthony Abell thus envisaged an elaborate Constitution which
8CO 943/1/59706/1, item 2, Secretary of State to High Commissioner, 17 August 
1950.
9Ibid.
]0Ibid; CO 943/1/59706/1, Minute by J.C.McPetrie, 24 June 1950.
nCO 943/1/59706/2, item 1, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 30 
December 1950.
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would involve a revision o f the Treaties with Brunei. The political situation in Brunei 
during the period seem to warrant such an approach (see below).
Towards the late 1940s Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin's relations with the British 
Resident in Brunei became strained. His main complaint was that he had not been 
treated in the same manner as the Sultans in Malaya, each of whom had a palace built 
by the State Government. In his case he still lived in an old palace built out of his 
cession monies. In addition he was dissatisfied that despite the large revenue raised 
from oil produced in the State he received the least political allowance when compared 
to the Rulers in Malaya.12 He was so frustrated that towards the late 1940s he spent 
much of his time in Kuching. The Sultan realised later that the main source of his 
problems was the treaties between his State and Britain which limited his power. 
Thus in May 1950 he decided to travel to England to discuss with the British 
Government matters concerning the future of Brunei and its oil. In a series of letters 
on 1 June 1950, Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin appointed Gerard MacBryan, whom he 
became acquainted with during his stay in Kuching, as his personal political adviser 
and authorised him to hold preliminary talks with the British Government "to obtain 
my release from the shackles which have so long encumbered the sovereignty and 
people of Brunei". He told MacBryan:
"...the oilfields of Brunei have been conceded without consideration of myself 
or my feelings or the interests of my people. But I have been helpless because 
of the Treaties between myself and Great Britain which have forced me to do
12CO 934/1/5921, item 4, Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin to Secretary o f State for the 
Colonies, 11 July 1949. The Sultan's stipend was eventually increased from $3, 500 
per month to $5,000 and his wife from $425 to $500 and his royal daughter from $100 
to $150. See CO 943/2/59721, High Commissioner to Secretary of States for the 
Colonies, 17 April 1950.
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whatever I was told in all matters. I ask you to seek revision of the 
agreements, if necessary, to permit of my having some little royalty. 
...Supposing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shows 
unreasonable attitude in these affairs then I ask you to proceed to the United 
States of America as my chosen and personal and political representative to 
come to an agreement with Mr. Hoffman, President of the Standard Oil 
Company regarding the Brunei oilfields so that they may be fully developed 
and exploited by the United States".13 
In the same letter he asked MacBryan "to present to the United Nations the injustices 
that have come to Brunei through the enforced treaties which my predecessors had no 
alternative but to sign in the face of overwhelming force". But before any 
negotiations could take place Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin died in Singapore on 4 June 
1950.14
The sudden death of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin prevented a confrontation 
between the British and the Sultan over the delicate issues of the revision o f Treaties 
and oil agreements, at least for the moment. However, the need to address the issue
13Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin to Gerard MacBryan, 1 June 1950. PS/Sultan Ahmad 
Tajuddin/1. Documents related to Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin acquired by the Brunei 
History Centre from the National Archives, USA.
,4CO 943/2/59721, item 16, Commissioner General to Secretary of State, 19 June 
1950. Apparently the visit was private and not an official one. Malcolm MacDonald 
who entertained Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin to a lunch in his official residence at Bukit 
Serene in Singapore on 30 May recorded in his diary that the Sultan "was on his way 
to England to pay his respects to the King and thank him for his 'K'. I wonder whether 
he will ever get there. He looks like a doomed man to me, much thinner, weaker, 
frailer than at his jubilee [September 1949]. His head seems narrower, his flesh 
thinner (almost nothing beneath the skin), his eyes with death in them". On 4 June 
he recorded that the Sultan had died after suffering a haemorrhage the previous night. 
See: (University of Durham), Malcolm MacDonald's Papers, Mss Diary, pp. 79/8/182- 
183.
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of a Constitution for Brunei became ever more urgent following the demise o f the 
Sultan without a male heir as it raised the question of succession to the Brunei 
Sultanate.15 The Brunei Council of Traditional Ministers unanimously proclaimed the 
Sultan's younger brother, Pengiran Muda Omar Ali Saifuddin, as the successor. The 
decision of the Council was "strongly supported" by the British Resident and 
"approved" by the High Commissioner.16 But it was disputed by MacBryan, who 
claimed that the late Sultan had left a will "anointing and appointing" his 16 year old 
royal daughter, Tengku Ehsan, as his successor and heir to the Sultanate of Brunei.17 
She was to be known as the "Puteri Besar of Brunei". MacBryan18 also claimed that 
the Sultan had appointed him as the guardian to the Princess and commanded him "to 
hold that position with full and absolute responsibility until she has been enthroned".19 
In addition he claimed that the late Sultan had entrusted to his care the State regalia 
a gold serpent-headed cane and seal of the State without which he claimed no one 
could be enthroned in Brunei.20
MacBryan's claim, however, was rejected by the Bruneis not only because they 
had not been presented with the supposed will but also because it was against Brunei
15Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin was only 36 years old when died but known to have 
been ill for a long time. See Appendix I for a biographical note.
16CO 943/2/59721, items 9 and 14, High Commissioner to the Secretary of State, 
9 June 1950 and 15 June 1950 respectively.
17Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin had three other daughters from his non royal wives.
18For a biographical note see Appendix I.
19The will was in a form of a letter from Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin to MacBryan 
dated 1 June 1950 which supposed to contain the Sultan's signature and a mark of 
"Round Yellow Seal of the Sultan of Brunei" at the left top right hand comer. See 
footnote 13 above.
20CO 943/2/59721, item 10, High Commissioner to British Resident, 10 June 1950.
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custom and tradition and the tenet of Islam to have a female ruler on the throne of 
Brunei.21 Furthermore Tengku Ehsan herself had not staked a claim to the throne. In 
fact the British Resident claimed that the widow of the late Sultan had given him a 
signed statement rejecting MacBryan as her daughter's guardian.22 The dispute was 
settled peacefully only due to the unanimous decision taken by the Bruneis; had there 
been any significant support for Princess Ehsan there would have been a succession 
crisis which inevitably would have affected the economic and social development. 
Nevertheless the problem caused some concern in the Colonial Office, which wanted 
the High Commissioner to supply "definite rules governing the succession".23 But 
Brunei had no written laws regarding succession to the Sultanate; the existing laws 
were based on tradition and custom, which could be influenced by the decision of the 
nobility in the Sultanate. The only way to avoid a recurrence of the problem was to 
have a written Constitution regulating the succession.
On the death of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin, Malcolm MacDonald wrote in his 
diary: "So passed away the last of the medieval Sultans".24 Perhaps MacDonald was 
not far from the truth. The new Sultan, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III, as he was
21Interview with Pengiran Ali, April 1993. See also CO 943/2/59721, item 9, 
High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 9 June 1950.
22CO 943/2/59721, item 16, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 19 June 
1950. Sir Dato John Peel recalls that when he was the British Resident in Brunei 
(July 1946 to January 1948) Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin had mentioned to him "once or 
twice" that he wanted his royal daughter, Princess Ehsan, to succeed him and believes 
that the Sultan had failed to secure agreement from his Traditional Ministers. 
Interview, 22 July 1995.
23CO 943/2, Minute by Whiteley, 16 June 1950 and Minute by M.Scott, 16 June 
1950.
24Malcolm MacDonald's Papers, Mss Diary, p. 79/8/183.
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officially listed in the Brunei Royal Genealogy, was the first member of the Brunei 
Royal House to obtain a modem education. After completing his studies at the Malay 
College, Kuala Kangsar in Malaya in 1936 he returned to Brunei where he was briefly 
attached to the Forest Department as a Cadet Officer before moving to the Legal 
Department as an Administrative Officer. In 1947 he was installed as the Pengiran 
Bendahara and automatically became a member o f the State Council.25 These 
experiences gave the new Sultan a wide knowledge of administrative and 
governmental matters which made him more confident in dealing with the affairs of 
his State than his predecessor. It is likely that as soon as he settled in his position the 
Sultan began to question the British Resident's power vis-a-vis his own powers and 
that of the State Council. This probably led J.C.Barcroft, the British Resident, to write 
a letter to the Sultan in September 1952 with regard to the functions of the State 
Council:
"I do not think it was intended, however, that the [State] Council should deal 
with detailed administration although, of course, an appeal from a decision of 
the administration would lie to Your Highness in Council. ...If it is now 
considered necessary or desirable to consult Council on details of 
administration then I think Your Highness must consider dissolving the present 
State Council and setting up a new body".26 
In the same letter Barcroft proposed two separate Councils with nominated members: 
"a small Executive Council" which would meet frequently to deal with detailed
25For a biographical note see Appendix I.
26Quoted from R.H.Hickling, Memorandum Upon Brunei Constitutional History 
and Practice, (Typescript), January 1955, p.37. A copy is found in the Kuching 
Museum Library.
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matters of administration, and a larger "State Council" with members meeting only 
two or three times a year to pass legislation. These proposals no doubt were 
acceptable to the Sultan because they would increase his role in the administration of 
the State. However their implementation would only give more weight for an urgent 
need for consideration of the introduction of a constitution to define the powers and 
membership of the Councils.
A month after the British Resident wrote to the Sultan the Colonial Office 
received the following intelligence report:
"There is increasing evidence that a number of school masters and other 
educated Malays in the State of Brunei are consolidating their opposition to the 
Sultan. They include Government servants, distant relatives of the royal 
family, and members of the Persatuan Darah Kerabat Di Raja Melayu of Seria. 
This group was almost certainly responsible for recent articles in the "Melayu 
Raya" press criticising the Sultan’s ministry"27 
In January the following year another report reached the Colonial Office:
"It is reported that the intention of this group is to force the Sultan to abandon 
his present age-old policy of nepotism in Government appointments and ensure 
that all Government appointments are reserved to Brunei Malays and are made 
only on merit".28
It appeared that as education expanded the people became more aware and critical of
27CO 1022/216, item 1, Extract from Sarawak and Brunei Political Intelligence 
Report for October 1952. There is little information available on the association 
mentioned in the report, and in fact only a few of the writer's informants know of its 
existence.
28CO 1022/216, Item 5, Extract from Sarawak and Brunei Political Intelligence 
Report for January 1953.
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what was happening around them. Despite the huge wealth generated from the oil 
industry which had "recovered remarkably well"29 there was little development in the 
State and economic and social conditions had not shown much improvement. Job were 
scarce.30 Moreover as there were still no post primary and vocational education in the 
State many young Bruneis were unable to obtain skilled and better paid jobs both in 
the public service and oil industry. The situation was worsened by a high cost of 
living as a result of the post-war effects. An economic survey made by the British 
Resident's Office for the Colonial Office showed that in 1949 the cost o f living in the 
State of Brunei was "roughly three times higher than it was before the war".31 Bad 
weather caused poor harvest and the collapse of the rubber boom in 1952 caused 
economic and social hardship among the rural population. The price of rubber 
tumbled from $2.00 per pound in January to 74 cents per pound in September 1952. 
Many peasants left their padi fields and rubber holdings and sought jobs in the 
towns.32 The economic and social situation during the period caused much discontent 
among the population.
Many among educated youths felt that the main cause of the problems lay in 
the political and administrative systems of the State. The State Council which was 
supposed to make policies not only had no real power other than the British Resident's
29See CO 943/1/59706, Minute by K.P.Ashton, 24 December 1948.
30The annual State revenue recorded in 1950 was 17.3 million Straits dollars of 
which 13.2 million dollars from the export of oil. See: Brunei Annual Report, 1951, 
p. 6. The writer's informants say that many people went to neighbouring territories 
looking for jobs during the period.
31BA/0074/1983, Economic Survey for the State o f Brunei, 19 October 1949.
32Brunei Annual Report., 1952, p .14.
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power but also their members were mostly composed o f the old Traditional Ministers. 
In addition Brunei's administrative association with Sarawak had resulted in most of 
the senior posts in the Government Departments going to non-Bruneis. Towards the 
end of 1952 dissenting voices began to appear and gather momentum (see below).
It was during this period that Shiekh Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud returned 
from Indonesia. The son of a Brunei trader of Arab descent Shiekh Azahari was sent 
to Bogor, Indonesia, by the Japanese to study veterinary surgery during the 
Occupation. When the war was over he became involved in the Indonesian war of 
independence against the Dutch. He claimed to have raised to the rank of captain in 
the Indonesian National Army and given the responsibility for a district command at 
Lampong in southern Sumatra. He was later suspected of sympathising with Darul 
Islam which wanted to establish an Islamic Republic of Indonesia. He decided to 
return to Brunei when he was dismissed from the army in mid-1950.33 His application 
to return to Brunei was received with suspicion by the British authorities in the State. 
They suspected him of being an Indonesian agent or at least that his mind had been 
corrupted by Indonesian politics.34 But on an appeal by his father to the Sultan, whom 
Azahari claimed was a childhood friend, A.M. Azahari - the name by which he was 
popularly known latter - returned to Brunei in October 1952.35 The return of Azahari 
changed the political climate of the Brunei. The young people in Brunei looked to 
him to resolve their problems. Sir Anthony Abell told the Colonial Office that upon
33Interview with Azahari, February 1993. For a biographical note see 
Appendix I.
34CO 1022/396, item 1, Nuttall to the Colonial Office, 5 March 1953.
35Interview with Azahari, February 1993.
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his return to Brunei Azahari, whom he described as "a well educated fanatical 
nationalist",
"started almost immediately to stir up trouble preaching an anti-colonial and 
pro-Indonesian creed. His persuasive tongue and superior education gained 
him considerable support, particularly among the young rank and file of the 
Police and the junior grades of the Civil Service".36 
Azahari told his audiences that the sources o f their problems were: control of power 
by the British and control of economy by foreigners including the British Malayan 
Petroleum Company (BMPC). He urged them to fight to end "colonialism" and to 
secure freedom so that they could control their own destiny.37 Not surprisingly the 
British authorities were apprehensive and suspicious of Azahari's activities.
Not long after his arrival Azahari called a meeting to promote his idea of 
forming a Malay trading company to be known as the Brunei Film Production 
Company or BRUFICO, and started collecting funds. But before it was registered the 
State Council declared BRUFICO an illegal association. To justify the ban the High 
Commissioner informed the Colonial Office that
"Azahari was using his influence to undermine the authority of the Sultan 
whom he described as a stooge of the British. He and followers are said to 
have found a secret society which demands the taking of an oath on the Koran 
and enjoins secrecy and loyalty to a movement for "merdeka" (freedom). ...the 
Resident made enquiries into the activities of the Film Company and found 
that it was without financial backing or experience and was, in fact, no more
36CO 1022/396, item 8, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 10 March 1953.
37Interviews with various people in Brunei between January 1992 to May 1993.
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than a swindle and a cover for Azahari's other activities and, of course, a 
means whereby he could collect funds either for himself or for political
38purposes .
On 23 January 1953 Azahari organised a protest against the ban in Brunei Town. 
Banners depicting anti-British slogans and calling for freedom and independence were 
carried in a procession of about one hundred people from Azahari's father's house to 
the British Resident's office, a quarter kilometre away. The procession ended 
peacefully after the British Resident, Barcroft, agreed to meet Azahari and three o f his 
supporters but "not when they were supported by an illegal gathering".39 But to the 
astonishment of Azahari and his followers, a few days later he and seven others were 
summoned before the Magistrate - A.T.Shaw, the Assistant British Resident - and 
sentenced to a year's imprisonment and fined $500 for organising an unlawful 
assembly. On an appeal Azahari's sentence was reduced to six months and the others 
to three months.40
A British owned newspaper in Singapore criticised the sentences as "harsh" and 
commented "Brunei is likely to make headlines again if its courts and its officials do 
not move a little more with the times".41 In fact the court decision showed how 
nervous the British officials and the BMPC were over these developments. Following 
the BRUFICO incident the BMPC in Brunei informed its headquarters in London of 
"Communist activities" in the State. The oil company "was very willing to give any
38CO 1022/396, item 8, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 10 March 1953.
39Ibid.
A0Ibid.
4]The Straits Budget, 12 March 1953.
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assistance they could, either financially or otherwise, regarding the question of 
increased police protection".42 Fearing a Communist uprising in Brunei the British 
authorities deployed "eighty non-Malay police reinforcements" from North Borneo in 
the oil town of Seria and Brunei Town on the day Azahari's court appeal was heard.43 
The High Commissioner credited the presence of the North Borneo police to averting 
unrest in Brunei. Although he believed that the situation did not warrant the 
declaration of a State of Emergency in Brunei he told the Secretary of State that he 
believed it was important
"to improve the contact between the people and the Sultan and his advisors by 
broadening the basis of representation in the State Council ...and the urgency 
of the need to make rapid progress in this matter is fully appreciated both by 
the Sultan and myself'.44 
As will be seen in the next section, in May 1953 the Sultan announced a proposal for 
a written Constitution in which he promised to bring about greater participation of his 
subjects in the administration of his Government. At the same time he launched $100 
million Five-Year Development Plan for Brunei, aimed at "turning Brunei into the 
most modem welfare State in the region".45
42CO 1022/396, item 1, W.L.F.Nuttle to Colonial Office, 5 March 1953 and 
enclosure: an extract of letter from the Managing Director of the BMPC in Brunei 
dated 11 February 1953.
43CO 1022/396, item 8, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 10 March 
1953.
44 Ibid.
45CO 1022/396, item 9, High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary of State, 13 
May 1953.
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2.2 The Sultan 's Constitutional Proposal
On 12 May 1953 Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin, announced his Constitutional 
proposals, which had been approved by the State Council, in the Lapau (Court House) 
in Brunei Town. He said:
"For sometime it has been my intention and desire to grant to my people a 
written Constitution, by means of which proper provision can be made for the 
government and well-being of our State of Brunei. It is my wish to set out in 
this Constitution, firstly, the laws by which the succession to the Sultanate 
shall be secured, and such other matters relating to the Sovereign and his 
family as is right and proper; and secondly, the composition, powers and duties 
of the State Council, together with the rules for the conduct of the State 
business and for the making of laws".46 
The Sultan added that the prosperity and progress of the State, the advancement of 
education and knowledge, together with the experience he had gained in his travels 
outside the State, persuaded him that reforms were required in the Constitution of the 
State Council. He wanted to enlarge the members of the Council to include his 
subjects who were best qualified to advise him for the advancement of the State.47 I t  
was also his intention to establish District Councils in each of the four districts in the 
State. The members of the Councils would be appointed by him from "local persons 
of proved loyalty, integrity and ability" and the functions o f the Councils would be to
46CO 1022/396, item 12, "Announcement by Sultan of Brunei", enclosure in High
Commissioner to Secretary of State, 13 May 1953.
A1Ibid.
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tender advice to him and his State Council in matters of local interest and to assist 
him in the administration and development of the districts. It was his hope that in due 
course the people of those areas would assist him to select suitable persons to sit on 
the Councils. It was also the Sultan's intention the District Councils would select from 
among their members "persons of such ability and distinction" that he could invite 
them to sit on the State Council with his traditional advisers and assist him in the 
government of the State.48
2.3 The Constitutional Advisory Committee
Having proclaimed his Constitutional proposals, the Sultan, after discussion 
with the British Resident, appointed a Committee of seven Malay members, to advise 
him on how best his proposal could be fulfilled.49 Although the State Legal Officer, 
who was in fact the Deputy Legal Adviser of Sarawak seconded to the Brunei 
Government, was appointed as the adviser to the Constitutional Advisory Committee 
he never attended any meetings of the Committee or gave any advice. Pengiran Yusuf 
(see below) believes that the Sultan, against the advice of the British Resident, wanted 
to make the ascertaining of the people's opinion was to be a "wholly Brunei affair".50 
In his report to Allan Lennox-Boyd, the new Secretary of State, on 5 August 1954, 
Sir Anthony Abell said the Constitution Committee was
"a body which appeared to satisfy public-opinion and certainly represented a
A*Ibid.
49CO 1030/133, item 1, High Commissioner to Secretary of States, 5 August 1954.
50Interview with Pengiran Yusuf, April 1993.
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wide diversity of views ranging from the very advanced opinions o f the 
teaching profession to the strictly orthodox and reactionary convictions of the 
mosque officials".51 
The members of the Committee were:
Pengiran Maharaja Laila Pengiran Muda Kahar bin Pengiran Pemanca Pengiran 
Anak Mohd.Yassin, (member of the State Council and the Third Traditional 
Minister after Pengiran Bendahara and Pengiran Pemanca who was elected as 
the Chairman);
Pengiran Syahbandar Pengiran Haji Mohd.Salleh bin Pengiran Anak Haji 
Muhammad (member of the State Council who was also the Chief of Kathi);52 
Pehin Orang Kay a Di-Gadong Haji Mohd.Yusof bin Pehin Jawatan 
Dalam Haji Awang Muhammad Hussain, (member of the State Council and a 
well known local businessman);
Pehin Orang Kaya Syahbandar Haji Ahmad bin Haji Muhammad Daud, 
(District Officer of Belait);
Pengiran Yusuf bin Pengiran Haji Abd.Rahim, (Malay School teacher from 
Temburong District who was elected as the Secretary. He was also the former 
Deputy President of the defunct Barisan Pemuda);
Pegiran Ali bin Pengiran Haji Mohd.Daud, (Malay School teacher from 
Brunei/Muara District and a leading member of the Brunei Malay Teachers' 
Association); and
51 CO 1030/133, item 1, High Commissioner to Secretary o f State, 5 August 1954.
52A Kathi is a Muslim judge.
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Awang Abu Bakar bin Jambul, (farmer and mosque Imam from Tutong
District).53
The first task of the Committee, as instructed by the Sultan in his announcement on 
12 May 1953, was to visit all the principal centres of population, to meet and discuss 
the Constitutional proposals to ensure the support of the people in that important step 
forward in the political development of the State. The Sultan also instructed the 
Committee to record in writing the views of the people so that he "could study them 
in detail".54
He further elaborated the duties of the Committee when he met its members 
on 3 July 1953. Firstly to explain the meaning of the proclamation to the people, 
secondly to seek on their opinion on the proposal and lastly, to ask them to nominate 
a person from their area to be a member of the proposed District Council. The Sultan 
also instructed the Committee to explain to the people that appointments to the State 
Council would be from members of each District Council, their numbers varying 
according to the population and size of the area. The Sultan also told the 
Constitution Committee to explain to the people the proposed Succession Laws "so 
that they would know that the successor to the throne would be chosen by the people 
from the sons of the reigning Sultan".55
53BA 0753/1983, BRO 302/53, Minutes of meeting of the Constitutional Advisory 
Committee, 1 July 1953. For biographical notes of the members of the Committee see 
Appendix I.
54CO 1022/396, item 12, Announcement by Sultan...
55BA 0753/1983, BRO 303/53, Minutes of Meeting of the Constitutional 
Committee with the Sultan at the Istana Darul Hana, 3 July 1953.
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These were the duties of the Constitutional Advisory Committee as outlined 
by the Sultan. However, the British Resident - repeating what the High Commissioner 
"understood to be His Highness's wishes in connection with the duties of ...[the] 
Committee" - told the Deputy Legal Adviser, that the duties of the Committee were: 
firstly, "to consult with the people regarding the present system of Headman" and 
secondly, to "explain the proposal for District Council".56 In regard to the system of 
the village Headman or Ketua Kampong the Committee was to consult the people to 
find out if the existing system was acceptable or if they desired some change. If 
change was desired the Committee was to find out whether the people wanted Ketua 
Kampong to be elected or whether they preferred a system of one Ketua for each 
village or a Village Committee to manage their affairs, possibly with the Headman as 
its Chairman. Having recorded the desires and wishes of the majority of people the 
Committee was to record its own recommendation.57
Then the Committee was asked to explain the proposal for the District Councils 
and in consultation with the people to make recommendations where the Councils 
should be, by taking into account the number o f the population, size of the area and 
other similar factors. In the composition of the Councils the British Resident 
suggested that "any person normally resident in the State of Brunei, whatever race or 
creed, should be eligible to sit on the District Council" and also that "the principal 
interests in each district for example commerce, agriculture, etc. should ...have
56BA 0753/1983, BRO 302/53, British Resident to Deputy Legal Adviser, 23 June 
1953.
57The existing system of Penghulu and Ketua Kampong were introduced by the 
British Resident in 1931 based on the practices in the Malay States in Malaya. Each 
Penghulu and Ketua Kampong was appointed by the British Resident and his main 
duties were to collect taxes and to oversee law and order in his village.
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representation on the Council". The British Resident then told the Deputy Legal 
Adviser:
"The most difficult problem that you will have to solve is how members are 
to be elected, selected or nominated to the District Councils. We want the 
people themselves to tell His Highness whom they would like as their 
representative. How can this best be done? As His Excellency [the High 
Commissioner] told you we cannot at this juncture employ the ballot system, 
nor do we particularly wish to do so, but there will have to be some form of 
election and it is for you to recommend a system most suitable to Brunei".58 
To assist the Deputy Legal Adviser in his deliberations the British Resident cited the 
system in force in Sarawak which was based on proportionate representation among 
the different the races. Finally the British Resident reminded the Deputy Legal 
Advisor that it was agreed between him and the High Commissioner that "the future 
composition of the State Council and other matters mentioned in the Sultan's address 
should stand over to a later date".59
Thus from the outset there were some substantive differences between the 
Sultan and the British authorities on the conception of the proposed new Constitution. 
These differences became more apparent later in the drafting stages (see section 2.5 
below). Meanwhile, the Constitutional Advisory Committee began their duties on 14 
July 1953. The Committee visited more than eighty centres of population throughout 
the State. Pengiran Yusuf, the Chairman of the Committee, recalls that the response
58BA 0753/1983, BRO 302/53, British Resident to Deputy Legal Adviser, 23 June
1953.
59Ibid.
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of the people to the Sultan's Constitutional proposal was overwhelming. The people 
who participated in the discussions were mainly the young educated sections o f the 
society particularly school teachers and they spoke with eloquence on subjects such 
as democracy, self-government and independence. "Obviously", he says, "they 
followed up political developments in the neighbouring countries".60 By the end of the 
year the Constitutional Advisory Committee had completed its tour o f Brunei. The 
Sultan was pleased with the work of the Committee and encouraged by the support 
from the people. In early 1954 the Committee was instructed to visit the various 
States in the Malay Peninsula, to study their Constitutions and administrative 
procedure and to submit a report.61
During the two week-tour of Malaya the Committee visited Johore, Kelantan, 
Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan and held discussions with the Menteri Besar, and 
senior officials in each State. Their discussions touched on the Federal and State 
Constitutions; the 1948 Federation of Malaya Agreement; religious affairs; elections 
to town, village, and state councils; state and district development, and information 
services.62 The Committee also visited government offices and secretariats; state 
councils; municipal offices; state and district development boards; schools, and other 
authorities to understand the working of these bodies. Included in their studies were 
also security and military matters which involved a visit to a home guard training 
centre, a Malay Regiment depot, and the Federation Military College.63 In short the
60Interview with Pengiran Yusuf, April 1993.
61 Brunei Annual Report., 1953, p. 2.
62The Borneo Bulletin, 6 February 1954.
63 Ibid.
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Committee's study tour was comprehensive and educational for the members. 
Pengiran Ali recalls a piece of advice given to the members o f the Committee by their 
brethren in the Malay States: "that in the proposed Constitution Brunei should 
maintain its features as a Malay, Islamic Sultanate to safeguard it from foreign 
influence and infiltration".64
2.4 The Constitutional Advisory Committee's Report
The Constitutional Advisory Committee submitted its report to the Sultan on 
23 March 1954,65 stressing that it reflected the wishes, demands and desires of the 
people.66 The Report focused on six main issues. These were: (a) The relations 
between Brunei and Britain, (b) The Government and matters affecting it.
(c) membership and composition of the State and District and Municipal Councils, (d) 
The Selection process for Village Headmen; (e) the question o f succession laws and 
matters relating to sovereign and his family; (f) and other socio-political issues such 
as Malay rights, language, army, oil industry, Muslims laws etc. The report began by 
stressing that "the policy of the Government [of Brunei] should be that o f 'Islam 
Democracy' (sic) and that the Government shall always have a sovereign Sultan, who
64Interview with Pengiran Ali, April 1993.
65A copy of the original report, courtesy of Dato Haji Marsal bin Maun. The 
English translation is found in CO 1030/133, item 10, High Commissioner to 
Secretary of State, 23 March 1955, Annexure I. Information in this section is based 
on both documents, otherwise stated.
66The Committee to the Sultan, 23 March 1954. The letter accompanying the 
Constitutional Report, in CO 1030/113, item 10, High Commissioner to Secretary of 
State, 23 March 1955, Annexure 1.
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has full authority in the country".67 It recommended that all treaties between Britain 
and Brunei should "be renewed and amended" to achieve the object of the proposed 
Constitution. It stressed that Brunei being an "Independent Malay State under a Malay 
Sovereign", should maintain its friendly relations with Britain which had agreed to 
accord a degree of protection.68 The powers vested in the High Commissioner, whose 
appointment should be confirmed by the Sultan with the advice of the State Council, 
should be transferred to the Sultan-in-Council, although he should retain the right to 
advise on matters other than the religion and customs of the Brunei Malay. The 
British Resident should be known as the "British Adviser" and, in contrast to the 
1905/1906 Supplementary Agreement, would be responsible to advise the Sultan in 
Government and political matters but not interfere with Islam and customs of Brunei 
Malays. Further it stressed: "the Sultan may listen to his advice which he considers 
good and beneficial for the progress of the State".69 This implied that the Sultan was 
not obliged to "take and act" upon the British Resident's advice. The candidate for 
the post of British Adviser had to be approved by the Sultan in Council. He was 
expected to be a senior officer; conversant in Malay language and understand Malay 
customs. Another significant change was the proposal that the British Resident's 
executive powers should be transferred to the Menteri Besar (Chief Minister), a 
position that was to be newly created and adopted from the existing system in the 
Malay States. The Menteri Besar who would hold office for at least five years was 
to be selected from among senior officers and should be a "pure Brunei Malay"
67Part A, Paragraph I.
68Part A, Paragraph II.
69Part A, Paragraph V (2).
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(Melayu Brunei Jati)10 and a Muslim. The selection of a. Menteri Besar must have the 
advice and consent of the Jamaah Pemangku Negeri (see below) and the approval of 
the State Council. There was also a provision for a Deputy Menteri Besar. The 
report also recommended the appointment of Setiausaha Kerajaan (State Secretary) 
responsible for the administration of the State and who would be the highest official 
in respect of administrative matters. The Setiausaha Kerajaan should be selected from 
the Brunei Government officers and must be also a "pure Brunei Malay" and a 
Muslim. Assistants Setiausaha Kerajaan should also be appointed and should also be 
"pure Brunei Malays" and Muslims. There should also be two other senior officers: 
a State Financial Officer, whom had to be a Malay and a Muslim, but not specifically 
a "pure Brunei Malay"; and a Legal Adviser.71
The Committee's Report found that the composition of the existing State 
Council did not give sufficient opportunity for the people to participate in the 
governing of the country. The report recommended that membership of the Council 
be expanded to twenty eight from twelve, including fourteen "unofficial" members. 
The "unofficial" members were to be elected directly by members of the four District 
Councils themselves. Each District Council would send representatives to the State 
Council in proportion to the size of its population: one from Temburong, two from 
Tutong, four from Belait and seven from Brunei/Muara Districts. The new State 
Council, which would be known as Majlis Masyuarat Negeri, would be presided over 
by the Menteri Besar. In addition to its powers to pass legislation the Council should 
also have the right "to advise and assist the Sultan in governing the State". However,
70In contrast to Malays/Muslims assimilated into the society.
71 See Part A, Paragraphs VII - X.
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for detailed matters of administration the report recommended the establishment o f an 
Executive Council or Majlis Masyuarat Kerajaan, comprising two official and not less 
than five "unofficial" members appointed by the District and State Councils. In 
addition, the Executive Council should have the following ex-officio members: the 
Sultan as the chairman, the British Adviser, the Menteri Besar, the State Secretary, the 
State Financial Officer and the Legal Adviser.
The report supported the Sultan's proposal for establishing a District Council 
in each of the four districts in Brunei. The proposal was widely supported by the 
people because they felt their voices and demands could now heard in the Councils. 
The report also contained a list of names from each district, which it claimed were 
representatives elected by the people during the Committee's tour of the State. 
However, in future the report recommended that two-thirds of members of the District 
Councils should be elected directly by the people themselves through secret ballot, 
while the remaining one-third should be appointed by Government. The qualifications 
for a person to be a member of a District Council were that they should be a Brunei 
citizen, over twenty-one years old, and understand Malay Language. Regarding the 
qualifications for the electorate, the report recommended they should be subjects of 
the Sultan of Brunei or should have lived in Brunei for more than fifteen years before 
the date of the election and be over 21 years of age. A General Election should be 
held every three years to elect new members of the District Councils.
The report suggested that the Chairman for each District Council should be 
elected by and from among the members of the Council. Similar procedures were to 
be used for the Councils' representatives to the State Council. The main functions of 
the District Councils, as recommended by the report, -should be to discuss matters
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relating to the administration, development and public welfare. However, the report 
also recommended that all new legislation should be discussed in the District Councils 
before they were considered in the State Council.
In order to accelerate development aimed at improving the livelihood of the 
people in the State, the report recommended the establishment of two Municipal 
Councils: one in Brunei Town (for Brunei, Muara, Tutong and Temburong), and one 
in Kuala Belait (for areas in the Belait districts). Although there were already two 
Sanitary Boards established under the Sanitary Board Enactment of 1920, the report 
felt they were inadequate. The Municipal Councils, the report recommended, would 
be involved in planning and carrying out developments on a larger scale, for the 
benefit of residents not only in towns but also villages outside the urban areas.
At the bottom of the administrative hierarchy were village Headmen. The 
report recommended that the existing system of headmen should be reorganised and 
upgraded. A village headman should be elected every three years by the residents of 
the respective villages. Every headman should be given an allowance of between 
twenty and sixty-five dollars depending on the number of inhabitants in his village. 
All headmen were answerable to a Penghulu who would be responsible for overseeing 
a Mukim  composing a number of villages. Unlike a village Headman the Penghulu 
should be given a salary like any other Government officer. A Penghulu should also 
be elected every five years. The qualifications for standing for the post of a Penghulu 
were that they should be a Brunei subject; at least twenty-one years of age; be able 
to read and write Malay; have attained Higher Standard in School; knowledgeable in 
Islam and Brunei customs; understand agriculture and be conversant with the land 
laws. At the district level, the report recommended a post of Dato Penghulu to be
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created for each district. Qualifications for the Dato Penghulu were similar to those 
for a Penghulu. Instead of being elected, the Dato Penghulu was to be appointed by 
the District Council and would become an ex-officio member of the Council. His post 
should be permanent and salaried. He should be given powers similar to those of a 
Third Class Magistrate.
The report also outlined its recommendations on the questions of succession 
laws and matters relating to the Sovereign and his families. For nominating the Sultan 
and the heir apparent, the report recommended the establishment o f a council called 
Jamaah Pemangku Negeri.12 Its members should consist of: all the Traditional 
Ministers, all Malay members of the State Council, one Menteri Darat from every 
district and two or three "suitable persons" from the blood royal. The Council would 
also be given the power to nominate persons to be appointed as "Brunei dignitaries" 
by the Sultan.
The report stressed that the Sultan and his heir must be Malay of Brunei Royal 
Blood, a male, and a Muslim. The future successors to the throne of Brunei should 
be the descendants of Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III, the then ruler. If, however, the 
Jamaah Pemangku Negeri found that the rightful heir was not fit to be Sultan, for 
reasons such as physical handicap or qualities which according to Shara'13 jeopardise 
his right to become Sultan, then, the nomination should go to the descendants of 
Sultan Muhammad Jamal-ul-Alam, on the father's side, then to descendants of Sultan 
Hashim Jalil-ul-Alam Aqamaddin, also on the father's side. If  there was still no 
rightful nominee to be found, then it would be the responsibility of the Jamaah
72Translated as "Supporters of the Country" in the English version o f the report.
73Islamic law.
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Pemangku Negeri to select a suitable candidate with the consent o f the State and 
District Councils. The late Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin did not leave a male heir that his 
descendants were left out from the proposed succession laws.74
The report also recommended that when a Sultan who was under twenty-one 
years of age came to the throne, two Regents; or a Council of Regency must be 
appointed until the Sultan was twenty-one. Regents or a Council of Regents would 
be appointed and dismissed by Jamaah Pemangku Negeri with the consent of the State 
and District Councils.
Although the report recommended that the Sultan should be given full authority 
over the country's internal and external affairs, the Sultan and his heirs and relatives 
should not be given the power to cede the State o f Brunei or any part of her 
dependencies to any authority or Government for whatever reasons or cause. If  he did 
so, the report said, "he was breaching the trust given to him by the people and 
breaching promises he had given to Allah and, under such circumstances the people 
were no longer obliged to pay their allegiance to him".75 Any agreement made by the 
Sultan with foreign authorities, or powers, presumably including with Britain, should 
be agreed by the members of the State and District Councils. The report also stressed 
that in ruling the country the Sultan should comply with the policy and provisions of 
the Constitution and the State Laws, which, from time to time, would be enforced . 
In short, the report recommended that the Sultan should rule according to the 
Constitution and Laws of the State.
74See pages 73-75.
75Part B, paragraph IX.
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The report also stressed that the interests and rights of the Malays must be 
protected. Steps should be taken to improve their livelihood by better access to 
education and assistance in their social and economic pursuits. Fearing that the 
Malays in Brunei would be swamped by immigrants as in Malaya, the report 
recommended that migration of foreigners into Brunei should be restricted. Only the 
following indigenous races, who were residing in Brunei, should be recognised as, and 
given equal rights to, the Malays: Muruts, Bisayas, Kedayans, Dusuns, Tutongs and 
Belaits.76 The Brunei Malays residing outside Brunei were allowed to return without 
any restrictions. Foreigners who had resided in Brunei for fifteen years or more were 
allowed to stay permanently in Brunei.
For the same reasons the report recommended that Brunei should always 
remain separated from Sarawak and North Borneo. However, if there should be a 
suggestion of uniting the three territories under a federation, it recommended that 
Sarawak and North Borneo be restored to Brunei because '’historically they were the 
property of the State and the Sultan of Brunei".77 In order that Brunei could stand on 
its own feet, the report recommended that a national army to be formed as soon as 
possible. The army should only be composed of Brunei Malays, and it should be 
known as Askar Brunei or Brunei Regiment. In relation to this the report stressed that 
no foreign military of any description should be asked or allowed to enter or allowed 
to be posted in Brunei, except when there was reason to believe that their presence 
was needed in the country and even then only with the consent of the State Council 
and District Councils.
76See Table 3 on page 24.
77Part A, paragraph XXI.
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The report also recommended Malay as the Official Language and Islam as the 
Official Religion of the State. Freedom of worship for other religions was allowed. 
In fact the report also recommended that the people should be afforded with freedom 
of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly in an organisation, freedom 
from poverty and fear, and freedom to participate in politics, even if they were 
Government Servants. Every person residing in Brunei should be entitled to protection 
by the laws of the State and nobody should be detained or banished unless found 
guilty of an offence under the law. But the report emphasized that every person 
residing in Brunei, no matter what nationality and race, he or she must comply with 
the Laws enforced in Brunei without any exceptions.
The last part o f the report contained mainly the grievances of the people: for 
example on high cost of living, salaries and privileges of Government Servants, 
conditions of labourers, wages and laws protecting them. The report recommended 
that a Social Welfare body should be established to investigate the social conditions 
of the people and set programmes to help the needy. The report also recorded the 
people's demands for improvement in the infrastructure of the State such as roads, 
clean water and more facilities for education and training such as secondary schools, 
agriculture and technical schools.
Regarding the oil industry the report recommended that all agreements entered 
into with the British Malayan Petroleum Company (BMPC) should be reviewed and 
renewed. It suggested that the Brunei Government should have equal shares. At the 
expiry date of an agreement, oil wells should be restored to the Government o f Brunei 
for management. The report was not happy with the policy of the Oil Company to 
send crude oil to be refined at Lutong in Sarawak. It recommended that a refinery
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plant should be built in Brunei. The report urged the Government to form a 
permanent committee to supervise matters concerning oil production, embarkation and 
other activities of the oil company. The report also urged the BMPC to train more 
local persons. The report wanted the excessive flow of unskilled labourers, in 
reference to the BMPC, from outside Brunei to be stopped because they deprived 
many local people of jobs.
Finally the report recommended that Muslim laws be enacted and enforced in 
Brunei. In connection with this an independent Religious Department should be 
established to settle and adjudicate on matters touching Muslim laws. Further it 
recommended that an establishment of a Majlis Tinggi Agama Islam or a High Muslim 
Religious Council and a post of Mufti to be created. To reflect that Brunei was a 
Muslim-Malay State the report requested that the Government Offices be closed on 
Fridays, and instead be opened for a full day, or half day on Sundays.
2.5 Formation of District Advisory Councils
In his report to the Colonial Office on 5 August 1954 Sir Anthony Abell 
expressed his satisfaction with the Constitutional Advisory Committee's Report. The 
High Commissioner said it was surprising that the Committee should submit a 
"unanimous report", but he had "no doubt minor political differences were 
subordinated to the strongly nationalist views held by all members of the Committee 
from the Chairman, the Maharaja Laila (the Third Minister) down".78 Sir Anthony
78CO 1030/113, item 1, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 5 August 1954.
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Abell added that:
"the Committee went outside its terms of reference in reporting, with obvious 
approval and relish, some of the more vexatious views of those who attended 
meetings with the Committee in the State. These meetings have, I think, 
proved a useful safety valve and a valuable indication to the Administration of 
the feelings of the younger educated element in the State. There is no doubt 
at all that events in Indonesia and Malaya are watched with the closest 
attention, and that political progress is a matter of great moment to a rapidly 
increasing section of the community. As I have previously reported to you, 
there is some urgency in obtaining a revision of the Treaty with Brunei, and 
a reconsideration of the position of the Resident vis a vis the Sultan and the 
State Council. But on the whole the report is moderate in tone and stresses the 
sincere friendliness and permanence of relationship between the United 
Kingdom and the State of Brunei".79 
He advised the Colonial Office that on the subject of constitutional advance the 
Committee's main recommendations could be accepted in principle by the Sultan in 
Council. In July 1954 Sir Anthony Abell held a series of meetings with the Sultan, 
the State Council and the Constitutional Advisory Committee. He said:
"throughout these negotiations His Highness had shown great wisdom and 
firmness in pursuing a middle course between the reckless ambitions of some 
of the young educated elements, who are represented by a strong and vocal
19Ibid.
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body of school teachers ...and his own immediate hereditary advisers who
naturally prefer the status quo...".80
In its meeting on 5 July 1954 the State Council, which the High Commissioner 
attended, accepted the recommendation of the Constitutional Report for the 
establishment immediately of four District Advisory Councils at the four main centres 
of population, i.e Brunei Town, Kuala Belait, Bangar and Tutong Town. However in 
contrast to the Report's recommendation that two-third of the members of each 
Council should be elected, the decision endorsed by the State Council was that all 
appointments to the Councils would be made by "the Sultan after consulting public 
opinion by traditional methods". It was also decided that no more than half the seats 
in each Council would be given to the traditional representatives of the Sultan - the 
Headmen and Penghulu - and the remainder to other elements in the community 
including representatives of the Chinese, Dayaks and the BMPC.81 As a very large 
body of educated opinion in the State was represented by the Government Servants, 
the Sultan agreed to appoint a limited number of them to seats on the District 
Councils. However this was on the understanding that it was a temporary measure 
and if there was a conflict of loyalties their duty was "to support the policy of His 
Highness' Government to the full".82
*°Ibid.
8,Ibid.; BA/0343/83, (BRO/462/54), Extract of Minutes of State Council Meeting 
on 5 July 1954.
nIbid.
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Following the decision of the State Council to set up the District Advisory 
Councils the "progressives in the Constitution Committee with considerable cunning 
and a sense of timing" announced that they had already held preliminary elections and 
had ascertained the wishes of the people during their tour of the State, and produced 
for the Sultan's approval a list o f persons for appointment to District Councils in 
which the teaching profession held a powerful majority in these proposals.83 However 
the Sultan, supported by Sir Anthony Abell, was firmly of the opinion that there could 
be no question of holding elections until the educational programme was further 
advanced and the necessary machinery and safeguards were established by law.84 In 
order that there would not be too much "loss of face" the Sultan promised to give full 
consideration to the list of candidates produced by the Committee. Sir Anthony Abell 
warned the Sultan that the agitation for full elections would increase and that "it 
would be unwise to delay unduly the setting-up of the necessary machinery".
The State Council had also endorsed the Committee's proposal that each 
District Council would select one to three of its members, depending on the size and 
importance of the district, to sit as "observers" in the State Council. Thus it was 
agreed that the Tutong and Temburong Councils should have one "observer" each, the 
Belait Council, two "observers" and the Brunei/Muara Council, three "observers". The 
Sultan had undertaken to promote those "observers" to full membership when he was 
satisfied that the District Councils were well established and working satisfactorily. 
This would mean an addition o f seven members to the Council, increasing its 
membership from twelve to nineteen. Sir Anthony Abell commented: "There is
*3Ibid.
uIbid.
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nothing very spectacular about these first tentative steps but they do represent a 
considerable readjustment of outlook in the last remaining stronghold of Malay 
feudalism".85
On 27 September 1954 the first District Advisory Council was established in 
the Brunei Town. In its inaugural meeting the Council elected a chairman and his 
deputy and three others, as "observers" in the State Council. In the following month 
similar Councils were established in the other three districts. According to the rules 
read by the Chairman of the Brunei/Muara District Council on the first meeting o f the 
Council that meetings should be held at least once in three months but not more than 
once a month. The Chairman should be responsible for the preparation o f the minutes 
of the meetings and the transmission of important matters which were thought fit to 
be referred to the State Council through the British Resident.86
Table 4: Membership of District Advisory Councils
D istr ic ts P en g h u lu /
K etu a
K a m p o n g
E lec ted  
b y  P eo p le
A d d itio n a l
G ovt.
n o m in e e s
D istr ic t
O fficer s
T ota l O b serv ers  in 
th e  S tate  
C o u n c il
B ru n ei/M u ara 16 14 5 1 3 6 3
B e la it 10 7 6 * 1 2 4 2
T u to n g 9 6 3 1 19 1
T em b u ro n g 6 0 5 1 12 1
T ota l 4 1 2 7 18 4 9 0 7
S ou rce: C o m p ile d  from  B ritish  R e s id e n t O ffic e 's  N o tif ica tio n , N o .  1 6 7 /1 9 5 4 , 11 S ep tem b er  1 9 S 4 . 
N o te :  3 C h in ese ;  3  B M P C 's R ep resen ta tiv es.
*5Ibid.
86BA/0353/1983, Minutes of the Brunei/Muara Advisory District Councils held on 
27 September 1954.
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On 17 November 1954 the "observers" took their seats in the State Council.87 
In welcoming them the Sultan hoped that they would gain experience in watching the 
deliberations of the Council. In outlining the duty o f the "observers" John Gilbert, the 
British Resident, told the new members of the State Council that:
"The duty of the observers is merely to listen and report back to the District 
Advisory Councils at the next meeting. I f  any matter arises which is of 
definite interest to the Advisory Councils, and His Highness wishes to hear the 
opinion of the various District Councils, after due notice having been given he 
will call upon the observer to address the Council. If the District Advisory 
Councils especially wish their observers to address the State Council on any 
matter, they will inform the British Resident at least 14 days before the State 
Council meets giving him a brief resume of the speech. The British Resident 
and His Highness will then decide whether or not to allow the request and the 
District Council will be so informed".88
87The following councillors were elected as "observers" in the State Council: 
Brunei/Muara District Council
Marsal bin Maun - Superintendent of Malay Education.
Pengiran Ali bin Pengiran Mohd.Daud - School teacher.
Pengiran Abu Bakar bin Pengiran Omar - District Officer.
Bel ait District
Pengiran Bahar bin Pengiran Syahbandar - District Officer.
Tan Poh Siong - Chinese Community leader.
Tutong District.
Abdul Manan bin Mohammad - School teacher.
Temburong District
Pengiran Abu Bakar bin Pengiran Pemanca - District Officer.
88BA/0343/83 (BRO/462/54), Extract of Minutes of State Council Meeting on 17 
November 1954.
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At the end of 1955 the Brunei Annual Report observed that the establishment of the 
District Advisory Councils proved successful. For first time the people from the rural 
areas had been able to air their complaints and views openly which "generally directed 
towards the improvements of water supplies, communications and other social 
services", and thus "kept the Heads of Departments on their toes".89
2.6 Drafting the Constitution Enactment
In August 1954, after the successful discussions in Brunei, Sir Anthony Abell 
informed the Colonial Office that the next step would "not be an unduly difficult one" 
if the District Councils and the "observers" in the State Council acted wisely and 
tactfully. It was to prepare for the necessary legislation establishing the District 
Councils and the reorganised State Council and defining their powers and 
responsibilities. He also said that they had reached a stage where the Sultan and he 
were prepared to consider a first draft of a Constitution for Brunei which would 
embody the reorganised State Council and the District Councils and lay down the 
succession laws. He had also reached sufficient agreement on the draft of an 
enactment defining a citizen of Brunei which was a necessary preliminary to the 
codification of the Constitution.90
In early December a conference was held in Kuching to prepare a draft o f the 
proposed Constitution. The meeting was chaired by Cecil Thomas, the Officer
*9Brunei Annual Report, 1955, p. 3.
90CO 1030/113, item 1, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 5 August 1954.
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Administering the Government of Sarawak and Acting High Commissioner,91 and 
attended by J.H. Ellis, the Secretary to the High Commissioner, George Strickland, 
Q.C., the Sarawak Legal Adviser, and R.H. Hickling, the Deputy Legal Adviser. 
Neither the Sultan's representatives nor the members o f the Constitution Committee 
were invited to the conference. Nevertheless the conference used the Committee's 
Report as the basis for drafting the new Constitution. They, however, found that 
further research would be necessary to establish clearly the details of the traditions and 
customs governing the succession and other matters of constitutional importance.92 
Thus in early November 1954, Hickling was directed to go to Brunei to prepare the 
legal and other documents required for drafting the new constitution. He held 
discussions with many people in Brunei, including the Sultan and the Pengiran 
Bendahara.93
On 17 December Thomas, accompanied by Gilbert,94 and by Hickling, 
presented the draft proposals to the Sultan and his two Wazir, the Pengiran Bendahara 
and the Pengiran Pemanca 95 After lengthy discussions Thomas informed the Colonial 
Office that: "His Highness and the two Wazir accepted them [the draft proposals]
91 Sir Anthony Abell was on leave in the United Kingdom.
92CO 1030/133, item 11, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 23 March 
1955.
93Interview with Professor Dr.R.H.Hickling, June 1993. Hickling's findings in 
Brunei are compiled in R.H.Hickling, Memorandum Upon Brunei Constitutional 
History and Practice, January 1955. (Unpublished). A copy of the typescript is found 
in the Kuching Museum.
94For a biographical note see Appendix I.
95Datu Perdana Menteri Ibrahim bin Jahfar, the Sultan's Private Secretary and a 
member of the State Council, acted as the interpreter.
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subject to some small amendments".96 However the Sultan said they should explain 
to the State Council the reasons for not accepting all the recommendations of the 
Constitutional Committee and also to make clear to the public, when the new 
Constitution was promulgated, that it was intended only as the first step towards self- 
government and that it would be appropriately amended from time to time as the 
people gained further knowledge and experience in government. When he returned to 
Kuching, Thomas and his advisers drafted the Constitution and the Succession and 
Regency Enactments and despatched them to the Colonial Office in March 1955 for 
"advice and guidance". The Sultan had requested a copy of the final draft proposals 
before they were submitted to the Colonial Office. But Thomas and his advisers 
considered that, "having obtained the Sultan's agreement to the main provisions o f the 
proposed new Constitution, no useful purpose would be served by discussing with His 
Highness and the Wazir the details of the legal instruments designed to bring it into 
effect".97 However he felt it would be "most impolitic to refuse" and despatched two 
sets of drafts to the Colonial Office: one set, of which a copy was sent to the Sultan, 
dealt only with the points which he considered "advisable to disclose to His Highness 
at this stage of negotiations"98 while the other set contained more details of the 
proposals.99
96CO 1030/113, item 11, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 23 March 
1955.
91Ibid.
98See CO 1030/113, items 10, (Despatch No.46), High Commissioner to Secretary 
of State, 23 March 1955.
"See CO 1030/113, items 11, (Despatch No.47), High Commissioner to Secretary 
of State, 23 March 1955.
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Thomas recommended in the draft Constitution that the State Council should 
be split into three separate bodies: Privy Council; Executive Council; and Legislative 
Council. He informed the Colonial Office that since the admission of the seven 
"observers" the situation in the State Council had been unsatisfactory. During the 
meetings, which were open to public, there had been "a growing tendency for the 
Sultan and the Malay members to play to the gallery". There had also been "repeated 
attempts ...to take out of the Resident's hands many executive matters upon which 
prompt decisions are desirable and which he alone decided in the past".100 Moreover 
he said, as it was constituted the Council was difficult to summon and when in session 
was often obstructive. He proposed that the new Constitution should eliminate these 
objectionable features of the State Council and recommended that the executive and 
legislative functions should be "entrusted to separate bodies on the prevailing British 
Colonial pattern".101
Under the arrangement the new Executive Council would exclude those Malay 
members of the State Council who were "patently unfitted for such responsibilities". 
However he felt that excluding those persons, who were mainly of royal blood, would 
cause them and the Sultan's family "a loss of prestige" and he was doubtful if the 
Sultan would consent to such a move.102 To avoid the difficulty, Thomas proposed 
the establishment of a Privy Council. He said:
"To it, I proposed, should be appointed, inter alia, all those persons of birth 
and rank now serving on the State Council who are not considered suitable for
m Ibdi.
,07 bid.
W2Ibid.
108
appointment either to the Executive Council or the Legislative Council. Their 
ranks, titles and privileges would remain, their prestige might even be 
increased, but their political importance would be diminished since the limited 
functions allotted to the Privy Council, while important, are not such as would 
enable that body to interfere with or obstruct the transaction of the day-to-day 
business of the State. In this way the door can be opened to more effective 
representation upon the new Executive and Legislative Councils''.103 
A Colonial Official commented: "This is an admirable solution of an awkward 
problem".104 Moreover the establishment of the Privy Council was compatible with 
the Constitutional Committee's proposals concerning the Jamaah Pemangku Negeri,105 
Its main function was to advice the Sultan on, among other things, the royal 
succession; the exercise by the Sultan of the prerogative of mercy; the appointment 
of a Regent; all State ceremonial honours and customs; and remission of sentences on 
criminals.106 However the Sultan would not be obliged to accept the advice of the 
Council. All members of the proposed Privy Council, other than the two ex officio 
members, the British Resident and the Legal Adviser, would be appointed by the 
Sultan. However unlike the members of the Jamaah Pemangku Negeri, which would 
include all Malay members of the Executive Council and Legislative Councils, the 
members of the Privy Council, in view of its "exalted status", would not include
m Ibid.
104CO 1030/133, item 14, "Some points of policy and of general importance 
discussed in despatch No. 47, with some preliminary personal thoughts" by 
G.C.Whiteley, 14 April 1955.
105See page 95.
106CO 1030/116, Despatch 46/1955, Annexure IV.
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persons who were members of the Executive or Legislative Council, or a Local 
Authority to avoid embarrassing "conflicts of interests".107
The executive functions of the State Council would then be entrusted to an 
Executive Council or Majlis Masyuarat Kerajaan as proposed in the Constitutional 
Report. Its mebers would consist of the Sultan as President, the British Resident, 
the Legal Adviser and the State Treasurer as ex officio members, and four other 
members to be appointed by the Sultan, of whom one would be appointed from the 
Official and three from the Unofficial members of Legislative Council. The main 
function of the Executive Council would be to advise the Sultan on the formulation 
and execution of Government policy, except on matters within the preview of the 
Privy Council, and questions relating to the Public Service which were not within the 
competence o f the Public Service Commission to resolve. It was also provided that 
the Sultan could act in opposition to the advice given to him by the Members of the 
Executive Council, provided that he informed the High Commissioner and recorded 
his reasons in the Minutes of the meeting.108
107CO 1030/113, Despatch 46/1955, Annexure III.
m Ibid
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Table 5. Members of State Council December 1954
Sultan (President)
British Resident
Pengiran Bendahara (First Minister)
Pengiran Pemanca (Second Minister)
Pengiran Maharaja Laila (Third Minister)
Pengiran Haji Mohammad Salleh (Chief Kathi)
Pehin Datu Perdana Menteri Haji Ibrahim (Sultan's Private Secretary)
Pengiran kerma Indera
Pehin Orang Kaya di Gadong
George Ah Foott (Chinese Community Leader)
R.E. Hales (BMPC's Managing Director)
E.W. Cousens (State Treasurer)
7 "Observers" (Footnote 87)
Source: Compiled from Minutes of the State Council Meeting, 9 December 1954.
A Legislative Council or Majlis Masyuarat Negeri was to be established to 
carry out the legislative functions of the State Council. It would consist of three ex 
officio members: the Resident, Legal Adviser and State Treasurer; ten Official 
members; and sixteen Unofficial members. The Unofficial members, in contrast to 
the recommendations of the Constitutional Report, were not to be elected directly by 
the people but to be appointed from Local Authorities. They should also include two
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persons appointed by the Sultan to represent important interests not adequately 
represented by the Unofficial members. The Legislative Council would be given 
power to debate matters of public interest. However, the Council should not be 
empowered to proceed without the prior consent of the High Commissioner, upon any 
Bill or resolution concerning the royal succession and the Regency; citizenship; 
defence and security; public finance, currency and banking; right and privileges of 
public servants; the administration of justice; and religion. In addition, the draft 
proposals considered it essential to vest reserve powers of legislation in the High 
Commissioner.109
At the lower level, the Constitutional draft proposals considered it desirable to 
establish four to six local authorities covering the whole of the State. Thomas told the 
Colonial Office:
"One of the main obstacles to the early attainment of a sound system of 
popular government in Brunei is the people's almost complete lack of 
experience of the art of government. Local government bodies provide the 
best training ground for representatives of the people and it is an important 
part of the proposals for a new Constitution that half of the Legislative 
Council, who will constitute the main body of the Unofficial members, shall 
. be drawn from members of the Local Authorities".110 
In order to provide opportunity for the representatives of the people to gain experience 
in the art of government, Thomas recommended that the new local authorities with
W9Ibid.
110CO 1030/113, item 11, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 23 March 
1955.
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fairly wide powers should be in operation in advance of the introduction of the new 
Constitution.111
Thomas, in agreement with the Sultan, suggested that all members of the new 
local authorities should be directly nominated by the Sultan. Earlier the Sultan and 
Sir Anthony Abell had agreed that the time was not yet opportune for the holding of 
popular elections for central or local government. On the qualifications for 
membership of the local authorities the Sultan was only prepared to consider those 
who were natural-born subjects of the Sultan, i.e. a person bom in the State who was 
also a member of one of the races considered to be indigenous, or, if bom outside the 
State, whose father was at the time of his birth a natural bom subject of the Sultan or 
a British Subject. The proposal to include British protected persons who had acquired 
that status by reason of their connection with the State was opposed by the Sultan and 
his advisers. Thomas informed the Colonial Office that since all the members would 
for some time to come be appointed, and not selected, the matter was not one of 
immediate importance. Thomas noted that the reason for the Sultan and his advisers 
decision to exclude the British protected persons was that the Malays o f Brunei, in 
common with their brethren in Malaya, "lived in fear of the eventual political 
domination o f the Chinese".112
Thomas felt that it was because of this fear that the Sultan, in agreement with 
the Constitutional Report, wanted to restrict acquisition of Brunei Citizenship by 
foreigners. Thomas said: "It is known that the Sultan has for some time desired the 
creation of separate citizenship for Brunei". Although the Order in Council of 1949
u 'lbid.
U2Ibid.
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permitted the promulgation of a local citizenship law, he was not in favour of it 
because the creation of a separate citizenship for Brunei would obstruct the closer 
relationship with neighbouring British territories which was being promoted at that 
time (see Chapter 4). He suggested that the matter should be allowed to rest for the 
present, "in the hope that, if necessary, expansion could be secured later".113
The draft proposals also recommended the setting up of a Public Service 
Commission to deal with appointments to the public service other than those relating 
to employment for daily wages. Its membership was to include the British Resident 
as the Chairman ex officio, together with two Official and two Unofficial Members 
of the Legislative Council, nominated by the Sultan. The Commission would also 
have power to prescribe examinations and administer discipline in accordance with 
administrative regulations to be approved by the Sultan in the Executive Council.
In regard to the position of the High Commissioner and the British Resident 
Thomas said:
"After careful consideration with my advisers I have come to the conclusion 
that it will be necessary to retain indefinitely the posts of the High 
Commissioner and the Resident which should not reside in one person. The 
former should continue to exercise the functions of general guidance and 
oversight usually entrusted to the Governor of a Colony and the latter to 
perform the executive functions usually carried out by the Colonial Secretary 
in a Crown Colony. The rapid growing wealth of the State is leading to its 
speedy social and economic development and it is more than ever necessary
113CO 1030/113, item 11, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 23 March 
1955.
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that an experienced administrator, who is not burdened with the cares of day- 
to-day administration should be always available to guide and advise the Sultan 
and his senior officers in the exercise of their functions under the new 
Constitution. The High Commissioner's chief tasks will be to educate and 
persuade; duties which, in Brunei, will require much more time and patience 
than a senior executive officer, such as the Resident, can afford to give".114 
Realising that this proposal was in conflict with the Committee's recommendations, 
Thomas suggested the appointment of a separate High Commissioner for Brunei who 
would reside in the State. He believed that such an appointment would not only be 
well received in Brunei but also be a welcome relief to the Governor of Sarawak. In 
respect of the British Resident, Thomas acknowledged that while the Sultan was 
sympathetic to the recommendation of the Constitutional Report proposing the transfer 
of the executive functions of the Resident to a Menteri Besar, the Sultan strongly felt 
that such a change would be impracticable for a long time to come. However he said 
it would remain one of the strongest aspirations of the politically minded section of 
the Malay population in Brunei.115
Thomas told the Colonial Office that the proposed Constitution Enactment and 
the Regency and Succession Enactment had defined "the respective spheres of the 
High Commissioner, the Sultan and the Resident with some exactitude" and therefore, 
he said, it became necessary either to amend the agreements o f 1888 and 1905/1906 
or to revoke them and make a new one. He thought the latter course would be
U4Ibid.
u 5 Ibid.
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preferable because the 1888 Agreement was "inconsistent with current practice".116 
Furthermore he believed that a new treaty would be popularly welcomed in Brunei 
because the requirement in the 1905/1906 agreement, that the Resident's "advice must 
be asked and taken", was regarded as an affront to the national dignity. He suggested 
that "in lieu of this requirement it would be suffice if, in the new agreement, the 
Sultan were to undertake loyally to observe the provisions of the Constitution 
Enactment in the letter and spirit and to exercise his powers and authorities in 
accordance therewith".117 For the rest, he said, the new treaty, would contain the usual 
provisions regarding the conduct of external affairs, defence, etc. The Sultan would 
require a clear undertaking that Her Majesty's Government would ensure succession 
to the Sultanate of Brunei in accordance with the provisions of the proposed 
Succession and Regency Enactment. Thomas suggested that the new treaty should 
come into force on the date that the Succession and Regency and Constitution 
Enactment took effect.118
The Colonial Office gave its general approval to the Constitution proposals 
subject to the retention in the new treaty of a provision on the lines followed in the 
Agreement with the Malay Rulers, in which the Sultan had to undertake to accept the 
advice of the High Commissioner in all matters connected with the government of 
Brunei except those relating to Muslim Religion and Brunei custom. With regard to 
the posts of the High Commissioner and the British Resident, the Colonial Office 
agreed to retain them indefinitely. However, it did not agree with the suggestion for
U6Ibid.
ulIbid.
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the appointment of a separate High Commissioner for Brunei and Sarawak. It 
believed that the Governor of Sarawak should still manage Brunei affairs particularly 
with the development of air communication. In fact this suggestion was supported by 
Sir Anthony Abell himself.119 On the whole the Secretary of State was satisfied with 
the progress of the drafting of the Constitution and congratulated the Sultan and his 
advisers "on the liberal and progressive attitude which the Constitutional proposals 
indicate".120
When Sir Anthony Abell returned from leave in May 1955, the Sultan told him 
that he did not agree with the Constitution as proposed by Thomas and that he had not 
been fully consulted nor shown any drafts of the legislation until they had been 
despatched to the Colonial Office.121 After studying the proposals in detail the Sultan 
said he "did not like them and nor did he think that they would be acceptable to the 
people". Sir Anthony Abell suggested that the Sultan had second thoughts because 
he was "considerably influenced" by the Constitution of the Malay States of 1948, 
which the Sultan used as a comparison, and by "the personal views of the two Wazirs 
who, no doubt, regarded their omission from the Executive and Legislative Councils
ll9CO 1030/113, item 14, Some points of policy and of general importance 
discussed in despatch No. 47, with some preliminary personal thoughts" by 
G.C. Whiteley, 14 April 1955. See also his marginal comments in the said 
document.
120 CO 1030/133, item 17, Secretary of State to High Commissioner,
30 May 1955.
121CO 1030/113, item 23, Sir Anthony Abell to Whiteley, 7 October 1955. See 
also ibid., item 19, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 31 May 1955.
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as a threat to their influence'1. The Sultan "proposed substantial amendments to the 
Draft Constitution".122
In mid-June Sir Anthony Abell visited Brunei to discuss with the Sultan the 
main amendments to the Constitution Enactment which the latter had put forward. 
The Sultan was not happy with the reserve powers of the High Commissioner, which 
he considered as "excessive". He felt they should be transferred to him or omitted 
from the Constitution.123 The Sultan considered the amendments desirable "...to reflect 
more accurately and with greater dignity his position as the Constitutional Ruler of a 
Protected State".124 The High Commissioner was forced to make concessions as the 
Sultan "was in a stubborn and suspicious frame of mind".125 He offered to relinquish 
"virtually all powers excepting only those connected with the finances of the State, 
public security, defence, external affairs and the conditions of service of certain classes 
of public servants" and the amendment, repeal or replacement of the Constitution 
Enactment.126 Even on the subject of reserve powers the High Commissioner made 
a concession whereby they were vested in the Sultan with the proviso that the High 
Commissioner might exercise such powers in matters which affected responsibility for
,22CO 1030/113, item 24, High Commissioner to Secretary of State,
19 October 1955.
I23C 0 1030/113, item 24, High Commissioner to Secretary of State,
19 October 1955.
124CO 1030/113, "Observation of Attorney-General on proposed amendments to 
the Constitution Enactment", enclosure in item 24, High Commissioner to Secretary 
of State, 19 October 1955.
125CO 1030/113, item 23, Sir Anthony Abell to Whiteley, 7 October 1955.
126Ibid.
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the State as a territory under Her Majesty’s protection. Sir Anthony Abell said the 
concessions "had an excellent psychological effect on the Sultan" and thereafter he had 
no objection to the general reserve powers being retained in the agreement and has 
been most reasonable in other respects.127 The Sultan was warned by the Attorney- 
General that the retention of the advice clause in the agreement was "contrary to the 
recommendation of the Constitutional Committee".128
Having secured the Sultan's agreement on the main provisions of the 
Constitution and a general advice clause in the proposed treaty, Sir Anthony Abell 
directed the Attorney-General to proceed with amendments to the Constitution and 
instructed him "to meet so far as possible the other amendments suggested by the 
Sultan". As a result there was a new provision in the Constitution which enabled the 
Sultan, if he was satisfied that it was necessary or expedient in the interests of the 
State, to appoint a Menteri Besar, a State Secretary and a State Financial Officer. 
Apparently the Sultan was anxious to appear to accede to that part of the 
Constitutional Committee's Report which recommended that the Resident should cease 
to have executive authority and be replaced by a British Adviser whose position was 
that of Chief Secretary in a Colonial Administration.129
Another major amendment was made with regard to the number of members 
of the Executive and the Legislative Councils. This was a result of the Sultan's wish 
that the two Wazir should be ex officio members of the Councils. This was seen as
X21Ibid.
128CO 1030/113, "Observation of Attorney-General on proposed amendments to 
the Constitution Enactment", enclosure in item 24, the High Commissioner to 
Secretary, 19 October 1955.
I29CO 1030/113, item 24, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 1955.
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an attempt by the Sultan to restore the prestige of the two Ministers. In addition the 
Sultan also wished to appoint a Religious Adviser to be an ex officio member o f both 
Councils. Consequently, the ex officio members of the Executive and the Legislative 
Councils were increased from three to six and two to five, respectively. To prevent 
the Executive Council becoming an official body, the Attorney-General suggested that 
the Unofficial members be increased from three to six. In the case of the Legislative 
Council the balance could be rectified by reducing the number of Official members. 
Therefore the Official members of the latter were reduced from ten to six, and the 
Unofficial members from sixteen to fourteen. The reason for the latter change was 
that "the Sultan was apprehensive that it was difficult to find sufficient suitable 
candidates for appointment as Unofficial members".130
In October 1955, a new Constitution Enactment was drafted and sent to the 
Colonial Office for comment and approval. The High Commissioner told the Colonial 
Office that he believed the delay and "the more generous Constitution" had paid 
"dividends" and he believed that the new proposals drafted would be welcome by the 
people and might even "be acceptable to the influential and nationalist-minded group 
of teachers and educated artisans who might well have tried to wreck our original 
proposals".131 He added: "I doubt if we can do less at the present time in this part of 
the world if we want to ensure that the constitution works and that the people take an 
active interest and part in it".132 A copy of the revised draft was shown to the Sultan
130CO 1030/113, item 24,"Observation by the Attorney-General ...19 October
1955."
l31CO 1030/113, item 23, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 7
October 1955.
n2Ibid.
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and his advisers and Sir Anthony Abell were confident that the amended Constitution 
was "preferable [to the Sultan] and likely to be more lasting than that originally 
submitted to you [Secretary of State]".133 But as will be seen in the next chapter the 
High Commissioner's optimism was dampened by the emergence of a political party, 
Partai Rakyat Brunei, which changed the political atmosphere in the State.
133CO 1030/113, item 24, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 19 October
1955.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PARTAI RAKYAT BRUNEI AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROPOSAL 1956-1957
The discussions on the constitutional proposals between the Sultan and the 
High Commissioner continued during 1956 and 1957 but growing opposition to certain 
aspects of the proposals threatened to disrupt the process. This discontent was 
manifested in particular in the emergence of the Partai Rakyat Brunei as the voice of 
the people. This chapter will firstly trace the emergence of the Partai Rakyat Brunei 
as a political force and then examine its impact on the constitutional process.
3.1 The Formation of the Partai Rakyat Brunei (Brunei People's Party)
The Constitutional discussions between the Sultan and the High Commissioner 
were held in closed sessions. The people were kept in the dark about their outcome. 
Throughout the discussions the Sultan was only advised by the two Wazir, Pengiran 
Bendahara and Pengiran Pemanca. The Constitutional Advisory Committee became 
defunct after it submitted its report to the Sultan in March 1954.1 Hence there was 
a growing interest in the constitutional proposals as time went by. In March 1955 a 
report sent to the Colonial Office noted:
"There is a quickening of public interest in Brunei in political matters, 
especially in constitutional reform and treaty revision, and it is not surprising,
’interview with Pengiran Ali and Pengiran Yusuf, April 1993.
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therefore, that there has been considerable adverse comment at the delay that 
has occurred in carrying out the Sultan's publicly made promises. ...It is highly 
desirable that the work should be completed and the new constitution 
introduced with the utmost despatch".2
Presumably the report was referring to an attempt by a group o f Malay youths 
in Brunei to form a political party in early January 1955. However, the attempt had 
not materialised "due to disagreement among the organisers".3 Among the organisers 
were Azahari and Salleh bin Masri, the leader of the defunct Barisan Pemuda; and two 
members of the royal family, Pengiran Indra Mahkota and Pengiran Anak Sapiuddin, 
both of whom were the Sultan's cousins.4
Although the attempt to form the political party failed it was a significant 
development. For the first time in Brunei, and in the British Borneo Territories, 
interest in a political party was manifested. The mass agitations, such as those the 
Barisan Pemuda of 1946 - 47 and the BRUFICO affair of 1953, had not led to any 
significant political changes in the State. The youths realised that the British were 
very strong and would not hesitate to use force to protect their interests. This was 
demonstrated during the BRUFICO trial in March 1953, when a squadron of police 
from North Borneo had been flown in as a precaution against possibility disturbances 
during the trial. In fact, as seen in the previous chapter, the British authorities and the 
BMPC's officials in Brunei were anxious of rumours that an uprising to overthrow the
2CO 1030/133, item 11, Acting High Commissioner to Secretary o f State, 23 
March 1955.
3 The Borneo Bulletin, 12 and 19 January 1955.
4Interview with Salleh bin Masri, March 1957.
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Government was planned to coincide with the trial. Although the trial passed without 
any incident the rumours intensified and the British authorities launched a massive 
house to house search. Three youths, Mohammad bin Manggol and his brother Garip; 
and Jais bin Haji Karim, were arrested and jailed for two years for allegedly being 
members of an underground movement conspiring to overthrow the Government. 
According to the evidence presented in court the movement planned to attack the 
Brunei Town police station to seize arms and then capture all Europeans and other 
prominent local men, take them to the Palace and demand that the Sultan sign a 
declaration of independence. If the Sultan and the "big" men refused they would all 
be tried and "punished". In finding the youths guilty of conspiracy charges the Judge 
told them:
"its is everyone's right to freedom of thought. You are perfectly at liberty to 
form an opinion that it is desirable to alter the method of government in this 
State. You may work towards procuring that end but it must be by lawful 
means".5
Taking heed of the Judge's advice, and particularly the British determination to 
suppress any attempt to end their connection with Brunei the nationalists decided to 
adopt a constitutional approach to achieve their goals.
The people in Brunei had been exposed to political developments in Malaya 
and Singapore through several Malay newspapers and periodicals from these 
territories. Many of the newspapers and periodicals were not only very nationalistic, 
but also educative in their approach. The news of elections in Singapore in April and
5The Borneo Bulletin, 7 November 1953. Interviews with Jais bin Haji Karim and 
Garip bin Manggol, April 1993; and Mohammad bin Manggol, January 1994.
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in Malaya in July 1955 inspired nationalists in Brunei.6 In August 1955 they decided 
to send Azahari on a "political study tour" of Malaya and Singapore to find out how 
Brunei could take advantage of political developments there. They realised that Brunei 
was too small and weak to demand independence from the British on its own but that 
it would be advantageous for Brunei to join hands with a much bigger entity such as 
Malaya.7 In Singapore Azahari was instructed to contact Harun Amirulrasyid, who 
had been in Brunei as the Malay School Superintendent, being seconded from the 
Malayan Civil Service from 1939 to 1946. Harun was well known in Brunei for his 
contribution in nurturing nationalist awareness among the Malays and sometimes 
referred as the source of inspiration for nationalism in North Kalimantan. Harun 
introduced Azahari to socialist leaders, Ahmad Boestamam, Ishak Haji Mohammad 
and Dr.Burhanuddin. In fact Azahari claimed that their meeting had inspired them to 
form a political party which encompassed Malaya, Singapore and the British Borneo 
territories.8 Azahari recognised the plan was a means to fulfil his search for a partner 
to achieve Brunei's independence. Thus in November when the Partai Rakyat Malaya 
(PRM) under Ahmad Boestamam and Burhanuddin was formed, Azahari agreed to set 
up a branch in Brunei (Harun formed another branch in Singapore).9
interview s with Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and June 1993; and Salleh bin 
Masri, March 1993.
interview  with Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and June 1993.
interview  with Azahari, February 1993. Ahmad Boestamam cited the historical 
meeting in his book, Dr.Burhanuddin: Putera Melayu Raya, Kuala Lumpur,
Pustaka Kejora, 1972, pp. 47-53.
9Ibid.
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However Azahari realised that it would take the PRM a long time to win over 
the confidence of the people as well as the British. He recognised that the United 
Malay National Organisation (UMNO) in the Federation of Malaya which had been 
negotiating for independence would be an asset for his political purposes. Thus in 
December 1955 Azahari proposed to Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Chief Minister of 
Malaya, that the Borneo territories should be merged with the Federation and that they 
should form a united front to demand independence for the new federation.10 Despite 
enthusiasm for the idea from Tunku Abdul Rahman, as manifested in his speech at the 
UMNO Annual Meeting in December 1955 in which he suggested that Brunei, 
Sarawak and North Borneo might consider joining the Federation o f Malaya as 
member states, the idea did not materialise because other UMNO leaders feared that 
the negotiations on Malayan independence would be adversely affected.11
The long term implication of UMNO's decision to reject Azahari's proposal was 
that it influenced the latter's future relations with the Malayan leaders and indirectly 
his decision to reject Tunku Abdul Rahman's Malaysia Plan in the early sixties. 
However, more immediately Azahari had no alternative but to contend with developing 
PRM. Thus on his return in January 1956 Azahari proposed the formation of a branch 
of the PRM in Brunei. A meeting was held on 22 January 1956 at Salleh's house in 
Kampong Sembiling in Brunei Town to discuss the formation of the party. About one 
hundred and fifty state-wide representatives invited to the meeting agreed to the 
formation a branch of the PRM. The new party, which was called the Partai Rakyat 
Brunei (PRB), adopted the PRM's constitution but with some modifications to suit
^Interview with Azahari, February 1993; Utusan Melayu, 31 December 1955.
11 Straits Times, 27 December 1955. Interview with Azahari, February 1993.
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local needs. Accordingly the objectives of the PRB were: to oppose all forms of 
Colonialism in the political, economic and social spheres; to fight for the freedom of 
all Malay nations in the Malay Archipelago by constitutional means; to safeguard the 
position of His Highness the Sultan of Brunei and his heirs as the constitutional head 
of State; and to bring about a democratic, sovereign and independent Malay state and 
to safeguard the security and prosperity of all the people.12 The PRB manifesto 
sought to demand the introduction of representative government in Brunei. The 
manifesto stressed that the Party believed in democratic rights such as free elections, 
freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly. In the economic field the party 
hoped to encourage and lead the people in commerce, agriculture and other activities. 
In the social field the party urged the creation of social laws to protect workers, 
peasants and others, especially in respect of wages, working hours, housing benefits, 
health benefits, children education, insurance for accident and old age etc. Finally the 
Party planned to work with political movements throughout the Malay Archipelago 
which had similar objectives: to form a strong national front to fight for independence 
and to bring about the formation of one Malay Nation and State, "Melayu Raya", 
covering the whole of the Malay archipelago.13
The constitution and the manifesto of the Party was adopted by the delegates. 
In order to reassure the British, Azahari declared:
"Even though we intend to fight for freedom from British rule, we do not wish 
to hate the British, in fact we will respect and love them as our teachers. If
l2For full text of the PRB's constitution and Manifesto see Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, 
Partai Rakyat Brunei (The People's Party o f  Brunei): Selected Documents, Petaling
Jaya, INS AN, 1987, pp. 85-94; and The Borneo Bulletin, 28 January 1956.
]3Ibid., pp.96 - 98.
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the English Government is willing without delay to recognise our rights it is 
certain that we will give them even more respect, we will recognise and 
acknowledge the rights and needs of the British themselves".14 
A steering committee was formed to obtain registration of the Party. The committee 
consisted of Azahari as President and Salleh bin Masri as Deputy; Yassin Affandi and 
Hidup bin Awang Besar as Secretaries; Othman bin Sungguh and Mudim Haji Ismail 
as Treasurers; and Khatib Moksin bin Othman, Buntar bin Salleh and Abdullah bin 
Jaafar as General assistants. Seven others were also elected as representatives of 
different areas in the State.15
At the end of January the PRB submitted an application to the Government to 
register the new Party. On the same day, the Party received a reply from the Registrar 
of Societies, who was also the Chief Police Officer, ordering the sponsors to dissociate 
themselves from PRM and suspending all its political activities until written approval 
was given.16 The interim committee of the Party met and agreed to dissociate itself 
from the PRM and to rewrite its constitution. The Party dropped its objective of 
fighting for freedom of all nations in the region and proposed instead that the Party 
be allowed to operate in Sarawak and North Borneo with the ultimate aim of bringing 
about a union of the three Borneo territories. To make it a pan Bornean political party 
the Committee also suggested that the Party should adopt a new name i.e. the Partai
]4The Borneo Bulletin, 28 January 1956.
]5Ibid. Interestingly, almost all persons elected to the interim committee were 
members and leaders of the defunct Barisan Pemuda, including Salleh its former 
President.
,6Interview with Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and June 1993; Haji Zaini Bin 
Haji Ahmad, Pertumbuhan Nasionalisme di Brunei (1939 - 1962), Kuala Lumpur, ZR 
Publications, 1989, p.55.
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Rakyat Kalimantan Utara or the People’s Party o f North Kalimantan.17 Azahari and 
Yassin discussed the proposal with Sir Anthony Abell and John Gilbert in early March 
1956. Both the High Commissioner and the British Resident concurred with the 
proposal. Sir Anthony Abell, who was also the Governor of Sarawak, did not object 
to the PRB's plan to open branches in Sarawak as long as its objectives were not 
against the policies of the Sarawak Government. He advised the party to submit its 
application to the government of the State. However in respect of North Borneo, Sir 
Anthony Abell advised Azahari to approach the government of North Borneo stressing 
it was not within his power to decide if the Party could operate there.18 The 
concurrence of the High Commissioner was not part of a compromise in return for 
Azahari's Party agreeing to break its connection with the PRM. In effect it 
compromised with a proposal, which was being promoted by the British Commissioner 
General in Southeast Asia, Malcom MacDonald, to bring about a political association 
o f the North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei (this will be discussed in the next chapter). 
The PRB redrafted its constitution and resubmitted its application. However the pan- 
Borneo objective of the Party was rebuffed by the Sultan's proclamation on 8 March, 
in which the Sultan stressed that neither he nor his Government had ever 
contemplated, or wished, to unite or federate the State of Brunei with any other State. 
In addition, he said he was "confident that the interests of his people and the future
1 interview  with Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and June 1993. Kalimantan is
the name use by Indonesian to refer to Borneo.
nIbid.
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of the State will best be served by the maintenance of the traditional form of the 
Brunei Sultanate, adapted to meet the needs and concepts of the day".19
The proclamation was reported to be a response to his name being implicated 
in the formation of a branch of the PRM in Brunei. However it was also possible that 
the Sultan was suspicious of the High Commissioner's decision to allow the PRB to 
set up branches in the North Borneo and Sarawak as a stealthy British design to merge 
his Sultanate with the two Colonies. The Sultan and his advisers would not 
countenance such plan which not only downgraded his Sultanate to the status of a 
Colony but also raised the possibility of the rich Sultanate being swamped by the two 
bigger neighbours. In June the Sultan minuted:
"3. If the aims and objectives of the Party [PRB] were not in conflict with the 
laws of the Governments of Brunei and Britain, ...they would not disrupt the 
working of the government and administration of Brunei and if they did not 
conflict with the Treaties between Brunei and Britain ...I have no objection for 
the registration of the Party in Brunei with one condition, that is, the Party 
must be for the State of Brunei only and it must not have power to conduct its 
political activities in the States of Sabah and Sarawak.
4. If the Party was allowed to conduct ...its ...political activities in those two 
States, there is no reason why it would not be allowed to ally itself or merge 
with parties in Singapore and the Federation of Malaya to be a Brunei branch 
of Partai Rakyat Malaya?
™The Borneo Bulletin, 10 March 1956; Pelita Brunei, 16 March 1956.
130
5. I should like an explanation from the B.R. [British Resident] to the matters 
in paragraphs 3 and 4 above in the first place..."20
Consequently, Gilbert summoned Azahari and told him that the Government 
would register his Party if its constitution was amended to confine its activities to 
Brunei. At first the Party organisers appeared determined to engage in political 
activities throughout British Borneo21 but when the Government refused to consider 
its registration unless they amended the constitution the organisers decided to shelve 
the Party's pan-Bornean objectives. However the unification of North Borneo, 
Sarawak and Brunei remained as a future objective of the PRB.22 Finally on 15 
August 1956, the sponsors of the PRB were informed by the Registrar of Societies that 
the PRB had been registered as a political party. The initial members of the Executive 
Council o f the Party were:
Azahari - President;
Salleh bin Masri - Deputy President;
Yassin Affandi - Secretary General;
Hidup bin Awang Besar - Deputy Secretary General;
Hapidz Laksamana - Treasurer;
Othman bin Latif - Head of Information Section;
Zaini bin Haji Ahmad - Head of Organisation Section;
20BA/1612/1983,(BRO/829/56), The Sultan's Minute to his Private Secretary 
accompanying the British Resident papers regarding the Partai Rakyat Brunei dated 
9 June 1956. The translation is mine.
2,See The Borneo Bulletin, 7 and 14 July, 4 and 11 August 1956.
^Interviews with Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and Junel993 and 
Azahari, February 1993.
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Jais bin Haji Karim - Head of Financial Section;
Abdul Kadir bin Abdul Razak - General Assistant I; and
Abdullah bin Jahfar - General Assistant II;
The members of the Executive Council and more than twenty other heads of branches 
and sub-branches of the Party formed the members of the Central Committee.23 (Their 
appointments were reconfirmed by the Party Congress held in March 1957). The 
British retracted their concurrence to the pan-Bornean plan of the PRB in order not 
to jeopardise their plan for the "closer association" of the Borneo territories.
The Brunei Government's decision to register the PRB as a political party was 
hailed by The Borneo Bulletin as "very wise" because it felt the Party would fill a 
political vacuum in the State, which might otherwise be filled by less desirable 
underground organisations.24 In fact the assessment was not without substance. From 
its formation in the beginning of the year up to its registration in August the Party
organisers claimed that nearly ten thousand would-be members were awaiting
admission throughout Brunei.25 Although there was an element of exaggeration, a 
relatively large number of people in the State had come under the PRB's influence. 
In a State where the population was no more than eighty thousand, the number of 
people claimed by the PRB as their members comprised more than two thirds of the 
adult male population. The influence of the PRB permeated deep into the Malay 
Muslim community; from the towns to the rural areas. The organisers also claimed
23Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, op.cit., pp. 57-58.
24The Borneo Bulletin, 25 August 1956.
25The Borneo Bulletin, 4 August 1956.
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that a large number of Malays in the neighbouring territories were keen to join the 
Party.26
Alarmed by PRB's popularity the Government issued a ruling, in February 1956 
(and repeated in October 1956), prohibiting Government officers from being involved 
in any political organisation.27 In November the Sultan warned all those holding 
traditional offices including the Wazir, Ceteria, and Menteri not to be involved in any 
political organisation or political activities and threatened to withdraw the titles and 
emoluments of those who disobeyed.28 It was due to these prohibitions that 
membership of the PRB was confined mainly to workers in the Oil Company and in 
the Government's Public Works Department where the two large concentrations of 
labour were found; and to farmers and fishermen. The farmers were mainly the 
Kedayans inhabiting the areas on the outskirts of Brunei Town and in Temburung 
District, whereas the fishermen were the Brunei Malays in Kampong Air (Water 
Village) and along the Brunei River. This section of the population was living in 
deprivation because wages, especially in the public sector, were insufficent to meet the 
high cost of living. The farmers also suffered as a result of the drop in the rubber 
prices since the end of 1952. These people received no benefits in terms of housing, 
medical services, or insurance for sickness, accident and old age. Although the Oil 
Company had better wages and benefits for its employees, dissatisfaction among its 
local employees arose as a result of competition from foreign employees, who had
26Interview with Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and June 1993; Othman bin 
Latif, December 1992.
27BA/0410/83,BRO/4/56, Part II, BRO. Circular No. 10/1956, dated 23 February
1956 and Circular No.54/1956, dated 29 October 1956.
2SPelita Brunei, 1 November 1956.
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better qualifications and experience, and deprived the local people of better jobs and 
wages. The aims and objectives of the PRB, which contained promises to alleviate 
the economic and social deprivation, appealed to these people. Slogans calling for an 
end to colonialism, freedom and independence, although vague to most people, 
represented a better life if the Bruneis were in control of their own destiny. But it 
was Azahari's personality and his gifted oratory skills which made the message of the 
PRB persuasive and effective.
The Government ruling, prohibiting Government Officers from taking active 
part in any political organisation, had denied the PRB the resourceful and educated 
leaders since most of them were recruited into the Government Service. The result 
of this policy was that the leadership of the PRB fell into the hands o f less educated 
people. Sir Anthony Abell at one point referred to the leaders of the PRB as "first- 
rate thugs".29 Azahari himself later admitted that he had a difficult time controlling 
some leaders of his party.30 In September 1956 the Party issued a circular in an 
attempt to control "unruly elements" in the Party and threatened them with expulsion 
for misbehaviour.31 It was unfortunate that the PRB was denied educated and more 
responsible leadership, because it affected the future development of the Party.
29CO 1030/464, item 1, High Commissioner to the Colonial Office, 25 
November 1956.
30Interview with Azahari, February 1993.
31 The Borneo Bulletin, 1 September 1956.
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3.2 The Local Government Proposal
While the draft of the Constitution Enactment was being considered in the 
Colonial Office preparations for establishing local governments were made in Brunei. 
At the end of 1954 the Sultan and Cecil Thomas agreed to establish local government 
bodies in Brunei prior to the introduction of the Constitution. The main objective of 
the local government bodies was to provide training for representatives o f the people 
in the proposed Legislative Council in the art of government. It was for this purpose 
that the Acting High Commissioner recommended to the Secretary of State that new 
local authorities should be given fairly wide powers and should be set up in advance 
of the introduction of the new Constitution.32
In early December 1955 the Sultan in Council appointed five of its members 
to be a Sub Committee (Select Committee) to consider the provisions of the Local 
Councils Bill and to make recommendations. The Committee consisted the following 
persons:
Pengiran Pemanca (the Second Minister);
Pengiran Maharaja Laila (the Third Minister);
Pehin Dato Perdana Menteri Haji Ibrahim (the Sultan's Private Secretary, who
was appointed as the Chairman);
R.E.Hales (the Managing Director of BMPC);
G.V.C.Young (the Deputy Legal Adviser of Sarawak Government, who was
32See pages 112-113.
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seconded to Brunei, as the Adviser).33 
In its report, which was submitted to the State Council at the end of January 1956, the 
Committee recommended that the State be divided into six Local Areas and six Local 
Councils: two Urban District Councils in the two main towns i.e. Brunei Town and 
Kuala Belait and four Rural District Councils, one in each of the four districts of the 
State. The Committee also recommended that the new Bill should come into 
operation on 1 July 1956.34
In outlining its proposal for the formation of the local authorities, the Sub 
Committee suggested that in the initial stages the local authorities would have to be 
run by the District Office Staff because of the inadequacy of staff especially in the 
rural areas. Anticipating opposition from the people because of taxes to be imposed 
the Committee suggested that the Government should be prepared to finance the local 
authorities to a considerable extent. On the initial activities of the local authorities, 
the Committee suggested that they should concentrate on social welfare and 
construction work rather than education which was "far too great a responsibility". 
However, the Local Authorities could work in conjunction with the Education 
Department by means of school (education) Committees. The Committee 
recommended that advance publicity and propaganda should be given as soon as 
possible to enable the plan to be accepted.35
33BA/1249/1983 (BRO/39/1955), "Minutes of the State Council Meeting on 6 
December 1955)".
34BA/1591/1983 (BRO/982/55), "Report of the Sub Committee on the Local
Councils Bill", n.d. (probably at the end of January 1956).
35 Ibid.
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On 9 February 1956 the Sultan in Council approved the recommendations of 
the Select Committee; but left open the date for the implementation of the plan.36 
Meanwhile preparations for the implementation o f the Enactment had begun. Two 
officers were engaged for the purpose; Patrict McAfee and Sunny bin Ahmat, both 
were Labuan-bom administrative officers.37 In June D.L.Bruen, the Assistant British 
Resident, accompanied by the two officers, toured the State to explain to the people 
how the local authorities would function and to gauge their views on the adoption of 
such a system in Brunei.38 The month-long tour had disappointing results. In his 
report Bruen noted that the meetings he held throughout the State were well attended, 
but the plan was overwhelmingly rejected by the people. He found that the whole 
matter had been discussed in detail by many of the people present. He blamed the 
influence of the Malay school teachers for the deep seated aversion to the proposals.39
Following the Assistant Resident's tour a group of Penghulus and Ketuas 
(Chiefs and Headmen) approached the Pengiran Pemanca (the Second Minister) and 
urged him not to implement the plan. When the Minister could not offer any 
guarantees the community leaders wrote a petition to the Sultan requesting the plan 
be withdrawn stressing that it would become a burden to the people and was against
36BA/1612/1983, (BRO/39/56), "Minutes of the State Council Meeting on 9 
February 1956".
37CO 1030/464, item 1, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 25 November 
1956. McAffee had been sent to the United Kingdom to study matters relating to local 
government bodies. For a biographical note see Appendix I.
nPelita Brunei, 16 June 1956; The Borneo Bulletin, 30 June 1956.
39BA/1591/1983 (BRO/982/55), "Report on Attempt to Introduce Local 
Government in Brunei",n.d. (presumably towards the end of July 1956).
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the teaching of the Hadith and the Koran.40 On 14 July the Sultan summoned the 
Penghulus and Ketuas to his palace to discuss their petition.41 The Chiefs and 
Headmen told their ruler that they were concerned about the definition o f "Rateable 
property" in the Enactment, which provided the possibility for private property owned 
by the people to be taxed, and gave the impression that there would be no limit to 
taxation. To support their opposition to the definition of "Rateable property" they 
quoted an article in a Malayan newspaper in which a Malay peasant in Kelantan had 
his property auctioned by the Local Council in order to recover taxes which were 
overdue. They added that they would not like to see such misfortune befall on them. 
The Sultan explained the difficulty involved in defining in the legislation what 
particular property was to be taxed and what was not. However, the Sultan assured 
them that since each Council would consist of Councillors of their choice, no matter 
how wide the definition of "Rateable Property" was, no one could be compelled to pay 
tax on any property owned by him if the Council did not resolve to tax the property.
The Penghulus and Ketuas were also not happy with the qualifications for 
appointment as Councillors, which allowed non-Bruneis to be appointed. They feared 
that the chances of the local people securing such appointments would be slim in the 
face of better educated and experienced non-Bruneis. The Sultan assured them that 
the powers vested in him by the Enactment to appoint Councillors would give the 
natural-born subjects preference. Although they expressed their confidence in the
40BA/1591/1983 (BRO/982/55), "A petition from the Penghulu and Ketua 
Kampong to the Sultan", 1 July 1956.
4'interview with Pehin Khatib Haji Moksin bin Pehin Khatib Othman, May 1993. 
Pehin Khatib Moksin, aged 98 years, was the Penghulu of Kampong Burong Pingai 
Ayer.
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Sultan, they pointed out that British subjects from other countries increasingly filled 
the appointments once held by Brunei-bom subjects. This was facilitated by raising 
the minimum scholastic qualifications required for such appointments. The Sultan 
explained to them that the Local Government was being established with the sole 
purpose o f training and guiding Brunei bom-subjects to govern themselves in order 
to achieve the dream which they had longed for i.e. self-government. However, 
despite the Sultan's assurances, the Penghulus and Ketuas contended that it was not 
yet time for them to take part in governing themselves as they lacked education or 
experience, adding that they would only consider the offer of governing themselves 
when the population was sufficiently educated and experienced. They also pointed out 
that Brunei was not only a wealthy state but also a Welfare State and as such they 
would not welcome the introduction of taxes when they ought to receive more 
financial aid from the Government instead; and hence they would very much prefer 
the existing system of government. Finally, they urged the Government to introduce 
the proposed constitution before establishing Local Councils.42
The Assistant British Resident summed up the main causes for opposition to 
the local governments plans were the fear of tax and the fear of the non-Bruneis 
predominating in key areas of local government because the Bruneis themselves had 
not sufficient education and experience.43 The latter point was highlighted by the 
appointment of two non-Bruneians: Patrick McAffee and Sunny bin Ahmat to take
42BA/1591/1983 (BRO 982/55), "Points raised by the Pehins and Ketuas against 
the establishment of Local Government in the State of Brunei at their meeting with 
His Highness the Sultan on 14th July 1956".
43BA/1591/1983 (BRO/982/55), "Report on Attempt to Introduce Local 
Government", by B.L.Bruen. n.d. (presumably submitted towards the end of July 
1956).
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charge of the local government plans. Sir Anthony Abell told the Colonial Office that 
"the Palace clique and hereditary Ministers opposed the plans because they would not 
be dictated to by commoners; and the commoners saw the local government plans as 
symptoms of colonialism".44
However the scale of opposition to the plan, which was formidable and 
permeated a cross section of the society, pointed to the real concerns of the people in 
the State. The fact that the teachers and other Government servants were very 
strongly against the local government plan was because many of them were members 
o f the District Advisory Councils and exercised considerable influence on those 
Councils and were afraid that under the proposed changes they would lose some of 
their influence, particularly when the newly formed Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB) was 
gaining popularity among the masses. The Penghulus and Ketuas too shared similar 
concerns.45
There was also suspicion that the opposition to the plan was due to a concerted 
campaign by the PRB which dismissed the local government bodies manned by 
nominated members as "useless". Azahari said the people turned down the Sultan's 
plan because all the members of the local authorities would have been nominated by 
the Government and would not be elected representatives of the people. He felt that 
the plan would have been readily accepted if the people had been allowed to have 
their own elected representatives in the local bodies.46 But more importantly, under
44CO 1030/114, item 50, the High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 27 August
1956.
45In retrospect the Penghulu and Ketua occupied about half o f the total seats in
each of the four District Advisory Councils in the State.
A6The Borneo Bulletin, 20 October 1956.
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the scheme his Party would have no power and influence; there would be little chance 
of its members being appointed by the Sultan to the local bodies. Hence they resisted 
the introduction of the Local Government plans. Above all, the people were not 
originally consulted and had no say in the drawing up of the Enactment.
In October 1956 the Brunei/Muara District Council criticised the way the 
Government was handling the local government plans. One of its "observers" to the 
State Council said the Local Council Bill was passed without being debated. He also 
blamed members of the State Councils, who concurred with most o f the Bills laid 
before them. The Brunei/Muara District Council adopted a resolution stating that the 
Local Council Enactment should be scrutinised by the Council before it was passed 
by the State Council.47
In October 1956 following the widespread opposition to the local government 
plan, the Government decided to postpone the implementation of the Local Councils 
Enactment until such time as the people of Brunei were ready to accept it.48 Sir 
Anthony Abell told the Colonial Office that the Sultan was "angry" and referred to the 
rejection as a "rebellion" against his authority.49 The implication o f the rejection of 
the Local Councils Enactment was that the Constitutional proposals could not be 
implemented because the proposals were based on the Enactment. Unless an 
alternative to the proposals could be found the implementation of the Constitution had 
to be delayed.
47BA/1665/1983 (BRO/139/56), Minutes of the Brunei/Muara District Council 
Meeting on 15 October 1956.
48BA/1591/1983 (BRO/982/55), the Government's Press Release, (October 1956). 
See also The Borneo Bulletin, 13 October 1956 and Pelita Brunei, 16 October 1956.
49CO 1030/114, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 27 August 1956.
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3.3 The Colonial Office and the High Commissioner: the Constitutional Draft 
Enactment and the Draft Agreement 1956
The amended draft Constitution Enactment sent by the High Commissioner to 
the Colonial Office in October 195550 was examined in early 1956. The Colonial 
Office was not happy with two main provisions in the amended Enactment: the 
provision empowering the Sultan to appoint a Menteri Besar in place of the British 
Resident when he considered the time was ripe for such an appointment, and the 
provision allowing for the reserve powers to be exercised independently by the Sultan 
and the High Commissioner. The Colonial Office argued that the provision for the 
appointment of a Menteri Besar and the abolition of the office of British Resident 
need not be included in the Enactment because the circumstances in Brunei at that 
stage were not appropriate for such "a momentous change". Instead it suggested that 
the provision should be incorporated in a separate gentlemen's agreement between the 
Sultan and the High Commissioner; or in exchange of notes expressing an 
understanding that the question could be raised either by the Sultan or by the High 
Commissioner at any time, and that if agreement were reached the constitution should 
be amended accordingly. Otherwise a provision for the concurrence of the High 
Commissioner in this change should be included in the Enactment as a safeguard 
against pressure for its early implementation. The Colonial Office did not regard as 
sufficient the writing of a clause in the proposed treaty, as had previously been agreed 
between the Sultan and the High Commissioner.51
50See pages 120.
5lCO 1030/113, item 28, Colonial Office to High Commissioner, 8 March 1956.
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The Colonial Office also felt that the provision which gave both the Sultan and 
the High Commissioner the same reserve powers in respect o f certain Bills in the 
Legislative Council needed some safeguards. It observed that there was a possibility 
that both the Sultan and the High Commissioner might decide to exercise their reserve 
powers independent of one another and suggested a provision in the Enactment that 
the Sultan should not use his reserve powers if the High Commissioner decided to use 
his. This would give to the High Commissioner power to exercise his own reserve 
powers at his discretion. As a further safeguard they also suggested that the advice 
clause in the treaty or agreement should be worded "to enable the High Commissioner 
to advise the Sultan on the exercise o f his reserve powers".52
Sir Anthony Abell advised the Colonial Office that the Sultan "felt very strong" 
about the appointment of a Menteri Besar. the Sultan told him that his subjects would 
not regard the new Constitution as any advance towards Merdeka (independence) if 
no provision was made for the replacement of the British Resident as the chief 
executive officer by a Malay. Furthermore, the Sultan felt - and Sir Anthony Abell 
supported him - that there might be less pressure on him to create the post of Menteri 
Besar if it could be done at will at any time. Therefore Sir Anthony Abell felt that 
the clause on the appointment of a Menteri Besar should be left as drafted in the 
Enactment. This was due to the political situation in the State. Sir Anthony Abell 
told the Colonial Office:
"I must, however, honestly say that I do not believe it is possible for us to put 
off this step for more than a few years. If  we are to retain the goodwill and 
active co-operation of His Highness and his people in the administration of
521 bid.
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Brunei it would be wise to accept the position ungrudgingly and promptly 
when the time comes".53 
He said that the Malays in Brunei and Sarawak were "under a great deal of pressure 
from their collateral in Indonesia and Malaya to take the first steps towards 
respectability", and that they (the British) could not expect things to go at a slower 
pace than in Malaya and Singapore. Sir Anthony Abell warned the Colonial Office 
that Brunei would not be as easy to keep within the "fold" as North Borneo and 
Sarawak unless they (the British) were prepared to move a good deal faster than they 
liked or was desirable. However he told the Colonial Office that he did not believe 
there was at that time much danger of the Sultan creating the post o f the Menteri 
Besar in spite of the pressure because he thought the example o f Malaya would 
persuade the Sultan to postpone a step which might affect his position.54
On the reserve powers, both Sir Anthony Abell and the Sultan reached an 
agreement which retained the wording in the Constitution Enactment; but a clause was 
to be included in the Agreement whereby the Sulttan would undertake to accept the 
advice of the High Commissioner on all matters connected with the exercise of the 
reserve powers. An Agreement between the Sultan and the British Government was 
drafted and sent to the Colonial Office for comments and approval. The Sultan agreed 
to give power to the British Government to legislate for the defence of his State. The 
Sultan had also indicated that he would accept a general advice clause, i.e. advice on 
all matters other than on Islam and Brunei custom, in the Agreement; but the High 
Commissioner very much doubted if the people would accept it. He said: "They will
53CO 1030/114, item 36, High Commissioner to A.M.MacKintosh, 16 April 1956.
54 Ibid.
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blame him [the Sultan] for accepting such a provision and I think you will agree that 
we should do everything we can to preserve his position and status".55
In summer the High Commissioner held discussions with the Colonial Office, 
including a brief meeting with the Secretary of State regarding the Brunei 
Constitution. A general agreement was reached that the provisions for the 
appointment of a Menteri Besar and the replacement of the office of the British 
Resident with the British Adviser was to be retained in the Enactment. However 
safeguards were to be inserted in the Enactment to ensure that its implementation 
would be subject to the concurrence of the High Commissioner; and in the treaty, 
provisions for acceptance of the High Commissioner's advice on all matters relating 
to the implementation of the Constitution Enactment. Further there was to be a 
provision for an exchange of letters between the Sultan and the High Commissioner 
in respect of the appointment of a Menteri Besar.56
Sir Anthony Abell was to examine the proposed Constitution Enactment and 
to discuss the general agreement reached in the Colonial Office, on his return to 
Brunei. But by the time he returned there was already strong opposition from the 
people on the plan to implement the Local Government Ordinance. The discussion on 
Constitutional proposal could not proceed because the new Constitution Enactment 
was drafted on the basis of the setting up of local authorities.57
55 Ibid.
56CO 1030/114, A Colonial Office Minute, 12 July 1956.
57CO 1030/114, item 50, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 27 August 1956.
145
3.4 The Reform of State Council and the Formation of District 
(Administrative) Councils
Sir Anthony Abell and John Gilbert made several efforts to make the idea of 
local government acceptable to the people in Brunei. In November 1956 Sir Anthony 
Abell proposed to the Sultan the gradual development of the Sanitary Boards into local 
authorities and the creation of Rural Development Boards, as an alternative to the 
local government bodies. The Sultan was not in favour of the idea because he feared 
that the scheme would be quickly viewed as device to introduce surreptitiously local 
authorities without first obtaining the general support of the public. He suggested 
instead that an Advisory Council should be established with the membership being 
nominated by him. The function of the Council, chaired by the British Resident, would 
be to advise the State Council in matters of importance including legislation.58 But 
this plan was a different concept from the local authorities scheme which aimed at 
training local people in administration and selecting Unofficial members to the 
Legislative Council. It was, however, not favoured by Sir Anthony Abell.59
Meanwhile pressure on the High Commissioner and the Sultan to finalise the 
new Constitution was mounting. In December 1956, the Brunei District Advisory 
Council criticised the Government for the delay in introducing the Constitution. It 
adopted a resolution urging the Government to expedite the process which had been 
delayed for more than three years. The Council also demanded that the draft of the
58CO 1030/237, item 1, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 25 November
1956.
59 Ibid.
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Constitution Enactment should be laid before the Council so that it could be 
scrutinised before it was to be adopted.60 On the other hand, the PRB, which had been 
registered in August 1956, continued to make rapid progress, especially in Brunei 
Town and the surrounding areas and by early 1957 had "assumed the proportion of a 
national movement".61 These developments were worrying for the Government. Thus 
in early February 1957 Sir Anthony Abell and Gilbert held discussions with the Sultan 
on how to stabilise the political situation in the State. The Sultan was adamant that 
he would not reintroduce the local government scheme which had been rejected by the 
people. However he agreed to inform the public that, as a first step towards the 
framing of the Constitution, he intended to enlarge the State Council by the 
appointment of members from existing District Advisory Councils. He also agreed to 
reorganise the District Advisory Councils to make them more representative and 
broadly based.
Before the new plan was made public in mid-February 1957, Gilbert made a 
last attempt to introduce the local government scheme by appealing directly to the 
Brunei/Muara District Advisory Council, which was the most vocal among the four 
District Councils, for support for the scheme.62 He explained to the Council that the 
new Constitution would contain a Legislative Council whose Unofficial members 
would be selected from the local governments councils. Unless the local government 
enactment was introduced the selection could not be done and the Legislative Council
60BA/1665/1983 (139/56), Minutes of the Brunei District Advisory Council 
Meeting on 27 December 1956.
61CO 1030/658, item 1, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 8 February 1957.
62BA/0343/1983 (BRO/642/54), British Resident to Chairman of the Brunei 
District Advisory Council, 14 February 1957.
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could not be established and the new Constitution could not be introduced. 
Furthermore he said if the ultimate aim of the Constitution was to achieve self- 
government under a constitutional monarch within the British Commonwealth, it was 
important to provide for future Government ministers to obtain sufficient training to 
in government. He did not see any other better way than to introduce local 
government bodies. However he assured the Council that the scheme would be 
introduced in keeping with the views of the people. He promised them that the taxes 
would not burdensome because the Central Government would give additional 
financial aid based on the number of people in the District or Urban areas. He also 
assured them that the money collected would be spent for the benefit o f the people.63
Despite the forceful plea the members of the Council unanimously opposed the 
reintroduction of the local government scheme. The members o f the Council held that 
the Local Council Enactment had been rejected and the Sultan had confirmed it in an 
announcement.64 As a result the Government had to contend with the Sultan's 
programme of reforming the State Council and reorganisation of the existing of the 
District Advisory Councils.
Under the programme, the scope of the State Council would be enlarged by 
increasing the representation of the people on the semi-hereditary Council: that is, by 
an addition of ten members selected by the Sultan from a panel of twenty-two 
councillors nominated by District Councils. These new members would become 
Unofficial members of the State Council. The existing four District Advisory Councils
63Ibid.
64BA/12917/78 (BRO/274/57), Minutes of the Brunei District Advisory Council 
Meeting on 28 February 1957.
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would be reorganised into administrative District Councils. The Brunei Town 
Municipal Board would become a district council and the Belait Municipal Board 
representatives would sit on the District Council for the Belait. Therefore there would 
be five District Councils. Although the District Councils would be administrative 
bodies and not statutory bodies, they would be a de facto  local government without 
raising the issue of the loss of authority by the Pengulus and Ketuas and the 
contentious question of taxes. It was intended that these councils would be given 
funds from central government to permit them to carry out development projects in 
their local areas. Half of the membership o f the each District Council would be 
elected by the people by "traditional methods" and the rest appointed by the Sultan.65
Table 6: Membership of District (Administrative) Councils
C o u n c ils O ffic ia l
M em b ers
U n o ffic ia l
M em b ers
T otal N o m in a te d  b y  
C o u cillo r s
S e le c te d  b y  the  
Sultan
B ru n ei U rban 12 0 12 4 2
B ru n ei R ural 16 16 3 2 4 2
T u to n g  R ural 9 9 18 3 1
T em b u ro n g  Rural 6 6 12 8 1
B e la it/S e r ia  Rural and  
U rban
14* 10 2 4 8 4
T ota l 5 7 41 9 8 2 2 10
S ou rce: C o m p ile  from  The Borneo Bulletin (9  M arch 1 957). 
N o te :  * In clu d in g  4  rep resen ta tiv es o f  b u s in e ss  and trades.
65CO 1030/658, item 1, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 8 February 1957.
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The programme was to be implemented immediately and from March 1957 the District 
Advisory Councils would be known as the District Councils. Elections to the 
Councils would be held during the year so that the Councils would be able to function 
from 1 January 1958. The remainder of the year the Sultan decided to promote the 
"observers" as full members and acted as the Unofficial members of the State 
Council.66
Although the Sultan refused to go further towards popular representation on the 
State Council, Sir Anthony Abell was satisfied that some advance had been made 
which presented an alternative to the PRB's programme and he hoped that it would 
lead to a more stable state of affairs in Brunei.67 However when the Sultan's reform 
programme was made public on 9 March 1957 it was immediately rejected by the 
PRB. Azahari described the plan to broaden the scope of the State Council as 
"primitive change" and the methods used to select the members of the Council as "a 
mockery of democracy".68 He declared that his party would not take part in the 
proposed new District Councils elections because they felt the people did not have 
sufficient representation on the State Council under of the plan. The PRB demanded 
that seventy-five per cent of the State Council should comprise freely elected members 
and an election enactment should be drawn up to regulate the proposed elections. The 
PRB threatened to boycott the Sultan's proposals and to organise a State-wide 
demonstration if it's views were not accepted.69
66The Borneo Bulletin, 9 March 1957.
67CO 1030/658, item 1, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 8 February 1957.
6*The Borneo Bulletin, 16 and 23 March 1957.
69Ibid.
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3.5 The Partai Rakyat Brunei's Constitutional Memorandum and the
Publication of the Sultan's Constitutional Proposal
The PRB held its first congress at the end of March 1957. The congress, which 
was attended by more than five hundred delegates, including observers from the 
neighbouring territories of Limbang, Lawas, Sipitang, Miri, Sibuti and Labuan, 
adopted a resolution reaffirming the Party’s call for seventy-five per cent o f the 
members of the State Council to be elected. In addition a resolution to send a 
delegation to London to demand full self-government was adopted. Another resolution 
called on the Party Executive to seek ways and means of bringing about the federation 
o f Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo into one State, with due safeguards for the 
position of the Sultan of Brunei. The congress also adopted a resolution calling for 
Trade Unions to be established in Brunei.70
In regard to the proposal to send a delegation to London, the PRB decided to 
engage a British Lawyer, Walter Raeburn, Q.C. to provide legal advice and to assist 
in drafting a memorandum to demand self-government. The memorandum was to be 
forwarded to the Secretary of State before the departure o f the PRB delegation. 
Raeburn's experience as a Constitutional adviser to David Marshall's "Merdeka 
Mission" in early 1956 and Lim Yew Hock's "Merdeka Conference" in London in 
March/April 1957 was useful to the PRB. In fact Raeburn was briefed by Marshall 
on behalf o f the PRB, after the latter had initially declined the assignment, on the 
grounds that he was no longer persona grata with the British Government and could
10The Borneo Bulletin, 6 April 1957; Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, Partai Rakyat
Brunei: Selected Documents, Petaling Jaya, INS AN, 1987, p. 11.
151
not therefore plead the PRB's cause effectively.71 Before arriving in Brunei, Raeburn 
contacted the Colonial office, on the instructions of the PRB, to find out the British 
Government's policy on the political future of Brunei. He told the Colonial Office that 
his clients wished "to act as openly as possible and in the fullest cooperation with the 
authorities in pursuing their objective".72
The PRB's decision to send a delegation to London and to invite Raeburn to 
Brunei alarmed the British authorities in the State. The PRB had publicised its plan 
to go to London and its intention to solicit support from Indonesia, India, Pakistan, 
Egypt and other countries. Sir Anthony Abell wrote to the Secretary of State towards 
the middle o f May:
"I am afraid we can't avoid the publicity or prevent the visit to you but it 
might be helpful if I could get them to agree to postpone the trip until the 
winter on the grounds that during the summer months you will be very busy 
with other constitutional meetings thereby allowing us time to give publicity 
to His Highness's plans. On the other hand you may decline to see them 
altogether which we would of course like but may be (sic)impossible".73 
In fact the High Commissioner asked the Colonial Office to dissuade Raeburn from 
taking up the assignment or at least to persuade him to wait until the Sultan's 
Constitutional proposals were published. The involvement of a British lawyer in the
71 CO 1030/464, item 9, Colonial Office to High Commissioner, 31 May 1957.
72CO 1030/464, item 1, Minute by RW ray, 20 May 1957; item 4, Colonial Office 
to the High Commissioner, 24 May 1957; item 8, Note of Meeting between Raeburn 
and J.B.Johnston at the Colonial Office on 30 May 1957.
73CO 1030/464, item 3, the High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 13 May 
1957.
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preparation of the PRB's political demands was viewed as particularly embarrassing 
to the British authorities in Brunei. They feared that the Sultan may suspect that the 
whole affair was a British plot to put pressure on him to concede a more liberal 
constitution. They also feared that the effects of the London trip and Raeburn's visit, 
which was expected to create much interest among the people in Brunei, would 
overshadow the Sultan's Constitutional reforms. Consequently, the whole affair could 
give Azahari and his Party a higher standing than the Sultan and could divert the 
loyalty of the people. The British were also concerned that Raeburn's visit could harm 
their interests in the State.74
The situation in Brunei during the period did not only cause concern among 
the British authorities. In June 1957 the Managing Director of Shell Head Offoce in 
London discussed the political situation in Brunei with the Colonial Office. The Oil 
Company was anxious about the possible effect of Azahari and his Party's programme 
on its oil industry. Presumbably the decision of company to change its name from the 
British Malayan Petroleum Company (BMPC) to the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company 
(BSPC) in March had something to do with the rise of nationalism in the State. The 
amount of publicity Azahari had received both in the local and foreign press they 
feared might have a disturbing effect on its labour force. The BSPC was afraid that 
racial sensitivities between the Malays and Chinese might be exploited by Azahari. 
The Company admitted that almost all its skilled and senior Asian staff were Chinese, 
and that the Brunei Malays, who did not possess the qualifications for skilled posts, 
had to be content with less important jobs and were accordingly jealous of the 
Chinese. Moreover Azahari's proposal for the creation of Trade Unions it feared
74CO 1030/464, item 5, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 27 May 1957.
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might well cause a great deal of trouble and intensify ill feelings if they in the hands 
o f the radical elements. The Company suggested the British Government should take 
action to stabilise the situation. The Colonial Office told the Company that without 
being unduly complacent on security, the British authorities did not wish to 
"precipitate action that might have the effect of making a martyr o f Azahari".75 
Instead it tried to guide and control the movements through peaceful and constitutional 
channels. The Colonial Office and the Company agreed that the way to tackle the 
problem was to "tame" Azahari by offering him a position in the Government or in 
the Oil Company76, and to consider creating an opposition Party to the PRB which 
could give support to the existing Government.77 In effect the British authorities in 
Brunei had been pondering over an alternative to the PRB. In November 1956 Sir 
Anthony Abell told the Colonial Office:
"It would be simple if it could take the form of a King's Party but we cannot 
do that effectively unless we drive a wedge between His Highness and his 
traditional advisers and that he would not countenance. Although I know he 
shares most of my views of his Ministers they are strongly entrenched round
75CO 1030/464, item 14, Note of Meeting between Whiteley of Colonial Office 
and Nuttall of Shell Head Office in London, 20 June 1957.
76Azahari claims that he had been offered "high positions" both by the Government 
and the BSPC, but declined them because he refused to abandon politics. Interview 
with Azahari, February 1993.
11 Ibid., CO 1030/464, item 16, Secretary of State to High Commissioner, 5 July 
1957.
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and in the Istana and his life would be made a misery to him if he deserted 
their interests".78
The Colonial Office, however, failed to dissuade Raeburn from taking up his 
assignment. Raeburn did not think that his visit would cause any problem because he 
emphasized that his brief was "a professional engagement" and that he was "simply 
doing a straight legal job by putting the PRB's demands in a coherent form". 
Raeburn suggested that he might even be able to persuade the PRB to modify its 
demands to make them acceptable. The Colonial Office doubted the sincerity of 
Raeburn; but hoped to see his influence on the PRB in the direction of moderation and 
gradualness in regards to constitutional advancement in Brunei.79
Raeburn arrived in Brunei in early June 1957 to begin his assignment. Before 
preparing the memorandum, Raeburn visited the main centres of population and met 
the people in order to gain first hand knowledge of the real situation in the State. His 
meetings were well attended by both the PRB's members and non Party members. 
Raeburn spoke with "moderation and ...impressed Azahari with the necessity for 
moderation at this stage".80 In fact Raeburn claimed that he was able to create a new 
understanding amongst the PRB of what the British were doing in Brunei and at the 
same time he had been able to interpret Azahari and the PRB to the European
78CO 1030/237, item 1, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 25 November
1956.
79CO 1030/464, item 8, Note of Meeting between J.B.Johnston and Raeburn, 30
May 1957; item 9, Colonial Office to High Commissioner, 31 May 1957.
80CO 1030/464, item 17, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 6 July 1957.
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officials.81 Sir Anthony Abell for example, noted:
"A more moderate view now prevails in the political circles: relations between 
Party Ra'ayat and Government have improved: relations between labour and 
employer, and between European and Asian have improved. There is in fact 
a pleasant lull on this front and it can be expected to last until October unless 
we do something to upset it".82 
Raeburn did not only meet and talk to PRB members but he also met members of the 
administration, including the British Resident and toured Government's development 
projects. He also visited the BSPC and talked to its managers and staff. Towards the 
end of his visit Raeburn had a cordial meeting with the Sultan at which the latter 
"discussed politics freely with him and on quite a few occasions they found 
themselves in agreement".83
At the end of his three week visit Raeburn completed the PRB's draft 
constitutional memorandum but he admitted that the final draft had been "somewhat 
mutilated" through the activities of Lim Cher Keng, an Independent member o f the 
Singapore Assembly who was included in Raeburn's entourage on the advice o f David 
Marshall in order to rally the Chinese supporters. Raeburn told the Colonial Office 
that Lim Cher Keng had taken the tiresome Singapore line that the Party would lose 
support if its proposals at any point reflected approval of British administration or
81CO 1030/464, item 18, Note of Discussion between J.B.Johnston and Raeburn 
on 16 July 1957.
82CO 1030/464, item 17, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 6 July 1957.
"Ibid.
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achievement in Brunei.84 The PRB’s Memorandum on Constitutional Proposals was 
finally submitted to the British Resident for onward transmission to the High 
Commissioner and the Secretary of State in London in early July. The High 
Commissioner gave a copy of the memorandum to the Sultan.85
As reiterated by the Party, the memorandum demanded the establishment of a 
Legislative Assembly with three quarters of the members being elected directly by the 
people. The remaining one quarter would be nominated by the Sultan. It was a 
concession to his prestige and position. In order for the election to be democratic 
voting would be by secret ballot. In relation to this demand the memorandum 
proposed new conditions for Brunei citizenship, which were: birth within the territory; 
continuous residence for a substantial number of years; or naturalisation. The 
citizenship proposal was seen partly as an attempt by the PRB to woo Chinese support 
in the State and partly a long term strategy which extended beyond the borders of 
Brunei. In addition the Party proposed that the Chinese Language be ranked together 
with Malay and English as one of the official languages of Brunei.
The memorandum also outlined the type of government the PRB wanted under 
the new constitution. The Residential System would be abolished and replaced by a 
Ministerial System under a local Chief Minister, presumably known as Menteri Besar. 
The Sultan would be under constitutional obligation to call upon the leader of the 
party commanding a majority of votes in the Legislative Assembly to form the 
Government. The executive authority would be vested in the Government of the day.
84CO 1030/464, item 18, Note of Meeting between J.B.Johnston and Raeburn, 16
July 1957.
85A copy of the Memorandum is in CO 1030/464, item 34, High Commissioner
to Colonial Secretary, 18 July 1957.
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The Sultan would become a Constitutional Monarch, conducting the affairs o f his 
Government on the advice tendered by the Chief Minister.
However, the memorandum was not specific with regard to the relationship 
between Brunei and Britain under the new constitution. It stated that there would be 
a British Adviser whose function would be to advice the Government, but it did not 
contemplate that the Government would have to accept his advice. This implied that 
the British Government had no real power other than on external affairs which would 
presumably be the responsibility of the High Commissioner. It also implied that 
Brunei would have full internal self-government under British protection. This was 
confirmed by Azahari when he assured the High Commissioner, on the day Raeburn 
left Brunei, that his Party wished to see the Sultanate preserved under the British 
protection and stood for the closest relations with Britain.86 Finally the memorandum 
also envisaged that a federation of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo, each retaining 
for the purposes of internal government its own peculiar constitution, should be the 
objective to be pursued.
Despite Azahari's assurance, the Colonial Office and the British authorities in 
Brunei agreed that PRB’s demands were unacceptable to them and the Sultan.87 To 
the British the PRB's proposals, which were "more advanced than the contemporary 
status of Singapore", could only represent a goal to be aimed at after 1 0 - 1 5  years 
experience of a constitution, and were quite unsuitable for adoption in Brunei at that 
stage. The British recognised that there were too many risks at stake to hand over
86CO 1030/464, item 17, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 6 July 1957.
87CO 1030/464, item 34, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 12 August 
1957; ibid., item 41 A, "Note on the Raeburn Memorandum", 3 September 1957.
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the government of Brunei to the people of Brunei when the level of education was still 
low.88 They believed Brunei was not ready at that stage to undertake full 
responsibilities of government. This notion was clearly expressed by Sir Anthony 
Abell to the Colonial Office:
"I feel also that the future of our capital investment in Brunei should not be 
forgotten. A longer period of tutelage and some promise of capacity to govern 
is required before we should risk the future by handing over power to such 
doubtful management".89
Although the demands of the PRB were unacceptable they could not be ignored 
because the British recognised that the PRB represented a large section o f the people. 
The press coverage, moreover, had given the Party a place on the political map. A 
Colonial Office official for example wrote to Sir Anthony Abell:
"The next steps are going to be very tricky, and we cannot help feeling here 
that we are now at something of a watershed in Brunei's political development; 
and that the way things go in future will very much depend on how affairs are 
handled in the next few months. Whether we like it or not it seems clear that 
the Party Ra'ayat are now on the map and that Azahari and his following are 
now more than a clique of hotheads who can be ignored".90 
The problem facing the British was how to handle the PRB while maintaining what 
they felt was a sensible pace of political development and without damaging their
88CO 1030/464, Minute by Whiteley, 14 August 1957.
89CO 1030/464, item 34, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 12 August 
1957.
90CO 1030/464, item 20, Colonial Office to High Commissioner, 23 July 1957.
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relations with the Sultan or provoking the PRB into violence. They did not want to 
take covert action against Azahari and his Party because they feared that the Party 
would go underground and resort to violence. At the same time they believed Azahari 
and his Party were as "moderate, at present, as any likely alternative". Sir Anthony 
Abell told the Colonial Office that there was "a very anti-British group of school 
teachers waiting their cue, [who were] ...pro-Sultan and rabid Brunei nationalist".91 
The sensible approach, they recognised, was to associate the PRB in some way with 
the Sultan's proposals; but at the same time they also recognised that there was little 
chance of bringing about an accommodation between the two opposing "parties"; the 
PRB demanded the Sultan give up his absolute power, but the latter refused to share 
power with the PRB.92
Meanwhile the British authorities in Brunei decided to put pressure on the 
Sultan to agree to publish his constitutional proposals before the PRB's proposals 
became known. The idea was to bring some of the "moderates" over to the Sultan's 
side, and to show that the large sums of money spent on the lawyers and delegations 
had been wasted.93 The Colonial Office agreed that the main provisions o f the 
Constitution should be published so that the Government took "some credit for moving 
at least in the direction of democratisation on its own initiative".94
91 CO 1030/464, item 17, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 6 July 1957.
92CO 1030/464, Colonial Office's Minute, 18 July 1957.
93CO 1030/464, item 17, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 6 July 1957.
94CO 1030/464, Minute by G.C.Whiteley, 18 July 1957.
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Towards the end of July 1957, Gilbert announced the outline of the main 
provisions of Constitution Enactment.95 Sir Anthony Abell informed the Colonial 
Office:
"It is not a clever document. We had the greatest difficulty in getting His 
Highness's agreement. He is, I am afraid, becoming more and more stubborn 
and though he wants a new Constitution and still more a new agreement with 
H.M.G. he is determined to give nothing away to Azahari. He wants only in 
fact his own powers increased at the expense of the Resident's and mine. His 
grudging concessions to democracy are purely moves of expediency in the 
game he plays with me. He is, unfortunately, receiving very bad advice at the 
present time from a group of school-teachers who are rabidly nationalistic as 
a result is playing right into the hands of Azahari who is now a clever tactician 
and surrounds himself with Raeburn's nauseating aroma of sweet 
reasonableness".96
Nevertheless, the High Commissioner believed that if the Sultan announced that he 
would consider any recommendations or criticisms he received from District Councils, 
and would say that he intended to hold free elections to District Councils as soon as 
possible it would go far to making the Constitution acceptable to the "moderates".97
Meanwhile the British were pondering on how to response to the PRB which 
determined to go ahead with its plan to send a delegation to London to seek interview 
with the Secretary of State on its demand for self-government.
95The Borneo Bulletin, 27 July 1957.
96CO 1030/464, item 32, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 5 August 1957.
91Ibid.
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3.6 The Partai Rakyat Brunei's Merdeka Mission and the Sultan's Discussions
with the Colonial Office
The PRB delegation left for London at the end of August 1957. The 
delegation, styled the "Merdeka Mission", was similar to the delegation led by Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, the Chief Minister of Malaya in January - February 1956 and David 
Marshall, the Chief Minister of Singapore, in June 1956. However, unlike the 
Malayan and Singaporean Merdeka Missions, the PRB's delegation could not claim 
to represent the people unless it had the blessing of the Sultan and his State Council. 
The PRB was aware of the weakness of its delegation; hence in early May the Party 
wrote to the Sultan asking him to receive its representatives to discuss its the plan to 
send a delegation to London to ask for self-government. It had intended to invite two 
representatives of the Sultan to join the delegation.98 But the Sultan refused to see the 
PRB's representatives on the grounds that he, as the Sovereign Ruler of Brunei, did 
not want to involve himself in matters connected with political movements or political 
parties.99 However, not long after that a report said that the Sultan was to have a long 
holiday in Europe.100 The PRB also sought an interview with the High Commissioner 
to discuss its demands and the visit to London, but was again turned down. The High 
Commissioner told the Party to await the Sultan's proposals instead.101 In August the
98General-Secretary of PRB to the Sultan, 6 May 1957. (Haji Zaini's Private 
Papers); The Borneo Bulletin, 20 April 1957.
"Sultan's Private Secretary to Secretary General of PRB, 14 May 1957 
(HajiZaini's Private Papers).
l00The Borneo Bulletin, 8 June 1957.
,01CO 1030/464, item 3, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 13 May 1957.
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High Commissioner advised PRB to submit its views on the proposals to the District 
Councils. However Azahari told the High Commissioner that he could not withdraw 
from the trip as it would be politically embarrassing.102 Furthermore, as he told the 
Secretary of State, he was not convinced that the existing system in the State could 
give a fair hearing for its cause, unless there were free elections. The only way of 
making itself heard was to send a delegation to London to talk directly with the 
Secretary of State.103
On the way to London the delegation met with prominent politicians such as 
Lim Yew Hock, the Chief Minister of Singapore; Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime 
Minister of India; and Zainuddin, the Minister of Education o f Pakistan. The 
delegation was encouraged by the support given by these politicians.104 Soon after the 
delegation left Brunei the Party issued a circular ordering its members to boycott the 
Sultan's Constitution or face expulsion. The PRB regarded the announcement of the 
constitutional proposals to coincide with its departure for London as an attempt to 
undermine its demands for self-government.105 Meanwhile the Sultan and his 
entourage had arrived in London ahead of the Merdeka Mission. The fact that the 
Sultan's entourage consisted of three of his closest advisers and State Council
102CO 1030/464, item 27, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 20 August 
1957.
103CO 1030/464, item 70, "Notes of Meeting in the Secretary o f State's Room on 
Monday, 30 September 1957".
I04lnterviews with members of the Merdeka Mission: Azahari, February 1993;
Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and May 1993; and Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, 
December 1992; The delegation's plan to seek support from President Sukarno 
of Indonesia and President Nasser of Egypt was abandoned because of lack 
of money.
i05The Borneo Bulletin, 7 September 1957.
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members, namely, the Pengiran Pemanca (the Second Minister); Pehin Datu Perdana 
Menteri Haji Ibrahim (the Sultan's Private Secretary who was also the Chairman of the 
Select Committee which drew up the Local Government proposals in 1956); and 
Pengiran Yusuf (Secretary of the 1953 Constitutional Advisory Committee) in the 
place of his wife, the Raja Isteri, and children, showed that the Sultan planned to hold 
important discussions on the constitutional proposals with the Colonial Office.106
In fact the Sultan held three official meetings: one with the Under Secretary, 
Sir John Martin, and twice with the Secretary of State, Allan Lennox-Boyd. During 
the discussions the Sultan agreed to a proposal for elections to District Councils by 
secret ballot. This agreement was received with relief by the Colonial Office because 
much of the PRB's demands would be met.107 Thus, a telegram was sent immediately 
to Gilbert in Brunei, who made a prompt announcement stressing that the members 
of District Councils would be elected by secret ballot and the Councils would elect 
their representatives to Legislative Council.108 On the proposed Constitution itself 
there were two important points raised: the High Commissioner's reserve powers and 
the appointment of the Menteri Besar. As he had suggested to Sir Anthony Abell 
during his previous discussions the Sultan wanted to delete the High Commissioner's 
powers from the Constitution Enactment but was agreeable to a mention the proposed 
Agreement. Lennox-Boyd told the Sultan that he feared the High Commissioner's 
powers would not have the force of law in Brunei if they were not inserted in the
106CO 1030/460, item 34, Note of Meeting between the Secretary of State and His
Highness the Sultan of Brunei held at the Colonial Office on 27 September 1957.
] 01 Ibid.
m The Borneo Bulletin, 27 September 1957.
164
Constitution. However the Sultan pointed out that there was no mention of such 
powers in the Constitution of the Malay States in Malaya. The Secretary of State 
replied that the High Commissioner's powers were set out in the Federation 
Constitution which covered all individual States. As a result the Sultan suggested that 
the detailed powers of the High Commissioner be deleted from the Constitution and 
a general clause inserted to the effect that anything in the Constitution was subject to 
the terms of the Agreement, which would contain details of the High Commissioner's 
powers.109 The Secretary of State promised to look into the matter, but was optimistic 
that a way might be found to meet the Sultan's wishes.110 In regard to the second 
point the Sultan wanted the appointment of the Menteri Besar, the State Secretary and 
the State Financial Officer to be made simultaneously with the introduction of the new 
Constitution or, alternatively, six months after the Constitution came into effect. The 
Sultan, who was supported strongly by Pengiran Yusuf, said the change had been 
delayed since 1953 and represented the wishes of the people.111 Lennox-Boyd felt that 
the Constitution should be established before the appointments were made but agreed 
to ask his Legal Advisers to look into the Sultan suggestion.112
109CO 1030/460, item 34, Note of Meeting between the Secretary o f State and His 
Highness the Sultan o f Brunei held at the Colonial Office on 27 September 1957.
110CO 1030/460, item 35, Note of Meeting between the Secretary of State and 
His Highness the Sultan of Brunei held at the Colonial Office on 30 
September 1957.
11'CO 1030/460, item 17, Note of Meeting with His Highness the Sultan Brunei 
in Sir John Martin's room on 11 September 1957.
112CO 1030/460, item 35, Note of Meeting between the Secretary of State and 
His Highness the Sultan of Brunei held at the Colonial Office on 30 
September 1957.
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The PRB's Merdeka Mission, which arrived in London in the middle of 
September, was given two formal interviews by the Colonial Office: with Sir John 
Martin and Lennox-Boyd, who told Azahari and his delegation that his decision to 
meet them was at the Sultan's recommendation. In fact this assisted the Secretary of 
State in its suggestion that the delegation should address its demands directly to the 
Sultan. The Colonial Office made clear to the delegation at the outset that it was not 
prepared to do more than listen to what the delegation had to say. Furthermore, 
Lennox-Boyd was able to point out to the delegation that since its memorandum had 
been written, the Sultan's proposals had been published. He suggested that the PRB 
should reconsider its position in the light of a careful study of the published text of 
the Sultan's Constitution. The Secretary of State said that Sultan's proposals were very 
wise and he fully supported them. He felt the PRB's proposals on the other hand 
represented too rapid a move forward at the stage of Brunei's political development. 
He also told Azahari and his delegation that their demand for democratic reforms had 
been partly met by the Sultan's agreement to hold elections by secret ballot. Lennox- 
Boyd criticised the PRB's decision to boycott the Sultan's Constitution as 
undemocratic, and suggested that the delegation should channel their comments to the 
Sultan-in-Council. Azahari, who was accompanied by the two members of his 
delegation and Raeburn, his Constitutional adviser, told Lennox-Boyd that the PRB 
had tried to find a method of communicating with the Sultan but had been unable to 
do so. He emphasised that their proposals were: that the autocratic power of the 
Sultan should be abolished; that the Sultan should not be Chairman of the Executive 
Council; that three-quarter of members the Legislative Assembly should be elected; 
that the Legislative Assembly should be chosen by direct election; that the Executive 
Council should work through a Chief Minister; and that the Menteri Besar should not 
be appointed but elected. But the Secretary of State reiterated that Azahari should 
submit his Party's views on the published proposals to the Sultan.
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Thus the Merdeka Mission failed to achieve its objectives and as will be seen 
in Chapter 5 its consequence was devastating to the PRB. It lost its popularity and 
began to experience a period of decline until early 1960s. Unlike the PRB, the Sultan 
returned to Brunei in triumph. He was given a clear assurance by the Secretary of 
State that the British Government would protect him from any threats including the 
PRB. He was subsequently so confident that he even withdrew his agreement to hold 
free elections to District Councils, which had been announced by Gilbert due to be 
held at the end of the year. When the British Resident asked the Sultan to inform the 
public of his decision not allowing the elections to be held, the latter refused on the 
grounds that the announcement was made neither on his authority nor the State 
Council. In fact the minutes of the State Council held on 6 November recorded that 
the Council passed a resolution that the decision on the elections be postponed until 
the return of the Sultan.113
Furthermore the Sultan was also assured that the British Government would not 
impose the Borneo "closer association" proposals on Brunei without his consent.114 
The Sultan had been unsure of the attitude of the British Government on these matters 
before he met the Secretary of State. The next chapter will focus on the British 
proposals to bring the three Borneo territories of Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak 
into a closer political association.
113BA/12875/78, Minutes of the State Council Meeting held on 6 November
1957.
1,4CO 1030/460, item 29, "Note of Meeting between the Secretary of State and 
His Highness the Sultan of Brunei held at the Colonial Office on 27 
September 1957".
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CHAPTER 4
BRUNEI AND THE CLOSER ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH BORNEO 
TERRITORIES PROPOSALS 1953 - 1958
In the midst of the discussions on the Brunei Constitution British officials were 
seriously considering proposals to bring the three Borneo territories of Brunei, North 
Borneo and Sarawak politically closer. The proposals, which were referred to as 
"closer association" of British Borneo territories, were discussed and considered behind 
closed door since February 1953; but only made public in February 1958. This 
chapter examines the proposals for a closer association, the problems the planners 
faced and the impact of the proposals on the shape o f the Brunei Constitution.
4.1 Malcolm MacDonald and the Closer Association Proposals
As seen in Chapter 1 the British policy since the World War II was to bring 
Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak under some form of political and administrative 
association. But due to the strong protests of the Malays in Sarawak against the 
cession of their independent State to the British Crown in 1946, the British feared that 
such a declaration would inflame the anti-cessionist campaign. Moreover, as a result 
the devastation of the war, particularly in North Borneo, the territories needed several 
years of physical reconstruction and administrative consolidation. Nevertheless, to 
pave the way for a closer political association a policy of closer departmental 
association in matters of common concern, such as geology, meteorology, the
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Judiciary, etc. were embarked upon. But in January 1949 Sir E.Twining, the Governor 
o f North Borneo and Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, the Governor of Sarawak, complained 
that the pace was being forced beyond the capacity o f their administrations, and a 
slower approach was agreed upon.1
By the early 1950s the political and social conditions in the territories 
permitted a reexamination of the policy. Moreover, the plan to bring the Federation 
o f Malaya and Singapore closer had become politically intractable. The Federation 
refused to absorb about three quarters of a million Chinese from Singapore so as not 
to upset the existing racial balance while the Chinese-dominated Singapore on the 
other hand did not wish to come under the Malay-dominated Federation. However, 
by the early 1950s there were indications that a closer union of the two territories 
might be acceptable to the Malays in the Federation if the Borneo territories with a 
smaller Chinese population could be involved. At the same, time Singapore would 
find it easier to bargain for suitable terms of entry into a Greater Federation if the 
Borneo territories were to join at the same time. It was mainly for this reason that the 
Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, Malcolm 
MacDonald, attempted in 1952 to revive the Colonial Office's wartime plans to 
bringing the five British territories into "some sort of Confederation".2 However, the 
Colonial Office maintained that the initiative for a closer association should come 
from the territories and there would be no question of Whitehall imposing such a
'CO 1022/61, item 30, "Political Objectives in British territories of South East 
Asia", 10 March 1953. A Colonial Office's paper prepared for the Secretary of the 
Joint Planning Staff, Ministry of Defence; see also CO 1022/61, Colonial Office's 
Minute, 7 February 1952.
2CO 1030/61, item 7, MacDonald to Colonial Office, 29 January 1952.
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plan.3 Thus it was left to MacDonald, whose main task was to promote co-operation 
and co-ordination of policies of all the territories under his authority, to foster the idea 
o f closer political association among the leaders in the five territories. To achieve his 
purpose MacDonald decided to take advantage o f the formation in Southeast Asia of 
branches o f the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, which periodically brought 
together the leading politicians of the British territories in the region, "to foster the 
idea of a political Association of all the South East Asian territories in a single 
group".4
In February 1953, after a successful meeting of the representatives of the 
branches of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association at Jesselton in North 
Borneo, MacDonald and the new Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak, Sir Ralph 
Hone and Sir Anthony Abell, respectively, agreed to take some concrete steps towards 
bringing the Borneo territories closer together.5 In order to achieve their objective a 
Standing Inter-Territorial Conference was established on 21 April 1953.6 The Inter- 
Territorial Conference, chaired by the Commissioner-General included the two 
Governors, their Chief Secretaries, two unofficial members of their Councils, the 
Sultan of Brunei and the British Resident, and certain members of the State Council.
3CO 1022/61, Colonial Office's Minute, 20 January 1953.
4CO 1022/61, item 30, "Political Objective..."
5CO 1030/61, items 4 and 5, Commissioner-General to Governor of North Borneo, 
10 February 1953 and Governor of North Borneo to Commissioner-General, 12 
February 1953. Brunei was not a member of the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association; however, it was represented at the Jesselton meeting by Datu Perdana 
Menteri Haji Ibrahim bin Jaafar, a member of the Brunei State Council and the 
Sultan's Private Secretary.
6CO 1022/294, item 5, Minutes of the First Meeting of the Borneo Inter-Territorial 
Conference, held at Kuching on 21 April 1953.
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The Conference met twice a year in each territory in rotation. It was purely 
consultative and had neither constitutional nor statutory legal authority. Its purpose 
was mainly to discuss matters of common concern and to take measures to promote 
closer co-operation and co-ordination between Departments of the three Governments.7 
However the main aim was to foster the idea of political association among the leaders 
o f the three territories. As MacDonald said: "when and if the 'atmosphere' o f the 
discussions on the Conference made it possible, the question of federation between the 
three territories would be considered".8
In October 1954 MacDonald chaired a meeting in Kuching to discuss his 
memorandum on "closer association" between the three Borneo territories. The 
meeting, which was attended by Sir Anthony Abell and Roland Turnbull (the new 
Governor of North Borneo) and Sir John Martin (Assistant Under-Secretary of State 
in the Colonial Office) agreed that there should be two successive moves on 
MacDonald's plan for "some sort of Confederation" between the three Borneo 
territories and the Federation of Malaya and Singapore: first the "closer association" 
o f the Borneo territories, and only afterwards an attempt to accomplish their 
constitutional partnership with the Federation of Malaya and Singapore.9
7CO 1030/164, item 24, Commissioner-General to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 4 February 1955.
8CO 1022/63, items 4 and 5, Commissioner-General to Governor of North Borneo, 
10 February 1953.
9CO 1030/164, item 9, Note of Meeting at Kuching to consider closer association 
between the Borneo territories, 28 October 1954. Neither the Sultan nor his 
representatives were invited to the meeting. The spokesman for Brunei at the meeting 
was Sir Anthony Abell in his capacity as the High Commissioner for the State.
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On the question of the "closer association" of the Borneo territories there were 
differences between Turnbull and Sir Anthony Abell. Turnbull wanted to bring North 
Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak into a complete amalgamation. He noted that:
"a Federal Government of the Governments of the three Borneo Territories 
would be nonsensical; it would be so top heavy that it would be unworkable. 
The obviously desirable thing was a single Government which removed the 
identities, certainly geographical identities, o f the three Territories".10 
He proposed that there should be one Governor or High Commissioner for the whole 
area, with a series of provincial administrations, two or three for North Borneo, two 
or three for Sarawak and one for Brunei. He believed amalgamation of the three 
territories could produce a unit which would be able to talk on level terms with 
Singapore and the Federation. He did not think the slow approach would get them 
anywhere.
However, Sir Anthony Abell thought there was no hope of getting the 
territories closer than they were at the time. He emphasised that "if they [the British] 
used the knife they would have to use troops". He believed that if  they tried to 
amalgamate the three Borneo territories, Brunei would regard it as a device to acquire 
a share of its wealth for the other two territories. He said:
"It would be a long time before there would be any closer association which 
would involve the sharing of Brunei's wealth with another Territory. Brunei 
would not tolerate such a step".11
]0Ibid.
11Ibid.
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Consequently, MacDonald proposed a scheme for a "closer association" which 
he felt would be acceptable to the three territories. The main feature of his scheme 
was the formation of a Standing Joint Council on which the three territories would be 
represented as equals. Although the membership of the central body would be similar 
to the existing Inter-Territorial Conference, unlike the latter the Joint Council would 
be made a constitutional body with executive powers in certain defined fields of 
common interest. He envisaged that the Joint Council would become the major 
policy-making body of the three territories.12
MacDonald felt that his scheme could be achieved by making the proposals for 
"closer association" part of a wider plan for constitutional development in the British 
Borneo territories. He proposed Brunei should cease to come under the Governor of 
Sarawak in his capacity as the High Commissioner. He thought that this would please 
Brunei because it was critical of the implication that Brunei was way subordinate to 
the Sarawak Government. Macdonald admitted that the idea to link Brunei and 
Sarawak in 1948 might have been a mistake on his part. However he said the step 
had been taken with the intention of bringing Sarawak and Brunei into "closer 
association". Brunei instead became suspicious of Sarawak, and MacDonald felt they 
had "lately tended to grow not to decrease".13 To resolve the problem he proposed 
that the British Resident should cease to be under the Governor of Sarawak: instead 
the Resident should assume the function of the High Commissioner, acting under the 
direct instructions of the Secretary of State. However, he suggested that if the Brunei
12CO 1030/164, item 24, MacDonald to Secretary of State , 4 February 1955.
l3CO 1030/164, item 9, Note of Meeting at Kuching...
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authorities agreed the heads of appropriate Government Departments might continue 
to act as advisers to the Sultan in their respective spheres.
Secondly, MacDonald proposed that the existing Treaty between Britain and 
Brunei should be revised, to remove features which were out of date with 
contemporary Asian opinion. He specifically suggested that the provision that the 
Sultan must accept the advice of the British Resident should be appropriately 
modified.
Thirdly, MacDonald proposed territorial concessions to Brunei: Labuan and the 
Fifth Division of Sarawak should be joined with Brunei for administrative purposes. 
However, the status of the territories and their inhabitants, he suggested, should remain 
British. He thought that on one hand, this would please the Brunei authorities because 
it would increase the sphere of influence and, on the other, be advantageous to the 
people of Labuan and the Fifth Division of Sarawak because Brunei's revenue could 
then be spent on those territories. In fact MacDonald wanted to see "Brunei money 
not only spent on Labuan [and the Fifth Division of Sarawak] but also spread over the 
whole of the Borneo territories". In order to do that he wondered whether the Sultan 
could become a "High Commissioner or Lieutenant-Governor" with certain 
administrative responsibilities in the three territories. However Sir Anthony Abell 
disagreed. He said, "while it was true we wanted to see Brunei's money spread out 
we did not necessarily want Brunei's influence to do the same".14
Fourthly, MacDonald proposed that the Sultan of Brunei should become the 
head of the Muslim faith for the three Borneo territories. But Turnbull did not think 
that the Sultan of Brunei should become a "M ufti", although he could become "the
uIbid.
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head of a body which guided Mohammadan affairs".15
In February 1955 MacDonald sent his proposals to the Colonial Office for 
approval.16 The Colonial Office was not enthusiastic about his proposals. The 
Secretary of State, Alan Lennox-Boyd, believed that it was "too early to agree even 
in principle to the separation of Brunei from Sarawak" and he would only be prepared 
to consider the revision of the Treaty when the new constitution in Brunei had been 
established. Lennox-Boyd said that the Government of Brunei should be allowed time 
to settle down after the new constitutional reforms had taken place, and the other 
concessions to Brunei proposed by MacDonald should be considered only when the 
success o f the new constitution had been established. In the meantime he suggested 
that nothing should be done which might divert the Sultan's attention from the task of 
ensuring their success.17 However the Secretary of State agreed in principle to the 
creation o f a Standing Joint Council with executive, powers on the lines proposed by 
MacDonald. He suggested that the constitution of the Joint Council, and the subjects 
in which it should be given executive authority, should forthwith be examined in 
greater detail, with a view to discussing it with the Sultan at a suitable opportunity. 
He advised MacDonald to proceed slowly even though it might mean deferring for a 
time the creation of the proposed Council.18
15 Ibid.
l6CO 1030/164, item 24, Commissioner-General to Secretary o f S tate , 4 February
1955.
17CO 1030/164, item 26, Secretary of State to Commissioner-General, 25 March
1955.
nIbid.
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In June 1955 MacDonald, Sir Anthony Abell and B.J. O'Brien, the Acting 
Governor of North Borneo, met at Jesselton to discuss the proposed Joint Executive 
Council approved by the Secretary of State. They agreed not to take any "overt 
action" to achieve "closer association" between the three Borneo territories through a 
Joint Executive Council until the new Brunei Constitution had come into being, and 
its working accepted by the Sultan. Their only aim meanwhile was to get the 
principle of "closer association" accepted by the three territories. However, they 
agreed that "covert action" should take place simultaneously and should be directed 
towards: drawing up what were considered to be the proper powers for the Joint 
Executive Council; consideration of the way in which the Brunei Constitution should 
eventually be revised to enable such a Council to function effectively; plans for the 
administration of Labuan under Brunei; any other matters which would be useful for 
promoting the aim of "closer association".19 In regards to the matters in which the 
Joint Council might have powers they decided to include: Defence, Internal Security, 
Judiciary, Geological Survey, Communications, Lights and Harbours, Trade and 
Customs, Banking and Currency. The Attomey-Generals of North Borneo and 
Sarawak were asked to consider and advise what changes, if any, would be necessary 
in the constitutions of Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei in order that a Joint 
Executive Council could be set up. At the end of the meeting they agreed that 
"nothing of the foregoing should be mentioned to the Sultan of Brunei at present".20
,9CO 1030/164, item E/33, "Summary of the Record o f a Meeting held at
Government House, Jesselton, on 26 June 1955 to discuss closer association of the
Borneo Territories".
20Ibid.
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4.2 Sir Robert Scott and the Closer Association Proposals
In September 1955 MacDonald was replaced by Sir Robert Scott as the 
Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia. Unlike 
MacDonald, Sir Robert Scott came from the Foreign Office, and was more concerned 
with security and strategy. This undoubtedly had an important bearing on his views 
on the future of the territories. By the time he took over the office o f the 
Commissionership, political developments in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore 
had changed considerably and they were well ahead in their march towards 
independence. In February 1956 he wrote to Lennox-Boyd:
"Modem strategy calls for dispersal, and the need to reduce overseas defence 
expenditure coupled with the political difficulties of maintaining large 
establishments in Malaya and Singapore point to reductions there”.21 
He pointed out the potentialities of the Borneo territories in the defence of British 
interests in the region. The first was Sandakan, on the east coast o f North Borneo, 
which he suggested could accommodate a small airfield, signals centre, and small 
garrison financed and operated by the Australians. He was confident that the 
Australians would be attracted to the idea because the area was strategic to the defence 
of their country. The second was Labuan Island. What he had in mind for Labuan 
was:
"a first rate airfield to take the heaviest civil planes, under joint R.A.F./civil 
control, with R.A.F. detachment and signals centre, a small naval depot ready
21CO 1030/164, item 37, Sir Robert Scott to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
18 February 1956.
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for expansion in an emergency with facilities for floating docks, and a small 
garrison of local forces raised in Borneo. Developed as a free port and as one 
of the world’s largest oil-transhipment and blending depots, Labuan could 
become a very prosperous place indeed, with enough air and sea traffic to pay 
much of the cost of upkeep".22 
However he realised the main problem would be capital for development, and shortage 
of labour. But he saw no insuperable difficulty in either. He said: "they will govern 
the pace, but should not be allowed to delay the plan".23 Sir Robert Scott undoubtedly 
was looking to Brunei for his capital as he insisted later that Labuan should be 
transferred to Brunei.
Towards the end of March 1956 Sir Robert Scott summoned Sir Anthony Abell 
and Sir Roland Turnbull (knighted in 1956) to Singapore resume the discussions on 
the "closer association" plan. They came up with a new proposal to bring the 
territories closer together. As a first step Brunei was to be separated from Sarawak. 
This decision was taken because they believed that the proposal for "closer 
association" would not commend itself to the Sultan of Brunei unless an assurance 
could be given to him that the complete separation of his Sultanate from Sarawak 
would be effected. Then the three territories would come under a single administrative 
head. The new administrative head would exercise the functions of the Governor in 
Sarawak and North Borneo and would hold the post of High Commissioner in Brunei. 
He would sit as the permanent Chairman of a Joint Executive Council consisting of 
Officials and Unofficial members of Legislatures from the three territories, which
22Ibid.
23 Ibid.
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would make policy decisions in regard to a limited number of subjects such as defence 
and external relations, and any other subjects which the three countries considered 
were appropriate to its functions.24 Sir Anthony Abell suggested the new head should 
be stationed in Brunei but Sir Robert Scott proposed making Labuan the Federal 
Territory where the new head would have his headquarters, served by a suitable 
Federal secretariat. The Island would in due course be returned to Brunei, subject to 
account being taken of the wishes of the inhabitants and to the solution of the problem 
o f citizenship.25
The agreement to bring the three territories into a single administrative head 
was an important shift of policy on the part of Sir Anthony Abell who had refused to 
consider such a proposal previously. He was concerned with the political 
developments in Malaya and Singapore, noting that:
"politicians in both the Federation and Singapore have shown considerable 
interest in the Borneo territories; its empty spaces, its potential wealth, and its 
oil are all considerable attractions, and I feel it is probably only a matter of 
time before Indonesia also gives us more attention".26 
His conclusions may have been influenced by the formation, in January 1956, of a 
Malayan branch of the Partai Rakyat in Brunei, the PRB, with pro-Indonesian 
leanings. The Party's left-wing ideology and rabid anti-colonialist attitude he feared 
would be a threat to the British connection and interests in the State and in the Borneo
24CO 1030/164, item 38, Sir Anthony Abell to Colonial Office, 6 April 1956.
25CO 1030/164, item 42, Assistant Commissioner-General to Secretary of State
for the Colonies, 5 June 1956.
26CO 1030/164, item 38, Sir Anthony Abell to Colonial office, 6 April 1956.
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territories as a whole. In the circumstances it is plausible that the British authorities 
in Brunei may have been behind the royal proclamation of 8 March 1956 which stated 
that neither the Sultan nor his Government had ever contemplated, or wished, to unite 
or federate the State of Brunei with any other State. The proclamation was reported 
as a response by the Sultan to the claim that he supported and approved the formation 
o f the PRB.27 After the proclamation Sir Anthony Abell told the Colonial Office that: 
"the Sultan and public opinion in Brunei at one time probably favoured a 
closer political relationship with the Federation o f Malaya, [but] recently this 
feeling has changed to one of fear and hostility towards the march of events 
in Singapore and the Federation. The average citizen of Brunei is very 
anxious to preserve his monarchy and the integrity of his Islamic State".28 
Nevertheless Sir Anthony Abell believed that if the single administrative head was 
stationed in Brunei territory, and if an assurance was given that there was no intention 
o f developing the Borneo Council into a full federation which would reduce the 
Sultan's sovereignty in his State and distribute his wealth, he said, he had hopes that 
the Sultan would agree to such arrangement. In order to support the new proposal for 
the "close association", Sir Anthony Abell permitted the PRB to open branches in 
Sarawak and asked the Party to do the same in North Borneo. But the plan to make 
the PRB as a pan-Bornean Party was snubbed by the Sultan when he questioned the 
British Resident on why the PRB was to be allowed to conduct its activities in the two 
Borneo States but not in Malaya and Singapore.29
27See above pages 129-130.
28CO 1030/164, item 38, High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 6 April 1956.
29See page 130.
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The Colonial Office was not entirely happy with the new "closer association" 
proposals. It feared that the proposals to bring the three territories under an 
administrative head who would be the High Commissioner of Brunei would be 
regarded by North Borneo and Sarawak as down-grading of the two Colonies. As an 
alternative the Colonial Office suggested that North Borneo and Sarawak should each 
retain its Governor, and Brunei should have a separate High Commissioner as well as 
the British Resident. The High Commissioner for Brunei would be the permanent 
Chairman of the Borneo Joint Council.30 He would have a small secretariat in Labuan 
under his direction dealing with business assigned to the Council by the three 
territories such matters connected with joint Departments e.g. the Judiciary, Geological 
Survey, Aviation, Telecommunications etc. and matters relating to external affairs, 
defence and internal security. He would also take over from the Commissioner 
General the responsibilities for co-ordination in the Borneo area. He might also be 
responsible for the administration of Labuan. However, although the seat for the 
High Commissioner for Brunei was in Labuan, there was to be no commitment to the 
Sultan's claim to the island.31
Further, the Colonial Office insisted that the new Brunei Constitution should 
be fully in operation before the changes took place. The Sultan was to be assured that 
there was no intention of imposing a Federation against his will.32 In August 1956 the
30CO 1030/164, item 46, Note of discussion between Sir Anthony Abell and the 
Colonial Office officials on the Borneo closer association, 22 June 1956.
31 CO 1030/164, item 50, Note of meeting between Sir Robert Scott, Sir Anthony
Abell and the Colonial Office officials on 26 July 1956.
1,2 Ibid.
181
Secretary of State authorised Sir Anthony Abell to approach the Sultan on the lines 
proposed.33 However the approach was not made because of criticism by Sir Roland 
Turnbull and second thoughts on the part of Sir Anthony Abell. The Governor of 
North Borneo, who believed that North Borneo opinion would favour the creation of 
central authority with effective organs wielding substantial powers, gave the Colonial 
Office's proposals an "entirely unfavourable" reaction. He criticised the proposal for 
the appointment of a High Commissioner on top of the two Governors as 
unpracticable and extravagant. He believed the appointment, far from promoting the 
cause of "closer association" in North Borneo, might provoke a cynical reaction 
against the whole idea.34
On the other hand, Sir Anthony Abell told Sir Robert Scott that he did not feel 
he could go to the Sultan, to discuss a matter of such vital importance before they had 
even made up their own minds. He preferred to await a decision on the status and 
future of Labuan which was still under discussion. He hoped that Labuan would be 
restored to Brunei because it would be "a great bargaining point" if they wished the 
Sultan of Brunei to join a union or federation of any kind. Sir Anthony Abell 
believed the Sultan would be tempted by such an offer; but unless he had that, or the 
offer of the separation of Brunei from Sarawak and a new agreement with the British 
Government, he was empty-handed. He believed that to discuss "closer association" 
with the Sultan at that time would only invite unpopularity in Brunei.35
33CO 1030/164, item 51, Secretary o f State to High Commissioner, 9 August 1956.
34CO 1030/164, item 52, Sir Roland Turnbull to Colonial Office, 1 September
1956. See also Ibid., item 41, Sir Roland Turnbull to Secretary of State, 4 June 1956.
35CO 1030/164, item 56, Sir Anthony Abell to Sir Robert Scott, 15 October
1956.
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As a result o f these developments, in January 1957 Sir Robert Scott, Sir 
Anthony Abell and Sir Roland Turnbull sent a joint memorandum to the Colonial 
Office. They urged the Colonial Office to bring about "closer association" of the three 
Borneo territories without delay, by means of "a bolder and more radical approach".36 
They highlighted the dangers if  the territories were not brought together soon. In 
Brunei they saw the threat as coming from the extreme Malay nationalism embodied 
in the PRB which, they said, was being encouraged by left-wing elements both inside 
and outside the country. They believed:
"if unchecked it will develop into a rabid opposition to the Monarchy and to 
the British connection, and it could bring about the overthrow of the Sultanate, 
with grave prejudice to the whole stability of the State including the security 
of the oilfield at Seria".37 
They also believed that after the Federation of Malaya became independent (on 31 
August 1957) many in Brunei were bound to look more and more to Kuala Lumpur 
and in such circumstances the danger to Brunei could grow quickly under the pressure 
from "extremists" in the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) for Brunei to 
be given independence. The threat to Sarawak, they believed, arose from Communist 
subversion among the Chinese who had long been influenced by events in Singapore; 
and if the State was left to itself the Communist influence would be increased, and 
eventually turned it into a Communist territory. In North Borneo, although there were 
no Malay extremists and Communist threats, they feared Muslim pressures from
36CO 1030/556, item 1, Sir Robert Scott to Colonial Office, 25 January 1957.
37Memorandum on the Future of the Borneo Territories, enclosure in CO 1030/556, 
item 1, Sir Robert Scott to Colonial Office, 25 January 1957.
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Brunei, Indonesia and Malaya "could readily develop and would provoke a hostile 
reaction in the Philippines, where there was already considerable anxiety that North 
Borneo should progress as a Christian rather than a Muslim Country".38 Finally they 
believed that the Borneo territories as a whole were bound to become "the target of 
Indonesia irredentism and of other pressures".39
They felt the remedy to these problems was to encourage the territories to enter 
into some form of political association. By doing so they believed the political 
pressures operating in the territories, especially in Brunei and Sarawak, would be less 
potent in the wider framework of the associated territories. Besides, they recognised 
that the Borneo territories had
"great potential advantage for purposes of defence if it were thought desirable 
to take some of our eggs out of the Malayan basket; and we could not but 
suffer heavily in pocket and prestige if Borneo territories became fresh scenes 
of political conflict and economic instability. For these and other reasons it 
is as much in the interests of the United Kingdom as of the Borneo territories 
themselves that they could enter into that political association in partnership 
with the U.K. without which their future security and prosperity cannot be 
assured".40
Earlier Sir Robert Scott warned the Secretary of State for the Colonies that if  they 
were not careful in handling Brunei that they were would "lose control over the
nIbid.
39Ibid.
40Ibid.
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biggest single source of dollars in the sterling area and grave effects of this on the 
United Kingdom economy will be felt in the years to come".41
In order to bring about "closer association" they recommended a package of 
proposals incorporating three fundamental principles: firstly, the territories should 
entrust to a central authority sole responsibility for dealing with certain agreed 
subjects; secondly, the political goal for the territories should be democratic local 
government, with the Queen as Constitutional monarch in North Borneo and Sarawak 
and the Sultan in Brunei; and finally, partnership with the United Kingdom should be 
openly accepted as an arrangement of indefinite duration. In order to put their plans 
into effect they proposed that:
(a) Brunei should be wholly separated from Sarawak.
(b) A new treaty with the Sultan guaranteeing United Kingdom support for his 
State and House.
(c) Sovereignty over Labuan should be transferred from North Borneo to the 
Sultan of Brunei, with safeguards to protect its economic development and 
potentialities for defence.
(d) There should be a High Commissioner for the three territories in 
association. He would ordinarily reside in Labuan and would be responsible 
for dealing with all centralised subjects. In this he would be assisted by an 
Advisory Council of representatives of the three territories.
(e) In Brunei there should continue to be a British Resident but in North 
Borneo and Sarawak the Governors should become Lieutenant-Governors. 
They would normally preside over their Executive and Legislative Councils but
41CO 1030/164, item 37, Sir Robert Scott to Secretary of State, 18 February 1956.
185
the High Commissioner would do so if those Councils met while he was in 
either territory.42
Sir Robert Scott recommended that these proposals be considered without 
delay. He disagreed that no steps should be taken towards "closer association" until 
the new Constitution for Brunei had been accepted. In fact he believed that an 
agreement on a plan for "closer association" might improve the chances o f a new 
Constitution being accepted. He warned the Colonial Office that unless the territories 
were brought together firmly without delay they would drift apart: "North Borneo 
looking to Hong Kong, China and the Philippines; Brunei looking to the Federation 
of Malaya; and Sarawak to Singapore". He was satisfied that the proposals he 
submitted were the best hope of giving the Borneo territories ten or twenty years of 
healthy growth and consolidation and which served the long terms interests of Britain 
and the Commonwealth.43
Sir Robert Scott recommended that Sir Anthony Abell should be authorised to 
discuss a scheme on the lines of the plan in confidence with the Sultan. If  that 
discussion was successful the Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak should then 
proceed to informal consultations with their officials and advisers. If  there was 
agreement a full scheme should be drawn up by means of a conference of 
representatives of all three territories and of the United Kingdom.44
42Memorandum ...
43CO 1030/556, item 1, Commissioner-General to Colonial Office, 25 January 
1957.
44Memorandum ...
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Although the Secretary of State agreed in principle to the proposals, he was 
unhappy with some of their features. He felt that the declaration of the principle of 
partnership with the United Kingdom in indefinite duration might be interpreted to 
mean that the British Government had abandoned its general policy o f leading the 
dependent territories step by step towards full self-government. He believed that such 
a declaration would be criticised both in Britain and in the territories. He said:
"it would not only arouse anti-colonialist criticism and opposition, but might well fan 
the flames of extreme nationalism in Borneo territories themselves".45 Further he 
believed the promotion of representative government in the territories would lead to 
demand for the democratic principle in the central Advisory Council of the three 
territories. He said: "Once the central authority came in practice to be exercise with 
or through a central elective assembly, it would be a short and seemingly inevitable 
step to the now almost traditional demand for full-self-govemment and 
independence".46 The Secretary of State was also not happy with the proposal to 
lower the status of North Borneo and Sarawak in relation to Brunei because he 
believed it would arouse widespread resentment, especially among the Malays and 
Dayaks in Sarawak: "who cannot but be rightly proud of their independent history 
between 1841 and 1946." He believed the proposal might mitigate against the whole 
scheme. He suggested they adopt some other nomenclature. He also did not like the 
proposal to hand over the sovereignty of Labuan to the Sultan of Brunei. He was
45CO 1030/556, item 8, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Acting 
Commissioner-General, 14 March 1957.
“Ibid.
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doubtful of the reception Parliament might accord to the proposal, which could be 
represented as
"the retrocession of part of the Queen's dominions, with its inhabitants, its 
defence and economic potentialities, with its sole trunk-route airport in the 
area, to the sovereignty of a Government having no representative constitution 
and of unproven efficiency and stability".47 
Further with regard to the draft of the new treaty with Brunei, he noted that in respect 
of internal administration and by its provision for the introduction of the Menteri 
Besar, in place of the British Resident the "degree of close tutelage over the Sultan 
diminished". The Secretary of State suggested that instead of offering Labuan to the 
Sultan as the price of his agreement to the "closer association",
"it might be made plain, in presenting to him the proposals for closer 
association, that unless some such closer association is agreed and entered into 
as early as possible the survival of his House and Sultanate is unlikely to be 
prolonged".48
The Commissioner-General and the two Governors did not think that the 
difficulties which the Secretary of State had raised were insuperable, and they believed 
they could be overcome within the broad ambit of their original proposals. However 
they refrained from any extensive examination of them at that stage. For them what 
was important was not to lose time in taking a decision to secure political association 
o f the Borneo territories. They jointly urged the Colonial Office to authorise Sir
41Ibid.
4%Ibid.
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Anthony Abell to approach the Sultan and to indicate the limits within which he may 
manoeuvre when so doing.49
In August 1957 the Secretary of State reluctantly authorised Sir Anthony Abell 
to approach the Sultan but he warned him that they should not appear to be making 
a public declaration of permanent dependence and making any commitment to the 
Sultan regarding Labuan.50
4.3 The Partai Rakyat Brunei, the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company and the 
Sultan
While the proposals for the "closer association" of the Borneo territories were 
being considered by British officials the Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB) was also 
formulating its own plans for bringing the three territories together. Being the only 
political party in British Borneo the PRB wanted to spread its influence over the 
whole area to bring the three territories together. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
in June 1956 the PRB proposed to Sir Anthony Abell that the Party be allowed to 
open branches in Sarawak and North Borneo and change its name to Partai Rakyat 
Kalimantan Utara or the People's Party of Northern Kalimantan.51 Although the High
49CO 1030/556, item 22, Sir Anthony Abell, Sir Roland Turnbull and MacKintosh 
to Secretary of State, 18 July 1957.
50CO 1030/556, item 26, Secretary of State to Sir Anthony Abell, 2 August 1957.
51Borneo Island is known as Kalimantan to Indonesian.
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Commissioner was sympathetic, the Sultan refused to sanction to the registration of 
the Party unless it dropped its Pan Bornean objective.52
In March 1957 the First Congress of the PRB adopted a resolution which 
called for the union of North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak and the formation of the 
Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara or Unitary States of Northern Kalimantan.53 
Although the PRB's proposals came at the time when the "closer association" o f the 
Borneo territories were being considered, the British attempted to suppress them 
because they feared that such proposals might mitigate against their own proposals. 
Unlike the British proposals, the PRB's proposals were based on historical and 
traditional roots, which meant the three Borneo territories were to be united under 
Brunei suzerainty with the Sultan of Brunei as the constitutional head.54 The British 
would never agreed to such proposals, not even Sir Roland Turnbull, who favoured 
the amalgamation of the three Borneo territories. Thus when the PRB engaged 
Raeburn to draft its Constitutional Memorandum in June 1957, the British advised him 
to persuade the Party to defer its plan for the unification of the Borneo territories.55
On the other hand, the PRB's concept of Kalimantan Utara was attractive to 
some people in the three territories. In Brunei, at least, the people took pride in their 
past, in which the Sultanate of Brunei had held sway over a large area in the region 
including the two territories of North Borneo and Sarawak; and many of them believed
52See pages 129-131.
53See page 151.
54Interview with Azahari, February 1993; The Borneo Bulletin, 6 and 13 April
1957.
55CO 1030/464, item 8, Note of a Meeting between Reabum and J.B Johnson at
Colonial Office 30 May 1957.
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that the wider Sultanate had been broken up as a result o f European incursions.56 The 
PRB's call for bringing North Borneo and Sarawak under Brunei suzerainty appealed 
to nationalists who saw it as a resurrection of the traditional Brunei Sultanate. In fact 
the Sultan's own Constitutional Advisory Committee, which was chaired by Pengiran 
Maharaja Laila (Third Minister and the Sultan's own cousin), recommended that if 
there should be a suggestion of uniting the three territories under a federation, Sarawak 
and North Borneo should be restored to Brunei because the Committee said the 
territories were historically "the property of the State and the Sultan of Brunei".57 The 
Colonial Office was reluctant to pursue the "closer association" plan openly for fear 
that Sultan might opt for the PRB's formula and inadvertently help PRB's cause. 
However in North Borneo and Sarawak, the proposal was not seen as a resurrection 
of the Brunei empire. The memories of Brunei's harsh rule still existed among the 
people in the two territories. The concept of Kalimantan Utara based on a democratic 
platform appealed to progressive minds in the two territories.58 Donald Stephen, a 
member of the North Borneo Legislative Council and the leader of the Kadazan 
Community, and Ong Khee Hui, the leader of the Chinese Community of Sarawak, 
worked closely with Azahari since the First Congress of the PRB (in March 1957), 
which they attended. As will be seen in Chapter 7 the two leaders formed a common 
front with Azahari to oppose the Malaysia Federation proposals in 1961 and were keen 
to accept a federation o f the Borneo territories under the Sultan of Brunei.
^Interviews with various PRB's members, January 1993 - May 1993.
57See page 97.
58Azahari said he fought hard to convince his Party to accept the multi-racial and 
multi-languages principles. Interview with Azahari, February 1993.
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Although Kalimantan Utara seemed a plausible solution to bring the multi­
racial and multi-language peoples of the Borneo territories closer together, the British 
were against the proposal. The last thing they wanted to see in the territories was the 
close identification of the PRB and the Chinese organisations in Sarawak. The PRB, 
which had leftist elements, and the Chinese Organisations, which were infiltrated by 
Communist elements, would inevitably endanger British interests in the three 
territories. Therefore so long the PRB was in a commanding position the Colonial 
Office had all sorts of reasons for not approving the proposals for "closer association" 
o f the territories, despite strong recommendations from the British officials on the 
spot.
Unlike the Colonial Office, the British officials in the territories felt that since 
the PRB had openly advocated the Federation of Borneo territories, the Sultan was 
less likely to give favourable consideration. Furthermore, they believed that the Sultan 
"would certainly be still further ill-disposed to the project if he were to learn from 
sources other than Sir Anthony Abell that H.M.G. were contemplating it".59 Although 
the sources were not specified, they seemed to refer to those people who had access 
to information in London even before it was made public. The most likely people 
who mingled with officials in London and had considerable interests in Brunei were 
the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company (BSPC). The Company was happy with the 
existing arrangement it had with the Sultan of Brunei. In 1954 the exclusive power 
to grant leases to oil exploration in the State had been transferred from the British 
Resident to the Sultan-in-Council. At the same time the Sultan appointed the BSPC's
59CO 1030/556, item 22, MacKintosh, Sir Anthony Abell and Sir Roland Turnbull 
to the Secretary of State, 18 July 1957. Emphasis is mine.
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local Manager as an Unofficial member of the State Council and thus was an ''adviser” 
to the Sultan.60 It was likely therefore, that the BSPC would have given the Sultan 
advice which was favourable to its industry.
The way in which British officials voiced their concerns showed that the Sultan 
might be exposed to advice against the idea of "closer association". There could be 
several reasons why the BSPC did not favour "closer association". One of them could 
be that "closer association" meant free movement o f people within the territories 
which would bring undesirable problems such as communism, trade unionism, 
industrial relation, etc. from Sarawak to its industry. Besides, under a closer 
association the Company's influence on the Brunei Government may be marginalised 
by a supra-national central council. Therefore the BSPC preferred to maintain the 
status quo in the State which had worked to its advantage. In September 1958 Brunei 
extended its continental shelf boundaries separating the offshore areas of Brunei from 
North Borneo and Sarawak in which one of the richest offshore oilfield in the world, 
West Ampa, would be discovered in 1963.
When Sir Anthony Abell approached the Sultan to discuss the "closer 
association" proposals on 14 August 1957 the Sultan told him that he was not in 
favour of changing the existing arrangements which seemed to him to work 
effectively. Brunei was a protected State and he was satisfied that the British 
Government would continue to protect Brunei interests as it had in the past. As long 
as Britain remained as Brunei's protector and the Sultan hoped that their happy and 
friendly relationship would continue, he had no fear either of communism without, or
60Unlike his predecessors Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin took active role in the 
governing of his State.
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subversion within his frontiers. He felt certain that Britain would continue to fulfil 
her obligations under the Treaty and afford his people the protection which they 
needed. He saw no reason to upset a happy arrangement which appeared to him to 
give perfectly adequate protection to his State in present circumstances.61
Such confident language was unlikely to have come from the Sultan's semi­
illiterate advisers but from people who were conversant with legal matters and how 
the British minds worked. As long as the Protectorate Treaty existed the Sultan need 
not worry about the security of his State because the Treaty guaranteed the Sultan 
protection of his State and his House. Moreover because o f their economic and 
strategic interests the British would not neglect Brunei's security. Nevertheless the 
Sultan was aware that under the Treaty he had an obligation ''to accept and to act 
upon" the British advice on all questions in Brunei other than those affecting Islam. 
When the Sultan met the Secretary of State in London in September 1957 he asked 
for clarification on whether he would be forced to adopt proposals which the British 
Government favoured by the use of the advice clause in the Agreement. The 
Secretary of State told him that "the advice clause had never been forced on Brunei 
in the fifty years the present Treaty had been in existence" and added: "In any event, 
"closer association" if it were to be effective must spring from a willing agreement 
between the three territories concerned".62 These statements sealed the end of "closer 
association" as far as the Sultan was concerned.
61 CO 1030/556, item 30, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 16 August
1957.
62CO 1030/556, item E/2, Note of Meeting between the Secretary o f State for 
Colonies and His Highness the Sultan of Brunei at the Colonial Office on Monday 30 
September 1957.
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The Sultan did not see any advantage in joining its two neighbours. When he 
presented the proposals for "closer association" to the Sultan in August 1957, Sir 
Anthony Abell said the "closer association" was necessary for defence and trade, and 
essential to Brunei for development of her resources, for the labour for her oilfields 
and the police for her security.63 Other than the security which had been and would 
be provided by the British under the Treaty obligations there had been no problems 
with labour for her oil industry. In fact the people in Brunei had been complaining 
of an influx of foreign labour which caused unemployment in the State, as illustrated 
in the report of the Constitutional Advisory Committee in 1954. Brunei's trade with 
the two territories was virtually nil other than its oil being refined in Lutong (Sarawak) 
which many people in Brunei believed cost the State enormously in revenue.64 In fact 
a paper on "Economic Aspects of Closer Association of the British Borneo", prepared 
by the office of the Commissioner-General, pointed out that "apart from the petroleum 
industry, the economies of the three territories are roughly similar".65
Furthermore there was no concessions which would attract the Sultan and the 
people of Brunei, such as the transfer of Labuan or the Fifth Division o f Sarawak to 
Brunei or raising his status by making him the head of all Muslims in the territories, 
or extending his influence throughout the territories, as had been proposed by 
MacDonald. The only concession actually offered by Sir Anthony Abell was that 
Brunei would be separated from Sarawak i.e. the High Commissioner for Brunei
63CO 1030/556, item 30, High Commissioner to Secretary o f State for the 
Colonies, 16 August 1957.
64See CO 1030/113, item 10, Constitutional Advisory Committee's Report, Part
H, Paragraph X.
65CO 1030/556, item 58, MacKintosh to the Colonial Office, 25 October 1957.
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would be no longer the Governor of Sarawak. But he would be the permanent 
Chairman of the Central Council of the proposed association. As far as the Sultan 
was concern the arrangement did not make Brunei any more independent than it was 
at the time. Probably for this reason that during his discussion with Sir Anthony 
Abell the Sultan insisted that
"before any other business he first wished to have settled the important and 
urgent matter of the replacement of the British Resident by a Menteri Besar 
and appointment of various other State Officers envisaged by the 
Constitution".66
In fact for the first time the Sultan insisted on the abolition of the office of the British 
Resident and its replacement with the office of Menteri Besar to be made 
simultaneously with the introduction of the Constitution.
A few days after Sir Anthony Abell's frustrating discussion, the Sultan invited 
Sir Roland Turnbull, to hear if there were any new offers on the table. The only new 
thing Sir Roland Turnbull could say was about "world political trends", which he used 
to support the proposal for "closer association". Naturally the Sultan was no more 
enthusiastic than when he met Sir Anthony Abell. However, either to hide his 
embarrassment from the Colonial Office for his failure to secure the Sultan's 
agreement or his failure to appreciate the Sultan's polite smiles and words, Sir Roland 
Turnbull reported:
"It was clear that the Sultan was now prepared to entertain idea of closer 
political association, and he seemed particularly impressed by possible 
advantage to Brunei of making arrangements for internal security the
66CO 1030/556, item 30, Sir Anthony Abell to Secretary of State, 16 August 1957.
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responsibility of Central Council".67 
But at the same time Sir Roland Turnbull said the Sultan hesitated to give his reply 
forthwith because the "subject was so new to him, and so weighty".68
In London the Colonial Office officials drew up a list o f advantages of the 
"closer association" to be presented to the Sultan when he came to London in 
September 1957 for talks with the Secretary of State. The Colonial Office was to 
argue that a closer association would be beneficial to Brunei in respect of internal 
security as well as external defence. Further the polling of resources of the Judiciary, 
Geological and Survey Departments as well as the Postal, Telecommunications, 
Broadcasting, Civil Aviation and others would increase the efficiency of these 
services.69 When these points were put to the Sultan he remained unmoved because 
none were new to him. Even when Lennox-Boyd assured him that the proposals 
would not in any way depress the status of Brunei as a "Malay Islamic Sultanate", the 
Sultan remained adamant. When the Secretary of State suggested that the proposals 
be discussed publicly in the three territories, the Sultan said he preferred that the two 
Governors should first discuss the matter between themselves and that any question 
which affected Brunei should be referred to him so that he could consult his advisers
67CO 11030/556, item 31, Sir Roland Turnbull to the Secretary of State, 22 August
1957.
6*Ibid.
69CO 1030/556, item 35, "Note on Points for meeting with Sultan of Brunei on 
11.9.1957".
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privately. Meanwhile, he insisted, there should be "no public discussion in Brunei, 
nor any public reference to his having been consulted".70
In urging acceptance of the proposals the Secretary of State reminded the 
Sultan that the PRB had pronounced in favour of "closer association", adding "no one 
wanted them to get all the credit". But the Sultan insisted that discussions should be 
confined to North Borneo and Sarawak only until the people in Brunei (other than the 
members o f the PRB) had expressed a wish to be included in the discussions. The 
Sultan said as far he knew, he had not heard of a desire in Brunei to examine the 
question. After further unfruitful discussions the Secretary of State proposed an 
exchange of letters between himself and the Sultan referring to the intention that talks 
between the two Governors should be started at once and this was agreed.71
The Sultan's anxiety was understandable. In all the discussions he had with the 
British officials both in Brunei and in London there was no mention of the future of 
Brunei's oil revenue. There was also no mention of the future of his position, and that 
of his Sultanate, other than an assurance of preserving its Malay Islamic identity. As 
far as the Sultan was concerned, "closer association" meant that Brunei would be 
under the power of central authority which would prejudice its sovereignty and his
position. Although it was explained to him that the power of the Central Council
would only relate to security, defence and agreed subjects, its inter-territorial character 
meant Brunei's voice would be submerged by the other two territories. In effect it 
also meant Brunei's position as an independent State under the protection of the
70CO 1030/556, item E/2, "Note of Meeting between Secretary of State for
Colonies and H.H.Sultan of Brunei held at the Colonial Office on Monday 30
September 1957".
1]Ibid.
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British would be downgraded to that of the two Colonies. In the circumstances the 
"closer association" proposals were neither attractive to the Sultan nor to his traditional 
advisers.
4.4 Public Discussion in North Borneo and Sarawak
On 4 December 1957 the British Cabinet approved the proposals for "closer 
association" of the three British Borneo territories.72 Following this approval Lennox- 
Boyd on 19 December, instructed the initiation of public discussion in North Borneo 
and Sarawak of "desirability of some form of closer association of Borneo Territories". 
However he wanted the discussion to be about "closer association" of all the three 
territories, not merely of Sarawak and North Borneo. The Secretary of State told Sir 
Robert Scott that discussion was to be exploratory and that no firm decision should 
be reached without further consultation with him.73 On the same day Lennox-Boyd 
wrote to the Sultan to persuade him to allow Brunei to be included in the discussion.74 
Two weeks later Sir Anthony Abell made another approach to the Sultan and urged 
him to reconsider his decision.75 But the Sultan remained adamant. Giving the same
72CO 1030/556, item 77, Extract from Minutes of a Meeting of the Colonial Policy 
Committee, held on 4 December 1957.
73CO 1030/556, item 79/81, Secretary of State to the Commissioner-General, 19 
December 1957.
74CO 1030/556, item 78, Secretary of State to Sultan, 19 December 1957.
75CO 1030/557, item 85 A, Sir Anthony Abell to Colonial Office, 25 January
1958.
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reasons to Sir Anthony Abell, the Sultan told Lennox-Boyd:
"I hope you will agree and appreciate that without knowing the exact details 
of the form or nature of the proposed closer association, other than the 
question of external, defence and internal security which, in fact, has already 
been provided in the existing Agreement or Treaty, it is extremely difficult for 
me, at the present juncture, to express any further views or to make any 
comments or to commit myself and my people, on the proposal".76 
Following this the Governor of North Borneo and the Governor of Sarawak made 
simultaneous radio broadcasts on the "closer association" proposal in their respective 
States on the evening of 7 February 1958.77
There were different reactions in the three territories. In Sarawak formal 
discussions were held in all District and Municipal Councils, in Divisional Advisory 
Councils, and in many Chambers of Commerce, and speeches were made in the 
Legislative Council, but no resolution was proposed and no conclusion reached. There 
were also informal discussions and debates among the general public. From the outset 
the Chinese population was clearly and actively in favour of "closer association". They 
believed that it would bring greater opportunities for trade and the process of self- 
government would be accelerated thereby and, being more advanced in education, 
many of the jobs held by expatriate officers would go to them. The native 
community, although supportive of the proposal in principle, were suspicious of 
Chinese motives. They were particularly conscious of the fact that they were
76CO 1030/557, item 85 B, Sultan to Secretary of State, 30 January 1958.
77The Governors' speech texts were in CO 1030/557, item 83, Sir Roland Turnbull 
to Colonial Office, 31 January 1957 and CO 1030/557, item 84, Sir Anthony Abell 
to Colonial Office, 1 February 1958.
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educationally and economically in no position to compete with the Chinese for jobs 
either in Government or in Commerce. They were only prepared to give their support 
on condition that their interests were safeguarded.78
In North Borneo the proposals were discussed throughout the State at special 
meetings o f district councils, local authorities, Chambers of Commerce and other 
associations. The response was generally favourable. The State Legislative Council 
unanimously recommended that the agreement of Brunei and Sarawak be sought for 
joint examination of the proposals.79 In May 1958 Sir Roland Turnbull wrote to the 
Sultan regarding the decision of his Legislative Council and urged him to take part. 
But the Sultan refused and said: "before I receive a clear explanation and advice from 
the Secretary of State, I regret I shall not be in a position to give an opinion on this 
topic".80
In Brunei no announcements were made. The Borneo Bulletin, on 15 February 
1958 reported that "its informants close to the Government revealed that the State 
Council almost to a man was opposed to any form of federation with other territories". 
Despite this unfavourable reception the British officials remained optimistic. After 
chairing the ninth Inter-Territorial Conference held in Brunei in early April, Sir Robert 
Scott said that the Inter-Territorial Conferences, held every six months in each State 
capital, pointed the way to some form of closer political association of the three 
territories.81 But this hope was dashed by the Sultan's annual Hari Raya speech to the
78CO 1030/557, item 145, Sir Anthony Abell to Secretary of State, 4 June 1958.
79CO 1030/557, Sir Roland Turnbull to Sir Anthony Abell, 17 April 1958.
80CO 1030/557, item 144, Sultan of Brunei to Sir Roland Turnbull, 13 May 1958.
%xThe Borneo Bulletin, 5 April 1958.
2 0 1
nation two weeks later in which he said that the conferences did not mean that the 
three territories would become a federation. Stressing that Brunei was not a colony, 
he wanted his people to preserve the country's position with patience and 
determination so that the state would progress even further.82 The speech was 
intended to calm many of his traditional advisers who were anxious that "closer 
association" would be forced on Brunei. In a State Council meeting in early May 
1958, three members of the Council, Marsal bin Maun, Pengiran Ali and Pehin 
Laksamana, suggested that Brunei should withdraw from the Inter-Territorial 
Conference because it "gave no definite benefit to the State".83 Although the Sultan 
deferred a decision on the matter, it was apparent that the Conference held in the State 
would be the last Inter-Territorial Conference he would attend.
In June 1958 Sir Anthony Abell informed the Secretary of State that there were 
indications that the Government of Brunei would reject every proposal for a closer 
association and would actively pursue a policy of exclusiveness in Borneo and of 
increased affiliation with the Federation of Malaya. He said the Sultan appeared 
determined to show that he would have nothing to do with the proposal and was trying 
to reduce the area of co-operation and consultation between the territories. He was 
doubtful if there were many Brunei Malays who saw any great advantage in a "closer 
association" with Sarawak and North Borneo. In his opinion, there was no likelihood 
of Brunei taking part in discussions on the subject. He concluded that North Borneo
n The Borneo Bulletin, 26 April 1958.
83BA/2017/1983, (BRO 46/52), Minutes of the State Council Meeting held on 7 
May 1958. In an interview (April 1993) Dato Marsal said once he reminded the 
Sultan that Brunei had only one voice against two from the other two territories, and 
therefore the Inter-Territorial Conferences eventually worked against the interest of the 
State.
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and Sarawak should work towards an agreement to "share a central office the head of 
which would be the High Commissioner for Brunei and endeavour thereby to keep the 
policies of the three territories in line".84
Despite the pessimistic view of Sir Anthony Abell, Sir Roland Turnbull wanted 
to go ahead with the plans for "closer association". In a letter to the Colonial Office 
in August he suggested that North Borneo and Sarawak should hold a meeting of 
representatives from both territories to discuss and examine the implications of the 
"closer association" proposals made by the two Governors. He hoped the discussions 
would produce a plan that could be presented to the Sultan and the Government of 
Brunei for their consideration, since the Sultan had said that he would not be able to 
participate until a plan was put before him.85
In September 1958 the Secretary of State agreed to Sir Roland Turnbull's 
proposals on the conditions that it was confined to consideration of proposals for 
"closer association" of Sarawak and North Borneo only. Lennox-Boyd told Governor 
o f North Borneo that he did not wish "any pressure put on the Sultan at present to 
participate in the examination", and he thought it would be unwise that the 
representatives should visit Brunei during their tour of North Borneo and Sarawak.86
However Angus MacKintosh, the Acting Commissioner-General, disagreed with 
Lennox-Boyd's opinion that the discussions should exclude Brunei. He believed that 
they should fall back only if the Sultan was not moved from his adamant position after
84CO 1030/557, item 145, Sir Anthony Abell to Secretary of State, 4 June 1958.
85CO 1030/558, item 160, Sir Roland Turnbull to Colonial Office, 19 August
1958.
86CO 1030/558, item 161, Secretary of State to Sir Roland Turnbull, 10 
September 1958.
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a concrete plan was laid before him. To improve the prospects of "closer association" 
he proposed that Brunei should be detached from Sarawak "with the least possible 
delay". He had gained a clear impression from his visits to Brunei that the Sarawak 
connection was steadily becoming distasteful to the Sultan, the State Council and 
Brunei opinion generally. He noted:
"In my view total separation from Sarawak would almost at once create a 
different and much more healthy atmosphere inside Brunei and in her attitude 
to her neighbours and would greatly facilitate progress in reaching agreement 
upon a new constitution for the State and in promoting co-operation between 
it and its neighbours both in day-to-day matters of routine and in the context 
of such special major issues as closer association".87
Although Sir Anthony Abell did not believe that the separation of Brunei and 
Sarawak would affect the plans for "closer association" he did not believe the Sultan 
had "any intention now or in the future o f a working relationship with his neighbours." 
However he admitted that there was no chance of an improvement in the position 
while the existing arrangements stood but he said there was perhaps "a faint chance" 
if change was made and the Sultan felt that he could negotiate from a position of 
independence. If a change was to be made he suggested that the Sultan should be told 
about it from the beginning.88 But the suggestion to separate Brunei was not 
considered by the Colonial Office until December 1958.89 Meanwhile the Sultan had
87CO 1030/558, item 167, A.M.MacKintosh to Secretary of State for Colonies, 4 
October 1958.
88CO 1030/558, item 169, Sir Anthony Abell to Colonial Office, 24 October 1958.
89CO 1030/557, item 169, E.Melville to Sir Anthony Abell, 2 December 1958.
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been building closer relations with the Federation of Malaya. During the opening of 
the grand Omar Ali Saifuddin Mosque in September 1958 an entourage o f Malayan 
royalty and prominent politicians, including the Prime Minister - Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, were invited. The following month it was reported in the Singapore Straits 
Times that the Sultan had remarked that: "there are, and always have been, the 
strongest bonds of religion and race between the peoples of Brunei and the Federation 
of Malaya".90 The paper said that many educated Bruneians favoured a "closer 
association" with Malaya, which had achieved independence, rather than with the two 
colonies o f North Borneo and Sarawak, which would only delay Brunei's 
independence.91 These statements were denied by the Government o f Brunei.92 But 
a week later, on 20 November 1958, the Brunei State Council approved a huge loan 
of $100 million to the Federation. After announcing the terms of the loan, the Sultan 
said:
"On behalf of my people, I am happy to be able to offer this contribution to 
the happiness and prosperity of the people o f the Federation of Malaya, a 
people who have so much in common with my people here in Brunei, not only 
in our religion, our customs and our language, but also in our way of life our 
ideals and our aspirations".93
90Straits Times, 20 October 1958.
9'lbid.
92The Borneo Bulletin, 15 November 1958.
93The Borneo Bulletin, 22 November 1958. This loan was an additional to forty 
million dollars given to the Federation in 1956.
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This loan opened a close relationship between the Sultan and the leaders of 
Malaya, particularly Tunku Abdul Rahman and dampened further the prospects of 
Brunei joining the "closer association" of the Borneo territories. In January 1959 the 
Sultan declined an invitation to attend the Inter-Territorial Conference in Kuching.94 
For the rest of 1959 the Sultan's attention was focused on negotiations on the Brunei 
Constitution and consideration of the "closer association" was shelved until the 
promulgation o f the Brunei Constitution. By that time, however, the Sultan had 
decided to reject the "closer association" plan and instead forged closer relations with 
Malaya. This consequently led to the abandonment of the Borneo proposals and the 
emergence of Malaysia Plan. Before examining Brunei's relations with Malaya the 
next chapter focuses oh the constitutional negotiations which ended with promulgation 
o f the Brunei Constitution.
9,4The Borneo Bulletin, 31 January 1959.
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CHAPTER 5
CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 1958 - 1959
As soon as he published his draft Constitutional Enactment in August 1957 the 
Sultan invited the people to give their comments on the Constitution through their 
District Councils. As a result the four District Councils debated the draft Enactment 
and submitted their comments and proposed amendments to the Sultan towards the end 
of the year. The Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB), having failed to persuade the Colonial 
Office to consider its constitutional proposal in September 1957, submitted its 
comments to the Government. After studying the various comments the Sultan 
discussed the draft Enactment in the State Council with the High Commissioner. 
There were several points on which the State Council and the High Commissioner 
disagreed, and the negotiations continued in London. This chapter examines the 
debates and discussions between the various interest groups at different stages of the 
constitutional negotiations.
5.1 The draft Constitution Enactment: Observations and Petition from the 
Partai Rakyat Brunei
In response to the Secretary of State's suggestion and the Sultan's invitation to 
his subjects to offer comments on his proposed Constitution Enactment, the PRB 
instructed its Constitutional Adviser, Walter Raeburn Q.C., to draw up a document 
which contained "Observations"- which were in fact criticisms - and a "Petition"
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calling for a number of amendments. Under its "Observations" the PRB drew attention 
to the Sultan's intention to delegate to his subjects a share in the government of the 
State and in particular to the Sultan's desire to establish a Legislative Council. The 
Party felt that the proposed Constitution failed to achieve the intended reforms. It 
pointed out that the Sultan would retain his "autocratic powers" under the proposed 
Constitution. These included the right to appoint all the principal officers of State 
including the Menteri Besar, and all Official and Unofficial members of the Executive 
and Legislative Councils; the right to dismiss and suspend them from office; the right 
of holding the position of President of the Executive Council; the right to prevent the 
Executive Council from meeting; the right to veto any Bill passed by the Legislative 
Council and to override the Council should it fail to pass a Bill or carry a motion; and 
the right to prorogue the Legislative Council. The Party was critical of the provision 
for a wholly nominated Legislative Council to which the executive authority was not 
answerable. As a result it believed that there was no guarantee that the voice of the 
people would be heard. Although the Sultan had promised that there would be 
provisions for elections for District Councils the PRB did not believe that members 
of popular movements, who were considered as "opposition", would be selected for 
the Legislative Council.1
Thus the PRB petitioned the Sultan to renounce in favour o f his subjects all 
his "autocratic powers" and to provide for three-quarters of the Legislative Council to 
be directly elected by secret ballot based on adult male suffrage. It urged the Sultan 
to refrain from participating in the practical business of governing and to adopt the
1 CO 1030/465, item E/90, Observations and Petition, Partai Rakyat Brunei; The 
Borneo Bulletin, 26 October 1957.
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practices of the British Monarch who stood above and outside politics. In effect the 
PRB was demanding a democratic Constitution in which there would be an elected 
government and a Constitutional Monarch.2
The PRB's document was actually prepared in London immediately after the 
Party's Merdeka delegation in September 1957 failed to obtain the Colonial Office 
agreement to discuss its memorandum on constitutional changes in Brunei. The 
document was despatched to Brunei and submitted to the Sultan-in-Council towards 
the end of October 1957.3 As will be seen later in this Chapter there were no 
indications that the comments and petition from the PRB were taken into account 
during the Constitutional discussions both in Brunei and in London. This was because 
the PRB was in decline after the disastrous Merdeka Mission to London in September 
1957.4 The failure of Azahari and his delegation to win any concessions from the 
British Government in London caused the support for the PRB to dwindle. In fact 
during the Second Congress of the Party in May 1958 some of the delegates criticised 
the leadership for spending a large amount of money for the trip and failing to inform 
the Party of the outcome of the trip.5
The failure of the Merdeka Mission had also caused a split in the leadership 
of the PRB. On his return from London, Azahari wanted to follow the advice o f the 
Secretary of State to "continue to petition for constitutional changes in an orderly
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4For discussion on the PRB's Merdeka Mission to London see Section 3.6.
sThe Borneo Bulletin, 24 May 1958.
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manner"6 But his deputy, Salleh bin Masri, wanted to adopt a more confrontational 
approach with the British authorities in Brunei.7 After the Colonial Office refused to 
entertain the Party's Memorandum for constitutional change in Brunei Salleh and the 
radical elements in the Party were convinced that the British would only listen to their 
demands if they were forced to do so. Consequently he planned to form a labour 
movement in Brunei through which strikes and unrest could be organised to hit the 
British interests particularly in the oil industry. However the British were not so 
concerned about Salleh because they believed that, unlike Azahari, he did not have the 
ability to gain State wide support.8 The activities o f Salleh and his followers in the 
Party forced Azahari to withdraw from the forefront. In January 1958 Sir Anthony 
Abell reported to the Colonial Office:
"Azahari is completely deflated and admitted as much to me in an interview. 
He talks of giving up politics and concentrates on his various businesses which 
also do not prosper. His party has disintegrated to a great extent and I doubt 
if he could raise money or significant enthusiasm for any cause at the 
moment".9
In the circumstances there was no need for the British to pressure the Sultan to pay 
attention to the PRB's petition or to bring the Party in the Constitutional discussions. 
In fact the Party did not recover from the decline until early 1960s when the Malaysia 
issue was hotly debated in Brunei. Meanwhile the Party suffered further setbacks: in
6The Borneo Bulletin, 9 November 1957.
7CO 1030/658, item E/5, J.H.Ellis to Colonial Office, 2 December 1957.
8Ibid.
9CO 1030/557, item 43, Sir Anthony Abell to Colonial Office, 25 January 1958.
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May 1958 seven of its leaders, including Azahari and Salleh, were prosecuted and 
fined twenty dollars each for failure to furnish particulars o f the Party's accounts to 
the Registrar of Societies;10 and in July Salleh was sentenced to four months' 
imprisonment after being found guilty of peijury11 which led to his resignation as the 
Vice President of the Party in October.12
5.2 The draft Constitution Enactment: Comments and amendments from 
District Councils
District Councils received the draft Constitution Enactment in September 1957. 
Although all the four District Councils discussed the Enactment only the Brunei/Muara 
District Council made substantial comments and proposed amendments to the draft 
Enactment. Nevertheless the District Councils were unanimous in demanding the 
appointments of a Menteri Besar, a State Secretary and a State Financial Officer, to 
be made upon the coming into force of the Constitution.13 The Brunei/Muara District 
Council, which had two former members of the Constitutional Committee, believed 
that it was important for the appointments of those principal officers to be made 
concurrently with the introduction of the Constitution "in the interests of the State of
]0The Borneo Bulletin, 3 May 1958.
"Ibid., 12 July 1958.
nIbid., 4 October 1958.
13BA/0239/1986, BRO 860/57, Amendments to be made in the New Brunei 
Constitution, 1957.
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Brunei as truly having a constitutional government'’.14 It also stressed that the person 
to be appointed a Menteri Besar, or a State Secretary or a State Financial Officer, had 
to be not only "a Malay professing the Muslim Religion and belonging to the Shafite 
Sect of that Religion", as provided in the draft Enactment, but specifically he must be 
"a true Brunei Malay". It defined "a true Brunei Malay" as "any member of the 
indigenous races, namely, Belait, Bisaya, Dusun, Kedayan, Murut, Malay and Tutong, 
who observes the customs traditionally practised in the State". If  however, such a 
person was not available it wanted the Sultan to appoint "any other Malay" to the 
office provided that the person so appointed should declare himself to be a "Brunei 
subject". But meanwhile it wanted the "true Brunei Malay" who would succeed this 
office in future to be trained forthwith for the purpose.15
Unlike the PRB the District Councils made no complaint on the provision 
which made the Sultan the Head of the Executive and thus the President of the 
Executive Council. Nevertheless it tried to limit the autocratic powers of the Sultan 
provided in the proposed Enactment. For instance the Council stressed that "in the 
exercise of his powers and the performance of his duties the Sultan shall in all cases 
consult with the Executive Council". This also included the Sultan's power to appoint 
members of Public Service Commission and the power to appoint, transfer, promote, 
dismiss or exercise disciplinary control over public officers.16 In effect the Council
14BA/0239/1986, BRO 860/57, Chairman of the Brunei/Muara District Council to 
British Resident, 12 December 1957.
15 Ibid.
16Ibid.
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wanted the Sultan to be answerable to the Executive Council which was to be the 
highest authority in the State.
The District Councils challenged the provision which gave both the Sultan and 
the High Commissioner reserve powers on the passage of certain Bills in the 
Legislative Council. According to the proposed Enactment if  the Sultan considered 
that it was expedient in the interests of public order, good faith or good government 
o f the State, he could declare any Bill or motion a law even though the Legislative 
Council failed to pass it. For the same purpose he also could override any Bill or 
motion passed by the Council. These reserve powers o f the Sultan might be exercised 
by the High Commissioner if the Bills or motions affected foreign relations, defence 
or internal security. The Council did not think this provision was necessary and 
recommended it to be deleted.17
Similarly the District Councils were not happy with the High Commissioner's 
reserve powers which prevented the Legislative Council from proceeding upon any 
Bill, motion or petition related to public revenue or public funds and suspending 
Standing Orders without prior approval from the High Commissioner. The Council 
demanded that the High Commissioner should record in writing his reasons whenever 
he refused to give his approval to such Bills or petitions, and that they should be 
referred back to the Legislative Council for reconsideration. In effect the Council did 
not want the decision of the High Commissioner to be final.
Although the Councils attempted to limit the autocratic powers of the Sultan, 
it did not demand an elected Legislative Council. It proposed that only a Brunei 
should be appointed as an Unofficial member of the Council and that a British Subject
17Ibid.
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would only be appointed as an Official member. The Enactment on the other hand 
provided for a Brunei or a British Subject to become an Official or Unofficial member 
o f the Legislative Council.
The District Councils proposed that Malay should be declared the Official 
Language of Brunei. Although the Council accepted that Bills introduced in the 
Legislative Council and Laws made under the Enactment should be printed in both 
Malay and English, where a dispute arises, over the correct interpretation, the Malay 
Text should be followed.18
5.3 Negotiations between the State Council, the Sultan and the High 
Commissioner
In February 1958 the Sultan convened a Special State Council meeting to 
discuss his proposed draft Constitution Enactment. The High Commissioner, Sir 
Anthony Abell, who attended the meeting, wanted to discuss the proposed draft 
Agreement between Brunei and the United Kingdom before discussion the 
Constitution. But the majority Council members did not agree; they felt that the draft 
Constitution Enactment should be considered first in the light of comments made by 
the District Councils.19 They proposed to discuss the draft Agreement among
1'Ibid..
l9CO 1030/461, item E/56, Minutes of the Special State Council Meeting held in 
the Lapau on 24 and 25 February 1958. These Minutes, which were taken and signed 
by the British Resident, were sent to the Colonial Office on 4 August 1958 by the 
Sarawak Chief Secretary. In the cover letter accompanying the Minutes the Chief 
Secretary stated that: "High Commissioner has commented that he cannot 
unfortunately certify that they correctly represent all that passed at these meetings - 
for instance in nearly all cases his own remarks have been completely omitted - so he
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themselves and with the Sultan first; then they would put forward another draft for 
consideration of the British Government. Despite Sir Anthony Abell's explanation that 
the draft Agreement (which had been drafted by his Legal Advisers and approved by 
the Colonial Office) was the document as agreed between him and the Sultan, the 
Council insisted that it should discuss the draft Agreement without the presence of the 
High Commissioner. The Council appointed three members: Pengiran Ali, Pengiran 
Yusuf and Marsal bin Maun to examine the draft Agreement, and to come up with a 
new draft.20
In his report on the meeting above, which he sent to the Colonial Office in 
mid-April 1958, Sir Anthony Abell said:
"Gilbert [the British Resident] and I have spent many long and weary hours in 
the State Council trying to agree to a Constitution which will both work and 
be acceptable to our various interests. It has been hard and so far unrewarding 
work".21
The main issue discussed in the meeting was the appointment of a Menteri Besar and 
the abolition of the British Resident. The Sultan informed the State Council that he 
had discussed the matter with the Secretary of State in London and had pressed for 
the early appointment of a Menteri Besar but it had been agreed that six months after 
the Constitution was brought into effect the Sultan and the High Commissioner would
has not agreed the minutes, knowing that it would take as long as the original to 
obtain agreement. He adds in any event, he is not a member of the State Council and 
only addressed them at the invitation of His Highness". See: CO 1030/461, item 56, 
Sarawak Chief Secretary to E.Melville, 4 August 1959.
20Pengiran Ali and Pengiran Yusuf were former members of the Constitutional
Advisory Committee established in 1953.
21CO 1030/461, item 48, Sir Anthony Abell to Colonial Office, 15 April 1958.
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make their recommendations for the appointment to the Secretary of State. The Sultan 
recommended the decision should be accepted by the Council and suggested that the 
person to be selected for appointment as the Menteri Besar should work with the 
British Resident as an understudy. Pengiran Ali, the Chairman of the Brunei/Muara 
District Council, stated that he would refer that Sultan's new proposal back to the 
members of his Council.22 In an attempt to persuade the Council to accept the Sultan's 
proposal Sir Anthony Abell explained that it was essential to have in existence a well 
tried and trusted administrative machine if the Constitution was to be given a fair 
chance to work smoothly and to prove that the people of Brunei could shoulder these 
responsibilities. Sir Anthony Abell offered to arrange as soon as possible for the 
training of candidates for the post of Menteri Besar. In the same report the High 
Commissioner told the Colonial Office:
"I believed at that time I had convinced them but I now hear that the Council 
have said that they will not agree to any Constitution or Treaty which contains 
reference to a British Resident. We must stand firm on this ground if we wish 
to see a stable and moderately efficient Government in Brunei and if we intend 
to make a democratic form of monarchy work".23 
Thus the Brunei/District Council had rejected the Sultan's recommendation and insisted 
for an appointment of the Menteri Besar being made with the introduction of the 
Constitution.
22CO 1030/461, item E/56, Minutes of the Special State Council Meeting held on
24 and 25 February 1958.
23CO 1030/461, item 48, Sir Anthony Abell to Wallace, 15 April 1958.
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On the issue of the Sultan's powers provided in the proposed Enactment the 
State Council agreed to retain the definition of the "Sultan-in-Council" in the 
Enactment provided that the Sultan agreed to submit to the preview of Executive 
Council all his powers and authorities. But as far as the reserve powers of the High 
Commissioner were concerned they wanted all reference to them to be omitted from 
the draft Enactment.24
The High Commissioner also had a tough time in reaching an agreement on 
the official language. The Council, which was dominated by non-English educated 
members, demanded that the official language throughout the State and in all Councils 
should be Malay and that no other language should be used officially. In his 
subsequent report to the Colonial Office on 9 May 1958 Sir Anthony Abell said that 
he and the Sultan had previously agreed that the new Interpretation Enactment, which 
would come into force with the Constitution should provide that Malay and English 
would be regarded as official languages for three years and that at the end o f that 
period the matter would be reconsidered. Sir Anthony Abell said he did not mind 
Malay being declared the official language provided that English could be used and 
would prevail in proceedings before the High Court and in the legislation of the State 
and in the conduct of public business. At the end of the lengthy discussion the High 
Commissioner agreed in principle that the definition of "official language" should be 
inserted in the Enactment and he believed a compromise in the matter would be 
reached in time.25
24CO 1030/461, item , "Minutes of the Special State Council Meeting held on 24 
and 25 February 1958"; See CO 1030/463, item 3, "Some Notes on Meeting at 
Istana Darul Hana on 27 October 1958: Points Provisionally Agreed".
25CO 1030/461, item 50, Sir Anthony Abell to E.Melville, 9 May 1958.
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Another important issue which generated into heated debate between the State 
Council and Sir Anthony Abell was that of the qualifications for the members of the 
Legislative Council. Although the members of the Council agreed to the High 
Commissioner's proposal that the Unofficial members of the Legislative Council 
should be elected, they disagreed that a non-Brunei should be qualified to be an 
Unofficial member. They insisted, being supported by the Sultan, that a British 
Citizen could only qualify to become an Official member of the Council. Sir Anthony 
Abell disagreed:
"This would have the effect of debarring all Chinese and Europeans from 
taking part in the work of District Councils and of election to the Legislature 
which would greatly restrict the choice of the electorate and deprive the Sultan 
of the advice and experience of a most important section of his subjects. It 
would virtually mean that no person in an executive capacity in the oilfields 
could take any part in local and central government. The discussion was long 
and heated but no compromise solution could be found".26 
Nevertheless he warned the Colonial Office that they might have to give way to the 
demand of the State Council in order to obtain Agreement, although he would deplore 
it.27
On 9 April 1958 the Sultan chaired another special meeting of the State 
Council to discuss the new draft Agreement submitted by the Council. Although John 
Gilbert who was present during the meeting, raised some doubts against some points 
in their draft Agreement the majority of the members of the Council gave their
26Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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approval to the proposals.28 Following this meeting the State Council's draft 
Agreement was submitted to Sir Anthony Abell, who did not attend the meeting, for 
his comment. The High Commissioner received the draft Agreement with disapproval, 
and on 9 May he informed the Colonial Office that he had written to the Sultan to 
seek elucidation on certain points found in the new Agreement.29 The main point of 
contention was the omission of the British powers to make laws relating to internal 
security of Brunei. In his reply to Sir Anthony Abell's queries on 21 May the Sultan 
did not consider it necessary or appropriate that the Queen should make laws in 
Brunei affecting the internal affairs of the State. He said: "Since Brunei is recognised 
as an independent State and merely under the protection of Her Majesty's Government 
it is the right of the State to make rules and laws affecting internal affairs".30 However 
the Sultan said there was no problem about the British Troops entering the State to 
protect the State of Brunei if it was attacked. The Sultan also pointed out that no such 
provision had appeared in the 1948 agreements with the Malay States.31 In fact earlier, 
in February, Sir Anthony Abell had been asked by the State Council to define the 
status of Brunei under the existing Agreements. He stated that Brunei was "a 
Sovereign independent state under the protection of Her Majesty's Government".32 
Apparently it was for this reason that the State Council wanted to make the position
28CO 1030/461, item E/56, Minutes of the Special State Council Meeting held in 
the Lapau on 9 April, 1958
29CO 1030/461, item 50, Sir Anthony Abell to E.Melville, 9 May 1958.
30CO 1030/461, item E/51, Sultan to High Commissioner, 21 May 1958.
"Ibid.
32CO 1030/461, item E/56, Minutes of the Special Council Meeting held in the 
Lapau on 24 and 25 February, 1958.
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of Brunei clearer in its new draft Agreement. It wanted to revoke the Agreement 
made in the year 1905-190633 and to add a clause which stated that:
"The sovereignty and powers of His Highness the Sultan of the State of Brunei 
shall be the sovereignty and powers owned by His Highness the Sultan of the 
State of Brunei on 17 September 1888, in accordance with this Agreement, and 
the State of Brunei is an Independent State, His Highness the Sultan will be 
the head of the ruling State and only under the protection o f Her Majesty's 
Government".34
In accordance with Brunei's status as an independent State under the protection of 
Britain, the State Council wanted to delete the High Commissioner's reserve powers 
and amend the advice clause in the draft Agreement to simply:
"His Highness agrees to accept any advice that is tendered to him by the High 
Commissioner on all matters connected with the betterment o f administration 
of Brunei State, except relating to Muslim Religion and custom of the Malays, 
as practised in Brunei".35 
During the State Council meeting on 9 April Pengiran Ali was asked by the British 
Resident, to explain its meaning, he said:
"if the advice was in the opinion of His Highness to be beneficial to the State 
His Highness would act upon such advice. However if in the opinion of His 
Highness the advice would not be for the good of the State His Highness
33CO 1030/463, item 8, State Council's Draft Agreement: Clause 17.
i4Ibid., Clause 18.
35Ibid., Clause 7.
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would not act upon such advice".36 
This was a contrast to the advice clause in the 1905/1906 Agreement when the advice 
of the British Resident "must be taken and acted upon on all questions in Brunei, other 
than those affecting the Mohammedan religion". Sir Anthony Abell said such 
provision was unacceptable because the Sultan could reject his advice at any time he 
considered it to unpalatable.37
There was also a provision for the Sultan to communicate directly to the Queen 
through the Secretary of State if he decided not to accept the advice of the High 
Commissioner.38 Sir Anthony Abell said such an arrangement was impracticable 
because he believed that many difficulties would arise and from time to time the 
business of government would be brought to a standstill. He told the Colonial Office: 
"I believe we must ensure as stable a government as possible while the oil lasts; we 
can only do this if the British element in the government is strong and has the power 
to act".39 He insisted that the Agreement must contain reference to the British Resident 
or the British Adviser. Apparently the Sultan, under the pressure from his State 
Council, returned to the assumption that the post of the British Resident would cease 
to exist once the Constitution was approved. But the Sultan defended his decision by 
pointing out that there were no such definition in the State Agreements of the Malay 
States in 1948.40 Sir Anthony Abell advised the Colonial Office that it was very
36CO 1030/461, item E/56, Minutes of the Special State Council Meeting held on 
9 April 1958.
37CO 1030/461, item 51, Sir Anthony Abell to E.Melville, 5 June 1958.
38CO 1030/463, item 8, State Council Draft Agreement, Clause 7.
39CO 1030/461, item 51, Sir Anthony Abell to E.Melville, 5 June 1958.
40CO 1030/461, item E/51, Sultan to High Commissioner, 21 May 1958.
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necessary that they should not give way on this point. He said: "If the present State 
Council remains adamant we will have to redraft the Constitution to conform with the 
old agreements and hope that elections will in time produce a Council with a greater 
sense o f balance and responsibility".41 Sir Anthony Abell could not hide his frustration 
at some members of the State Council whom he described as "stubbornly 
uncompromising". He added: "the ignorance and prejudice are of a depth and 
darkness which are never encountered in Sarawak".42 He asked the Colonial Office 
how far the British Government was willing to concede to the wishes of the State 
Council.
In July the Colonial Office asked the High Commissioner, in view of the 
Sultan's intransigence, whether British interests were really served by pushing ahead 
on the lines being pursued by him or whether at least for some time to come, the 
existing arrangements should be allowed to continue. But it told Sir Anthony Abell 
whatever moves he made should involve consideration of: "how much steam there is 
behind Azahari and his party, whether generated within Brunei or outside it, and also 
an assessment of local feeling on the question of ..Menteri Besar".43 On the question 
of Menteri Besar the Colonial Office wanted to know whether there was any popular 
support for the Sultan or whether the pressure was simply from the Sultan himself and 
his immediate advisers.44
41CO 1030/461, item 51, Sir Anthony Abell to E.Melville 5 June 1958.
42CO 1030/461, item 48, Sir Anthony Abell to Wallace, 15 April 1958.
43CO 1030/461, items 52, E.Melville to Sir Anthony Abell, 24 July 1958
44Ibid.
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In response to the Colonial Office query at the end of July Sir Anthony Abell 
sent a paper entitled "A Brief Appreciation of the Political Situation in Brunei - June 
1958" by E.R.Bevington. He thought it was a fair assessment of the situation in 
Brunei and he was generally in agreement with the author's views as to the root causes 
of the difficulties in the State.45 Bevington, who was appointed as the State 
Commissioner of Development, blamed the members of the Malay Teachers 
Association (MTA) in the State Council for causing the difficulties. In his report to 
the Colonial Office earlier Sir Anthony Abell pin pointed three of them, two teachers, 
Pengiran Ali and Marsal bin Maun, and the State Information Officer, Pengiran Yusuf. 
He said: "These three gentlemen did most of the talking while the senior ministers 
remained in somnolent and apathetic silence only raising their hands to vote with the 
crowd".46 Bevington said that these members of the MTA were often, although not 
always, the spokesmen of the Sultan in sessions of the State Council. He suspected 
that on many matters the Sultan and the three gentlemen met in advance and agreed 
on the action to be taken in Council.47 In agreement with Bevington, Sir Anthony 
Abell blamed them for the demands for various amendments to the Constitution 
Enactment and Draft Agreement, and particularly in respect of the appointment of
45CO 1030/658, item 11, Sir Anthony Abell to Wallace, 30 July 1958. 
E.R.Bevington arrived in Brunei in 1953 to take up a post o f Commissioner 
Development, whose main task was to direct the One Hundred Million Dollars State 
Five-Year Development Plan which was launched in the same year. He left at the end 
of his contract in June 1958.
46CO 1030/461, item 50, Sir Anthony Abell to E.Melville, 9 May 1958.
47CO 1030/658, item E / l l ,  "A Brief Appreciation of Political Situation in Brunei - 
June 1958, by E.R.Bevington".
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Menteri Besar".48 Bevington suggested that the Sultan, MTA and the PRB may have 
forged "a marriage of convenience" in order to achieve their immediate ends, which 
were "absolute control of Brunei by Brunei Malays with all others on sufferance". He 
believed that once they had that power, their individual manoeuvres for position could 
be resumed, "in an atmosphere free from interference by the British or anyone else".49 
In agreement with the assessment Sir Anthony Abell said: "I have no doubt at all that 
if it suited a group who felt sufficiently strong to do so they would without hesitation 
or regret remove the Sultan from his throne".50 A Colonial Office Official said:
"It is not easy to see how this problem can best be sorted out. I cannot help 
feeling that it may prove disastrous just to let matters drift; and that there is 
much to be said for continued efforts to get a new Constitution introduced".51 
In August the Colonial Office told Sir Anthony Abell that "there must be no 
weakening on the issues of the British Resident and a Menteri Besar".52
In an attempt to sort out the problem Sir Anthony Abell withdrew Gilbert and 
replaced him with Dennis White as the British Resident in Brunei in mid-July 1958. 
Gilbert had been holding the office in Brunei since June 1953 but his relations with 
the Sultan had deteriorated. The Sultan in fact refused to attend various functions to 
mark the departure of the British Resident. The source of the problem is not clear but 
the deterioration of their relations began in November 1957. The Sultan was not
48CO 1030/658, item 11, Sir Anthony Abell to Wallace, 30 July 1958.
49CO 1030/658, item E / l l ,  "A Brief Appreciation of Political Situation in Brunei- 
June 1958".
50CO 1030/658, item 11, Sir Anthony Abell to Wallace, 30 July 1958.
51CO 1030/658, Minute to item 11 by H.Nield, 21 August 1958.
52CO 1030/658, item 12, Wallace to Sir Anthony Abell, 26 August 1958.
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happy when Gilbert announced elections for District Councils while the former was 
still in London. On his return the Sultan forced Gilbert to cancel it but at the same 
time he refused to take responsibility for the cancellation.53
White had been briefly Acting British Resident in Brunei when Gilbert was on 
a six month leave in June 1956. Sir Anthony Abell hoped that the arrival o f White 
would improve relations between the British Administration and the State Council. 
In fact he specifically asked White to do all he could "to woo the Sultan from the 
influence of the schoolmasters Marsal and Pengiran Ali".54
In a further attempt to improve the situation in Brunei, Sir Anthony Abell sent 
a telegram to the Secretary of State in September 1958 proposing the introduction of 
the Brunei Nationality Enactment on the lines of the Kelantan Nationality Enactment 
of 1952. He believed that this would remove some of the misgivings o f the Brunei 
State Council about the provisions of the Constitutional Enactment and facilitate 
progress in the negotiation of the Constitution.55 However, the Colonial Office had 
serious reservations about the introduction of the Enactment. It feared that such 
legislation would further discriminate and exacerbate bitterness among the Chinese in 
Brunei after the State had passed the Immigration Enactment which came into effect 
on 1 July 1958.56 Under the immigration legislation all non-Bruneis who had lived
53The proposal for an election for the District Council by secret ballot was agreed 
by the Sultan in London. See page 164.
54CO 1030/658, item 9, Sir Anthony Abell to Wallace, 21 July 1958.
55CO 1030/461, item 59, Sir Anthony Abell to Secretary of State, 13 September 
1958.
56CO 1030/461, item 62, Secretary of State to High Commissioner, 24 September 
1958 and also Minute by H.Nield, 16 September 1958.
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in the State for seven years or more during the period between 1 July 1948 and 1 July 
1958 were required to apply for residents' permits if they wished to take up residence 
in Brunei. However if they had lived in Brunei for less than seven years during the 
same period, they must apply for visitors' passes in order to remain in the State.57 The 
Colonial Office feared that the introduction of the Nationality Enactment might lead 
to disturbing consequences, and would rather face ''the possibility o f some further 
delay in constitutional reform in the State" than difficulties as a result o f such 
legislation.58
But Sir Anthony Abell did not agree with the view of the Colonial Office. He 
said one of the difficulties in making the Brunei Constitution, and in the 
administration generally, was the increasing antipathy of Malays for Chinese. He told 
the Colonial Office: "
"In view of what has happened in Malaya and elsewhere since the war it is 
hardly surprising that Brunei is determined to contain what they regard as the 
greatest menace to their future as a Malay Islamic State. There will therefore 
be discrimination against the Chinese whatever we may do and neither their 
Protected Status or British Nationality is going to be of any assistance to them 
in the future in Brunei. I think therefore we should support the Sultan in his 
policy of opposition to Chinese expansion in hope that by so doing we are 
more likely to get reasonable terms for the Chinese now living in Brunei. As 
you say there has been some vociferous opposition to the recent Immigration
51 The Borneo Bulletin, 7 June 1958.
58CO 1030/461, item 62, Secretary of State to High Commissioner, 24 September
1958.
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Enactment but I believe the more thoughtful Chinese appreciate that in fact it 
is the best thing that has ever happened for them. A Residence Permit now 
gives them a status in the country for the first time and I would hope that in 
the future this permit, together with an oath of allegiance, might qualify the 
non-indigenous members of the community for Brunei citizenship".59 
The High Commissioner thought that the State Council would demand that the 
Constitution make it quite clear that the only people in Brunei with full rights of 
citizenship were the indigenous people, and those who were naturalised and took an 
oath of allegiance. He believed that if the British could give the Brunei Malays a 
sense of security from Chinese expansion the locally domiciled Chinese might be 
treated with more regard. Then legislation could be passed to enable domiciled non- 
Bruneis to become Brunei subjects and to enable them to take an active part in politics 
which he believed should remove racial bitterness. Therefore Sir Anthony Abell 
believed something on the lines of the Kelantan Nationality Enactment would be 
required in Brunei if the fears of the Malays were to be removed and the Constitution 
accepted.60
On 3 November 1958, Sir Anthony Abell resumed negotiations with the Sultan 
and the State Council on the Brunei Constitution but the discussions was bogged down 
on the first item: the appointment of a Menteri Besar6] Sir Anthony Abell told the 
State Council that the appointment of a Menteri Besar would not be considered until 
the new Constitution had been in force for a period. But the State Council refused to
59CO 1030/462, item 63, Sir Anthony Abell to E.Melville, 6 October 1958.
60Ibid.
61 CO 1030/462, item 67, Sir Anthony Abell to E.Melvillve, 6 November 1958.
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compromise on its demand that the post of the British Resident should be abolished 
and his powers be transferred to a Menteri Besar to be appointed simultaneously with 
the introduction of the Constitution.62
When it appeared that a deadlock had been reached, Sir Anthony Abell put 
forward two proposals to the State Council, which he said, he would be prepared to 
recommend to the Secretary of State. The first proposal was that the Constitution 
should be published as soon as possible and a Menteri Besar should immediately start 
a period of training in the Resident's Office. The Constitution would be brought into 
effect as soon as the Sultan and the Secretary of State agreed that the Menteri Besar 
was capable of assuming office. He believed that a period of at least nine months 
would be required to draft and pass the necessary legislation to provide for elections 
and prepare an electoral register. He told the Sultan that his support for the proposal 
would be greatly strengthened if he knew who the Sultan had in mind for the post of 
the Menteri Besar. But the Sultan steadfastly refused to divulge a secret which Sir 
Anthony Abell believed might well lose him valuable support in the Council. 
According to Sir Anthony Abell his proposition had some lukewarm support from 
those members of Council who had some experience of administration but ''they were 
soon silenced by the more uncompromising and vocal members".63
The second proposal was that the Council itself should assume the powers of 
the British Resident and delegate them to various officers. Some of these powers 
would be immediately transferred to the Menteri Besar designate, some to the British 
Adviser and other officers of Government. The proposal allowed a gradual transfer
62Ibid.
62 Ibid.
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of duties to the Menteri Besar. When the proposal received no support from the 
members of the Council he knew that a deadlock had been reached and that there was 
no purpose in continuing the meeting.
Sir Anthony Abell felt he was regarded by some members as the principal 
opponent and believed that there was a better chance o f agreement if  he was excluded 
from the discussions. He told the Council:
"As the field of disagreement had been narrowed to a few points o f major 
importance which would in any event have to be referred to the Secretary of 
State it was possible that solutions could be found readily and satisfactory in 
London at the Colonial Office".64 
Consequently, on the following day, 4 November, the Malay members o f the State 
Council met the Sultan at his Palace. When the constitutional negotiation resumed on 
5 November the Sultan produced a resolution which contained agreements he and his 
Malay Councillors had reached. There was no change in their demand that a Menteri 
Besar, a Secretary of State and a Financial Officer should be appointed simultaneously 
with the implementation of the Constitution and that the post of the British Resident 
be changed to that of British Adviser with all powers vested in the British Resident 
being assumed by the Menteri Besar. They also demanded that the Constitution should 
come into force on 1 July 1959 at the latest. They welcomed the suggestion by Sir 
Anthony Abell that a delegation headed by the Sultan should hold discussions with 
the Secretary of State in London. Before the delegation left for London they 
suggested that the State Council should give the delegation full powers to negotiate 
matters connected with the Agreement and the Constitution with the Queen's
6AIbid.
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representatives. They also suggested that the State Council should appoint two legal 
experts to advise the delegation on matters connected with the Agreement and the 
Constitution.65
Sir Anthony Abell strongly urged the Colonial Office to agree to receive the 
Sultan's delegation as soon as possible. He did not believe that the differences were 
insoluble. He said:
"I believe if  His Highness considers he is receiving unbiased and independent 
advice in London, and divorced from rather tense atmosphere in the State 
Council here, and with me out of the picture, he will be less 
uncompromising.66
However, Sir Anthony Abell warned the Colonial Office that the Sultan was very 
unpredictable and it was difficult to tell what he really wanted. It was for this reason 
that Malcolm MacDonald, the former Commissioner-General in Southeast Asia, who 
had a "unique standing with the Sultan", was despatched to Brunei in December "to 
have an appreciation of the way in which the Sultan's mind is working".67 Although 
MacDonald failed to make the Sultan reveal his intensions on the Constitution, he was 
able to bring about greater understanding between the Sultan and the Colonial Office.
65Ibid., CO 1030/462, item E/67, Resolutions of a Special Meeting at Istana Darul 
Hana, Brunei, on 4 November 1958.
66CO 1030/462, item 67, Abell to Melville, 6 November 1958.
67Actually the Colonial Office had been planning of sending MacDonald to Brunei 
since July when the latter was invited by the Sultan to the opening ceremony of his 
grand Mosque on 23 September 1958. Apparently the plan was only materialised when 
the Constitutional negotiations between the Sultan and the High commissioner reached 
an impasse in November. The aim of the visit was not only to find out the Sultan's 
mind on the Constitution but also on "closer association". See CO 1030/558, item 
165E, Colonial Office to Commonwealth Relations Office, 25 July 1958.
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After the visit MacDonald reported:
"I noticed a pleasing change in the Sultan himself. Immediately on meeting 
him I observed that his face reveals a much more mature, self-confident 
character than before. ...All my conversations with him confirmed my 
impression of a responsible and statesmanlike young Ruler".68 
With regard to the London Conference MacDonald advised the Sultan to be flexible 
in his approach and meet the British authorities half-way. He said the Sultan assured 
him that he was willing to reach a compromise agreement with the Secretary of 
State.69 As a result the Secretary of State agreed to receive a delegation headed by 
the Sultan in the third week of March 1959.
5.4 The London Conference
The Sultan appointed Dato Bukit Gantang Haji Abdul Wahab, the former 
Menteri Besar of Perak, as his Constitutional Adviser.70 In London he engaged 
another lawyer, Neil Lawson Q.C., to advise his delegation. Both lawyers had been 
involved in the Federation of Malaya's Constitutional talks in London in 1956. The 
Brunei Delegation comprised entirely of the Malay members o f the State Council. 
They were:
The Sultan;
68CO 1030/462, item 71, MacDonald to G.Laithwaite, 24 December 1958.
69Ibid.
70For a biographical note see Appendix I.
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Pengiran Pemanca Haji Muhammad Alam;
Dato Perdana Menteri Haji Ibrahim;
Pehin Orangkaya Shahbandar Haji Ahmad;
Pehin Jawatan Dalam Muhammad Noor;
Pehin Orangkaya Laksamana Haji Taha;
Pengiran Haji Abu Bakar;
Pengiran Ali bin Pengiran Mohad.Daud;
Pengiran Yusuf bin Pengiran Abdul Rahman;
Marsal bin Maun.
The Sultan submitted twenty-two points he wished to be discuss in London with the 
Secretary of State. Among the major points were the timing of the hand-over of the 
British Resident's power to a Menteri Besar:; the question of nationality and 
qualifications for election to the Legislative Council; defence; and the High 
Commissioner's reserve powers.71
The Brunei delegation left for London on 14 March 1959. On his departure 
to London the Sultan told his subjects that the Constitution he was about to negotiate 
with the Secretary of State would give opportunity to the people in Brunei to take part 
in the government of the State. In this matter he emphasised that the Legislative 
Council, which would have responsibility of passing, enacting and initiating laws for 
the well-being of the people, should have a majority of members elected by the people 
themselves. He asked his subjects to give their support to his Constitution and assured 
them that the Constitution could be amended to fulfil their demands. However he
71CO 1030/462, item 73, Sir Anthony Abell to Secretary of State, 6 January 1959; 
Ibid., item 74, White to Wallace, 26 February 1959.
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asked them to give the Constitution opportunity to work for five to six years before 
such amendments should be made.72
The London Conference, which was held at the Colonial Office, began on 23 
March 1959. At the opening Plenary Session, Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of 
State, proposed to the Sultan that he was prepared to consider administrative 
separation of Brunei and Sarawak if satisfactory arrangements about staffing and the 
internal security of Brunei could be reached.73 This was a significant move on the part 
o f the Colonial Office because it had consistently opposed the separation of the 
administrations of the two states until the Brunei Constitution had been working for 
some time. Lennox-Boyd attempted to bring the Sultan and his delegation to a more 
conciliatory position. Sir Anthony Abell had in fact told the Colonial Office on 9 
March that the difficulties he had with the Sultan and the State Council on the 
Constitution were "due to resentment on the part of the Sultan and his State Council 
at the connection with Sarawak and if the cause could be removed undoubtedly the
12Pelita Brunei, 18 March 1959.
73CO 1030/526, item 7, Record of the First Plenary Session, 23 March 1959. There 
were six Plenary Sessions in six days of conference. All the Plenary Sessions were 
chaired by the Secretary of State and were attended by senior Colonial Office officials 
and the High Commissioner and the British Resident. The agenda for each Plenary 
Session was drawn up by a Working Party whose members consisted of 
representatives from the Colonial Office and the Brunei delegation. The Colonial 
Office representatives included the Deputy Under-Secretary, Sir John Martin (the 
Chairman); E.Melville, Head of the Southeast Asian Department; W.I.J.Wallace, 
Assistant Under-Secretary; and their Legal Advisers. The Brunei representatives 
consisted of Datu Perdana Menteri Haji Ibrahim (Deputy Chairman); Pehin Orang 
Kaya Shahbandar Haji Ahmad, Pengiran Haji Abu Bakar; Pengiran Ali; Pengiran 
Yusuf and Marsal bin Maun; and the two Legal Advisers: Dato Panglima Bukit 
Gantang Haji Abdul Wahab and N.Lawson.
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position would be considerably eased".74
The first major point discussed in the Conference was the replacement of the 
post of British Resident with a Menteri Besar simultaneously with the introduction of 
the Constitution. The British however felt that Brunei was not ready for the change. 
They insisted that the officer selected to take over from the British Resident must be 
capable of fulfilling the functions of that office, adding that they could not find such 
a person in Brunei. But the Bruneis were determined that the Menteri Besar should 
be appointed as reflected in Sir Anthony Abell's letter to the Colonial Office in early 
January 1959: "Long and patient explanation has convinced only the silent minority 
in the State Council that is not a job which any Brunei Malay who has been to school 
can tackle".75 The High Commissioner's letter followed the Sultan's new year speech. 
In the speech the Sultan stressed that "as a people with a country of their own, they 
were entitled to manage their own affairs".76 Under such intense pressure the Colonial 
Office decided to give in; however, it resolved that the Sultan must be persuaded to 
reveal who he had in mind for the post of the Menteri Besar so that training could be 
given to him.77 In a meeting with the Colonial Office on 9 March 1959 Sir Anthony 
Abell agreed there would be enough time to train him before being called upon to 
assume the post. In the same meeting it was agreed that in the period prior to the
74CO 1030/526, item 2, Note of discussion with Sir Anthony Abell and 
Mr.D.C.White on the Brunei Constitution Enactment and the Agreement held on 9 
March 1959.
75CO 1030/462, item 73, Sir Anthony Abell to Secretary of State, 6 January 1959.
16The Borneo Bulletin, 3 January 1959.
77CO 1030/526, item 1, Note of a Meeting to discuss the Brunei Constitution and 
Agreement held at the Colonial Office on 6 March 1959.
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introduction o f the Constitution there would be devolution of the British Resident's 
powers to several members of the State Council.78 What the British had in mind was 
"a sort of embryo ministerial system".79
At the First Working Party Session on 23 March, the Colonial Office told the 
members o f the Brunei Delegation that it was prepared to meet their demand provided 
that the candidate for the post had a short period o f training as Menteri Besar 
designate under the British Resident. Marsal bin Maun, a member o f the delegation, 
expressed dissatisfaction with the suggestion of a period of preliminary training and 
pointed out that there had been adequate time for that during the past four years. The 
Brunei Delegation felt that a suitable person would be available and that the time had 
arrived for the appointment to be made. However the delegation agreed that the 
personalities for the post of Menteri Besar and the State Secretary should be the 
subject of private discussions between the Sultan and the Secretary of State.80
In the Second Plenary Meeting held the following day the Sultan told Lennox- 
Boyd that he wished to discuss privately the question of selection and timing o f the 
appointment of a Menteri Besar.i] In that private meeting Lennox-Boyd said the 
Sultan told him that with regard to personality for the post:
"he was going to Malaya and when he got back he would consult his people
78CO 1030/526, item 4, Note of Meeting held at the Colonial Office on 10 March 
1959.
79CO 1030/526, item 1, Note of a Meeting to discuss the Brunei Constitution and 
Agreement held at the Colonial Office on 6 March 1959.
80CO 1030/526, item 8, Summary Record of Meeting of the Working Party held
on 23 March 1959.
81 CO 1030/526, item 10, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Session held on
24 March 1959.
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in Brunei. They might have suggestions which he would not like and he might 
have suggestions which they might not like, but the decision would be his and 
he would give me a promise to write to me at the end of this month [April]".82 
That seemed to satisfy Lennox-Boyd because he stated in the Fifth Plenary Session 
that the appointment of the Menteri Besar did not present further difficulty and would 
not affect the introduction of the Constitution".83 The Sultan's reluctance to reveal his 
thoughts was influenced by likely negative reactions from Bruneis.84 As seen above 
the Constitutional Committee and District Councils had wanted the posts of Menteri 
Besar and the State Secretary to be filled by "true Brunei Malays", and were likely 
to oppose the appointment of a Malayan as the first Menteri Besar.95
The second major point discussed was the High Commissioner's reserve 
powers. Although Lennox-Boyd stressed that the High Commissioner's reserve powers 
should be retained he was agreeable to their omission from the Constitution provided 
they appeared in the Agreement.86 The Sultan agreed but proposed that the High 
Commissioner's powers should be worded in general terms. The Sultan told Lennox- 
Boyd that he wished to retain the words contained in the 1905/1906 Supplementary 
Agreement: that he agreed to accept advice on all matters except those relating to the
82CO 1030/529, item 8, "Minute by the Secretary of State", 3 April 1959.
83CO 1030/526, item 16, Summary Record of the Fifth Plenary Session held on 
3 April 1959.
84CO 1030/527, item 2, "Brief for the Secretary of State", Colonial Office Paper, 
n.d. (?March 1959).
85See page 212.
86CO 1030/526, item 10, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Session held on
24 March 1959.
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Muslim religion and Malay custom. The Secretary of State said that his preference 
for some specifications was intended to differentiate between matters on which formal 
advice could be given and those on which only informal advice could be given. The 
Sultan, however, pointed out that this was the position in the Federation of Malaya 
Treaty, 1948, and he wished to retain it.87 In order to overcome the problem Lennox- 
Boyd was prepared to consider that the High Commissioner's powers should be given 
in the form of a general advice clause in the Agreement provided that the Sultan 
agreed that there should be in addition an exchange of letters between himself and the 
Sultan to cover the detailed points which would otherwise be specified in the 
Agreement. He stressed that his final agreement on a general advice clause as desired 
by the Sultan would depend on what was agreed in the exchange of letters.88
Following the agreement Lennox-Boyd sent a draft letter to the Sultan on 2 
April outlining the matters on which he would particularly wish the High 
Commissioner to give advice. In the Fifth Plenary Session held the following day it 
was acknowledged that the Sultan had agreed to the content of the Secretary of State's 
letter. Among them were matters relating to defence and security on which the British 
insisted that Brunei should give full powers to the Queen, including jurisdiction to 
make laws in Brunei relating to defence and external affairs.89 The Brunei Delegation 
was prepared to give full powers to the British Government in respect o f defence and
87CO 1030/526, item 12, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Session held on
25 March 1959.
88CO 1030/526, item 15, Summary Record of the Fourth Plenary Session held on
26 March 1959.
89CO 1030/526, item 37, Summary Record of the Fifth Plenary Session held at the
Colonial Office on 3 April 1959.
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external affairs but strongly opposed conceding powers to the British to make laws for 
Brunei on internal security. For the British it was impossible to isolate external 
defence from internal security. In order to carry out their obligation to protect the 
State the British wanted to have certain powers of legislation to deal with an internal 
emergency. They also wanted to have executive powers to seek outside assistance - 
troops or police - in the event of an emergency; and to have general administrative 
control o f the police, including the appointment of top police officers.90
In effect the British previously had no powers to make laws for Brunei in 
respect o f defence. The defence obligations they had were derived only from the 
general advice clause in the 1905/1906 Supplementary Agreement in which the British 
Resident's "advice must be taken and acted upon on all questions in Brunei, other 
those affecting Mohammedan religion".91 The Sultan wanted to maintain the 
arrangement. However, if the general advice clause, which he wanted to insert in the 
new Agreement, was not sufficient to meet the problem he suggested the setting up 
of a Defence Advisory Council, of which the High Commissioner and representatives 
o f local defence forces would be members. So far as executive power was concerned, 
he suggested that a section be inserted in the Constitution allowing for the declaration 
of an emergency; and with regard to the question of personnel he believed that it 
would be resolved if the British had powers in matter of "key posts".92
90CO 1030/526, item 8, Summary Record of Meeting of the Working Party held 
on 23 March 1959 and item 12, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Session held 
on 25 March 1959.
91 See: CO 1030/113, item 28, Colonial Office to Sir Anthony Abell, 8 March
1956.
92CO 1030/526, item 12, Summary Record of Meeting of the Third Plenary
Session held on 25 March 1959.
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In order to meet this demand the draft Agreement was modified to include the 
Sultan's suggestions. A Standing Advisory Council, consisting of representatives of 
the British and of the Government of Brunei, would be constituted. The purpose of 
the Council, which had no executive power, was solely for consultation with regard 
to implementing measures relating to defence against internal threat. Lennox-Boyd 
agreed that the Council would be consulted before British troops were brought in for 
the purposes o f internal defence, except when there existed a state of emergency, in 
which case, it should be consulted as soon as possible after measures had been taken. 
This apparently satisfied the Sultan and the Brunei Delegation.93
The Bruneis regarded internal security as an internal matter which should be 
dealt by themselves. The Sultan had for a for long time been asking for the 
establishment of a Brunei Regiment on the lines of the Malay Regiment in the 
Federation of Malaya. In fact it was one of the recommendations of the Constitution 
Committee in 1954.94 The idea was opposed by Sir Anthony Abell, not because the 
Regiment would "divert useful people from essential jobs" as he told the Sultan, but 
because he distrusted the Bruneis in terms of security.95 When the Sultan and his 
advisers told Sir Anthony Abell that they were capable of looking after their internal 
security if allowed to have an army, and to increase the size of their police force, the 
High Commissioner told the Colonial Office:
"It is hardly tactful to reply that it is the Brunei element in these forces which
93CO 1030/526, item 16, Summary Record of the Fifth Plenary Session held on 
3 April 1959.
94See page 98.
95CO 1030/658, item 9, Sir Anthony Abell to Melville, 21 July 1958; item 10, 
Melvillve to Sir Anthony Abell, 31 July 1958.
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might prove unreliable. As I explained in a demi-official letter o f 6 October 
1958 to Melville I believe we must retain full powers, including the power to 
make laws in Brunei, if we are to ensure the security o f the oilfields".96 
The distrust of the Bruneis was the main reason why the British posted a platoon of 
Sarawak Field Force, and a contingent of Malayan Police, to guard the oilfields at 
Seria. The Special Branch was controlled from Sarawak.97 Whatever decisions were 
taken in regard to the security of Brunei the British had to take into account the 
security o f the oilfields, which involved the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company 
(BSPC).98 In a letter to Sir Robert Scott, the Commissioner-General for Southeast 
Asia, on 23 March 1959 Lennox-Boyd stated:
"There are indications that Shell, who have previously maintained that 
maximum powers in field of internal security should remain with High 
Commissioner, now believe that more liberal policy might in the long run best 
preserve their good relations with the Government of Brunei"99 
Undoubtedly it was the change in attitude of Shell which influenced the decision of 
the British to soften their demand for the complete control of security in Brunei.
In regard to Lennox-Boyd’s proposal for separation of the administrations of 
Brunei and Sarawak, the Sultan said that he agreed provided no great difficulties were 
encountered. The Sultan was told that one of the implications of the proposal was
96CO 1030/462, item 73, Sir Anthony Abell to Secretary of State, 6 January 1959.
97CO 1030/527, item 2, "Brief for the Secretary of State", March 1959.
98The British Malayan Petroleum Company (BMPC) changed its name to the 
Brunei Shell Petroleum Company (BSPC) in March 1957.
99CO 1030/462, item 77, Secretary of State to Commissioner-General for the 
United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, 23 March 1959.
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Brunei would lose the service of expatriate officers from the Sarawak establishment.100 
However, in replying to the Sultan's question as to whether he would be free to recruit 
officers from other territories, Lennox-Boyd said that there would need to be a few 
"key posts" which should be filled by officers appointed by him. But the Secretary 
of State assured the Sultan that the number of the "key posts" would be kept to a 
minimum and as suitable Bruneis became available they could be considered for the 
appointment to those posts as they became vacant.101 After discussing the matter with 
his advisers the Sultan agreed to the separation of Brunei and Sarawak 
Administrations. Consequently the drafting of the Agreement and Constitution 
Enactment proceeded on that effect.102 The other implication of the proposal was the 
Governor of Sarawak would no longer be the High Commissioner for Brunei. Instead 
there would be a separate High Commissioner for Brunei directly responsible to the 
Secretary of State, and this led to a decision dropping a proposal for an appointment 
o f a British Adviser because his role would be taken over by the High 
Commissioner.103
100Under the Brunei/Sarawak Agreement signed in 1948 Sarawak provided senior 
officers for Brunei Establishment. See page 66.
101 CO 1030/526, item 10, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Session held 
at the Colonial Office on 24 March 1959.
,02CO 1030/526, item 16, Summary Record of the Fifth Plenary Session held at 
the Colonial Office on 3 April 1959.
103It was decided during the Working Party Session on 24 March 1959 that the 
appointment of the British Adviser depended on the outcome of the proposal for the 
separation o f the Brunei and Sarawak Administrations. See: CO 1030/526, item 11, 
Summary Record of Meeting of the Working Party held at the Colonial Office on 24 
March 1959.
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Although the Sultan was cautious about accepting Lennox-Boyd offer to sever 
Brunei's links with Sarawak there was no doubt that the proposal had brought some 
compromising attitudes among the Bruneis. For instance on the qualifications for 
membership o f the Legislative Council the Brunei Delegation indicated that it was in 
favour of the Sir Anthony Abell's proposal for a non-Brunei be qualified to be an 
Elected Member of the Legislative Council if the person had been resident in Brunei 
for seven out of the preceding ten years, had taken the oath of allegiance and had 
reasonable command of Malay Language.104 Previously they had resisted fiercely any 
such proposal; they wanted the Elected members of the Legislative Council be 
preserved for Bruneis only. In a related matter the Sultan proposed that there should 
be a State Nationality Law. Although Lennox-Boyd agreed to the proposal he refused 
to discuss it because, he knew that it was a delicate matter and it would cause 
problems to the Conference. He suggested the proposal be dealt with after the 
Conference.105 This was possible because the Sultan planned to implement the 
Constitution in three stages. On the Constitution Day the Menteri Besar and the State 
Secretary would be appointed. This would be followed by the enactment of 
nationality laws, the holding of elections to District Councils and, finally, the 
appointment of elected members of the District Councils by the Sultan to the
104CO 1030/526, item 8, Summary Record of Meeting of the Working Party held
on 23 March 1959.
105CO 1030/526, item 15, Summary Record of the Fourth Plenary Session held on
26 March 1959.
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Legislative Council. Lennox-Boyd agreed to the plan provided that the period did not 
exceed two years.106
There was also a significant compromise on the part o f the Brunei Delegation 
when it agreed that for a period of five years legislation in Brunei, including the 
Constitution Enactment, should be written in both Malay and English; and that for the 
purpose of interpretation English would prevail. Initially it demanded the Malay 
version should prevail if a question of interpretation arose in respect of the Agreement. 
But agreed to a compromise that both English and Malay versions of the Agreement 
be signed by both sides and the English version should prevail in the event of 
dispute.107
With the major points being settled the road to agreement on the Constitution 
and the Agreement seemed clear. However, as there was a vast amount of work to 
be undertaken to provide for the transfer of powers and to bring existing legislation 
into line with the new Constitution, Lennox-Boyd was unable to promise to meet the 
Sultan's target 1 July 1959 for the introduction of Constitution. However it was 
agreed that he and the Sultan should exchange letters to facilitate the introduction of 
the new Constitution on the 1 July 1959.108 On the final session held on the 6 April 
the Sultan and Lennox-Boyd initialled the English and Malay versions of the draft 
Agreement at the Colonial Office.
106CO 1030/526, item 10, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Session held 
on 24 March 1959.
I07CO 1030/526, item 15, Summary Record of the Fourth Plenary Session held on
26 March 1959.
108CO 1030/526, item 16, Summary Record of the Fifth Plenary Session held on
3 April 1959.
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The Sultan was satisfied with the outcome of the Conference.109 He obtained 
almost all his demands. Furthermore he had out manoeuvred the vocal members of 
his State Council. The new Constitution would give supreme authority to him instead 
of the Sultan-in-Council as demanded by the State Council. The Constitution would 
be published by proclamation rather than by Enactment as the Council had previously 
demanded.110
5.5 Exchanges of Letters between the Sultan and the Secretary of State
Before the Constitution could be promulgated there were several points to be 
settled. The most important point was the appointment of a Menteri Besar. On 23 
April 1959, barely two weeks after he returned from the London Conference, the 
Sultan travelled to Malaya to search for a candidate for the post of Menteri Besar. 
But on his return from the two week visit to the Federation, he wrote to Lennox-Boyd 
stating that he had decided to appoint his Private Secretary, Dato Perdana Menteri Haji 
Ibrahim bin Jahfar, as the first Menteri Besar of Brunei.111 The Sultan had failed to 
find a suitable candidate in the Federation. However there was also a possibility that
109CO 1030/526, item 17, Summary Record of the Sixth Plenary Session held on 
6 April 1959. According to Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid, who acted as the Sultan's 
interpreter during the Conference, after the initiation ceremony the Sultan shook his 
hand and told him: "It's done! (in English!)". Professor Zainal, who was student at 
that time attached to the Malayan Foreign Affairs, said he could felt the Sultan was 
"extremely satisfied" with the outcome of the negotiations. He saw the Sultan for the 
first time relaxed and cheerful. Interview, May 1993.
110CO 1030/526, item 10, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Session held
on 24 March 1959.
11'CO 1030/529, item 29, Sultan to Secretary of State, 6 May 1959.
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he was under pressure from his traditional advisers and members of the State Council 
to appoint a Brunei Malay. Although Dato Perdana Menteri Haji Ibrahim was never 
considered by the Bruneis as a "true Brunei Malay" because he was bom in Labuan, 
he was chosen because he was more acceptable to the British.112 Like all the others 
in Brunei at that time Haji Ibrahim had never been to a high school. He was brought 
to Brunei by a British Resident in 1917 as an office messenger in the British 
Resident's Office. Before he became the Sultan's Private Secretary in 1956 he was the 
British Resident's Secretary.113 On 12 June Lennox-Boyd wrote to the Sultan 
informing him that he approved the appointment. He did not demand a preliminary 
period of training for the new Menteri Besar before the office of the British Resident 
was abolished. Haji Ibrahim's long experience in administration gave confidence to 
the British to handle the new administration in Brunei. However the Secretary of 
State was unable to meet the Sultan's desire for the appointment to be made by 1 July 
1959 because there were still outstanding issues in connection with the provisions of 
the Constitution, and staffing problems following the separation of Brunei from 
Sarawak which needed to be settled.114
With regard to the provisions of the Constitution the Sultan told Lennox-Boyd 
that he and his traditional advisers could not accept non-Bruneis eligible to be Elected 
members of the Legislative Council, as provided in the draft Constitution Enactment.115 
He said the provision did not reflect what he and his advisers the agreed at the
1 ^Interviews with Pengiran Ali and Pengiran Yusuf in April 1993.
113For a biographical note see Appendix I.
114CO 1030/489, item 36A, Secretary of State to Sultan, 12 June 1959.
115CO 1030/489, item 30, Sultan to Secretary of State, 2 June 1959.
245
London Conference. In order that non-Bruneis should not be disqualified permanently, 
he said, he was willing to undertake that within two years of the Constitution Day, and 
at the same time as the Election provisions were introduced, a Nationality Enactment 
would be passed.116 Lennox-Boyd was prepared to meet the Sultan's demand because 
he felt it was not an immediate matter. However, he stressed that it must not be later 
than two years as promised by the Sultan.117
Earlier, on 6 April 1959, the Sultan wrote to the Secretary of State to confirm 
the agreement that the selection of officers to fill the "key posts" would not be 
confined to United Kingdom personnel. If a suitably qualified and acceptable nominee 
was found who was not United Kingdom personnel he would not be barred from 
selection. He also told the Secretary of State that he desired that the officers accepted 
to fill "key posts" should have a sufficient knowledge of Malay to enable them to 
carry out their duties efficiently.118 Lennox-Boyd confirmed that the selection of 
officers for "key posts" was not intended to be confined to United Kingdom personnel, 
although he was not sure that it was always possible to find a suitable officer with 
knowledge of Malay as well as the experience and qualifications needed for the 
post.119 The Sultan asked Lennox-Boyd to recommend names of officers whom he 
suggested as suitable. On his part the Sultan said he had asked the Government of the 
federation of Malaya whether they could assist him in the matter.120
,16CO 1030/490, Sultan to Secretary of State, 13 July 1959.
117CO 1030/490, Secretary of State to Sultan, 29 July 1959.
l,8CO 1003/529, item 10, Sultan to Secretary of State, 6 April 1959.
ll9CO 1030/529, item 13, Secretary of State to Sultan, 15 April 1959.
120CO 1030/529, item 51, Sultan to Secretary of State, 4 July 1959.
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By early August a report on staffing was completed. The Sultan said he agreed 
in principle to the recommendations of the report. He suggested there should be two 
agreements: with Sarawak regarding the end of the administrative links, and with the 
British Government regarding compensation.121 At the same time the Sultan had 
agreed to reserve the posts of Chief of Police, Officer-in-Charge of Special Branch, 
State Medical Officer and State Engineer to expatriates as recommended by the 
Secretary of State. However the State Financial Officer, Attorney-General and State 
Education Officer were people of his own choice: officers from the Federation. The 
post of the State Secretary, which was not a "key post", was filled by Wan Ahmad bin 
Wan Omar from the Federation. Further the Sultan had agreed to the nomination of 
Dennis White, the British Resident, as the High Commissioner for Brunei under the 
new arrangement.122 Basically these arrangements satisfied the British and thus the 
Constitution was promulgated on 29 September 1959.
121CO 1030/529, item 81, Sultan to Secretary of State, 26 August 1959.
n2Ibid.
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CHAPTER 6
THE PROMULGATION OF THE 1959 CONSTITUTION
On 29 September 1959 the Sultan promulgated the first written Constitution 
of Brunei. In order to bring the Constitution into force four other documents were 
also promulgated: the Succession and Regency Proclamation, which contained rules 
regulating succession to the throne of Brunei and the appointment of regent or regents 
in the absence of the Sultan from the State; the Brunei Agreement, which spelled out 
the new relations between Brunei and Britain; the Brunei Overseas Officers 
Agreement, which dealt with appointments of contract officers to the Brunei 
Government and compensation paid for loss of career resulting from the new 
arrangements; and the Brunei and Sarawak (Administrative Separation) Agreement, 
which terminated the 1948 Agreement signed between the two States and dealt with 
compensation paid to Sarawak officers who were affected by the new changes. The 
first part of this chapter deals with constitutional and administrative structures 
provided by the new the Constitution, the second part examines the establishment of 
the new administration and its problems and the last part discusses the proposals for 
introducing the Nationality Bill and elections.
6.1 Internal Self-government
The Sultan expressed his satisfaction with the promulgation of the Constitution. 
He said that the 1959 Agreement brought "to an end an era of direct rule by the
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British Government over the State of Brunei".1 Under the constitutional reform the 
post of the British Resident was abolished and the administrative link with Sarawak 
through the High Commissioner, who was also the Governor of Sarawak, was severed. 
Instead, Brunei had its own High Commissioner, who resided in the State and was 
directly responsible to the Colonial Office. Unlike the British Resident, who was the 
Sultan's chief adviser and the de facto  chief executive officer, the new High 
Commissioner had a smaller role in the internal affairs of the State. He sat in the 
Executive Council in his capacity as an adviser to the Sultan "on all matters connected 
with the Government of the State other than matters relating to the Muslim religion 
and the custom of the Malays".2 In practice, however, as admitted by a Colonial 
Official, the powers of the High Commissioner were "limited to defence and external 
affairs [and]... to internal security in view of its connection with defence, and to one 
or two other items such as banking and currency".3 In April 1960 Dennis White, the 
last British Resident, who was appointed as the new High Commissioner, told the 
Colonial Office:
"My position is difficult in the extreme ...too much criticism and too much 
advice would be regarded as an interference and resented, and I have to 
confine my frankest exchanges to the Menteri Besar".4 
Nine months later, in January 1961, White was advised by the Colonial Office that: 
"in relation to internal Brunei matters, which do not directly affect H.M.G's interests,
]The Borneo Bulletin, 3 October 1959.
2"The Brunei Agreement, 1959", Clause 4 (1).
3DO 35/10035, item A, Melville to MacDermot, 2 February 1960.
4CO 1030/937, item 8, White to Wallace, 28 April 1960.
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it seems best to keep in the background as far as possible".5 The High 
Commissioner's functions were best described by White in his letter to the Colonial 
Office in August 1961: "Every action and word has to be governed by need to retain 
the Sultan's goodwill and win back confidence in the British connection".6 In fact the 
Sultan was not obliged to accept the advice of the High Commissioner as there was 
a provision in the Agreement that he could address the Queen through the Secretary 
of State if  he desired.7
As far as the internal matters were concerned the supreme executive authority 
o f the State which formerly vested in the Sultan in Council nOw vested with in the 
Sultan. However the authority could be exercised by State officers acting in the 
Sultan's name. The principal officer responsible to the Sultan for the exercise of all 
executive authority was the Menteri Besar. He replaced the British Resident as the 
head of the administration. However the Menteri Besar had no over-riding power as 
the British Resident had had. The British Resident's powers were distributed among 
the principal officers of the State, which included the Menteri Besar,; the State 
Secretary, who was in charged of the administrative affairs; the Attorney-General, and 
the State Financial Officer. All these officers were appointed by the Sultan and held 
office at his pleasure. The Menteri Besar and the State Secretary had to be Malays 
professing Islam and belonging to the Shafeite sect as did the majority of the Muslims 
in Brunei. The positions of Attorney-General and the State Financial Officer which 
came under the Brunei Overseas Officers Agreement had to be approved by the
5CO 1030/1447, item 4, E.Melville to D.C.White, 15 February 1961.
6CO 1030/1448, item 14, White to Melville, 29 August 1961.
7"The Brunei Agreement, 1959", Clause 4 (2).
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Secretary o f State. Other "key posts" which came under the Agreement were State 
Engineer, State Education Officer, Chief Police Officer (later Commissioner of Police), 
State Medical Officer and Officer-in-Charge Special Branch. The Agreement 
stipulated that until locally domiciled persons were available all the "key posts" were 
to be filled by officers nominated by the Secretary of State and appointed by the 
Sultan or by officers nominated and appointed by the Sultan with the approval of the 
Secretary o f State.8
The State Council which was established during the British Residency was 
abolished. In its place three Councils were created: Privy, Executive and Legislative. 
The main functions o f the Privy Council, whose members were mainly the traditional 
advisers of the Sultan and the principal officers o f the State, were to advise the Sultan 
on the exercise of the prerogative of mercy, the amendment or revocation of any of 
the provisions of the Constitution, the appointment o f persons to Malay customary 
ranks, titles, honours and dignitaries.9
The Executive Council on the other hand was the most important body of the 
State. In the exercise of his powers and the performance of his duties, the Sultan had 
to consult the Executive Council whose main functions were to consider and to give 
advice on matters in relation to government policies presented by the Sultan. The 
Sultan might reject the advice of the Executive Council but in that case he had to give 
his reasons in writing.10 The Executive Council, which was presided over by the
8DO 35/10034, item 67, "Brunei Overseas Officers Agreement, 1959", 
Clause 2.
9"The Constitution, 1959", Section 6.
]0Ibid., Sections 19 and 20.
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Sultan himself, had seven ex-officio members (the two Wazir, the Menteri Besar, the 
State Secretary, the Attorney-General, the State Financial Officer and the Religious 
Adviser); and also included the High Commissioner; and seven Unofficial members. 
The Unofficial members comprised six Elected members of the Legislative Council 
and one Nominated member of that Council.11 However before the Elections were 
held the Unofficial members of the Executive Council were appointed by the Sultan. 
The Nominated Member of the Council was the Managing Director of the Brunei 
Shell Petroleum Company (BSPC).12
The Legislative Council was the law-making body of the State. It was presided 
over by the Menteri Besar (but later after an election in August 1962 the Sultan 
appointed a Speaker from among its members to preside over it). The members of the 
Legislative Council comprised eight ex-officio, six Official, three Nominated and 
sixteen Elected members. The ex-officio members were the two Wazir, the Menteri 
Besar, the State Secretary, the Attorney-General, the State Financial Officer, the 
Religious Adviser. The Official Members were people who held public office and 
were appointed by the Sultan. Like the Official members, the Nominated members 
were appointed by the Sultan but they could not hold public office. At least two of 
the Nominated members should represent important interests which were not 
adequately represented by the Elected members. When the Legislative Council was 
first established in October 1959, the Sultan appointed RE.Hales to represent the
uIbid., Sections 11 - 14.
I2BA/13168/A/1978, SUK/173/59, Minutes of Executive Council Meeting held on
29 October 1959. These Minutes show all, but one, the Unofficial members comprised 
the members of the Sultan's Constitutional delegation to London. For a complete list 
of members of the Executive Council see Appendix II.
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BSPC and George Newn Ah Foott to represent the Chinese Community.13 The 
Elected members were members of District Councils, chosen by the Councils 
themselves. The Constitution provided for elections for the District and Legislative 
Councils to be held within two years after the proclamation of the Constitution. Until 
the elections were held, the "Elected members" of the Legislative Council were 
appointed by the Sultan. They comprised members of the Sultan's Constitutional 
delegation to London and members of District Councils.14
6.2 The New Administration
As soon as the new Constitution was promulgated a new administration was 
established. The Sultan appointed his Private Secretary, Dato Perdana Menteri Dato 
Haji Ibrahim bin Jahfar,15 as the first Menteri Besar o f Brunei; and Wan Ahmad bin 
Wan Omar, a Malayan officer, as the State Secretary. The appointment of Dato Haji 
Ibrahim and Wan Ahmad to the most senior posts in the new administration surprised 
most people in Brunei particularly the members of the Sultan's constitutional 
delegation. In his report to the Colonial Office White noted:
"There was little or no public animation but, I hear, there are undercurrents of 
resentment at the appointment of two non-Bruneis as Menteri Besar and the 
State Secretary. One or two members of State Council, who had hopes of
]3The Borneo Bulletin, 24 October 1959.
,4For a complete list of members of the Legislative Council see Appendix III.
15Given the top award "The Most Honourable Order of the Crown of Brunei, First 
Class, Seri Paduka Mahkota Brunei" by the Sultan on the latter's birthday on 23
September 1959. Hereafter Dato Haji Ibrahim.
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advancement, are believed to be talking to the Party Raayat".16 
In retrospect the Sultan's decision to appoint the Labuan-bom Dato Haji Ibrahim as 
the first Menteri Besar, as being due to the fact that he was the only "local person" 
acceptable to the British. It is likely that rather than submit to the British demand that 
the Menteri Besar should receive a period of training if the candidate was not 
acceptable to the British,17 and which would have meant a delay in the establishment 
of the new administration, the Sultan chose his Private Secretary. However by doing 
so the Sultan disappointed many members of the State Council who had fought hard 
both with the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office to reserve the posts of 
Menteri Besar and State Secretary for a "pure Brunei Malay". Some of them were in 
fact hoping to be appointed to the posts themselves. In November 1959, two months 
after the promulgation of the Constitution, the Sultan was reminded by members of 
the Executive Council about the issue of the appointment of the Menteri Besar and 
State Secretary. They demanded an immediate training of local candidates.18
However the appointment of the Menteri Besar and State Secretary was not the 
only issue which caused resentment among the local elites and the Bruneis generally. 
Except for the Menteri Besar, all senior posts in the new administration were filled 
by Malayan or British officers. During the London talks the Secretary of State agreed 
to meet the Sultan's wish to fill his administration with officers of his own choice 
provided that the appointment of seven "key posts" had to be approved or nominated
,6CO 1030/533, item 10, White to Wallace, 1 October 1959.
1 interview s with Pengiran Ali and Pengiran Yusuf, April 1993.
18BA/2237/1983, "Minutes of Executive Council Meeting held on 28 November 
1959".
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by the Secretary o f State himself. However on the insistence by the Sultan that 
officers recruited into his administration should be conversant in the Malay Language, 
only the positions o f State Financial Officer, Chief Police Officer, State Engineer and 
Officer-in-Charge o f Special Branch were filled by expatriates. All ten other senior 
posts were filled by Malayan officers.19 In addition a considerable number o f 
Malayans were working in the Government Service and the commercial organisations 
on a contractual basis, and a few on a permanent Government service basis.20 Among 
them were forty-two teachers who taught in the various schools and a Teacher's 
College in the State, including a number o f recipients of scholarships from the Brunei 
Government.21
The "influx" of these Malayans officers caused resentment among local officers 
who saw their opportunities for promotion disappear. Although they knew that the 
Malayan officers were in Brunei on secondment until local officers were available to 
take over, some of the local officers felt that having worked hard rid the State of 
Sarawak and British officers some of the senior posts should be given to them. In 
November 1959, two months after the promulgation of the Constitution, Marsal bin 
Maun, an Unofficial member of the Executive Council, brought a motion in the
19See: CO 1030/1447, item 75/E, Tunku Abdul Rahman to Sultan of Brunei, 4 July 
1961. The ten seconded Malayan officers were: State Secretary; Attorney-General; 
State Education Officer; Commissioner of Lands; Secretary for Development; 
Establishment Officer; State Forest Officer; State Surveyor; State Medical Officer; and 
Assistant Attorney-General.
20Ibid.‘, CO 1030/1447, item 76/E, "An Appreciation of Recent Events in Brunei", 
nd. This report was prepared by the Special Branch Officer and it was sent to the 
Colonial Office by the High Commissioner on 22 July 1961. He also sent the same 
report to the Security Intelligence Far East in Singapore. See item 76 of the same file.
21CO 1030/1447, item 75/E, Tunku Abdul Rahman to the Sultan of Brunei, 4 July 
1961.
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Council which stated that it was "the intention o f this Government eventually to post 
Brunei Malays as Heads of the following Departments:- Immigration; Information; 
Broadcasting; and Customs".22 When there seemed to be no move on the part of the 
Government to promote local officers to senior posts a member of the Legislative 
Council criticised the Government in April 1960 for not providing opportunities to 
local-born people to join the public service and commercial firms. He challenged "the 
common belief in Brunei that local people were not qualified to enter the public 
service".23 Consequently relations between the Malayan officers and the local officers 
became strained. The local officers felt that, although Brunei had achieved its self- 
government after the promulgation of the Constitution, they were losing out to non- 
Bruneis high positions in the new administration. In December 1960 all sixteen 
Unofficial members of the Legislative Council stage a walk out after their proposals 
on the privileges and allowances of Members of Legislative Council, which had been 
passed by the Council, were rejected by the Sultan on the advice of the Government 
and the High Commissioner. They were angry with the claim of Ali bin Hassan (the 
Attorney-General), who was a Malayan officer, that motions passed by the Legislative 
Council could only be acted upon if approved by the Sultan in Council. They felt that 
it would reduce them to the status of a "rubber stamp". The "Constitutional crisis" 
was resolved after the Sultan agreed to see them privately. Dennis White believed the 
whole affair was clouded by the "growing friction between the locals and the Malayan
22BA/13802/A/78, "Minutes of Executive Council Meeting held on 28th.
November 1959".
23The Borneo Bulletin, 23 April 1960.
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contingent".24 In an attempt to reduce the tense situation the Sultan decided to 
promote the following local officers: Dato Marsal bin Maun25 from a Superintendent 
of Malay School, the post he held since 1948, to Deputy State Secretary; Pengiran Ali, 
a school Headmaster, to Religious Affairs Officer; and Pengiran Yusuf was confirmed 
in his post as State Information Officer.26
The discontent among the Brunei civil servants spread out from Government 
offices to the general public, especially when inefficiency in the administration became 
widespread. In its annual Congress held in February 1960 the PRB criticised the delay 
in carrying out Government business and adopted a resolution pressing for the removal 
of some of the Malayan officers and their replacement with local personnel.27 In May 
1961 the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company (BSPC), which was worried about these 
developments sent a report to London urging the British Government "to exert more 
influence" in the State. According to the report, the State was "in a mess" and the 
administrative machinery was "grinding to a stop". The report claimed that there had 
been minimal governmental action under the new Constitution: out of a development 
budget of $30 million for 1960 the administrative machine had only succeeded in 
spending $4 million.28 The report blamed the "mess" on the Menteri Besar, who was
24CO 1030/1447, item 2, White to E.Melville, 22 December 1960.
25Awarded "Dato Setia Negara Brunei" by the Sultan on the occasion of his 
birthday on 23 September 1960. Hereafter Dato Marsal.
^Interviews with Pengiran Ali and Pengiran Yusuf, April 1993; with Marsal bin 
Maun, May 1993.
27CO 1030/932, item 1, White to A.Waddell, 23 February 1960.
28CO 1030/1447, item E/29, "Extract of a letter from the Foreign Office to the
Colonial Office", 9 May 1961.
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"in fact a very ill man and quite incapable of taking a strong or effective lead". 
However it also believed that there was "a grave shortage o f qualified administrators" 
and the situation was worsened by "the friction between the Bruneis and the Malayan 
seconded officers, who wanted to get home".29 In a reply to the Colonial Office query 
on the matter, in August 1961, White said:
"You are well aware of the difficulties o f my own position here; being 
maintained by the Sultan, sanctions are in his hands, if  he should desire to use 
them and we have no effective come back. I am ostensibly an Adviser on 
everything other than Religious and local custom, but in fact I am limited to 
defence and external affairs and every action and word has to be governed by 
the need to retain the Sultan's goodwill and win back confidence in the British 
connection".30
When most senior Sarawak and British officers left as a result of the 
constitutional changes in 1959 Brunei was deprived of experienced officers. Most of 
the Malayan officers lacked experience and were unsuitable to handle the newly 
established administration. Wan Ahmad, the State Secretary, who was responsible for 
running the day to day administration was a junior Malayan Civil Service officer with 
only three years' service. In October 1959, the British High Commissioner in Kuala 
Lumpur reported that the appointment of Wan Ahmad Brunei was contested by the 
Federation Establishment Office "on the ground that he was not fully qualified and
29Ibid.
30CO 1030/1448, item 14, White to Melville, 29 August 1961.
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lacked of experience".31 In fact the appointment of Wan Ahmad, who was previously 
the Personal Secretary of Tunku Abdul Rahman, was agreed between the Sultan and 
the Prime Minister in July 1959 following his successful London Constitutional 
negotiations.32 In another report the British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur said 
that the handling of nominations of Malayan officers for positions in Brunei had been 
taken over from the Establishment Office by the Prime Minister's Department. It said 
the secondment of Malayan officers to Brunei was treated in Kuala Lumpur
"as a political exercise and one to which Ministers attach considerable 
importance. Any advice tendered by the F.E.O. as to the unsuitability of 
candidates Ministers wish to put forward would, in any case, be ignored in the 
interests of getting Malays into the influential jobs in Brunei".33 
This was confirmed by the Attorney-General, in April 1960, when he told the Brunei 
Legislative Council that there was no formal written agreement between Brunei and 
the Federation on the secondment of the Malayan officers but the principle had been 
accepted by both countries.34
Given this background it was not surprising that the Menteri Besar was unable 
to cope with the demands of the new administration. However, White also blamed the 
Sultan's interference with the day to day administration as being responsible for the
31DO 35/10034, item 51, the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur to the 
Commonwealth Relation Office in London, 13 October 1959.
32Ibid.
33DO 35/10034, item 57, A.J.Brown (Office of the British High Commissioner, 
Kuala Lumpur) to R.C.Ormerod (Commonwealth Relations Office, London), 3 October
1959.
34The Borneo Bulletin, 23 April 1960.
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state o f affairs. In his annual report to the Secretary of State in London at the 
beginning of 1961 the High Commissioner said:
"It is well known that the Menteri Besar is required by the Sultan to refer 
everything to him, and thus reasonable decisions arrived at the State Secretary 
and the Heads of Departments are frequently varied or rescinded by the 
Menteri Besar on the Sultan's instructions, often supported by the so-called 
"unofficial" members of the Executive Council, all o f whom, in fact, hold posts 
in the Brunei Civil Service".35 
In fact the High Commissioner said the appointment of the Sultan's former Private 
Secretary as the first Menteri Besar had resulted in the Sultan becoming the executive 
authority in fact as well as in name and had deprived him of the essential buffer 
between the throne and the Government and the people.36 However in another report 
White said that the Sultan was frequently critical "of his own Government in 
Executive Council for the papers and views they put up, and for bringing up matters 
which were within their competence to decide".37
In such circumstances, and since the administration was almost entirely under 
the Malayan officers, it was not surprising that the Sultan, as the High Commissioner 
said, "adopted with enthusiasm, the role of Chief Administrator" and, with a weak 
ailing Menteri Besar, "exercised the closest control of day to day administration, 
which slowed down the wheels almost to a standstill".38 In summing up his report
35CO 1030/1447, item 5, White to Iain MacLeod, 30 January 1961.
36Ibid.
37CO 1030/1447, item 13, White to E.Melville, 14 March 1961.
38CO 1030/1447, item 5, White to Iain MacLeod, 30 January 1961.
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White said: "the public are restless and critical and the civil service is worried and 
unhappy".39
Another important factor which caused the administrative problems was the 
fact that many of the Malayan officers themselves were not enthusiastic in working 
in Brunei. Feeling unwanted and disliked by their host country they were increasingly 
anxious to return to Malaya, where the shortage of staff was acute and appointments 
for promotion was greater. Their restlessness could also be attributed to the fear o f 
being passed over for promotion in Malaya during their absence. In March 1961, Wan 
Ahmad told White that Malayans were increasingly reluctant to accept secondment in 
Brunei, however much the politicians tried to persuade them.40 In fact in April 1961, 
Wan Ahmad and three other senior officers, the Attorney-General, the Establishment 
Officer, and the State' Education Officer requested to return to Malaya. However 
White believed their request would not be accepted by the Sultan or the Federation 
Government, not only because they had not completed their two-year secondment 
period, but also because their secondment was decided on a political rather than an 
administrative basis.41
But their opportunity came on 12 June 1961 when one of their colleagues, 
Mohammad Yakin bin Haji Long, the State Forest Officer, was assaulted by three of 
Azahari's brothers.42 This isolated incident, apparently the result o f a dispute over the
39Ibid.
40CO 1030/1447, White to E.Melville, 23 March 1961.
41 CO 1030/1447, White to I.Wallace, 13 April 1961.
42CO 1030/1447, item 59/E, Report by the Commissioner of Police to the Menteri
Besar, 28 June 1961.
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non-granting of a Forest Department Permit to Sheikh Nikman, one of the persons 
involved, was blown out of proportion by the officers to request their transfer to 
Malaya. Immediately after the incident all the senior Malayan officers and some 
teachers submitted their resignations and demanded their immediate withdrawal. Four 
days later Wan Ahmad, the State Secretary, and Ali bin Hassan, the Attorney-General, 
against the Menteri Besar*s wishes, flew to Kuala Lumpur to seek agreement from the 
Prime Minister to their demand for immediate withdrawal.
The Menteri Besar wished that the incident should not be publicised for fear 
of straining further the relations between the Malayan officers and the local people. 
However, Mohammad Yakin, who decided to return to Malaya without waiting for 
approval from the Brunei and Malayan Governments, gave an exaggerated account of 
the incident to the press on his arrival in Singapore.43 The situation worsened when 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, after hearing the account of his officers, made press statements 
alleging that the Malayan officers were not given enough protection by the authorities 
in Brunei. He warned that unless their safety was guaranteed he had no choice but 
to agree to their request for withdrawal from Brunei. This statement became a 
political issue when he accused the PRB of causing the troubles. (The political 
implications of this incident will be discussed in the next chapter).44
43CO 1030/1447, item 36, White to E.Melville, 15 June 1961.
44CO 1030/1447, item 76/E, "An Appreciation of Recent Events in Brunei", nd. 
This report was prepared by the Special Branch Officer, with the approval of the 
Commissioner of Police Brunei. It was sent by the High Commissioner to the 
Colonial Office and Security and Intelligence Far East, Singapore on 22 July 1961. 
See item 76 in the same file. See also CO 1030/1447, item 59/E, "Report by the High 
Commissioner of Police to the Menteri Besar, 28 June 1961.
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Despite the incident, the Agong's State visit to Brunei, which had been planned 
prior to the incident, went ahead in early July 1961. During the visit the Tunku, who 
was in the entourage, handed a letter to the High Commissioner in Brunei addressed 
to the Sultan, which appeared to be an "ultimatum". He told the Sultan that on his 
return to Malaya he would take steps to withdraw all his officers in Brunei except the 
forty-two teachers whom he advised to wait until replacements could be found either 
from Brunei or from Malaya. He urged the Sultan to appoint his own officers to as 
many posts possible and to call on Britain to provide technical and other officers 
unavailable locally.45
The Tunku's letter upset the Sultan because it put him in a difficult position.46 
On the one hand the Sultan knew that his officers were not ready to replace the 
Malayans; and on the other, he would "lose face" if he went back to the British to ask 
for officers after terminating their services. The Sultan refused to let the Malayans 
go unless replacements found and he appealed to the Agong and to Tun Abdul Razak, 
the Deputy Prime Minister, not to take the drastic action.47 As soon as the Malayan 
King's entourage left Brunei the Sultan despatched the Menteri Besar, and two of his 
advisers, Dato Marsal and Pengiran Ali, to Kuala Lumpur to discuss the staffing 
position and to arrange for replacements.48 Consequently Tunku Abdul Rahman 
withdrew his threat to pull out all his officers from Brunei. Instead he agreed to 
replace them with "another batch of civil servants who would as far as possible be
45CO 1030/1447, item 75/E, Tunku Abdul Rahman to the Sultan, 4 July 1961.
46CO 1030/1447, item 53, White to Secretary of State, 4 July 1961.
47CO 1030/1447, item 55, White to Secretary of State, 20 July 1961.
48CO 1030\1447, item 54, White to the Secretary of State, 12 July 1961.
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more senior and have more experience behind them".49
After the staffing dispute was resolved the Sultan reassessed his policy towards 
his own officers. Towards the end of July 1961 he promoted Dato Marsal, the 
Assistant State Secretary, as Acting Menteri Besar. The Menteri Besar, Dato Haji 
Ibrahim, went on a nine months leave to seek to regain his health; and at the end of 
the leave, the latter would retire if so advised medically. The Sultan appointed 
Pengiran Yusuf as the Deputy State Secretary, taking over from Dato Marsal.50 On 
the departure of the substantive holder (Wan Ahmad), Pengiran Yusuf acted as the 
State Secretary. In his annual report to the Colonial Office on political developments 
in Brunei for 1961 the High Commissioner described the appointments o f Dato Marsal 
and Pengiran Yusuf in the following words:
"At any time up to a few months ago, it would have been impossible to view 
the appointments of Marsal and Pengiran Yusuf with anything but the gravest 
apprehension. They, together with Pengiran Ali, now the head of the Religious 
Affairs Department, were the three members of the Brunei Malay Teachers 
Association who had been specially selected by the Sultan in 1956 as the 
spearhead of the attack on the British Resident's entrenched position. Ardent 
nationalists, they all had close contact with the Party Rakyat".51 
He continued that there had been a marked improvement in the administration in 
Brunei. White said the Sultan had indicated that he intended to allow the new Menteri
49CO 1030/1447, item 87, British High Commissioner Kuala Lumpur to 
Commonwealth Relations Office, 5 August 1961.
50CO 1030/1447, item 85, White to E.Melville, 29 July 1961.
51CO 1030/1447, item 101, White to R.Maudling, 15 January 1962.
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Besar to lead the Government. This was in fact confirmed by Lord Selkirk,52 the new 
Commissioner General o f the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, in September, when 
he told the Secretary of State that: "He [the Sultan] is being more of a Constitutional 
Sultan with Marsal".53 After just four months of their appointment, White said:
"Marsal and Pengiran Yusuf started, with exemplary diligence, to clear up the 
enormous backlog of business, including some 600 files in the State Secretary's 
office awaiting attention. The speed with which they achieved this, despite 
Marsal's complete lack of English, was commendable".54 
Earlier in July 1961 Tunku Abdul Rahman withdrew Ali bin Hassan, and replaced him 
with Dato Abdul Aziz bin Mohammad Zain, the Permanent Secretary in the Prime 
Minister's Department.55 With arrival o f the new Attorney-General, who was 
described by White as "a vast improvement on his predecessor", the wheel of the 
administration began turning again.56
6.3 The Nationality Bill and the proposals for Elections
The new Constitution had provided for elections to be held within two years 
after its introduction. But by the end of September 1961 the elections had not been
52For a biographical note see Appendix I.
53CO 1030/1448, item 16, Lord Selkirk to MacLeod, 12 September 1961.
54CO 1030/1447, item 101, White to R.Maudling, 15 January 1962.
55CO 1030/1447, item 87, British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur to
Commonwealth Relations Office, 5 August 1961.
56CO 1030/1447, item 101, White to R.Maudling, 15 January 1962.
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held to the annoyance of the Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB), which was hoping to gain 
political power through the democratic process. Among the main reasons for the 
delay, as evident above was that the new administration was weak and besieged by 
problems. In February 1960 the deputy Commissioner-General informed the Colonial 
Office that: "Lord Selkirk has also asked me to tell you that in his view nothing 
should be done to encourage the Sultan of Brunei to expedite the introduction of 
democratic methods, at least until the Civil Service begins to take shape”.57 In fact 
White agreed with Lord Selkirk. In a report to the Colonial Office in February 1960 
the High Commissioner noted that the Brunei Civil Service was too weak to exercise 
any control over any elected element in the Councils, particularly if a number of the 
"more ardent PRB adherents" were elected. Therefore he said: "We should play a 
waiting game and, at present, neither encourage or discourage the introduction of 
democratic methods".58 In the same report White said the State Secretary, Wan 
Ahmad, and the Attorney-General, Ali bin Hassan, both viewed the time limit of 
holding elections within two years with "misgivings", for different reasons. Wan 
Ahmad felt that: "the introduction of the ballot box to people who have little or no 
idea of its meaning, at a time when only one party is in the field, is unnecessarily 
dangerous".59 On the other hand, Ali bin Hassan felt that time was inadequate, 
particularly in view of the fact that no decision had been reached either on who could 
stand for the elections or who could vote.60
57CO 1030/937, item 6, D.Allen to E.Melville, 13 February 1960.
58CO 1030/937, item 7, White to E.Melville, 16 February 1960.
59Ibid.
60Ibid.
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Despite these pessimistic opinions the Sultan was determined to go ahead with 
his plan to hold the elections by September 1961. During the London talks the Sultan 
had told the Secretary of State that he would introduce Nationality legislations before 
holding the elections in order to determine the electorate. In April 1960 the Sultan 
appointed a Select Committee to consider the draft o f the Nationality Bill and to hear 
representations from the public. After all views had been taken into consideration, the 
Select Committee would make its recommendations on the final form of a draft Bill 
to be introduced in the Legislative Council. However before that he also promised to 
send a copy of the draft Bill to London for comments from the Secretary of State and 
for legal experts.61
The Select Committee, which was chaired by Dato Haji Ibrahim, the Menteri 
Besar, consisted of the State Secretary, the Attorney-General, the State Financial 
Officer, members of the Sultan's London Constitutional delegation and three unofficial 
members of the Legislative Council including a Chinese representative.62 In its first 
meeting in May 1960 the Committee agreed, on the suggestion of the Attorney- 
General, that in order to simplify the work he should first have discussions with the 
parliamentary draftsman in Kuala Lumpur, R.H.Hickling, on the general merits of the 
Bill and on the drafting arrangements of the various clauses. According to the 
Attorney-General the draft Bill was based substantially on the Nationality Law of the 
Malay States which were passed about six years earlier and, in his opinion it was 
necessary to take into account the various changes and defects found in the Malayan
61BA/13229/1978, SUK/249/49/60 A, "Executive Council Paper No. 110/60 - 
Nationality Bill".
62BA/13168/A/78, SUK/173/59, "Minutes of Executive Council Meeting held on 
13 and 14 April 1960".
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Law. The Committee agreed to defer further consideration of the draft Bill until the 
Attorney-general had made his report, which came only in early September 1960. The 
report o f the Attorney-General together with the draft Bill were considered by the 
Select Committee at three meetings in early September. At the end of those meetings 
the Committee drew up a second draft of the Bill.63
Meanwhile the Sultan sought assistance from the Malayan Elections 
Commissions to make preparations for the elections in the State.64 In August 1960 the 
Chairman of the Malayan Elections Commission and two members o f his Commission 
were in Brunei to make observations and submit proposals on the steps to be taken to 
hold elections within the stipulated time. At the end of his one week tour in the State 
the Chairman of the Commission submitted a draft proposal for an election programme 
to the Brunei Government, which was discussed by the Sultan and his London 
Constitutional Delegation on 27 August 1960. The Chairman of the Malayan 
Commission suggested that in order to allow the elections to be held within the 
stipulated time, the qualifications of electors to the District Councils should include 
all resident adult Bruneis as defined in the Constitution,65 and holders of residence 
permits, who were mainly Chinese. The Sultan and his Committee rejected the 
suggestion. Instead they felt that the qualifications should follow those laid down for 
Brunei nationals in the Nationality Law, which was still under consideration. For that 
reason the Committee recommended that the Nationality Law must be enacted some
63BA/13229/1978, SUK/249/49/60 A, "Report of the Select Committee appointed 
to examine the First Draft Nationality Bill", 1 October 1960.
64The Borneo Bulletin, 20 August 1960.
65In the Constitution "Bruneis" comprised the following races: Belait, Bisaya, 
Dusun, Kedayan, Malay, Murut, and Tutong.
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time during October 1960 if the elections were to be held by June or May 1961 as 
recommended by the Malayan Elections Commission. However the Committee agreed 
that the election of members of the District Councils to the Legislative Council should 
be delayed until September 1961 in order that Members should have an opportunity 
to assess the merits o f candidates for election. In view of the difficulty of finding 
suitable persons to form an Election Commission, the Malayan delegation 
recommended that the Sultan appoint one person to be an Election Commissioner and 
another to be Supervisor of Elections responsible to the Commissioner. But the 
Committee wanted an independent commission to be appointed consisting of a 
Chairman and four members, and proposed that two of the members be drawn from 
the Federation of Malaya, one of whom would be Chairman of the Commission. 
These recommendations were approved by the Executive Council during its meeting 
on 31 August and 1 September I960.66
Subsequently, on the anniversary of the promulgation of the Constitution, the 
Government confidently announced that the District Council elections would be held 
at the end of August 1961. It also announced that after the elections the Elected 
members of District Councils would elect from among their members representatives 
to the Legislative Council which would form an unofficial majority in the Council.67 
It was agreed in the Executive Council that Members nominated by the Sultan to the 
District Councils should not exceed twenty-five per cent of the total Elected members.
66BA/13808/78, "Executive Council Paper No. 286/1960 - Proposals for holding 
Election", 31 August 1960. The Chairman of the Malayan Elections Commission
submitted his full report in the middle of September 1960. See: BA/13809/78, 
Executive Council Paper No.313/60.
67The Borneo Bulletin, 1 October 1960.
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It was also agreed that the Nominated members should have the same rights as the 
Elected members except they could not vote on the election of their members to the 
Legislative Council.68 However the Sultan told White that the timing o f the election 
was subject to agreement on the Nationality legislation.69
When the Second Draft of the Nationality Bill i.e. the draft produced by the 
Nationality Committee at the end of its meetings in September, was brought up in the 
Executive Council in October 1960 for consideration, it was strongly attacked by Jamil 
bin Umar,70 an Unofficial member of the Council and a member of the Nationality 
Committee. Jamil claimed that he was not present during any o f the Select 
Committee's meetings but was forced by other members to sign the document. White 
said the members of the Executive Council, including himself, "spent seven hours 
arguing with Jamil", who wanted to introduce amendments to the draft bill, which the 
High Commissioner said aimed at excluding Chinese and went much further than the 
second draft of the bill.71 Consequently the Executive Council decided to defer its 
decision to adopt the Select Committee's draft Bill, but agreed to publish it as drafted 
in the Government's Gazette before its introduction in the Legislative Council. It also 
agreed to forward a copy of the Bill to the Secretary of State "for his information and 
comments".72 Meanwhile the High Commissioner had written to the Menteri Besar
68CO 1030/1402, item 4, "Extract from Brunei Political Intelligence Report for 
September, 1960".
69Ibid.
\
70For a biographical note see Appendix I.
7,CO 1030/1402, item 8, White to W.I.J.Wallace, 17 October 1960.
72BA/13229/1978, SUK/249/60 A, "Extract of Minutes of Executive Council 
Meeting held on 12 October I960". See: CO 1030/1402, item 11, D.C.White to the
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expressing concern over the question of the statelessness of certain persons which 
might result from the proposed Nationality legislation.73
The draft proposed Brunei Nationality Law provided that Brunei nationality 
could be acquired by three methods: by operation of law; by registration; and by 
naturalisation. It proposed that only the indigenous races of Brunei qualified for 
acquiring citizenship by operation of law. They comprised: Belait; Bisaya; Dusun; 
Kedayan; Malay; Murut; and Tutong. All others besides these seven groups were 
considered foreigners and had to acquire Brunei citizenship either by registration or 
naturalisation. For registration, a person had to be bom and to have resided in the 
State for fifteen out of the past twenty years; and for naturalisation, they must have 
resided in the State twenty out of the past twenty-five years. Besides these 
qualifications the person had to be able to speak the Malay language with proficiency. 
A language board was to be established to asses the applicant's ability.74 White 
believed that under these rules a large number of Brunei residents, largely British 
Protected Persons and Chinese would not qualify.75
Secretary of State, 29 October 1960.
73BA/13449/1978, SUK/249/49/60 A, "Notes dictated by Attorney-General on 
22nd. November, I960".
74BA/13229/1978/49/60 A, Appendix B of the "Report of the Select Committee 
appointed to examine the First Draft Nationality Bill", 1 October 1960.
75During the London talks the Secretary o f State had told the Sultan that he was 
anxious that the loyalty of Brunei people should be focused on the Sultan and the 
State but he would not want them to be deprived of their British protected status. The 
Sultan assured the Secretary of State that measures taken on this particular question 
would give fair treatment to the people loyal to the country. See CO 1030/526, item 
13, Summary Record of the Fourth Plenary Meeting, 26 March 1959
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When the draft nationality Bill was published in November 1960, there were 
adverse reactions, not only from the people who were affected by the proposed 
legislation, but also from the PRB. The PRB threatened to bring ten thousand of its 
members and supporters into the street to stage "a mammoth torchlight procession, 
followed by a mass meeting of protest" unless the Government made amendments to 
the Bill.76 But the demonstration was never held. The Government attempted to ease 
the tension by announcing that it was prepared to consider the views of the public, 
associations or political parties on the provisions of the Nationality Bill. It urged the 
public to submit their petitions and memoranda without delay to enable it to introduce 
the Bill in the Legislative Council by the end of the month.77 By the end of 
November 1960 the Government had received six memoranda, of which two were 
from political parties: the PRB, and the Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Brunei (Brunei 
National Organisation - BNO); three from associations: the Persakutuan Kebajikan 
Dusun (Welfare Association of Dusun), the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Indian Association Sei;ia-Belait; and one from a member of the public: Awang Matali 
bin Omar Inchi of Kuala Belait.78
76CO 1030/1403, item 22, "Extract from the Brunei Political Intelligence Reports 
October 1960". See: The Borneo Bulletin, 5 November 1960.
77BA/13229/1978, SUK/249/49/60 A, "Executive Council Paper No.403/60"; The 
Borneo Bulletin, 12 November 1960. Azahari said he was told by the High 
Commissioner to cancel his plan to hold the demonstration because he feared such a 
demonstration, which was to be held at night with demonstrators carrying sharp 
bamboo torchlights would lead to violence. The High Commissioner, instead, advised 
him to express his and his supporters grievances through a petition to the Government. 
Interview with Azahari, February 1993.
78BA/13229/1978, SUK/249/49/60 A, "Executive Council paper No.403/60 - The 
Nationality Bill", 30 November 1960.
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In the light of strong reactions and petitions from the public the Sultan decided 
to invite representatives of the petitioners to discuss their grievances.79 At the end of 
November 1960 the Sultan decided to defer the introduction of the Nationality Bill in 
the Legislative Council. He organised the Executive Council into a Special 
Committee by adding members of the former Select Committee who were not 
members of the Council - including a Chinese Unofficial member of the Legislative 
Council - to listen to the people's representations and to reconsider the Nationality 
Bill. In view of the importance of the Bill the Sultan insisted that he should chair the 
meetings of the Committee, against the advice of his advisers.80
In December 1960 the representatives of the petitioners were invited to present 
their views and proposals to the Special Committee. The PRB was led by its 
President, Azahari. The main proposals of the PRB were that the Ibans, who were not 
recognised as the indigenous race of Brunei by the Nationality Bill, should be given 
citizenship by operation of law like the other seven indigenous races; that the 
residential requirements of 20 out of 25 years for naturalisation should be reduced to 
10 out of 15 years, and that children bom in Brunei, whatever their parentage, should 
be entitled to citizenship.81 Azahari's main theme was that generous treatment would 
provide a better chance of assimilating non-Bruneis. He said that it was his party's 
policy to bring the three territories together, under the Sultan as a Constitutional Ruler,
79CO 1030/1403, item 30, "Extract from Brunei Intelligence Report for November 
1960".
80BA/13229/1978, SUK/249/49/60 A, "Extract of Minutes of Executive Meeting 
held on 30 November, 1960".
81Note: Azahari himself was not included in the seven indigenous groups. He was 
bom in Brunei. His father was an Arab, who married to a local Malay woman. For a 
biographical note see Appendix I.
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and the exclusion of the Ibans, the largest indigenous population of Sarawak, was 
unjustified and would create ill-feeling and drive Brunei and Sarawak apart. He 
insisted, however, on a good knowledge of the Malay language.82
The Chinese and Indians submitted petitions for less stringent conditions for 
registration and naturalisation. The Indians, whose representative admitted his total 
inability to speak Malay and asked permission to speak in English, took the line that 
they were a small community and posed no danger to the Malays (in contrast with the 
Chinese) and therefore should be exempted from language tests and other provisions. 
The Chinese sent the largest delegation, but as the High Commissioner said, they were 
"not impressive". They blandly admitted that, though many of them had lived in
v
Brunei for many years, few if any spoke sufficiently good Malay to qualify and asked 
that this requirement should waived.83
However, as White told the Colonial Office, no Malay was prepared to be 
liberal over the language issue and, unless the Chinese really got down to the task of 
learning Malay, many would be made stateless. He added that Malay nationalism, and 
genuine apprehension regarding Chinese, offered little hope of obtaining a more liberal 
policy.84 Earlier the Secretary of State, who had received the draft Nationality Bill, 
expressed his concern that a number of persons would become stateless when the Bill 
became law and hoped that the Bill might be modified to prevent hardship to loyal 
residents. He told White: "It is the policy of H.M.G. not to be a party to any
82CO 1030/1403, item 31, White to W.IJ.Wallace, 14 December 1960.
83CO 1030/1403, item 36, "Extract from the Brunei Political Intelligence Report
December 1960".
84CO 1030/1403, item 36, "Extract from the Brunei Political Intelligence Report
December 1960".
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legislation which results in any person becoming stateless". 85 When White reported 
to the Executive Council of the anxiety of the Secretary of State with regard to the 
Bill, and his position as to final wording of the Enactment, it "sparked off an outburst 
on the right of H.M.G. to dispose of people's birth right".86 White said the Sultan 
himself had stated that:
"nationality is the birth right of his people and, before non-Bruneis can share 
it, he must be certain that the recipients of his bounty are worthy of it. This 
involves a strict test of a candidate's knowledge of the Malay language and a 
proficiency in speaking it.87 
The High Commissioner believed that the Sultan and his Council were motivated as 
much by genuine fear of the Chinese, as by Malay nationalism. However he said that: 
"in fairness to the Malays, I have to admit that the vast majority of the Chinese 
have shown not the slightest wish to learn Malay, or get to know them. Even 
the delegation chosen to represent the Chinese Community, the Chambers of 
commerce, etc., committed ruthless massacre of the Malay language in their 
valiant efforts to put over their case in Malay. The Indian representative 
frankly admitted that he could not speak Malay and asked permission to speak 
in English".88
In February 1961 White suggested to Colonial Office that a letter from the 
Secretary of State might be helpful in changing the Sultan's position and he enclosed
85CO 1030/1403, item 24, Secretary of State to White, 25 November 1960.
86CO 1030/1403, item 29, White to E.Melville, 6 December 1960.
87/ b i d .
88CO 1030/1403, item 31, White to Wallace, 14 December 1960.
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a draft letter for the signature of the Secretary of State.89 By that time there was 
already less optimism about holding the elections by August 1961. In November 1960 
the Attorney-General informed the Legislative Council that elections to District 
Councils could still be held, though the proposed Nationality Enactment had not been 
passed, but voters would be limited to the people mentioned in the Constitution i.e. 
Bruneis.90 White advocated that the elections be delayed so that the Nationality Bill 
could be considered in a leisurely manner. However the Sultan who was apprehensive 
of criticisms for breaking his promise to hold the elections within two years after the 
promulgation of the Constitution, agreed to the postponement of the elections. No 
public announcement however was to be made till the inevitability of postponement 
became obvious.91
The Special Committee completed its sittings in the middle of February 1961. 
The draft Bill was then sent to the Attorney-General who was in Kuala Lumpur to tidy 
it up with Hickling, the Malayan Parliamentary draftsman, who was apparently helping 
the Brunei Attorney-General unofficially in his task.92 The Bill was only returned by 
the Attorney-General in early March 1961.93 By that time the High Commissioner had
89CO 1030/1403, item 34, White to Wallace, 1 February 1961.
90The Borneo Bulletin, 26 November 1960.
91CO 1030/1403, item 44, "Extract from Political Intelligence Report February 
1961".
92BA/13229/1978, SUK/249/49/60 A, State Secretary to Attorney-General, 20 
February 1961.
93BA/13229/1978, SUK/249/49/60 A, the Attorney-General to the State Secretary, 
6 March 1961.
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already lost hope in his endeavour to get a liberal Nationality Bill. He wrote to the 
Secretary of State:
"I do not think that there is any hope of obtaining more liberal treatment for 
Chinese over Nationality, except with a sledge hammer, which means sanctions 
of some kind, and I can think of no sanction which would not be highly 
prejudicial to British interests".94 
As he was certain that no arguments would persuade the Sultan and his advisers to be 
more liberal he withdrew his suggestion of personal a letter from the Secretary of 
State to the Sultan.95 It was for this reason that officials from the Colonial Office, 
Home Office and Foreign Office decided to discuss the nationality issue in London 
and to explore the possibility of lessening the impact on those persons who would 
cease to be British Protected Persons.96
In May 1961 a meeting of the three Departments was held in the Colonial 
Office to discuss the issue. The meeting was attended by T.Mackie, an Immigration 
Officer and Registrar o f Citizens of Brunei. Mackie told the British officials that the 
number of British Protected Persons, who would be rendered stateless by the new 
Brunei Nationality legislation was unlikely to be more than a few hundred. Because 
the number of persons affected was small the meeting decided to continue to give 
British passports and to afford protection abroad to those affected. They would not be 
subject to the Aliens Order in the United Kingdom and would be British protected
94CO 1030U447, item 11, White to Iain MaacLeod, 1 March 1961.
95CO 1030/1403, item 40, White to E.Melville, 18 March 1961.
96CO 1030/1403, Minute by H.Nield, 22 March 1961.
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Persons.97
By the end of May 1961 the High Commissioner observed that there was a 
marked decline in the interest of the Sultan in the Nationality Bill. He wondered 
whether Tunku Abdul Rahman had spoken to the Sultan about his Malaysia Plan. He 
also said that neither the Attorney-General nor the State Secretary seemed anxious to 
push things along. He believed that both Malayan officers were hoping to get back 
to Malaya before the elections and saw no reason to tackle the heavy work involved.98 
As seen in the previous section the Malayans had requested to be transferred back 
home because they felt that they were mistreated by the Bruneis and also feared that 
they would be passed over for promotion in their country.99 Whether the decline in 
interest on the part of the Sultan and the Malayan officers in pushing the Nationality 
Bill was caused by the Tunku's Malaysia Plan had yet to be seen. But the result of 
that inaction was that the elections, which was scheduled for September 1961 could 
not be held. As will be seen in the next chapter the delay in holding the elections 
caused tremendous tension in the State which almost exploded into a crisis.
97CO 1030/1403, item 59 E, "Note of a Meeting held at the Colonial Office on
Tuesday, 16th.May, to discuss the proposed Nationality Enactment".
98CO 1030/1447, item 24/25, White to E.Melville, 30 May 1961.
"See page 261.
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CHAPTER 7
THE MALAYSIA PLAN AND THE FIRST BRUNEI ELECTIONS
Brunei's politics in the period 1961 - 1962 was dominated by the issues of 
Malaysia and the elections. The plan to hold the elections two years after the 
promulgation of the Constitution in September 1959 became entangled with the 
Malaysia Plan put forward by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of the 
Federation of Malaya, in May 1961. It was a plan to bring Singapore and the Borneo 
territories of Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak into a form of federation with 
Malaya. The Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB) opposed the Malaysia Federation and 
proposed instead the formation of an independent Borneo Federation consisting of 
Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak. This chapter examines the impact o f the Malaysia 
Plan on Brunei politics which determined the outcome of the elections and, ultimately, 
the development of the Constitution itself.
7.1 The Alignment of Brunei with the Federation of Malaya
After attaining internal self-government with the coming into operation of the 
new Constitution in September 1959, the prospects of Brunei's participation in the 
British plan for a "closer association" of the Borneo territories became more remote. 
Apprehensive of being coerced into accepting the plan, made public in February 1958, 
the Sultan aligned Brunei with the Federation of Malaya. As seen in the previous 
chapter he replaced almost all British officers in the Brunei Civil Service, who were
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mainly from the Sarawak Establishment, with Malay officers from the Federation. He 
personally cultivated close relations with the Federation's leaders, particularly with 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, and its Rulers. He sent his children there for education and 
spent extensive holidays in Kuala Lumpur.
The Sultan's move to align Brunei with the Federation was received with 
enthusiasm by the Malayan leaders, particularly Tunku Abdul Rahman, as reflected 
in their readiness to second senior officers to Brunei when their own Administrative 
Service was facing an acute shortage.1 For the Tunku, Brunei's alignment not only 
benefitted the Federation financially, since Brunei had given Malaya a generous loan 
o f one hundred and forty million (Malayan) dollars,2 but also facilitated his plan to 
bring the British Borneo territories into the Federation. The Tunku told Malcolm 
MacDonald privately in December 1958 that he thought his Government was ready 
to contemplate Singapore and the three Borneo territories becoming units in the 
Federation of Malaya. The Tunku, who had been under pressure from the British to 
bring Singapore into the Federation, said the Malays would not consider a merger 
between Malaya and Singapore alone because the predominant Chinese population of 
Singapore would reinforce the Chinese in Malaya and was likely to lead to Chinese 
political predominance. However, he said, he would accept such a federation if it 
included the three Borneo territories because the non-Chinese population in those areas 
would be a counter-weight to the Singapore Chinese. The Tunku was also concerned 
with the Philippines' claim over North Borneo and he anticipated that at some future
'In fact the secondment of the officers to Brunei was taken against the advice of 
the Federation's Establishment Department. See page 259.
2The first loan of forty million dollars was given in 1956 and the second loan of 
one hundred million was given in 1958.
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date Indonesia would make a claim to Sarawak and Brunei. Therefore he felt that a
larger federation would not only resolve Malaya's difficult relations with Singapore but 
also help in the defence of the whole area.3
As seen in Chapter 1 a plan for a federation of all British territories in 
Southeast Asia had been contemplated by Whitehall during the wartime period and in 
the early fifties by Malcolm MacDonald, when he was the British Commissioner 
General in the region, but due to the different levels of development between the 
territories the idea was shelved. Instead the British hoped to bring the less developed 
Borneo territories together before attempting the "Grand Design". However the 
proposal for the Borneo "closer association" had never taken off because of the 
Sultan's refusal to commit Brunei to the plan.4
The Brunei/Malaya alignment produced different reactions from the British 
officials in the region. Sir Roland Turnbull observed in October 1959 that an 
identification of Brunei with Malaya could introduce "a tiresome political complication 
in the affairs of the British territories". He urged every endeavour to avoid such an 
eventuality. He also rejected a closer association of the Borneo territories 
independently of Brunei.5 On the other hand, Dennis White, the High Commissioner
3DO 35/1009, item E/3, Note on a Talk [between Malcolm MacDonald] with the 
Prime Minister of Malaya, 22 December 1958. The fact that the Tunku invited 
MacDonald for the private talk was prompted by a warning he received from the 
British Ambassador in Manila that when he arrived there he would be asked either by 
pressmen or by the Filipino authorities about the Philippines' claim on North Borneo. 
The Tunku visited the Philippines in January 1960 to promote his plan to set up a 
non-military Association of Southeast Asian Countries.
4See Chapter 5 above for discussion on the Borneo "closer association" proposals.
5CO 1030/558, E/192, Memorandum on Closer Association by R.Tumbull, 21 
October 1959. Sir Roland Turnball left North Borneo, where he was the Governor 
since June 1954, in October 1959.
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for Brunei, noted that "an identification of interests between Malaya and Brunei could 
act as a brake on Indonesian designs on Sarawak and North Borneo". In his view 
Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak should be left to develop on their own; that they 
should not close the door to "closer association" with each other or Malaya but should 
not encourage it.6 Sir Anthony Abell, at the end o f his Governorship in Sarawak, in 
December 1959, expressed concern that if Brunei were to become the twelfth state of 
Malaya it would become "a focus for Malay discontent or Malay irredentism 
throughout Borneo" and suggested that nothing should be done to encourage a closer 
relationship between Brunei and Malaya. He felt that a closer association of Brunei, 
North Borneo and Sarawak was in the best interests of those territories.7 Sir Dennis 
Allen, the Deputy Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, 
believed that the problems that would arise in the event of the identification of Brunei 
with Malaya would be a "lesser evil" and more readily resolved than if Brunei turned 
to Indonesia. He suggested that the Sultan's ideas for closer ties with Malaya should 
be regarded, "if not with benevolence, at least with equanimity".8
In January 1960 the Brunei/Malaya alignment was discussed by British officials 
in "a side talk" at the Eden Hall Conference in Singapore. There was anxiety that the 
Sultan of Brunei was going to make a sudden move to merge his State with the 
Federation of Malaya so that he might become the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the
6CO 1030/558, item E/191, Memorandum on Closer Association by D.C.White, 
27 October 1959.
7CO 1030/558, item 195, Sir Anthony Abell to F.D.Jakeway, 2 December 1959.
8CO 1030/558, item E/193, Closer Association between the British Borneo 
territories by D.Allen, 7 December 1959.
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Paramount ruler of the Federation.9 The British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur 
had reported to London that there had been speculation amongst well-placed 
Federation civil servants that the Tunku would like to see the Sultan of Brunei become 
the second Yang di-Pertuan Agong, after the expiry of the current Agong's five-year 
term in 1962. This could however happen only if Brunei became part of the 
Federation.10 Although the discussions at the Singapore Conference ended 
inconclusively there was a demand for the formulation of a policy in the event Brunei 
sought a union with the Federation.11
However by April 1960 the likelihood of a sudden move towards Malaya on 
the part of the Sultan may have been reduced by the death of the first Agong of the 
Federation which was followed by the election of a successor for a full five-year 
period. Moreover there had been considerable opposition in Brunei to the 
Brunei/Malaya merger. This was evident from the hostile attitude of the local people 
to the appointment of Malayan officers to senior posts in the Brunei Civil Service. 
Dennis White believed that the support for the Sultan's merger plan came only from 
a few of his closest adherents, and it was probable that he would jeopardise his throne 
if he tried to force the plan. The High Commissioner said the Sultan and the Malayan
9DO 35/10019, item E/1, Record of Meeting on Borneo territories held at Phoenix 
Park, Singapore 23 January 1960. The Eden Hall Conference, which was chaired by 
the Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, was held 
annually and attended by all British representatives and military commanders in the 
region.
10DO 35/10019, "Sir Geoffrey Tory's views on the possibility of a wider 
Federation of the Borneo territories, the Federation of Malaya and Singapore", nd., the 
Commonwealth Relations Office's paper.
"DO 35/10019, item E/1, Record of Meeting on Borneo territories held at Phoenix 
Park, Singapore 23 January 1960.
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leaders were aware of the local reactions and neither wished to press the issue for the 
time being.12
The most formidable opposition to the Brunei/Malaya merger came from the 
PRB. Probably apprehensive of the Sultan’s alignment with Malaya, the Party's Third 
Congress passed a resolution in February 1960 calling for a federation of North 
Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.13 The Party rejected the "closer association" o f the 
territories as proposed by the British, because it wanted a Borneo Federation, as its 
leader, Azahari, put it, "on a basis of national inspiration and not on colonial 
inspiration". In contrast to the Sultan's policy, the PRB wanted the Borneo Federation 
to move closer to Indonesia on the "basis of peaceful coexistence and cooperation in 
economic matters and defence".14
In order to gamer support for this proposal the PRB invited the leaders o f the 
Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) to their third Congress.15 Azahari explained 
that the Borneo Federation which his Party envisaged was a federation "without 
impairing the status or the past glories of the territories". Stephen Yong, the Chairman 
of the SUPP, liked the idea, and he proposed that the name "Brunei" could be made 
a unifying factor. As an initial step Azahari proposed the formation of a united
12CO 1030/558, item E/191, Memorandum on Closer Association by D.C.White, 
27 October 1959.
u The Borneo Bulletin, 20 February 1960.
v
]4The Borneo Bulletin, 23 January 1960.
15SUPP, which was formed in 1959, was the first political party in Sarawak and 
the second in the British Borneo territories after the PRB, which was formed in 
January 1956. Although it claimed to be a multi-racial party, its leaders and members 
were predominantly Chinese. See: CO 1030/1027, Cobbold Report, Part A, paragraph 
79.
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political front consisting of the SUPP, the PRB and the leaders of North Borneo.16 
This proposal was further discussed in June 1960 during the SUPP Congress between 
the leaders of the PRB and SUPP. They agreed to form a "Pan-Borneo Congress” - 
a permanent body representing political and semi-political organisations in the three 
territories. Azahari said the proposed congress "would be a policy-making body and 
it would seek by constitutional means to build one nation o f the peoples o f Sarawak, 
North Borneo and Brunei". As a first step towards organising such a Congress, a joint
v
consultative committee was formed by the two parties.17
Understandably the British did not want to use the support of the PRB and the 
SUPP to promote their own policy of "closer association". In Brunei they might 
antagonise the Sultan, who wanted to have nothing to do with the PRB; and in 
Sarawak they might antagonise the natives by appearing to support the Chinese- 
dominated SUPP. Moreover both parties were left wing oriented: the PRB was 
looking to Indonesia, and the SUPP to Singapore. Instead, the new development 
provided the occasion for an urgent reassessment of the British policies, particularly 
in view of the desire of Sultan and Tunku Abdul Rahman for closer relations. Thus 
in May 1960 a meeting was held in London between the Colonial Office, the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office, to discuss these problems. 
The meeting recognised that it had been British policy that the peoples of North 
Borneo and Sarawak should, subject to their own wishes, ultimately achieve self- 
government. However because o f the geographical position and their racial make-up,
]6The Borneo Bulletin, 20 February 1960. There was no political party in North 
Borneo until August 1961 when the United National Kadazan Organisation (UNKO)
was formed under the leadership of Donald Stephen.
]1The Borneo Bulletin, 25 June 1960.
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the British believed that North Borneo and Sarawak were too vulnerable to stand 
alone. They feared China, Indonesia and the Philippines might step in when Britain 
withdrew. They also believed that an association o f North Borneo and Sarawak would 
not be strong although the inclusion of Brunei could make it more viable. However, 
they recognised that there was no prospect in the foreseeable future of Brunei joining 
an association with North Borneo and Sarawak. For these reasons they concluded that 
the most hopeful solution would be an association of the Federation o f Malaya, 
Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei, with, if possible, Singapore, which might stay 
within the Commonwealth. However they emphasised:
"There is no question of H.M.G. wanting to get out [of North Borneo and 
Sarawak] in the near future. To do that prematurely would be the exact 
reverse of helping the territories, where we still have an immense task before 
us of trying to bring forward the indigenous people to a level where, subject 
to their innate capabilities, they have the opportunity to compete with the
v
Chinese on reasonably equal terms in political and economic life".18 
However on the question of a Brunei/Malaya merger, if it eventuated, they would not 
resist it "since it would be a step towards the ultimate goal o f a wider federation". 
Therefore their policy on such a merger was "benevolent neutrality". However they 
hoped it would happen "later than sooner" because they feared that a Brunei/Malaya 
merger might cause the Malays in Sarawak to begin looking the same way.19
The meeting also considered the question of "closer association" between 
Sarawak and North Borneo if Brunei were left aside. They believed that it fitted in
18DO 35/10019, item 39A, J.M.Martin to Sir Dennis Allen, 18 May 1960.
,9Ibid.
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with the general aim of achieving the wider federation. But they did not want to hurry 
it, on the one hand, for fear of pushing Brunei more quickly into the arms of Malaya, 
and on the other, for fear of a negative reaction from the indigenous races. They 
believed that the enthusiastic expression of Chinese opinion in favour o f "closer 
association" of the Borneo territories had already frightened the indigenous races. 
However they believed that "closer association" between North Borneo and Sarawak 
"should be pursued by every reasonable means".20
In June 1960, when the leaders of the PRB and the SUPP were discussing their 
Borneo Federation Plan, Tunku Abdul Rahman approached the Colonial Office with 
a plan of his own to bring the Borneo territories into the Federation of Malaya. This 
plan was later to become the Malaysia Plan. Having formed its policy the previous 
month the Colonial Office told the Tunku that the Borneo territories were not ready 
to join the Federation. Realising that the British were not enthusiastic about his 
"Malaysia Plan" the Tunku then asked what their attitude would be if the Sultan of 
Brunei asked to join the Federation. Before the British official respond the Tunku told 
him that "the Sultan had shown nervousness himself at this [Brunei/Malaya merger]", 
because "he thought it might cost him [the Sultan] money". The British official said 
he had the impression that the Tunku "had in fact pressed the Sultan quite hard to be 
a member of the Federation and that the Sultan had held back, even though there was 
in front of him the possibility of his one day being Yang di-Pertuan Agong".21 The 
Tunku was told that it must be something for the people of Brunei themselves to
20Ibid.
21DO 35/10019, item 44, Note of Lord Perth's talk with Tunku Abdul Rahman on 
10 June 1960.
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decide. The Tunku also suggested that Brunei and Sarawak should join the 
Federation, while the British Government remained in North Borneo to develop it 
economically and use it as a military base. The British official gave the Tunku 
impression that Britain was neither for nor against the general principle.22
Following this discussion Tunku Abdul Rahman was reported as telling Brunei 
students in London that the time was not too far when Brunei would become an 
integral part o f the federation of Malaya. Without taking into account the sensitivity 
o f Brunei feelings he told them that "Brunei was too small to become an independent 
state and equally too small to become a member of the Commonwealth of Nations".23 
He said he was waiting for "the green light signal" from the Colonial Office to start 
discussions with the Sultan on the admittance of Brunei into "full partnership with 
other States in the federation".24 The Tunku's statement was criticised by the people 
in Brunei. Following the criticism the Sultan issued a statement denying he held talks 
with the Tunku on the matter. The Menteri Besar, who also denied knowledge of 
such discussions said "Brunei could apply to join the Commonwealth if and when the 
country achieved full independence".25
Azahari responded by declaring that his Party aimed to bring about an 
independent federation of the three Borneo territories and called on the Tunku to 
support the idea.26 Towards the end of the year the PRB sought to amend its
22Ibid.
\
23The Borneo Bulletin, 25 June 1960.
24Ibid.
25The Borneo Bulletin, 2 July 1960.
26The Borneo Bulletin, 9 July 1960.
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constitution to make membership of the Party open to Sarawak and North Borneo 
citizens and to work for the reunification of the three territories with the Sultan as a 
constitutional ruler. However the PRB's application which was to be tabled in the 
Executive Council was withdrawn on the advice of the High Commissioner, who 
pointed out that the Sultan should not be embroiled in politics, and the approving of 
the proposed amendments would be in conflict with his treaty obligations.27 
Meanwhile, in December 1960, the Legislative Council passed a resolution calling for 
the date for independence of Brunei to be set for 29 September 1965, i.e. six years 
after the promulgation of the Constitution.28 This was followed in January 1961 by 
Azahari's speech at a public rally to celebrate the fifth anniversary of his Party, 
declaring that if his Party won the elections with a big majority he would asked for 
the country's independence by June 1963.29 The declaration of the date of 
independence by both the Legislative Council, which represented mainly the educated 
opinion, and the PRB, which represented the masses, clearly indicated rejection of any 
plan to merge the Sultanate with the Federation o f Malaya.
Certainly the preemptive statement of Tunku Abdul Rahman had not helped 
the Sultan in his policy of bringing Brunei closer to Malaya. In January 1961 White 
said:
"The Sultan's policy, if it did not have any enthusiastic support from his closest 
advisers, certainly did not have their opposition, but recently there had been 
signs that even his advisers shared the dislike of the Malayans and it was
27CO 1030/1447, item 3, White to E.Melville, 31 December 1960.
2%The Borneo Bulletin, 31 December 1960.
29The Borneo Bulletin, 28 January 1961.
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becoming increasing doubtful if the Sultan would be able to gain much support 
for his plan for closer association with Malaya.30 
The High Commissioner was worried about the development. He believed that if  the 
Sultan decided to join in some form of association with Malaya but failed to carry his 
people with him, it might cause him to lose his throne. He told the Secretary of State 
that: "The most intelligent approach to the future was that of the Party Rakyat and, in 
consequence, one can look forward to the elections with less apprehension than was 
possible a few months ago".31 As seen in the previous chapter, White and Lord 
Selkirk, the Commissioner General, had suggested in February 1960 that the Sultan 
should not be encouraged to "expedite the introduction of democratic methods" until 
the Civil Service began to take shape.32 But because of the rise in opposition to the 
Sultan's policy of closer association with Malaya, White thought the elections should 
be held as planned to test the people's view on that policy.33
The PRB, which stood diametrically opposed to the Sultan's policy, was 
apprehensive that the Sultan might effect the Brunei/Malaya merger before the 
elections were held. In March 1961 there had still been no indication from the 
authorities that the elections would be held by September, as provided by the 
Constitution. In fact their apprehension was justified when The Borneo Bulletin 
reported on 11 March "rumours circulating in high quarters" that it was probable the
30CO 1030/1447, item 5, White to I.MacLeod, 30 January 1961.
3]Ibid.
32See page 266.
33CO 1030/1447, item 5, White to I.MacLeod, 30 January 1961.
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elections would be put off for some time.34 As a result of this uncertainty the more 
militant element in the Party demanded tougher action. However the "moderate" 
element, led by Azahari favoured a constitutional means of achieving their aims. 
Apparently it was this split which caused Azahari's resignation in April 1961.35 He 
resigned because "he did not agree with the politics of the PRB" and went off to 
Singapore to attend to his business.36
7.2 The Sultan, Tunku Abdul R ahm an, Azahari and the British
While emotions in Brunei were still high against the merger proposal, the 
Tunku came up again with his Malaysia Plan when he spoke publicly at a press 
luncheon of the Foreign Correspondent's Association o f Southeast Asia in Singapore 
on 27 May 1961. He proposed that Brunei, North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore and 
Malaya be brought closer together in political and economic cooperation.37 The 
reaction in Brunei was swift and critical. The PRB reiterated that it was not interested 
in becoming another state within Malaya. They would only consider the Tunku's plan 
after the Borneo territories became united and independent; and even then not as a
34The Borneo Bulletin, 11 March 1961.
35CO 1030/1447, item 36, White to E.Melville, 15 June 1961.
36The Borneo Bulletin, 15 April 1961.
31 Straits Times, 29 May 1961. For discussions on the formation of Malaysia 
Federation see Mohammad Nordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore 
Separation: Political Unification in the Malaysia Region 1945-1965, Kuala Lumpur, 
Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1974 and Simanjuntak, B., Malayan Federalism 1945- 
1963: A Study o f  Federal Problems in a Plural Society, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford 
University Press, 1969.
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mere unit in the Federation, but as a partnership of equals. A similar response came 
from the SUPP in Sarawak, which wanted Brunei to take the lead towards the 
federation of the three Borneo territories. In rejecting the Tunku's merger plan the 
North Borneo and Sabah Times (which was owned by Donald Stephen, the leader of 
the largest ethnic group, the Kadazans, and a member of the North Borneo Legislative 
Council) suggested that the Sultan of Brunei could become the constitutional head of 
the federated Borneo territories.38
The Tunku's public utterance had rallied the members of the PRB behind their 
leader, Azahari. In mid-June 1961, Azahari suddenly reappeared in Brunei leading his 
Party in a Joint Rally'with the Barisan Buruh Bersatu Brunei or the Brunei United 
Labour Front (BULF). The BULF, which had been formed the previous year, had 
been for some time agitating over a pay dispute in the Government's Public Works 
Department and over the retrenchment policy of the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company 
(BSPC).39 The PRB brought in the labour movement as a show of solidarity and to 
prove to both the Government and the oil company that the Party could exert pressure 
by way of a general strike if their demands were not met. The PRB demanded that 
the Government publish the Nationality Bill and set a date for the elections.40 The
3*North Borneo and Sabah Times, 3 June 1961.
39The BULF was formed on 29 May 1960. The aim of the central labour body 
was to protect workers in the State. On its formation, the BULF was pressing for the 
Government to introduce trade union legislation. Most o f the leading members of the 
labour movement were the leaders of the PRB, who included, Azahari (the President 
of the PRB) was the Honorary Adviser; Yassin Affandi (the Secretary General of the 
PRB) was the deputy President; and Hapidz Laksamana (the deputy President of the 
PRB) was the Secretary General. See The Borneo Bulletin, 4 June 1960.
40See Section 6.3 for a discussion on the Nationality Bill and proposal to hold 
elections.
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BULF passed resolutions urging the BSPC to reconsider its retrenchment policy, and 
called upon the Government to bring about a labour policy which would ensure the 
well-being o f the workers.41 Although there was no direct reference to the Tunku's 
Malaysia Plan, the urgent call to hold the elections indicated the PRB was anxious 
about the merger.
The atmosphere became more tense when Tunku Abdul Rahman became 
personally involved in the dispute between some of the Malayan officers and local 
Bruneis. As seen in the previous chapter, in mid-June 1961 the Malayan officers 
resigned en masse and appealed to the Tunku for their immediate withdrawal from 
Brunei. The incident which sparked the resignation was an assault on one of the 
Malayan officers, Mohammad Yakin bin Haji Long, a forest officer, by some local 
men over a dispute of a forest permit.42 Initially the incident and the resignations of 
the Malayan officers had been treated as a private matter. In fact the incident, which 
occurred five days before the Joint Rally, passed without notice from the PRB. It was 
not until the Tunku became involved, and brought the PRB into the scene, that the 
whole affair became politically significant.
On 25 June 1961, the Tunku, without making thorough investigations, made 
a press statement alleging that "a group of thugs belonging to a political party" was 
responsible for the incident which led to the resignation of his officers.43 The PRB
4,CO 1030/1447, item 42, White to E.Melville, 21 June 1961; The Borneo 
Bulletin, 24 June 1961.
42See pages 261-262.
43CO 1030/1447, 76/E, "An Appreciation of Recent Events in Brunei", nd. It was 
prepared by the Special Branch Officer and approved by the High Commissioner. The 
report was sent to the Security Intelligence Far East and the Colonial Office on 22 
July 1961. See item 76 on the same file. The Bruneis involved in the assault
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in response accused the Tunku of sending Malayan officers to "colonise Brunei" and 
warned that if he tried to do that, he would have "to do it by force and that bloodshed 
would result".44
In early July 1961 the Tunku visited Brunei on the pretext of investigating the 
reasons behind his officers resignation. In fact, he was trying to sell his Malaysia 
Plan, which he had sent to London the previous week (See page 300). He told his 
Malay audience that the aim of his Malaysia Plan was to bring together all the Malays 
in the three Borneo territories. Later when he called at Kuching on his way back to 
Kuala Lumpur, he said the three Borneo territories would have equality with the other 
eleven States in the Federation. By talking about his Malaysia Plan publicly without 
consulting prominent local leaders the Tunku aroused the general resentment of the 
people in the Borneo territories. The Tunku was insensitive to nationalistic feelings 
of the people, particularly when he said: "It is nonsense for a State with a population 
smaller than that of Perlis [the smallest State in the Federation of Malaya] to talk 
about independence".45 The PRB, which the Tunku publicly dismissed as "parochial" 
and "being of no importance" felt humiliated and insulted. The Party issued another 
circular attacking the Tunku's Malaysia Plan as being designed for his own 
aggrandizement and proof of his colonialist intentions.46
The Tunku's insensitivity and tactless approach to the Borneo people drove 
Azahari, Ong Kee Hui, the Chairman of the SUPP, and Donald Stephen to form a
happened to be three brothers of Azahari.
44Ibid.
45The Borneo Bulletin, 8 and 15 July 1961.
46CO 1030/1447, item 57, White to the Secretary of State, 10 July 1961.
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United Front opposing the Tunku's Malaysia Plan. In their joint statement issued on 
9 July 1961 they said the Tunku's plan "would be totally unacceptable to the people 
o f the three territories".47
The Tunku not only aroused the resentment of the PRB and the general public 
with his statements, he also upset the Sultan. Before he left Brunei he delivered a 
memorandum through Dennis White telling the Sultan that he would adhere to the 
request of his officers to return home. He advised the Sultan to appoint his own 
officers to the posts and to ask Britain for technical and other officers who could not 
be obtained locally.48 'White believed that the Tunku was trying to use the Malayan 
officers' crisis to put pressure on the Sultan to make up his mind on the Malaysia 
Federation proposal. He was perfectly aware that the Sultan would not go back to the 
British for officers after having terminated their services but yet would not provide 
any officers if he was not in position to protect them.49 When White asked whether 
the responsibility towards his officers could be obtained under some form of 
agreement, or whether he thought that merger was the only answer, the Tunku replied 
that: "any responsibility obtained by virtue of an agreement such as that between 
Brunei and the United Kingdom would render him liable to charges of Colonialism, 
and therefore merger was the only acceptable solution".50 This "ultimatum" upset the 
Sultan because he felt he would "lose face" if he were to go back to the British for
47Straits Times, 10 July 1961.
48CO 1030/1447, 75/E, Tunku Abdul Rahman to the Sultan, 4 July 1961.
49CO 1030/1447, item 57, White to Secretary of State, 10 July 1961.
50Ibid.
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new officers, but he would not be coerced into accepting the Federation.51 It is likely 
that the trust and close bond between the Sultan and the Tunku began to deteriorate 
as a consequence of this "ultimatum".
The Tunku also tried to use the whole affair to attack and subdue all opposition 
in Brunei to his merger plan. He suspected that the Sultan wanted merger but was 
hesitant because of opposition by the Brunei people led by the PRB. The Tunku 
suggested that the authorities in Brunei should take strong action towards the PRB and 
urged an introduction of Trade Union Legislation to break the "solidarity" between the 
Party and the Labour organisation.52 The Tunku told White:
"People in Brunei needed a firm hand, and perhaps a hammering, to cut them 
down to size and he was sure he [the Sultan] could do it".53 
As a result of the Tunku's showdown the PRB's popularity increased tremendously; 
its membership soared from 19,000 to 26,000 within a month.54 The Party became 
more active and bolder. When the Government failed to respond to their demands for 
publication of the Nationality Bill and setting the date o f elections, the PRB issued an 
ultimatum, in the third week of July 1961, giving one week's notice before calling a 
general strike and demonstration.55 The labour front, the BULF, had declared its 
solidarity with the PRB and ordered its members to join the strike.56
5]Ibid.
52Ibid.
v
53CO 1030/1447, item 2, White to Secretary of State, 3 July 1961.
54The Borneo Bulletin, 15 July 1961.
55CO 1030/1447, item 73/74, White to E.Melville, 24 July 1961.
S6The Borneo Bulletin, 29 July 1961.
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Tension was high because if the PRB and the BULF carried out their threat the 
whole State would be paralysed. Anticipating trouble, White sent an urgent message 
to the Colonial Office, on 27 July 1961, that they might have to declare a state of 
emergency. He requested Lord Selkirk, to inform the Commander-in-Chief of the 
British Forces in Singapore to be ready to give assistance if trouble broke out in 
Brunei. He had pressed the Sultan to call for an immediate meeting of the Standing 
Advisory Council on Defence and also to issue a public statement explaining fully his 
reasons for postponement of the elections.57
The Standing Advisory Council on Defence, which was formed under the 1959 
Agreement for the purpose of dealing with matters of internal security, met on 29 July 
1961.58 It was chaired by the Sultan and its members consisted o f the High 
Commissioner, the Chief Police Officer, the Officer-in-charge of the Special Branch 
and the Menteri Besar. However the Menteri Besar, Dato Haji Ibrahim, was on 
medical leave. In his place the Sultan brought in his closest advisers: Dato Marsal, 
the Acting Menteri Besar, and Pengiran Ali, the Head of the Religious Affairs 
Department. He also brought in Dato Abdul Aziz, the new Attorney-General seconded 
from the Federation. Preparations to face possible breakdown in law and order 
discussed and put in place. The Sultan authorised the Chief Police Officer to seek 
assistance from Sarawak and North Borneo under the Police Enactment. He also 
authorised him to mobilise the Oilfields Security Force. Proclamations in draft were
57CO 1030/1447, item 62, White to Secretary of State, 27 July 1961.
58CO 1030/1447, item 68, White to Secretary of State, 29 July 1961.
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to be prepared for declaring a state of emergency and Trade Union Legislation was 
to be expedited.59
During the meeting White secured an assurance from the Sultan that he would 
not stop political meetings as long as they were properly conducted and that no one 
should be arrested unless they committed an offence. Further, it was agreed no action 
should be taken against the Labour organisation, although they were in breach of their 
own constitution in striking over a political matter. White told the Colonial Office: 
"All this relieved a lurking anxiety that the Sultan was contemplating undemocratic 
steps to destroy the Party Rakyat".60 The High Commissioner also told the Sultan that 
any action to obtain support from the British Forces in Singapore had to be based on 
the Sultan's own request. He hoped that if  trouble did arise the Sultan would have 
ready access to him.61
While the Standing Advisory Council was meeting, Lord Selkirk discussed the 
situation in Brunei with the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in Singapore.62 
At the end of their discussion a telegram was sent to London:
"Should it become necessary to send forces to Brunei the British Defence 
Coordination Committee (Far East) had considered the alternatives of Plan 
ALE and Plan Demon and find themselves well placed to implement Plan ALE
59CO 1030/1447, item 85, White to E.Melville, 29 July 1961.
mIbid.
61Ibid.
62CO 1030U447, item 69, the Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in 
Southeast Asia to the Secretary of State, 29 July 1961.
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if  request for assistance is received".63 
However "Plan ALE" was not needed, at least for the time being. As a result o f the 
Government's announcement on 27 July 1961 that the elections would be held by 18 
October 1962 the tension subsided. (The Sultan amended the original provision in the 
Constitution to allow for the postponement).64 At the same time White had 
successfully persuaded Azahari and the PRB to cancel the strike. Instead the High 
Commissioner agreed to allow their demonstration and received a petition.65
Subsequently, on 6 August 1961, Azahari and an estimated of eight thousand 
supporters marched to the High Commissioner's residence to hand in their petition.66 
The PRB wanted the British to guarantee that democracy would be upheld in Brunei 
by holding an election as soon as possible. The PRB also appealed to the Secretary 
o f State to hold a conference at the Colonial Office with the representatives o f the 
Sultan and the Party,'67 The announcement of the date o f the elections and the 
agreement of the High Commissioner to receive their petition were seen by Azahari 
and his Party as a victory and consequently the tension eased.68
63CO 1030/1447, item 77 B, FEDSEC, Singapore to Ministry Of Defence, London, 
29 July 1961.
64CO 1030/1447, item 85, White to E.Melville, 29 July 1962; The Borneo Bulletin, 
29 July 1961.
65Ibid; CO 1030/1448, item 12, White to Secretary of State, 28 August 1961.
66CO 1030/1448, item 2, White to E.Melville, 7 August 1961. The petition was 
sent to the Colonial Qffice on 7 August 1961. See item 1 on the same file.
67The original copy in Malay and an English translation of the petition are found
in file CO 1030/1448, item 1.
68CO 1030/1447, item 89/E (v), White to E.Melville, 16 August 1961.
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Meanwhile, Tunku Abdul Rahman had made an official approach to the British 
Government by despatching a memorandum outlining his Malaysia Plan to the Prime 
Minister, Harold MacMillan, on 26 June 1961. He proposed that as a first step, 
Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak be brought into the Federation o f Malaya, as units 
enjoying the same rights and privileges as the other nine States in the Federation. 
Brunei, like the Malay States, would be headed by a Sultan; and North Borneo and 
Sarawak, like Penang and Malacca, by Governors. However, he said: "It would be 
better of course if Sarawak could be returned to Brunei, at least the northern part of 
Sarawak, where the population is mainly Malays and Dyaks".69 After the merger of 
the Borneo territories with the Federation, he proposed that Singapore should join in, 
which he envisaged should be before 1963, when the Constitution o f Singapore would 
be reviewed. In contrast to the Borneo territories, the Tunku envisaged that 
Singapore's relationship with the Federation would be more autonomous, particularly 
in respect of determining fully its internal affairs. The Tunku did not see any 
Constitutional problems in his merger plan. The main problem would be how to 
present the Malaysia Plan to the peoples of the Borneo territories because, he said, the 
Singapore people could express their own will through their elected representatives, 
but in view of the political immaturity of the people of Borneo it was not anticipated 
that they would have politicians who could represent them. Therefore he proposed an 
independent inquiry to be set up which would be made up of members of the 
Commission who drafted the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya in 1956.70
69CO 1030/1079, item 14/E, Tunku Abdul Rahman's Memorandum on "Integration
of British North Borneo Territories and Singapore with the Federation of Malaya", 26 
June 1961.
10Ibid.
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The Tunku's Malaysia Plan proposals were discussed by officials from the 
Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office in July
1961. They were not enthusiastic about the Tunku's proposals, in spite of an earnest 
argument in favour of urgent consideration of the proposals, put forward by Lord 
Selkirk and Sir Geoffrey Tory, the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, who
v
attended the discussions. The British felt that before they committed themselves to 
the proposals they had to be assured that their defence interests would be safeguarded, 
in particular their rights to use Singapore freely as a base for SEATO operations. 
They also did not want to force the Borneo peoples to join the Federation against their 
will. Nevertheless they decided to invite the Tunku to London in October for an 
exploratory talks.71
However in August 1961 the political situation in Singapore became critical. 
Lord Selkirk told London: "Lee Kuan Yew [the Chief Minister of Singapore] has not 
been successful in riding the Communist tiger and is in danger o f being gobbled up".72 
He believed that if Singapore did not merge with the Federation by the end of the 
year, Lee Kuan Yew would probably have to face a general election which he would 
lose to the socialist front, Barisan Sosialis. Lord Selkirk suspected the Barisan 
Sosialis of being manipulated by Communists. The only solution he envisaged would 
be a "crash programme", where Singapore came under the Federation ahead the
71 CO 1030/1079, item 14A and item 20, Note of a Meeting held at the Colonial
Office to discuss the possible future Political Association of the Federation of Malaya, 
Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo on 5 July and 20 July 1961 respectively; item 
E/12, Note for Secretary of State's discussions with Lord Selkirk on 5 July 1961.
72CO 1030/1012, Lord Selkirk to I.MacLeod, 24 August 1961.
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Borneo territories. He said, Lee Kuan Yew suggested to him that:
"if Brunei by itself were to join the Federation now, the Tunku might agree to 
early merger for Singapore if offered some prospect of North Borneo and 
Sarawak being brought in at a later stage and an assurance of our intention to 
work to this end.73
Towards the end of August 1961 Lord Selkirk flew to Brunei to discuss the 
proposal with the Sultan. However he failed to get any commitment from the Sultan. 
White believed that the size of the demonstration organised by the PRB a few weeks 
earlier had alarmed the Sultan and he became apprehensive of trying to bulldoze a 
merger without the consent of the people.74 However it was also likely that the Sultan 
resented Tunku Abdul Rahman's discourteous action in threatening to withdraw his 
officers from Brunei at a time when they were badly needed. Feeling "betrayed" by 
the Tunku, whom he had trusted not only as a friend but as an adviser, the Sultan fell 
back on his traditional advisers: Dato Marsal, Pengiran Ali and Pengiran Yusuf. All 
three, the High Commissioner believed, favoured an isolationist line.75 The High 
Commissioner had invited the Sultan to express his preliminary views on the Malaysia 
Plan, but the latter flatly refused stating he was barred from doing so both by the 
Constitution and by the Treaty.76 When Lord Selkirk failed to get the Sultan's 
agreement, the Tunku despatched two of his advisers, Dato Sardon bin Jubir and Dato 
Osman bin Talib - both were close friends of the Sultan during his student days at the
Ibid.
\
74CO 1030/1448, item 14, White to E.Melville, 29 August 1961.
75CO 1030/1012, item 6, White to Lord Selkirk, 27 September 1961.
76CO 1030/1447, item 86, White to Secretary of State, 8 August 1961.
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Malay College in Kuala Kangsar in 1930s - to meet the Sultan on 27 September. Not 
only did they fail to secure the Sultan's agreement; to the surprise of the Malayans, 
the Sultan refused to discuss the subject at all. The Sultan offered the same excuse 
he gave to the High Commissioner: that he was bound by the Constitution and by the 
Agreement with the British.77
Without Brunei, the Tunku refused to consider the "crash programme". The 
Tunku had stated that merger between the Federation and Singapore would come 
about simultaneously with the creation of Malaysia.78 This had left the British with 
no alternative but to go back to the Tunku's original Malaysia Plan. Therefore in 
October the Colonial Office told the Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak that 
they had decided to invite the Tunku to London to discuss his Malaysia Plan, which 
would include the Borneo territories.79 In early November the Secretary o f State wrote 
to the Sultan to invite him to express his preliminary views on the Tunku's plan.80 
However, the Sultan again refused until he consulted his traditional advisers.81
The discussions between Tunku Abdul Rahman and the British officials were 
held between 20 to 22 November 1961 and ended in principal agreement to the 
Malaysia Federation proposal. In a Joint Statement issued at the end of the 
discussions, both the Malayan and the British Governments were convinced that the 
"creation of the Federation of Malaysia was a desirable aim". However before any
V
77CO 1030/1012, item 6, White to Lord Selkirk, 27 September 1961.
1%The Borneo Bulletin, 2 September 1961.
79CO 1030/1012, Sir John Martin to A.Waddell, 30 October 1961.
80CO 1030/1012, item 12, R.Maudling to Sultan, 2 November 1961.
81CO 1030/1012, item E/26, Sultan to R.Maudling, 15 November 1961.
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final decision was to be taken it was necessary to ascertain the views o f the peoples 
of North Borneo and Sarawak. A Commission of Inquiry would be appointed to 
undertake the task. At the same time, the views o f the Sultan of Brunei were sought. 
The British Government decided to approve the Malaysia Plan because they assured 
by the Malayan Government that the British would continue to have the right to 
maintain their bases in Singapore.82 On the same day the Sultan gave his reply to the 
Secretary of State's letter: he welcomed the Malaysia Plan and would be willing to 
take part in any negotiation between the Federation of Malaya and the British 
Government for the purpose of considering and determining Brunei's terms of
'  * 9 1association.
Towards the end of November 1961 the Sultan informed the Executive Council 
of the Secretary’s letter and of his decision to welcome the Malaysia Plan. White 
observed that there was no discussion and no vote taken to obtain the consent of the 
Council. He believed that the Sultan had enlisted the support o f Dato Marsal, 
Pengiran Ali, Pengiran Yusuf and Dato Abdul Aziz, whom he had appointed as "a sort 
o f Committee" to advise him on the matter.84 On 5 December 1961, the Sultan told 
the Legislative Council that:
"In my own personal view this [Malaysia] proposal is a very attractive one, 
because the ties of religion, race, custom and culture between this State and 
other countries comprised in the Malaysia Plan are similar and strong.
82CO 1030/1016, item 2, "Federation of Malaysia: Joint Statement by the 
Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Federation of Malaya", 22 November
1961.
83CO 1030/1012, item E/48, Sultan to Secretary of State, 22 November 1961.
84CO 1030/1012, item 49, White to W.I.J.Wallace, 27 November 1961.
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However, since the future of my subjects will depend on our attitude to this 
proposal, I have ordered my Government to study this problem carefully and 
to ascertain thev views of the public on this Malaysia Plan. The result o f such 
studies will determine our next step in this matter. I would therefore appeal 
to all my subjects who love this country to give their sincere views and 
opinions when so requested by the Government always bearing in mind the 
interests of race, religion and country".85 
It was clear from the speech, that the Sultan had not committed Brunei to join 
Malaysia; it was merely a statement that he himself was personally attracted to the 
idea. This cautious statement reflected differences between his advisers, from Dato 
Abdul Aziz, who was sent to Brunei by the Tunku on a "mission" to get Brunei into 
Malaysia,86 to Dato Marsal, who, as will be seen below, was against Brunei joining 
the Malaysia Federation.
Having persuaded the Sultan to come in favour of the Malaysia Federation the 
next task of the Sultan’s advisers was to bring Azahari and the PRB around. Since the 
submission of its petition in early August 1961 the PRB had kept a low profile. 
Azahari had spent most of his time outside the country, according to White, because 
his commercial venture was in "dire trouble". However it is likely that he was
85Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, Titah: 1959 - 67, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Brunei, 
1971, pp. 106-107.
86CO 1030/1012, item 8, White to Lord Selkirk, 11 October 1961. The High 
Commissioner said Dato Abdul Aziz, who was the head of the Prime Minister's 
Department in Malaya, told him that he had been sent to Brunei by the Tunku "to help 
with any constitutional problems arising out of merger. The High Commissioner said 
Dato Abdul Aziz expressed considerable surprise that no step had been taken on the 
proposal and had clearly been led to understand in Kuala Lumpur that he would be 
consulted about the implementation of the plan by the Sultan.
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apprehensive about the attitude the Sultan would adopt. He had for some time 
suspected that action might be taken against him and, having no desire for martyrdom, 
had prepared his line of retreat. In July 1961 he had planned to seek shelter in North 
Borneo.87 White believed that the two most senior members of the PRB after Azahari 
were "intractable, unpleasant and obstinate" and were quite likely to refuse to even 
discuss merger. It was for this reason that the High Commissioner said: "It seems 
essential to get Azahari back, even if it means a bit o f 'political jobbery"'.88
In fact White and Lord Selkirk had been in favour of rapprochement between 
the PRB and the Sultan as well as Tunku Abdul Rahman. In August 1961 White had 
asked Sir Geoffrey Tory, the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, "to 
disabuse the Tunku of his impression that one can ignore Azahari and the Party 
Rakyat".89 He believed that the PRB was "anti-autocracy rather than anti-Sultan, and 
anti-Tunku rather than anti-Grand Design". He thought the only obvious solution to 
the problem was to persuade the Sultan to change his attitude to the PRB, to grant 
Azahari an interview and to give him assurances about elections and point out the 
advantages of the Malaysia Plan to Brunei and enlist his support. If the Tunku gave 
his backing and was conciliatory, he felt that there was a good chance that the PRB 
would agree to joining Malaysia.90
87CO 1030/1012, item 24, White to W.I.J.Wallace, 4 November 1961. In 1953, 
Azahari had been imprisoned for six months, for organising a street protest against the 
authority.
uIbid.
89CO 1030/1448, item 14, White to E.Melville, 29 August 1961.
90CO 1030/1448, item 15, White to E.Melville, 30 August 1961.
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In July 1961 the Colonial Office officials while agreeing that Azahari was "not 
at all unreasonable" were doubtful whether he carried the guns for the role he 
envisaged for himself.91 But in September Lord Selkirk told the Colonial Secretary: 
"It is vital to create some relationship with Azahari. I have not met Azahari 
but all reports indicate he is on the whole of a reasonable frame o f mind. But 
clearly he could if permanently alienated become fertile soil either for 
Communists or Indonesians to work on. ...If we cannot reconcile the Sultan 
and Azahari, there is almost certain to be a clash both inside Brunei and 
outside in relation to Tunku's Greater Malaysia. I have no doubt Azahari is 
strong enough to prevent any move the Sultan may make towards the 
Federation. I think the best way is to suggest he should come and see you 
sometime early next year".92 
In November White supported Lord Selkirk's concern about the PRB when he told the 
Colonial Office that even if the PRB were disorganised, either by arrest or flight of 
the key men, the rank and file would not automatically swing over to support 
Malaysia.93
However, despite, the earnest call by Lord Selkirk and White the Colonial 
Office refused to invite Azahari, who was persona non grata to the Sultan, for talks. 
In early January 1962 London instructed Sir Dennis White (knighted in January 1962),
91 CO 1030/1079, item E/12, Note for Secretary of State's discussions with Lord 
Selkirk on 5 July 1961, Far Eastern Department Paper, 30 June 1961.
92CO 1030/1448, item 16/18, Lord Selkirk to I.MacLeod, 12 September 1961.
93CO 1030/1012, item 24, White to W.I.J.Wallace, 4 November 1961.
307
to reply Azahari's and his Party's petition delivered in August. In that reply the High 
Commissioner told the PRB:
"the Secretary of State for Colonies has carefully considered the petition 
...[however] in the view of the Secretary of State, elections in Brunei and the 
timing of them are internal matters and therefore primarily the concern of His 
Highness' Government".94 
This was hardly the reply the PRB expected. Nevertheless it held to the Sultan's 
promise to hold the elections by October 1962.
At the same time as the reply to the PRB's petition arrived, Azahari received 
a letter from the Government appointing him as a Nominated Member of the 
Legislative Council and as the Vice Chairman of a special commission to ascertain the 
public opinion in Brunei and to make recommendations on the Malaysia Plan.95 
Despite strong advice from his Party not to accept the appointments because it feared 
it was an attempt by the Government to break up the Party, Azahari accepted the 
appointments "out of respect to the Sultan".96 Other than Azahari the Brunei-Malaysia 
Commission consisted of Dato Marsal (the Menteri Besar), the Chairman; Pehin 
Bendahari China Hong Kok Tien (a Chinese Community leader); Orang Kaya Gimang 
Anak Parit (an Iban Chief); Orang Kaya Lukan bin Uking (a Dusun Chief) and 
Hashim bin Tahir (the Secretary). The Commission, which was claimed by Hashim 
(now Dato Hashim) to be the creation of Dato Abdul Aziz, was meant to embrace a 
cross-section of the nation, all representatives of the major races, the Government and
94CO 1030/1448, White to Secretary General of the PRB, 10 January 1962.
95CO 1030/1012, item 65A, White to R.Maudling, 15 January 1962.
96Interview with Azahari, February 1993.
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political party leaders.97 In mid January 1962 the Brunei-Mai ay si a Commission began 
its task, and it held its hearings in public in the main centres of population throughout 
the State. It completed its hearings on 3 February 1962.
The findings of the Commission have never been published but it was well 
known from press reports and Commission sources that the opposition to the Malaysia 
Plan was overwhelming. On the other hand a large section favoured a Borneo 
Federation comprising Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak.98 According to Dato 
Marsal, he submitted the Commission's report to the Sultan soon after his Commission 
had completed its public hearings.99 He believed that the Sultan was advised by Dato 
Abdul Aziz, the Attorney-General, not to publish it. He also said that in a meeting 
with the Sultan held on 22 March 1962, to discuss the Commission's report, Dato 
Abdul Aziz attacked the report as invalid because it was not signed by all members 
of the Commission, but only by the Chairman. Dato Marsal believed that Dato Abdul 
Aziz expected the Commission to "make its own recommendation", which would be 
in favour of the Malaysia Plan.100 Dato Marsal's claim might have substance because 
in his report to the Colonial Office Sir Dennis White said:
"It had been thought that the views given to the Menteri Besar's Committee 
would be sufficiently varied as to enable it to report with some show of 
decency that the public was in favour of Malaysia or at least was not opposed
"Interview with Dato Hashim bin Tahir, April 1993.
9%The Borneo Bulletin, 3 February 1962; Interview with Dato Marsal and Dato
Hashim Tahir, April 1963, Orang Kaya Lukan Uking, May 1993 and Azahari,
February 1993.
"interview with Dato Marsal, April 1993.
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to it. This would now seem to be out of question, although written opinion 
submitted may modify the almost unanimous opposition*'.101 
Anxious that the findings in Brunei might affect the opinions of the Borneo 
representatives to the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee (MSCC), which 
began its four-day meeting in Singapore on 3 February 1962, Dato Abdul Aziz asked 
Lee Kuan Yew (the Prime Minister of Singapore) to withheld the report.102 Thus on 
1 February 1962 "the Singapore Government threatened to close Reuters in Singapore 
if they did not suppress the report".103 According to Lord Selkirk, two days earlier 
Lee Kuan Yew "laughed off* the rumours that the Brunei-Malaysia Commission had 
recorded almost 100 per cent opposition from all sections of the population to 
Malaysia. He said Tunku Abdul Rahman had told him that "all was well and complete 
understanding existed between him [the Tunku] and the Sultan".104
The MSCC had been formed on the initiative of the North Borneo and Sarawak 
delegates to Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Regional Meeting in Singapore 
in July 1961. The aims of the MSCC, whose members were Unofficial members of 
Legislative Councils and Civil Servants in North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore and 
Malaya, were to collect views and opinions and to disseminate information on the 
question of Malaysia, and to foster activities for the realization o f Malaysia. Brunei,
101CO 1030/1012, item 89, Sir Dennis White to C.G.Eastwood, 20 February 1962. 
The High Commissioner said the Chinese Chamber of Commerce submitted written 
representations to the Commission and that they told him that they would support 
Malaysia. See: CO 1030/1012, item 72, White to Secretary of State, 3 February 1962.
I02CO 1030/1012, kitem 84, Sir Dennis White to Lord Selkirk, 13 February 1962.
103CO 1030/1012, item 70, Lord Selkirk to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1
February 1962.
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which was not a member of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, decided 
not to join the MSCC, but sent observers to the meetings in Kuching, Kuala Lumpur 
and Singapore. As a result of concerted campaigns by the Malayan and Singaporean 
members, as well as by leaders in both countries, the Borneo members were eventually 
converted to Malaysia. Donald Stephen, who chaired the MSCC, broke away from 
the United Front against Malaysia which he had formed in July 1961 with Azahari and 
Ong Kee Hui.105 Without support from native leaders, both in North Borneo and 
Sarawak, the United Front was ineffective. Further, Azahari accused the Tunku of 
raising racial emotions against Chinese to convert native leaders to his Malaysia 
Plan.106 At its last meeting in Singapore, on 7 February, the MSCC approved the 
Malaysia Plan, but with special safeguards for Borneo territories. On the same day 
a memorandum, signed by all the delegates to the meeting, including the Brunei 
delegates, was submitted to the Commission of Inquiry, later known as the Cobbold 
Commission, which was set up by the Malayan and British Governments as had been 
agreed in their joint statement in November 1961.107
The signing of the MSCC Memorandum by the Brunei delegates was strongly 
criticised by the PRB, because it was contrary to the wishes of the people in Brunei, 
as evidenced from the public hearings of the Brunei-Malaysia Mission. The PRB 
claimed that the almost unanimous rejection of Malaysia was the voice o f the whole
105See pages 296.
106Interview with Azahari, February 1993.
107The MSCC Memorandum is found in File CO 1030/1001, item 45/46 and also 
in the Cobbold Report in File CO 1030/1027, Part A. Other than Pengiran Ali, the 
members of the Brunei delegation were: Pengiran Yusuf, Haji Jamil bin Umar, Dato 
Temenggong Lim Cheng Ho and Dato Abdul Aziz as the Adviser.
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people and not merely that of the Party; it claimed that it had adopted a neutral stand 
during the Brunei-Malaysia Commission sessions.108 In fact this claim was supported 
by the High Commissioner's report to the Colonial Office, that before the hearings 
there was no marked campaign either by the PRB against Malaysia or by others in 
favour of it. The PRB issued a directive to its own members saying that each man 
should speak from his heart.109 The PRB demanded the publication of the 
Commission's report to prove that the people were against the Malaysia Plan.110
Sir Dennis White observed that there was a marked increase in tension in 
Brunei as a result of the signing of the Memorandum and the failure of the 
Government to publish the Brunei-Malaysia Commission's report.111 The PRB was 
back on the offensive against the Malaysia Plan and called for the independence of a 
united Borneo. On 9 February 1962, Azahari left for Egypt to attend a meeting of the 
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, which earlier had condemned the Tunku's 
Malaysia Plan as an "imperialist plot",112 to campaign for international support against 
the formation of Malaysia. On the same day he told the local press that his Party "had 
taken a firm, anti-Malaysia stand and would do all in its power to achieve its aim of 
uniting the Borneo territories of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo under one flag".113 
It was probably during this time that some leaders of the PRB lost hope of stopping
]0SThe Borneo Bulletin, 3 February 1962.
109CO 1030/1012, item 89, Sir Dennis White to C.G.Eastwood, 20 February 1962.
U0The Borneo Bulletin, 17 February 1962.
11'CO 1030/1012, item 89, Sir Dennis White to C.G.Eastwood, 20 February 1962.
U2The Borneo Bulletin, 3 February 1962.
u*The Borneo Bulletin, 10 February 1962. The meeting was held between 12 and 
17 February 1962.
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the implementation of the Malaysia Plan by peaceful means and decided to oppose it 
militarily. As will be seen in the next chapter on his return from Egypt Azahari 
together with Yassin Affandi approached Indonesian military leaders seeking 
assistance in training members of their Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara (TNKU) 
or National Army of North Kalimantan , a secret military wing of the Party.
Meanwhile, in Brunei, steps were planned to neutralise opposition to the 
Malaysia Plan. In mid-February 1962 Sir White said, that Dato Abdul Aziz was 
talking of proscribing the PRB, on the grounds that the Party was in breach of the 
Societies Enactment when it applied to join the Afro-Asian Solidarity Group. The 
High Commissioner however opposed the plan because he believed that any action 
taken at that juncture to proscribe or suppress the PRB "would be construed as an 
obvious move to facilitate merger". He also believed the Police might be unreliable 
if called upon to deal with trouble emanating from such action. Furthermore he 
believed the British Government would find it gravely embarrassing to be called upon 
to restore order, if the trouble was caused by unjustifiable repression.114 The Colonial 
Office agreed with the High Commissioner’s view that proscribing the PRB "would 
be unwise". The Colonial Office said:
"It has always been our view of course that the question of Brunei's entering 
Malaysia is one for the Sultan and people o f Brunei and that, while advising 
the Sultan that we think this is a good idea, we should keep out of the internal 
Brunei argument. ...We should therefore very much like it if  White could keep
114CO 1030/1012, item 89, Sir Dennis White to C.G.Eastwood, 20 February 1962.
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out of any argument about proscribing or not proscribing the Party Rakyat".115 
Nevertheless on the advice of Sir Dennis White, the Sultan called a meeting of the 
Standing Advisory Council on Defence to assess the situation in Brunei on 20 March
1962. The Council decided that the Government should be equipped with adequate 
powers to deal with internal disturbances and subversion, and to preserve peace and 
order in the State. Thus the Public Order Enactment was prepared and legislated in 
June 1962.116
However the PRB was not the only source of problem in Brunei in relation to 
the question of Malaysia. Some of the Sultan's advisers themselves were still not 
convinced of the advantages of the Plan. Pengiran Ali and Pengiran Yusuf had openly 
supported the Malaysia Plan and had agreed to put their signatures to the MSCC's 
Memorandum on Malaysia. However, as Dato Abdul Aziz told Sir Dennis White, "the 
present Menteri Besar, [Dato Marsal] is definitely wavering in his support for 
Malaysia".117 Perhaps it was for this reason that a report stated that the former 
Menteri Besar, Dato Haji Ibrahim, who had retired for medical reason in August 1961, 
was to resume office.118 However good counsel prevailed and the risk o f provoking 
opposition, particularly among the Malay Teachers Association, where Dato Marsal 
had a strong following, diminished.
115CO 1030/1012, item 106, C.G.Eastwood to G.P.Hampshire (CRO), 5 March
1962.
II6BA/13852/78, Executive Council Paper No.114/62, 27 June 1962; Government
Gazette, Part III, 30 June 1962.
117CO 1030/1012, item 122/126, Sir Dennis White to W.I.J.Wallace, 13 March
1962;
usThe Borneo Bulletin, 24 April 1962.
314
The High Commissioner said he had a great deal of sympathy with the Sultan 
in his dilemma. He added: "I do not think that I should be guilty o f over-emphasis 
if I stated that the situation posed a threat to the dynasty”.119 He thought that it would 
not be appropriate to bring further pressure to bear on the Sultan although it was for 
further consideration whether anything could be done to ease pressure on the Sultan 
either in London or in Kuala Lumpur. On the role of Dato Abdul Aziz, who had been 
called ”the Tunku's spy”,120 the High Commissioner said: "It is already becoming 
obvious that the Attorney General has compromised his official position by his 
advocacy of Malaysia, and his usefulness will become limited in this sphere”.121 
Thus in March 1962 Lord Selkirk went to see the Tunku and told him that he very 
much hope that "the Malayan treatment” would be accorded to the people of Brunei 
more fully so as form a counter-attraction to the visits to Indonesia of the PRB's 
leaders.122 Following this a mixed delegation from Brunei, which included two 
unauthorised members of the PRB, was invited to tour Malaya in April 1962.123
Meanwhile in March 1962 Dato Abdul Aziz told the High Commissioner that 
the Sultan seemed to be "swinging back to his previous support of Malaysia”.124 It 
was not clear whether this was due to the visit of Dato Osman bin Talib, a close 
adviser of the Tunku, on 11 March, who may have brought a personal message for the
ll9CO 1030/1012, item 89, Sir Dennis White to C.G.Eastwood, 20 February 1962.
I20CO 1030/1012, item 122/126, White to W.I.J.Wallace, 13 March 1962.
121CO 1030/1012, item 89, Sir Dennis White to C.G.Eastwood, 20 February 1962.
122CO 1030/1012, item 105, Sir Dennis Allen to C.G.Eastwood, 5 March 1962.
mPelita Brunei, 18 April 1962.
124CO 1030/1015, item 4, Sir Dennis White to C.G.Eastwood, 24 March 1962.
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Sultan from the Tunku.125 But on 26 March 1962 the Sultan summoned his advisers 
to discuss the Secretary of State's letter sent in January. In the letter the Secretary of 
State had urged the Sultan to start informal discussions with the Government of 
Malaya on the terms and conditions which the Brunei Government would wish to 
propose in the event of joining Malaysia.126 The High Commissioner told the Colonial 
Office the Sultan had decided to scrap the report of the Brunei-Malaysia Commission. 
Instead he said, there was talk of tabling a resolution in favour of the Malaysia Plan 
to the Legislative Council. In his view if such a resolution was agreed in a nominated 
and official Legislative Council there would be trouble beyond the ability of the 
Brunei Police Force to control.127 It was for this reason that the Colonial Office asked 
the High Commissioner to use his influence at that stage to delay the introduction of 
the resolution in the Legislative Council. The Colonial Office thought it was
important that the PRB should be persuaded of the benefits of Malaysia at first
hand.128
Thus, when the Legislative Council met on 16 - 17 April 1962 the resolution 
on the Malaysia Plan was not brought up. Instead Azahari, who took his appointment 
as a Nominated member for the first time, introduced a motion asking the Brunei 
Government to recognise the historical sovereignty of the Sultan of Brunei over the 
whole of the British Borneo territories.129 However his motion failed to gain support
]25Pelita Brunei, 21 March 1962.
126CO 1030/1012, item 63, R.Maudling to the Sultan, 8 January 1962.
127CO 1030/1015, kitem 4, Sir Dennis White to C.G.Eastwood, 24 March 1962.
128CO 1030/1015, item 5, Secretary of State to White, 12 April 1962.
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from a majority of the Legislative Council members. Claiming that he could not work 
under the existing system in Brunei, he submitted his resignation.130 Later in Johore, 
where he went on a "self-imposed exile", he explained that he had resigned because 
there could be no democratic opposition in Brunei.131 However the High 
Commissioner suspected that Azahari left the State because he was angry at the 
Government's decisions to refuse to finance his business and to foreclose all his 
outstanding loans.132
Meanwhile the Cobbold Commission, consisting of a Chairman, (Lord 
Cobbold), and two British (Sir Anthony Abel and Sir David Watherston) and two 
Malayan (Muhammad Ghazali Shafie and Dato Wong Pow Nee) members, toured 
Sarawak and North Borneo from 19 February to 18 April 1962 to ascertain the views 
of the people with regard to the Malaysia Plan. At the end its tour the Commission 
claimed that:
"about one third of the population in each territory strongly favours early 
realisation of Malaysia without too much concern about terms and conditions. 
Another third ... ask ...for conditions and safeguards. ...The remaining third is 
divided between those who insist on independence before Malaysia is 
considered and those who strongly prefer to see British rule continue for some 
years".133
The Tunku was expected to go to London in July to finalise an agreement with the
l30The Borneo Bulletin, 5 May 1962.
™ Straits Times, 17 May 1962.
I32C 0  1030/933, item 7, Sir Dennis White to Sir Dennis Allen, 7 May 1962.
I33C 0  1030/1027, Cobbold Report, Part A, p.10.
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British Government on the formation the Malaysia Federation.
It was in view of these developments that in June 1962 Sir Dennis White
V
approached the Sultan and urged him to make up his mind on the question of 
Malaysia. He told the Sultan that Brunei shared not only religious, cultural and 
language interests with the Malay States, but also the Sultanate form of Government. 
However the Sultan told him that none of those factors were important compared to 
the welfare o f his State and his people, and the eventual decision would be taken in 
the light of the State's welfare. Sir Dennis White told the Sultan that he must not only 
consider the immediate advantages and disadvantages but also the long term ones. 
The High Commissioner said it was not only the question o f dwindling oil revenues 
and no fresh finds, but defence and general stability in a troubled part o f the world. 
The Sultan said, his Government could take no steps until he knew the terms and 
conditions suggested for Sarawak and North Borneo. Quoting a Malay proverb, he 
told the High Commissioner: "Travel slowly, and arrived safely" [Biar lambat asal 
selamat].UA
Nevertheless the Sultan took the advice of the High Commissioner, and on 9 
July a five-member delegation headed by Pengiran Pemanca, proceeded to Kuala 
Lumpur seeking clarification on the character of the Malaysia Plan and its application 
to Brunei.135 At the meeting, Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister, who 
presided over the meeting, stated that Brunei would be given the same status as a 
sovereign Malay State in the Federation of Malaya. Tun Abdul Razak further 
explained that under the Federation of Malaysia, Brunei would retain the special
134CO 1030/1017, item 182, Sir Dennis White to W.I.J.Wallace, 12 June 1962.
135 77ie Borneo Bulletin, 14 July 1962.
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privileges enjoyed by the Sultan's subjects, and its welfare system. With regard to the 
Sultan o f Brunei's position in line for the succession as Agong, Tun Abdul Razak 
stated that, the terms of precedence as set out in the Federation Constitution, would 
be in accordance with the date of accession to the throne, and according to this 
method, the Sultan of Brunei was the most senior Sultan next to the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong.136
With regard to immigration, the powers relating to entry into the Borneo States 
for the purposes of permanent residence would be given to the each State. Tun Abdul 
Razak also assured the delegation that Brunei investments and interest would be the 
State property. However the manner in which this principle would work would have 
to be further examined. The tax system in Brunei was one in which the people 
enjoyed freedom from personal income tax, fees such as radio licence and other fees. 
Tun Abdul Razak agreed in principle that the special provisions be allowed to 
continue, but the manner in which they would be conducted would be subject to 
negotiation. He said oil, mining, and production required closer examination and 
negotiation; but, in principle, Tun Abdul Razak agreed that they would be included 
in the concurrent list. Royalties from crude oil and gas, which was a State revenue, 
would be subject to negotiation.137
At the end of the meeting Tun Razak told the Brunei delegation that his 
Government was planning to bring about Malaysia on 31 August 1962. If  Brunei 
agreed to join Malaysia, the necessary action should be taken before the elections in
136BA/14191/78, "Questions by and Replies given to the Brunei Delegation on the
Proposed Malaysia Concept".
ulIbid.
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Brunei, to avoid any embarrassment which might arise as a result of the change in the 
future State Legislative Council.138
On the basis of assurances to the Brunei delegation given by Tun Abdul Razak, 
the Sultan announced to the Legislative Council on 18 July 1962 that he was advised
V
that Malaysia should bring benefits and advantages to Brunei and its people. In his 
view it was possible for him "to accept the Federation of Malaysia in principle". This, 
he said, would enable the Government to negotiate officially with the Governments 
of the Federation of Malaya and United Kingdom to determine the type and pattern 
of association. However, he stressed that his acceptance o f the Malaysia Plan in 
principle did not necessarily mean that it was final; if an agreement could not be 
reached on certain important matters it was probable that Brunei would not participate 
in the proposed Malaysia Federation.139 This was followed by a motion moved by the 
Menteri Besar endorsing the Sultan's speech and fully supporting the principle of 
Brunei's participation kin the proposed Federation of Malaysia.140 The motion was 
passed by the Legislative Council by 24 votes to four with one abstention.141
mIbid.
139BA/14191/78, "Speech of His Highness the Sultan at the Meeting of the Brunei 
Legislative Council on Wednesday, 18 July 1962".
I40BA/141191/78, "Motion to be moved by the Honourable Menteri Besar", 17
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7.3 The Malaysia Issue and the First Brunei Elections
Meanwhile on 20 June 1962 the Government announced that the elections were 
to be held on 30 August 1962. The elections were to elect 55 District Councillors, 
including 24 for the Brunei District Council; 12 for the Belait District Council; 12 for 
the Tutong District Council; and 7 for the Temburong District Council. Voting in the 
elections was by secret ballot and only citizens as defined in the Nationality Law 
passed by the Legislative Council in December 1961, aged over twenty one could 
vote. The elected councillors would form an electoral college for each District Council 
which would elect representatives to the Legislative Council. The number of District 
Councillors to be elected to the Legislative Council was 16, of which 8 were from 
Brunei, 4 from Belait 3 from Tutong and 1 from Temburong. This election would be 
held on 17 September 1962.142
The PRB had opposed the electoral system and had threatened to boycott an 
election which did not bring the winning party to power. However it had no 
alternative. The Sultan's acceptance of the Malaysia Plan in principle and the mandate 
given to him by the Legislative Council to negotiate with the Governments of Malaya 
and Britain meant Brunei's entry into Malaysia, as far as the PRB was concerned, was 
a fait accompli. The only option open to the Party to prevent Brunei from joining the 
federation by peaceful means was the elections. Recognising that the people rejected 
Malaysia, the PRB used the Malaysia issue as its main platform in the elections. 
Hence in its election manifesto the PRB made a clear stand: Brunei's independence 
in 1963; rejection of the concept of Malaysia as proposed by Tunku Abdul Rahman;
]A2Pelita Brunei, 20 June 1962.
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and formation of an independent Kalimantan Utara which would encompass Brunei, 
North Borneo and Sarawak, with the Sultan of Brunei as the Constitutional Head of 
State. The manifesto also laid out the Party's economic, educational, social and 
administrative programmes if they were elected.143
The PRB faced two pro-Malaysia political parties in the elections: the Brunei 
National Organisation (BNO) and Brunei United Party (BUP). The BNO was formed 
by Abdul Manan bin Muhammed, a former PRB leader in Tutong District, who had 
accepted the Sultan's appointment as an Unofficial member of the Legislative Council 
after the promulgation of the Constitution in September 1959. The Party, which was 
registered in November 1960, had never been active except in the Tutong District.144
V
Initially the BNO adopted an anti-Malaysia stance but later changed its stand 
favouring Brunei joining Malaysia.145 The BUP was formed in December 1961 by a 
local businessman, Haji Hasbollah bin Haji Daud. It was formed mainly to promote 
the Malaysia Plan among the people of Brunei. In January 1962 the BNO and BUP 
formed an alliance to fight the PRB.146
Besides the BNO and the BUP there were also several Independent candidates 
who were in favour of the Malaysia Plan. Most of them were Government servants. 
Apprehensive of the PRB's popularity, the Government issued a circular in June 1962 
allowing Government servants to stand in the elections. However, they had to get
143Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, Partai Rakyat Brunei: Selected Documents, Petaling 
Jaya, INSAN, 1987, pp. 161-167; The Borneo Bulletin, 4 August 1962.
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approval from the Executive Council. Those given permission were granted paid leave 
and allowed to retire from Government service if elected. Those who lost would be 
reinstated into the Government service.147 The fact that they were "selected and stood 
for the Government" meant they amounted to the "King's Party".
The PRB fielded candidates in all the fifty-five seats of the District Councils 
in order to gain the maximum number of seats. The BNO fielded eight candidates; the 
BUP only one candidate, Haji Hasbollah himself, and there were 17 Independent 
candidates. Even before the first vote was cast it was clear the PRB would win the 
elections. On the Nomination Day, 21 June 1962, the Party won 32 uncontested seats: 
20 out of 24 seats in Brunei/Muara District, 7 out of 12 seats in Belait District and 5 
out of 7 seats in Temburong District. Therefore except in Tutong District, in which 
all 8 seats were contested, the PRB already controlled the District Councils.148
The encouraging performance of the PRB probably prompted Azahari to return 
to Brunei from his self-imposed exile in Johore on 11 August 1962. Azahari did not 
put up his name for the elections. It was widely believed that he was not eligible 
because he was not a citizen. As an Arab descendent, Azahari had to apply for 
citizenship under the new Nationality Law. However there is also the possibility that 
Azahari initially intended to boycott the elections as he had threatened in the past 
unless the Constitution was amended. Azahari recognised that the Constitution, which 
he dismissed as "undemocratic", not only provided for a non-elected government but 
also for a Legislative Council with only 16 out of the total of 33 being elected. Even 
if his Party won all the seats in the elections it was still in minority. The treatment
147BA/13833/78, Executive Council Paper No.118/62, 27 June 1962.
148BA/0760/83, Report on Nomination Day by Election Supervisor, 21 July 1962.
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given to him during his brief appearance in the Legislative Council in April proved 
that the system would work against the interests of his Party. But by the end of July 
the Malayan and British Governments had reached an agreement on the formation of
V
Malaysia Federation, which would include the Borneo territories and possibly 
Brunei.149 It became clear to him that the establishment of Malaysia had become a fait 
accompli, and by then he began to agree with his Party's assertion that the only 
peaceful door left open for them was the elections. On the other hand, Sir Dennis 
White suspected that he was encouraged by the Barisan Sosialis in Singapore, which 
was anti-Malaysia, in order to put a spoke in the Malaysia wheel to keep Brunei out.150
The presence of Azahari in Brunei raised the election fever. By using his 
power of oratory he campaigned fervently for his Party. When the results were 
announced on 30 August 1962, the PRB won all except one o f the remaining 23 seats. 
The Independent who won the sole seat later joined the PRB. Thus the PRB 
controlled all the four District Councils and was assured of the 16 elected seats in the 
Legislative Council.151
The pro-Malaysia parties and Independent candidates gained few votes and 
many lost their deposits. For instance, Haji Hasbollah, the strong supporter of the 
Malaysia Plan obtained only 25 votes compared to the PRB candidate's 266 votes. 
More significantly over 90 per cent of the total electorate of 6,000 went to the polls.152
149CO 1030/1025, item 115/118, Colonial Office to North Borneo, Sarawak, and 
Brunei, 1 August 1962.
I50CO 1030/1447, item 112, Sir Dennis White to W.I.J.Wallace, 7 August 1962.
151BA/0760/83, Election Results for District Councils in Brunei, 1962; The
Borneo Bulletin, 1 September 1962.
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It was an embarrassment to the Government because it was clear rejection of its policy 
to bring Brunei into the proposed Malaysia Federation. The elections established the 
PRB as the representative of the people and it could not be ignored any further by the
v
Government.
7.4 The Question of Brunei's Entry into the Malaysia Federation
In early September 1962 Azahari led a delegation of all elected members of 
his Party to meet the Sultan. During the meeting Azahari told him that the people 
regarded the elections as a major step towards establishing a democratic government 
and asked the Government to cooperate with the elected representatives. Azahari also 
explained his Party's opposition to the Malaysia Plan, which he said was "based on 
a desire to unite the three Borneo territories with the Sultan as ruler". He added, 
however, that as North Borneo and Sarawak had accepted the Malaysia Plan and the 
Sultan had agreed in principle, on behalf of his Party he supported the address made 
by the Sultan in the Legislative Council in July accepting the Malaysia Plan in 
principle.153 A week later however he corrected the report of his remarks by saying 
that he, as an individual, would not oppose the Malaysia Plan if  it was the Sultan's 
wish that Brunei should federate with Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo. 
However, he added, he was not committing his Party to that line.154
This was a significant shift in Azahari's stand on the Malaysia Plan when 
compared to what he had said in February 1962: that his Party had taken a firm, anti-
V
^T h e  Borneo Bulletin, 15 September 1962.
]54Ibid., 22 September 1962.
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Malaysia stand and would do all in its power to achieve its aim of uniting the Borneo 
territories of Brunei, Sarawak, and North Borneo under one flag.155 There were two 
factors which influenced Azahari's volte-face. Firstly, by supporting the Sultan's policy
V
on Malaysia, he hoped the Sultan would give more favourable treatment to him and 
his Party, possibly, by recognising his Party as the "legitimate Government" and 
appointing him as the Menteri Besar. Before the August elections Azahari was 
reported as saying that "if he and the Party were consulted and treated as a responsible 
political body he would persuade his followers to accept Malaysia". He also indicated 
that his policy would be to work to get the Constitution amended and a ministerial 
system introduced.156
Secondly, he believed that once inside Malaysia his Party, which had won 
overwhelmingly in the elections, would be asked to form the State Government in 
Brunei and he might be appointed as the Menteri Besar or a Federal Minister. In fact 
Azahari was reported to have held meetings with Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime 
Minister of Malaya, when the latter visited Brunei in mid-August. Although nothing 
had been reported from the meetings, it was quite possible that some kind of deal had 
been discussed with regard to acceptance of the Malaysia Plan by the PRB in return 
for political power in Brunei. Sir Dennis White told the Colonial Office that Tun 
Abdul Razak, after the meetings, was "quietly optimistic of a peaceful acceptance [of 
the Malaysia Plan] in the long run".157
]S5Ibid., 10 February 1962.
156CO 1030/932, item 11, J.D.Higham to A.A.Golds, 19 February 1963.
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But the goodwill gesture by Azahari was not reciprocated by the Sultan who 
told the delegation that he "stayed aloof from politics" and whatever decision he might 
reach regarding Brunei's future, he would consider the nation's interest and its people 
and there would be no thought of personal benefit for himself. Moreover when 
Azahari raised the doubts that had been cast on his nationality, the Sultan pointed out 
that under the State's nationality laws non-Bruneis, if they met the necessary 
qualifications, could become Brunei subjects.158 This lukewarm reception from the 
Sultan and inconclusive meetings with Tun Abdul Razak in mid-August probably 
prompted Azahari's departure to Kuching on 9 September to confer with Stephen Yong 
of the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) and G.S.Sundang of North Borneo's 
Pasok Momogun Organisation.159 At the end of their meeting the three leaders signed 
a Joint Memorandum protesting the implementation of the Malaysia Plan without the 
exercise o f the right of self-determination by the people in the three territories. The 
Memorandum, which was forwarded immediately to the United Nations, rejected the 
claim by the Cobbold Commission that two-thirds of the peoples in North Borneo and 
Sarawak favoured joining the proposed Malaysia Federation and only one-third were 
against it. It appealed for the intervention of the United Nations to hold a plebiscite
l5*The Borneo Bulletin, 15 September 1962.
l59Ibid. Pasok Momogun Omagisation or National True Sons of the Soil 
Association was one of the political parties formed as a response to the Malaysia Plan. 
It was predominantly composed of non-Muslim Dusuns and it claimed to have 10,600 
members. Other political parties in North Borneo were: United National Kadazan 
Organisation (UNKO) led by Donald Stephen; United Sabah National Organisation 
(USNO), a Muslim party led by Datu Mustapha bin Harun, and two Chinese parties, 
United Party and Democratic Party. In Sarawak political parties were also formed on 
racial line: Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), a Chinese party; Party Negara 
(PANAS), a Malay party; Sarawak National Party (SNAP), an Iban Party and Barisan 
Rakyat Sarawak (BERJASA), a Malay-Iban party. See CO 1030/1027, Cobbold 
Report, Part A, 1962.
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to determine the wishes of the people. It also urged that the three Borneo territories 
should be brought under a federation or union with the Sultan of Brunei as the 
Constitutional Head.160 In support of their petition the three parties planned to hold 
a conference of all the people's representatives from the three territories.161
Meanwhile, despite repeated calls from the PRB for the amendment of the 
Constitution and the formation of a democratic government, the Sultan, on the eve of 
his birthday (23 September 1962), announced the nomination o f members of the 
Legislative Council and members of the Executive Council.162 The Sultan had earlier 
reconfirmed Dato Marsal as the Menteri Besar and now created a new post, the 
Deputy Menteri Besar, which was filled by Pengiran Ali, the Head of Religious 
Affairs Department.163 The appointment of Pengiran Ali, one of the closest advisers 
of the Sultan, to the new post could be seen as a measure to strengthen the position 
o f his Government in anticipating the accession of the PRB members into the 
Legislative and Executive Councils.
The PRB held all the sixteen Unofficial seats in the thirty-three member 
Legislative Council. The Party was also returned in all the six Unofficial (Elected) 
seats o f the fifteen member Executive Council. Although the PRB occupied all the 
elected seats in both the Councils the Party remained dissatisfied because it remained 
in a minority in both Councils. Furthermore, unlike the Legislative Council, where 
the PRB chose its own representatives from each of the four districts through
160Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, op.cit., pp. 169-172.
16177ze Borneo Bulletin, 6 October 1962.
]62The Borneo Bulletin, 29 S e p te m b e r  1962.
162Ibid., 1 September 1962.
328
collegiate system of election, the Sultan had absolute discretion to choose all the 
Executive Council members. As a result, other than Hapidz Laksamana, the Deputy 
President, none o f the Central Executive Committee of the Party was appointed to the 
Executive Council. At first the PRB refused to accept the Sultan’s nominations; it 
demanded that it should have a say in who should be appointed.164 Azahari, who did
V
not participate in the elections, was not given any appointment; nor were the elected 
members o f his Party invited to join the Government.
On the day the nominations were announced, the Sultan presided over a 
meeting of the Committee he had appointed to examine the terms and conditions of 
Brunei's entry into the proposed Malaysia Federation. The Committee appointed in 
July 1962 had twenty-five members, consisting of the traditional advisers and the 
principal local officers, Sir Dennis White, Dr. Joseph S.Gould (an economic adviser 
from the United Nations), Dato Neil Lawson Q.C. (a legal adviser from the United 
Kingdom) and a representative of the Chinese community. The only seconded 
Malayan officer on the Committee was Dato Abdul Aziz, in his capacity as the 
Attorney-General.165 Despite having the mandate of the people, none of the members 
of the PRB were invited to join the Committee; nor were they invited to the meeting.
164CO 1030/1076, item 6, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 20 December 
1962. For the full lists of the members of the new Executive and new Legislative 
Councils see Appendix IV and V respectively.
165BA/14191/78, Papers Relating to Malaysia; CO 1030/932, item 11, J.D.Higham 
to A. A.Golds, 19 September 1963. Dato Neil Lawson was one o f the Constitutional 
Advisers to the Sultan's Constitutional delegation to London in March/April 1959. He 
was awarded by the Sultan "The Most Esteemed Family Order Second Class", which 
carried the title "Dato Paduka", in September 1959 for his service. See The Borneo 
Bulletin, 26 Septembef 1959.
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On 25 September a delegation led by, Dato Marsal, the Menteri Besar flew to 
Kuala Lumpur "to hold a final round of exploratory talks" with Malayan Government. 
The delegation consisted of senior Government officials - Pengiran Ali (Deputy 
Menteri Besar), Pengiran Yusuf (Deputy State Secretary), Pengiran Kerma Indera Haji 
Mohammad (Controller of Telecommunications), Haji Jamil (Director of Language and 
Literature Bureau), Salleh bin Masri (Welfare Officer) and two legal advisers Dato 
Abdul Aziz and Dato Neil Lawson. The Malayan team, which also composed of 
senior Government officials, was headed by Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime 
Minister.166
The main proposals of the Brunei delegation were: full self-government; 
Federal responsibility for external affairs and for defence against external aggression; 
a Federal guarantee of the status of the Sultan of Brunei and the Constitution of the 
State; Brunei would accept the concept o f Federal citizenship broadly upon the lines 
of the Cobbold Report, but subject to immigration control being vested in the State; 
Brunei should be given a measure representation in the organs o f the government of 
the new Federation; and Brunei would be prepared to make an agreed financial 
contribution to the Government of the new Federation. In considering its proposals 
the Brunei delegation asked the Malayans to give full weight to the special features 
of the State: Brunei had full internal self-Government for the last three years; Brunei 
was characterised by va strong Brunei nationalist feeling held by a predominantly 
Malay population and centred round the concept of loyalty to an old-established royal
]66Ibid.-, The Borneo Bulletin, 29 September 1962. Salleh bin Masri was the 
former Deputy President o f the PRB. He left the Party in August 1958 and appointed 
into the Brunei Civil Service in August 1962, no doubt with an aim to strengthen the 
Government's position against the PRB.
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dynasty; Brunei was financially and economically more favourably placed and 
advanced in social welfare benefits than North Borneo and Sarawak.167
When the proposals were put to the Malayans, they were rejected summarily. 
Tun Abdul Razak thought that his Government would not be prepared to entertain 
proposals falling short o f the partial surrender of sovereignty by each State coming 
into the new Federation; nor would it entertain proposals involving only the 
representation of the State in external affairs and its defence against external 
aggression, whilst permitting the State to enjoy complete internal self-government. He 
indicated that in his view this was contrary to the basis of federation which had been 
agreed between his Government and the British. When the delegations met again the 
following day Tun Abdul Razak put forward broad counter proposals: a federation 
with a strong central Government, but with the States enjoying a measure of 
autonomy. He told the Brunei delegation that if Brunei desired to participate in the 
Malaysia Plan, it must join the new federation and accept the implications in relation 
to partial surrender of sovereignty and control in essential matters by the central 
Government, including: external affairs; defence; internal security and financial 
policy.168
Tun Abdul Razak said that the Federation Government's aim was that all States 
would be treated alike. However when the Brunei delegation pointed out that 
Singapore was to be accorded special status in the new federation, Tun Abdul Razak 
replied that Singapore was a special case because of its economic importance and
167BA/14191/78, Report on Discussions between the Brunei Delegation and the 
Government of the Federation of Malaya held in Kuala Lumpur on 25 and 26
September 1962, 29 September 1962.
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particular racial complexion. He added that Singapore also had for some time enjoyed 
democratic government. When asked whether this meant that, in the event of Brunei 
having full representative and responsible government, its claim to similar special 
treatment would be recognised, Tun Abdul Razak gave no clear answer but indicated 
that this would certainly be a factor for consideration. When it appeared that the 
Government o f the Federation was not prepared to consider the participation of Brunei 
in the Malaysia Plan except on the basis of Brunei agreeing in principle to enter the 
new Federation as a member State, and thus accepting the implications to sovereignty 
and control, the discussions were concluded. The Brunei delegation returned "in 
dudgeon" to Brunei.169
On 29 September 1962 Dato Lawson submitted a report on the outcome of the 
Kuala Lumpur meeting to the Government which laid out three alternatives for Brunei. 
They were: a. To withdraw from the Malaysia Plan and to seek full independence 
from the British Government or to remain under British protection as to external 
affairs and defence, b. To await the establishment of the Malaysia Federation and at
V
a later date, if so desired, to seek to enter it. c. To accept Federation plan in principle 
and to negotiate the appropriate safeguards.170 It was later reported by a British 
official that the delegation gave the Sultan unanimous advice to reject the invitation 
to join the Malaysia Federation, and to seek full independence. However, the Sultan
]69Ibid.- CO 1030/10932, item 11, J.D.Higham to A.A.Gold, 19 February 1963.
170BA/14191/78, Report on Discussions between the Brunei Delegation and the 
Government of the Federation of Malaya held in Kuala Lumpur on 25 and 26 
September 1962, 29 September 1962.
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reserved his position.111 He sent a delegation of observers to the Inter-Governmental 
Committee meetings, which began on 22 October, in Jesselton.172 The Committee, 
whose members comprised representatives of the Governments of Britain, Malaya, 
North Borneo and Sarawak, was set up to work out the future constitutional 
arrangements for Malaysia and the form of safeguards for North Borneo and Sarawak. 
It was under the chairmanship o f Lord Landsdowne, the British Minister of State for 
Colonial Affairs, and its deputy chairman was Tun Abdul Razak. The North Borneo 
Legislative Council and the Sarawak Council Negeri had meanwhile passed resolutions 
welcoming in principle the decision to establish Malaysia by 31 August 1962.173
While the Sultan and his advisers were pondering on the alternatives for the 
future of Brunei, the Malayans decided to talk to the PRB, to bring Brunei into the 
Federation of Malaysia. In early October a delegation of UMNO members, which 
included two Malayan Cabinet Ministers (Ghafar bin Baba and Dato Senu bin Abdul 
Rahman) came to Brunei to woo the PRB and to extend Tunku Abdul Rahman’s 
invitation for a meeting in Kuala Lumpur. After the impasse with the Brunei 
Government the Malayans seem to have accepted that they had little alternative but 
to talk to the PRB which had the solid support of the people in Brunei. Thus, around 
the time when the Sultan officially opened the first meeting of the new Legislative
Council, in which sixteen elected members of his Party were included (10 October
)
\
171CO 1030/1076, item 6, Sir Dennis White to Secretary of State, 20 December 
1962; CO 1030/932, item 11, J.D.Higham to A.A.Golds, 19 February 1963.
]72Pelita Brunei, 7 November 1962.
173James P.Ongkili, The Borneo Response to Malaysia 1961-1962, Singapore, 
Donald Moore Press LTD, 1967, pp.74-75. The North Borneo Legislative Council 
passed the resolution on 12 September and the Sarawak Council Negeri on 26 
September.
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1962), Azahari slipped off quietly to meet Tunku Abdul Rahman in Kuala Lumpur.
Azahari claimed to have put forward to the Tunku a list o f demands as a basis 
for negotiations prior to merger. They were: unification of North Borneo, Brunei and 
Sarawak under a new state to be called Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara or the 
Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara; recognition of the Sultan of Brunei as the 
sovereign constitutional head of Kalimantan Utara to be known as Sri Mahkota; free 
and democratic elections to be held in Kalimantan Utara to elect a responsible 
government; and independence for Kalimantan Utara. When these demands had been 
agreed, discussions shpuld be held between the Government of Kalimantan Utara and 
the Government of Malaya to bring about the Federation o f Malaysia, based on two 
equal partners. Azahari said the Tunku asked him for three weeks to think about the 
proposals.174
Following this meeting Azahari said that while he was travelling by train from 
Kuala Lumpur to Johore, Tun Abdul Razak, who happened to be travelling on the 
same train, invited him to his first class compartment. Prompted by a question about 
his demands to the Tunku, Azahari claims that Tun Abdul Razak said:
"You are a Malay leader; I am a Malay leader; and the Tunku is a Malay 
leader. Why do we not just unite and lead our Malay people to the future.
V
The Tunku remains as the Prime Minister; I would be the First Deputy Prime 
Minister, and you would be the Second Deputy Prime Minister".175 
He also claimed that on that occasion Tun Abdul Razak suggested the Tunku might 
be prepared to consider allowing one or two of Azahari's friends in the PRB to be
174Interview with Azahari, February 1993.
115 Ibid.
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included in the Federal Cabinet. Azahari told Tun Abdul Razak that this could 
certainly be discussed when Malaysia had been formed, but he would not sacrifice his 
principles for "political bribery".176
If  Azahari's story is accepted there was probably one important factor which 
influenced his stand on Malaysia from the time he left Brunei to the time he met the 
Tunku. Despondent after the Sultan gave him a cold shoulder, Azahari was prepared 
to discuss Brunei's entry into Malaysia with the Malayans. However just when the 
discussion was about to be held, he probably received a message from Stephen Yong 
of SUPP informing him that he (Stephen Yong) had received a letter from the United 
Nations dated 8 October, saying that their Joint Memorandum had been considered by 
the United Nation Sub-Committee on Petitions, and that the latter had decided to 
forward it to the Committee of Twenty-Four for a hearing. The petitioners were 
requested to send their representatives as soon as the date had been fixed for the 
meeting o f the Committee.177 This was a significant development for Azahari, who 
might yet see his dream of creating Kalimantan Utara come true. Thus he reverted 
to his policy of unification of the Borneo territories.
The "detente" between the PRB and the Malayans had been watched with 
anxiety by the Sultan and his advisers. Immediately on his return from Malaya, 
probably towards the end of October, Azahari says that he was summoned to the 
Palace. When he arrived there he was received by the Crown Prince, the present ruler, 
who led him to his father's study on the upper floor. During the "four-eyes" meeting, 
Azahari said the Sultan asked him whether it was true that Azahari had met the Tunku
]16Ibid.
1??The letter from the UN is in Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, op.cit., p. 173.
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at Kuala Lumpur, and if he could know what had transpired during the meeting. 
Azahari informed the Sultan that he was invited by the Tunku to discuss his Party's 
demands for Brunei joining the proposed Federation of Malaysia. He told the Sultan 
that he had informed the Tunku that before any discussion on joining the proposed 
Federation could be held the Tunku had to agree to his proposals for the formation of 
an independent Kalimantan Utara, with the Sultan of Brunei as the constitutional ruler. 
Azahari said that the Sultan was happy to hear what transpired at the meeting and 
added that the Sultan gave him his full support. Azahari also said that the Sultan told 
him that he had also received representations from North Borneo and Sarawak asking 
for his agreement to a Federation of Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak and inviting 
him to be the constitutional ruler of the Borneo Federation.178
Assuming Azahari's story is true, several conclusions could be deduced: the 
Sultan had perhaps accepted the inevitable, a constitutional form of government; 
perhaps the Sultan had rejected the Malaysia Plan and looked to Borneo for solutions 
to security and stability for the future of his small Sultanate, which meant he accepted 
the federation of the three Borneo territories which he had fiercely opposed in the 
past; perhaps the Sultan merely used Azahari as leverage to extract more concessions 
from the Malayans; perhaps the Sultan was merely distracting Azahari from joining 
forces with the Malayans at his expense; or perhaps the Sultan, like Azahari, wanted 
to wreck the Malaysia Plan.
Meanwhile Azahari's plan to present a united voice of the three Borneo 
territories in the United Nations faced an obstacle when G.S.Sundang, of the Pasok 
Momogun Party, withdrew his name from the joint petition to the world body.
,78Interview with Azahari, February 1993.
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Sundang was under pressure to withdraw from the PRB-led action, both from the 
Malayans and the British who did not want any distraction from their plan to create 
a Malaysia Federation by 31 August 1963. He also faced pressure from some leaders 
within his own Party and the leaders of the other four parties in North Borneo, who 
wanted to maintain a united voice in order to get the best possible concessions from 
the Malayans during the Inter-Government Committee meeting which was about to 
take place.179 Without Sundang, Azahari's case could not be sustained: there was no 
representative to speak on behalf of the people in North Borneo. But Azahari hoped 
that Sundang would change his mind and said that if Sundang stuck to his principles 
the people of North Borneo would support him in his anti-Malaysia stand.180
However Azahari believed that Sundang's problem was not as pressing as the 
problem of the Philippines' claim to North Borneo. The Philippines' claim, which was 
based on the proprietaiy rights of the heirs of Sultan Jamalul Kiram of Sulu Sultanates 
to a portion of North Borneo, was made official by President Macapagal in June 
1962.181 Macapagal called on the British and the Malayan Governments to discuss the
l79The news of Sundang's decision to withdraw from the joint petition was first 
revealed by Dr.Lim Swee Aun, the Federation of Malaya Minister of Commerce and 
Industry after returning from North Borneo. Claiming to have a signed statement from 
the leader of the Pasok Momogun Party, the Minister said the Party had decided to 
join the Alliance of the four other parties to back the Malaysia Plan. See: The Borneo 
Bulletin, 20 October 1962.
noThe Borneo Bulletin., 27 October 1962.
I810 n  the Philippines' claim to North Borneo (Sabah) see among others: Ariff, 
Mohamed O., The Philippines' Claim to Sabah: Its Historical, Legal and Political 
Implications, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1970; Lela Gamer Noble, 
Philippine Policy Toward Sabah. A Claim to Independence, Arizona, The University 
of Arizona Press, 1977; Nicholas Tarling, Sulu and Sabah: A Study o f  British Policy 
Towards the Philippines and North Borneo from the Late Eighteenth Century, Kuala 
Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1978.
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matter. But the British refused to entertain the call because they recognised that the 
Philippines had little legal justification and the claim was strongly opposed by the 
people in North Borneo. The fact that the claim was put forward at the time when the 
British and Malayan Governments were almost reaching an agreement on the 
formation of the Malaysia Federation, which included the North Borneo territory, 
suggests that the Filipinos were anxious over their security rather than voicing a 
genuine national aspiration. Azahari knew the arguments for the claim by the 
Filipinos. In late October Azahari, accompanied by two senior members of his Party, 
flew to Manila in a mission to "neutralise" the Philippines’ claim and to turn the 
dispute to his advantage.182
In Manila Azahari and his colleagues were guests of Nacasio Osmena, the legal 
adviser to the heirs of the Sulu Sultan. Discussion between Azahari and his host 
concluded with an understanding that if Kalimantan Utara came into being, with full 
sovereignty over the three Borneo territories, Azahari would be prepared to recognise 
the rights of the Sultan of Sulu's heirs over a portion of North Borneo. However that 
would be possible only if the Philippine Government dropped its claim to North
V
Borneo. This prompted Osmena, who wanted to capitalise on a cash settlement on the 
heirs' rights, to arrange a meeting between Azahari and the Vice President Emmanuel 
Pelaez, who was also the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Azahari explained his Party's 
policy with regard to the Malaysia Plan and to the formation of an independent
,82Interview with Azahari, February 1993; The Borneo Bulletin, 3 November 1962. 
In June 1962 when the Philippines' claim to North Borneo created a storm of protest 
in the territory, Hapidz Laksamana, the Vice President of the PRB, called on the 
British Government to forestall the Filipino claim by making the Sultan of Brunei 
ruler of the three Borneo territories of North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei. See: Ibid., 
30 June 1962.
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Kalimantan Utara. He requested the Philippine Government to drop its claim to North 
Borneo because it had no support in the territory. Instead he requested the Philippine 
Government to lend its support to the struggle of the people in the Borneo territories 
for independence.183 Azahari told Pelaez that he, together with Stephen Yong of 
Sarawak and Sundang of North Borneo, had submitted a Joint Memorandum to the 
United Nations opposing the formation of Malaysia and supporting the formation of 
Kalimantan Utara, that their memorandum had been considered by the United Nations, 
and that he was waiting to appear before the world body to present his case. Azahari 
said later that Pelaez was concerned with the security threat to his country, as the 
result o f the formation of Malaysia Federation, and for that reason his Government 
was calling for the formation of a Confederation of Malaysia which would include the 
Philippines. Azahari told Pelaez that the Kalimantan Utara he envisaged would be a 
strong and viable state because it was based on the people's aspiration rather than 
imposed on the people, like the Malaysia Federation; and he saw it as compatible with 
the Philippines' concept of confederation. Azahari said Pelaez was satisfied with his 
explanation and told him that he (Pelaez) believed his Government would be 
sympathetic to Azahari's request for support.184
The Philippine Government probably saw Azahari's request for support for his 
proposals for the formation of Kalimantan Utara, and to oppose the formation of 
Malaysia, as coming at the right time. President Macapagal and Pelaez knew that
V
183Interview with Azahari, February 1962; The Borneo Bulletin, 10 November 
1962.
184Interviews with Azahari, February 1993 and Haji Zaini, December 1992; Haji 
Zaini Haji Ahmad, Pertumbuhan Nasionalisme di Brunei 1939 - 1962, Kuala Lumpur, 
ZR Publications, 1989, pp. 135-138. Haji Zaini was one of the PRB's leaders involved 
in the discussion.
339
supporting Azahari openly at the United Nations would cause embarrassment to the
British and Malayan Governments, at the time when they needed international support
to realise their Malaysia Plan. President Macapagal and Pelaez seized this opportunity
to their maximum advantage. Firstly it would put pressure on the British to agree for
talks if  only to save face. Secondly, even though the formation of Kalimantan Utara
would be incompatible with their policy on North Borneo, it would be better than to
see the realisation of the Federation of Malaysia, which in any case, would include
North Borneo. They were opposed to the concept of Malaysia because they believed
it would endanger Philippines security
\
"on the grounds that the island chain found comfort and protection in their 
isolation from the mainland; to link the three Borneo territories juridically with 
a weak mainland Power, which might easily be overwhelmed by Red China 
meant danger to Filipino shores".185 
They would rather see the formation of an independent State of the three Borneo 
territories, which could not only "act as a buffer between the Philippines and 
Indonesia" but also could "prevent contamination [communism] spreading from fellow 
travellers in Singapore".186
The first sign of a positive reaction from the Philippines Government to 
Azahari's request for support came when the Philippine Ambassador in the United 
Nations said that his Government would stop Britain from transferring North Borneo 
to Malaysia. Following Azahari's line the Ambassador said "the present transfer 
arrangements contained no provision for the exercise of self-determination by the
,85CO 1030/1068, item 100, Manila to Foreign Office, 9 December 1962.
186CO 1030/1071, item 315, Manila to Foreign Office, 12 December 1962.
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North Borneo people".187 Azahari, for his part, tuning to the Filipinos' anxiety over 
its security, said, "the entry into Malaysia of Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei 
would throw those countries wide open to insidious in roads by the Red menace". He 
also said that after the formation of an independent Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara 
"a Confederation of Malaysia could be formed, as envisaged by President 
Macapagal".188
While in the Philippines Azahari was gaining support from politicians including 
the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Philippine Congress, Veleral and Pendatun 
respectively, who promised to help to lobby the American Congressmen and Senators 
to counter the influence of the British in the United Nations. Osmena also introduced 
Azahari to Hermenegildo Atienza, a Political Adviser to President Macapagal and the 
Commissioner o f Repatriation. Encouraged by this overwhelming support and 
sympathy from the Filipinos, and probably on their advice, Azahari instructed his 
Party in Brunei to introduce anti-Malaysia motions in the Legislative Council, which 
was due to meet on 5 and 6 December 1962.189 Thus on 24 November the PRB wrote 
to the Speaker of the Council and asked for the inclusion of its motions at the 
forthcoming meeting. kThe motions were: that the British Government should revoke 
the Malaysia Plan on the ground that it formed a denial o f the right of self- 
determination; that the Council give its mandate to the representatives of the PRB to 
bring the aspirations of the people before the United Nations; that North Borneo and 
Sarawak be returned to the sovereignty of the Sultan of Brunei; that the two territories,
n iThe Borneo Bulletin, 1 December 1962.
m Ibid., 8 December 1962.
18977*e Borneo Bulletin, 10 November 1962.
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with Brunei, form a llnitary State of Kalimantan Utara; that the Sultan of Brunei be 
installed as the Constitutional Ruler of the Kalimantan Utara; that Kalimantan Utara 
should have a democratic form of government; and that full independence should be 
granted in 1963.190 As will be seen in the next chapter these motions were summarily 
rejected by the Speaker, and the consequences were devastating.
k
190Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, op.cit., pp. 183-191; The Borneo Bulletin, 1 December
1962.
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CHAPTER 8
THE REBELLION, PACIFICATION AND NORMALISATION
The period September to December 1962 was one of the most critical periods 
in the political and constitutional development o f Brunei. During this period the 
leading political party; the Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB), sought a bigger role in the 
political decision-making process and this had serious implications. Further, Brunei 
was under pressure to decide on its entry into the Malaysia Federation. The period 
marked a turning point in Brunei's modem history as it determined the shape of the 
emerging nation. This chapter will examine the events leading to the outbreak of the 
rebellion in December 1962, the steps taken to suppress it and the constitutional and 
political developments that followed.
8.1 The Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara and the Rebellion
V . . .
While pursuing constitutional means of achieving their aims Azahari and some 
leaders of the PRB had formed an underground movement called the Tentera Nasional 
Kalimantan Utara (TNKU) or the National Army of North Kalimantan. Its formation 
was a direct response to Tunku Abdul Rahman's Malaysia Plan, which was against the 
PRB's objective of forming an independent federation of the Borneo territories called 
Kalimantan Utara. Both the Sultan and the Tunku had underestimated the PRB's 
commitment to Kalimantan Utara. In his endeavour to bring the Borneo territories 
under the Malaysia Federation the Tunku had alienated the PRB. The Sultan's refusal
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to discuss the Constitutional changes and the Malaysia issue with the PRB leaders 
offended the Party. When the Sultan announced at the end of July 1961 that he had 
decided to postpone the elections scheduled for September for a year the PRB 
suspected that both the Sultan and the Tunku were planning to bring Brunei into the 
Federation without consulting the people. This apprehension led to the PRB's decision 
to form the TNKU in August 1961 with the main objective of opposing the formation 
of Malaysia and bringing about the realisation of Kalimantan Utara.
The TNKU was a military wing of the PRB. The responsibility for organising 
the movement was given to a small committee within the leadership of the Party under 
the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, Yassin Affandi. Among the members of 
the committee were Hidup bin Awang Besar, Jais bin Haji Karim, Mesir bin Keruddin, 
Abdullah bin Jaafar and Shiekh Osman bin Shiekh Mahmaud.1 Interestingly Jais bin 
Haji Karim had been one of the leaders of an underground movement in October 1953 
which plotted to over throw the British Administration in Brunei.2 In an interview in 
February 1993 Azahari claimed that, although he gave his approval he was not directly 
involved in organising the TNKU.3
The TNKU leaders decided to provide military training for their members. It 
is not known whether this was a response to the fact that sixty recruits o f the Brunei 
Malay Regiment had been undergoing military training in Malaya since the middle of
'Interviews with Azahari, February 1993; Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and 
June 1993; Mesir bin Keruddin, December 1992; and Jais bin Haji Karim, April 1993.
2See above page 124.
interview , February 1993.
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the previous year.4 But both Azahari and Yassin Affandi later insisted that the main 
objective of the TNKU was to defend the new state of Kalimantan Utara.5 The plan 
was that once Kalimantan Utara achieved independence, presumably by constitutional 
means, the TNKU would become a regular army. In December 1961 Azahari, Yassin 
Affandi, and Abdullah bin Jaafar attended the Partindo (Partai o f Indonesia) Congress 
in Jakarta. Azahari and Yassin Affandi claim that Partindo adopted a resolution 
supporting the PRB's struggle for the independence of Kalimantan Utara.6 It is likely 
that during this time some understanding may have been reached between the PRB 
leaders and certain Indonesian politicians on assistance (in terms of training and 
weapons) to the TNKU. Many Indonesians might have sympathised with the PRB 
because they were concerned with the Malaysia Plan which had been agreed by the
i
British and Malayan Governments in November 1961. In addition the Indonesians had 
a declared policy of supporting nationalist movements wherever, and whoever, they 
were. It was probably through the leaders of the Partindo that the plight of Azahari 
was brought to the attention of the Indonesian leadership.
In March 1962 Azahari and Yassin again went to Jakarta. This time they claim 
that they met Brigadier-General Sambas Atmadinata, the Minister o f Veteran's Affairs, 
and General Nasution, the Minister of Defence and Security and Chief of Staff of the
4The first batch of the Brunei Malay Regiment was sent for training in Malaya on 
31 May 1961. See: The Borneo Bulletin, 3 June 1961.
5In separate interviews: Azahari in February 1993 and Yassin Affandi in December 
1992 and June 1993 claim that when they first formed the TNKU in August 1961 a 
rebellion was only a remote possibility. Both say that the main objective of TNKU 
was to form an army for the preparation for achieving an independent new State of 
Kalimantan Utara.
interview s with Azahari, February 1993 and Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and 
June 1993.
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Armed Forces. Azahari explained to the top military leaders that the aim of his Party 
was to struggle for an independent Kalimantan Utara but that the British were 
determined to force the people of the territories to join the Malaysia Federation. For 
that reason he came to Indonesia to seek assistance in training and weapons for the 
freedom fighters o f Kalimantan Utara. Azahari and Yassin claim that both Sambas 
and Nasution were sympathetic to their struggle and were prepared to receive a 
number o f TNKU recruits for immediate military training in Jakarta.7
In mid-April 1962 more than twenty young men, mostly from Kilanas and 
Temburong and a few from Kampong Ayer, were secretly sent to Jakarta for military 
training. Due to a lack of funds to pay for their air passage most o f the TNKU 
recruits were sent by land, trekking across the Borneo jungle to Tarakan in the 
Kalimantan Indonesia from where they travelled by sea to Jakarta. A guide from 
Kalimantan was engaged to lead the recruits through the jungle track. Some eight 
recruits were sent by air; but their fares were paid in part by the recruits themselves.8
After trekking for about twenty-one days the recruits reached Malinau, a 
military post in Kalimantan. As they did not have proper travelling documents, the 
recruits were arrested by the district Military Commander and ordered to march back 
to where they came from. But when they reached Merapok, a small town in the 
Lawas district of the Fifth Division of Sarawak from where they had begun their trek, 
they were ordered to march back again by Yassin Affandi after he promised to rectify 
the problem with the higher authorities in Jakarta. Yassin sent his representative,
1Ibid.
interview s with Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and June 1993; and Mesir bin 
Keruddin, December 1992.
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Mohammad bin Haji Mangol, to receive the recruits in Manilau and to arrange for 
their immediate departure to Jakarta. An additional twenty or more recruits were also 
sent for training.9
The second batch of the TNKU recruits contained a number of young men 
from the Lawas district o f Sarawak and the Sipitang district o f North Borneo. The 
people in these areas, particularly along the coast, were mainly Brunei Malays, 
Kedayans and Bisayas. They were closely linked, socially, culturally and 
economically, with Malays in Brunei. In fact these "Brunei societies" covered the area 
from Weston in North Borneo (including the Labuan Island) through the whole of the 
Fifth Division of Sarawak and Brunei to Sibuti in the Fourth Division of Sarawak. 
It was understandable that most of the people from these areas opposed the Malaysia 
Plan and expressed their desire to be brought closer to Brunei. But when they found 
that the channels for expression were closed they decided to join the TNKU.
In January 1962 the Malays in Labuan submitted an application to register a 
political party, the Angkatan Desa Bersatu, whose aims, among others, were: closer 
association of the Borneo territories in accordance with the old Sovereignty of the 
Sultan of Brunei; the formation of a United States of Borneo under the Sultan of 
Brunei, prior to consideration of Malaysia; and the return of Labuan to Brunei.10 
But the application was rejected by the Government of North Borneo. Their appeals 
in July, August and October 1962 were also rejected. The authorities found out that
9Ibid.\ Interviews with Mohammad bin Haji Manggol, January 1993 and Baha bin 
Momin, April 1993. Baha bin Momin was one of the recruits who went to 
Kalimantan by land.
10CO 1030/932, item 11B, Local Intelligence Report, North Borneo, November 
1962.
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the proposed party had close connections with the PRB. In May 1962 the people in 
the Sipitang district also attempted to register an organisation known as Angkatan 
Rakyat Sabah but their application was also rejected on the same grounds.11
When the Cobbold Commission visited Lawas district in March 1962, to 
ascertain the views of the people on the Malaysia Plan, the Barisan Pemuda Sarawak 
branch in the district went against its parent organisation in Kuching and handed a 
memorandum to the Commission opposing the Malaysia Plan and declaring its support 
for an independent union of the Borneo territories.12 The Commission also received 
a similar memorandum from the people in Limbang district; and in February a group 
o f people in the latter district, claiming to represent the views of over eight thousand 
natives, sent a letter to the Sarawak Government (with a copy to the British and 
Brunei Governments) demanding the return of Limbang to Brunei before the creation 
o f the Malaysia Federation.13
Meanwhile the TNKU recruits had reached Manilau. This time they were not 
deported but confined^to Manilau until Mohammad bin Manggol came to take them 
to Jakarta. Unfortunately while waiting for the recruits to arrive, Mohammad ran into 
trouble with the local Military Commander in Tarakan, who suspected him of being 
a foreign spy after he took some pictures with his camera. Mohammad was detained 
and released only in March 1963 when President Sukarno needed a stalking-horse for 
his "crush Malaysia campaign". Further he claims that he was known under different
"Ibid.
]2The Borneo Bulletin, 17 March 1962.
uIbid., 24 March J962.
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name in Indonesia which led to some confusion when the recruits asked for him.14 
After three months without contact with Mohammad, some of the recruits began to 
lose patience and decided to return to Brunei by trekking back along the same route.15
When the TNKU recruits reached Brunei in mid-August 1962, the election 
fever was at its height and the Malaysia Plan was the main issue. The Sultan had 
announced his acceptance of the Malaysia Plan in principle, and the Legislative 
Council had given its mandate to the Sultan to negotiate with the Malayan and British 
Governments the terms and conditions for Brunei's entry into the Federation. There 
was no time to ponder over what had gone wrong with the TNKU training programme 
in Indonesia; it had to organise its own training.
Thus from the end of August more young men were recruited and secret 
training grounds were set up in jungle clearings all over the State, and in the adjacent 
areas of North Borneo and Sarawak where the PRB supporters were strong. In order 
to avoid detection the TNKU was organised into several areas and each area 
comprised several independent units. The central committee of the TNKU had little 
control over the various units. Each unit was responsible for its own recruitment and 
training. Each unit was linked to the central committee through the area commander 
who was usually the PRB branch leader. The training of the recruits was done, in the 
evening after work or at night, by some of its own members who had some training 
as former police constables or who underwent military training during the Japanese
1 interview  with Mohammad bin Maggol, January 1993.
l5There were not more than fifteen recruits left behind. Among them was Baha 
bin Momin who said some time after the rebellion broke out in Brunei they were 
given training by the Indonesian Military and sent to the border with several hundred 
Indonesian volunteers during the "Konfrantasi". Interview with Baha bin Momin, 
April 1993.
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occupation. Training mainly consisted of drill, combat techniques, and silat - an art 
of self-defence. Because of a lack of funds the TNKU had no weapons other than a 
few shotguns; during the training the trainees used "dummy guns". Meagre finance 
came mainly from branch funds, through subscriptions and the proceeds of sales of the 
PRB emblems and badges and of Azahari's picture.16
As the date for the formation of Malaysia approached, the TNKU activities 
increased. Members of the TNKU and training grounds increased, which made them 
more liable to detection by the authorities. In early September 1962 the authorities 
in North Borneo discovered "twenty-three wooden rifles and half-used bamboo torch" 
from "a clearing-cum-parade ground" in Sipitang district, and in mid-November from 
another parade ground in the same district. On the 20 November the North Borneo 
Police received information from its counterpart in Brunei
"that during the past two or three weeks, a considerable number of young 
Malays between the ages of 20 and 35 had been buying shirts and slacks made 
of green material... [and there was] ...an increase in the sales o f jungle hats, 
Army webbing haversacks and sheath knives".17 
On 22 November 1962 the Police in Brunei discovered a "parade ground" in
v
Temburong district and a bag containing a flag and some documents related to the 
PRB. These discoveries culminated in the arrest on 25 November of seven persons in 
Lawas district in Sarawak and the further arrest of four persons from the same area 
two days later. From the interrogations of the prisoners, and from uniforms, badges
16CO 1030/1068, Minutes of Intelligence Meeting held at Lawas on 28 November 
1962.
17CO 1030/932, item 11B, Local Intelligence Report, North Borneo, November 
1962.
350
and documents discovered in the their possession, the authorities for the first time had 
evidence of the existence of the TNKU movement. Although they found that it was 
connected with the PRB in Brunei the authorities failed to get definite proof o f its link 
with the Central Committee of the Party.18
The arrests in Lawas caused panic and tension among the members and leaders 
of the TNKU in Brunei. They feared that the arrests had exposed their organisation 
and believed that it was just a matter of time before the authorities acted against them. 
Some leaders of the TNKU strongly demanded that the rebellion be launched 
immediately.19 This critical situation prompted Hapidz Laksamana, the Deputy 
President, Yassin Affandi, the Secretary-General, and Pengiran Metussin, a member 
of the Central Committee of the PRB, to fly to Manila immediately to confer with 
Azahari, who was in Manila discussing with Filipino politicians on Manila's claim to 
North Borneo and his plan to go the United Nations.20 On hearing about the discovery 
o f the TNKU in Lawas, Azahari was shocked and furious. He instructed Yassin to 
send a coded cable immediately to Hidup bin Awang Besar, Deputy Secretary-General 
of the PRB ordering the TNKU not to act until he returned from the United Nations, 
which meant at least until Christmas when the United Nations General Assembly 
ended.21 This probably means that the rebellion was to be launched if he failed to stop
18CO 1030/1068, Minutes of Intelligence Meeting held at Lawas on 28 November 
1962.
19Interview with Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and June 1993; Mesir bin 
Keruddin, December 1992; and Jais bin Haji Karim, March 1993.
20See pages 338-341.
21Probably this was the reason why the interrogation of rebels in Limbang after 
the rebellion indicated the rebellion was originally planned to coincide with Christmas. 
See: CO 1030/1073, item 432A, Sarawak to Colonial Office, 15 December 1962.
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the formation of Malaysia in the United Nations. He asked the three leaders to return 
to Brunei immediately to calm the TNKU. He instructed Hapidz Laksamana to 
contact Stephen Yong of SUPP and G.S.Sundang of Pasok Momogun Party to urge 
them to proceed immediately to the United Nations. Azahari also gave Hapidz 
Laksamana a letter from the Kiram Corporation, to be delivered to the Sultan of 
Brunei, proposing an agreement on transferring the Sultan of Sulu's heirs rights over 
North Borneo to the Sultan of Brunei in return for compensation.22 He asked Yassin 
Affandi to proceed with the plan to hold the North Kalimantan People's Conference 
against Malaysia, and1 specifically instructed him to secure resolutions rejecting the 
Malaysia Plan and calling for unification of the three territories. This was to 
strengthen his case in the United Nations.23
When Hapidz Laksamana, Yassin Affandi and Pengiran Metussin reached 
Brunei, probably at the end of November or in early December, the atmosphere was 
tense. Many TNKU members had gone into hiding. Tension increased when on 3 
December the Speaker of the Legislative Council informed the PRB that their anti- 
Malaysia motions could not be accepted because they concerned the British and 
Malayan Governments and the Council was not competent to discuss them (see page 
342-343).24 At the same time the Speaker decided to postpone the meeting of the 
Council from 5 December to 19 December. No particular reason was given for the
22A copy of the letter is in Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, Partai Rakyat Brunei: Selected 
Documents, Kuala Lumpur, INS AN, 1987, p. 181.
23Interview with Azahari, February 1993; Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and 
June 1993.
24The letters from the Speaker are in Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, op.cit., pp. 183-191; 
See also The Borneo Bulletin, 1 December 1962.
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postponement. But interestingly the Inter-Governmental Committee, which was 
meeting in Jesselton to discuss the constitutional arrangements and the form of 
safeguards for North Borneo and Sarawak under the Malaysia Federation, was 
scheduled to conclude its Kuala Lumpur meeting on 20 December. It was probably not 
a coincidence.
If  the PRB's motions got through the Legislative Council it would not only be 
an embarrassment to the British and Malayan Governments but it would also annul the 
mandate given to the Sultan by the Legislative Council to discuss Brunei's entry into 
the Malaysia Federation. Significantly Sir Dennis White made an analysis of the 
composition of the Legislative Council on 27 October and found it was 
"overwhelmingly anti-Mai ay si a".25 Therefore it was not in the Government's interest 
to allow the PRB motions to be tabled in the Legislative Council, at least until the 
meetings of the Inter-Governmental Committee concluded.
On 1 December the Tunku told the British High Commissioner in Kuala 
Lumpur that he had received information from the Legal Adviser o f Brunei (Dato 
Abdul Aziz) and from a Malayan member of Staff of Radio Brunei who had just 
returned to Kuala Lumpur, of plans for an early rebellion organised by the PRB. He 
suggested that the British should be prepared to take emergency action and suggested 
that Lord Selkirk should visit Brunei immediately to asses the situation.26 He told 
Lord Selkirk that unless the British and Brunei Governments were able to protect
25CO 1030/933, item 10, White to J.D.Higham, 27 October 1962.
26CO 1030/1068, item 1, Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth Relations Office, 1
December 1962.
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Malayan officers and their safety he would withdrew them.27 The Commissioner- 
General reassured him that everything was alright. But, the Commissioner-General 
reported, the Tunku was anxious that "any movement [probably against his Malaysia 
Plan] should be nipped in the bud".28 Probably Dato Abdul Aziz had also told the 
Tunku of the PRB's motions and had suggested to him that it was likely that if  the 
motions were defeated the PRB would launch a rebellion. Either the Tunku purposely 
did not tell this to Lord Selkirk or the British did not take it seriously. But it is 
possible that when the British did not take action to "nip" the PRB in the "bud", the 
Tunku instructed the Legal Adviser to advise the Speaker to reject the embarrassing 
motions and to postpone the meeting of the Legislative Council. The purpose was 
either, as suggested earlier, to avoid embarrassment or to provoke the PRB and TNKU 
to create trouble in order to allow action to be taken against them and stop Azahari 
from going to the United Nations to campaign against the Malaysia Plan. But 
interestingly in a statement to the Malayan Parliament three days after the rebellion 
the Tunku said:
"The rebellion has every indication of being preconceived for some time. In 
fact it was planned to occur after Party Ra'ayat's motion has been rejected by 
the Legislative Council. Unfortunately the Legislative Council [meeting] was 
postponed and hence the rebellion broke out for the purpose not originally 
intended (sic)".29
27CO 1030/1073, item 457, A Translation of the Statement made by Tunku Abdul 
Rahman in the Malayan Parliament on 11 December 1962.
28CO 1030/1068, item 1, Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth Relations Office, 1 
December 1962; Ibid., item 8, Lord Selkirk to the Colonial Office, 3 December 1962.
29CO 1030/1073, item 457, "A Translation of the Statement made by Tunku Abdul 
Rahman in the Malayan Parliament on 11 December 1962" issued by the Malayan
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Whatever the motives or whether the PRB had any plan such as the Tunku 
suggested, the postponement of the Legislative Council and the rejection of the PRB's 
motions aggravated the tense atmosphere. They justified the views of those within the 
PRB who favoured confrontation to achieve their aims. This was the last straw for 
the militant members of the PRB. Probably on 4 or 5 December Sheikh Osman, the 
younger brother of Azahari who held the rank of "Brigadier-General" in the TNKU, 
was despatched to seek the go ahead from Azahari, who had returned from Manila to 
his family in Johore.30
It is not known what transpired during the meeting between Sheikh Osman and 
Azahari. However, Azahari said later that he was furious and begged his brother and 
the TNKU leaders to reconsider the decision to rebel. But Sheikh Osman told him 
that, whether he liked it or not, the rebellion was now no longer avoidable. Osman 
advised Azahari not to return to Brunei, but warned that he must support their cause 
or otherwise they would label him a "traitor". After hugging each other the two 
brothers parted in tears.31
There is no w^y to verify Azahari's story, because Shiekh Osman was killed 
in a shootout with the security forces in May 1963. But what seems to have happened 
is that Azahari departed with his wife, child and father-in-law to Manila from 
Singapore on the Friday morning, 7 December 1962.32 That afternoon he cabled
Information Department on the same day.
30Azahari was reported arrived in Singapore from Manila on 30 November. See: 
Straits Times, 1 December 1962.
3,Interview with Azahari, February 1993.
32Azahari was reported to have left by air for Manila from Singapore at 10.15 
hours on Friday, 7 December 1962. See: CO 1030/1068, item 48, Kuala Lumpur to
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orders to start the rebellion from Manila and instructed that communications with him 
should be channelled through Nacasio Osmena.33 What had changed Azahari's mind, 
if  it had indeed changed? It was reported that he saw Lim Chin Siong, the leader of 
Barisan Sosialis of Singapore, the day before he left for Manila.34 Did Azahari seek 
advice from him? He may also have sought advice from his lawyer friend, Osmena, 
as soon as he arrived, in Manila. Probably the argument for rebellion was that it 
would help to focus international attention on Brunei, and thus would strengthen 
Azahari's case in the United Nations. Another possibility is that he was informed by 
Zaini bin Haji Ahmad, who arrived in Singapore from Brunei on 6 December, that the 
authorities were contemplating some actions against the PRB leaders.
Lord Selkirk was in Brunei on the same day, having discussions with the 
Sultan prompted by the Tunku's complaints about the imminent outbreak o f rebellion 
in the State. Among the decisions agreed upon were: to bring in a Malayan Special 
Branch Officer; to extend beyond the end of the month the stay of the Malayan Police 
contingent in Brunei; to bring in a military liaison officer from the British force in
k
Singapore; and to establish a consultative committee with Sarawak and North Borneo 
to review action against the TNKU. The Commissioner-General said that during the 
meeting, the Menteri Besar, who had no doubt of the association between Party akyat 
and Azahari and TNKU, suggested taking repressive measures against the PRB
Commonwealth Relations Office, 8 December 1962.
33Manila Chronical, 8 December 1962; CO 1030/1068, item 90, Manila to Foreign
Office, 9 December 1962.
34CO 1030/1068, item 98, Commissioner-General to Foreign Office and Colonial
Office, 9 December 1962.
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leaders.35 In a close society such as Brunei - moreover Zaini's father was one of the 
Sultan's advisers - it possible that information my have leaked from the meeting 
prompting Zaini's expeditious exit from Brunei.36 This convinced Azahari of what 
Sheikh Osman had told him: that the rebellion must be launched before the authorities 
made a move against the PRB and the TNKU.
Once the orders from Azahari were received they were passed by couriers to 
TNKU's Commanders, State wide, and to the adjacent areas in North Borneo and 
Sarawak. "About mid-day" on 7 December the Acting High Commissioner in Brunei 
"was informed on the 'safe' telephone by Mr. Linton, the Shell Managing 
Director in Seria, that the Resident, Miri [Sarawak], Mr. Fisher, had received 
what he regarded as reliable information that a revolt was timed to start in the 
early hours of Saturday morning".37 
The information was passed to Lord Selkirk, who was about to embark on a plane to 
Singapore, and to the Dato Marsal, who was with the Commissioner-General at the 
airport. The Menteri Besar immediately relayed the information to the Sultan, who 
ordered the Police to take precautions.38
35CO 1030/1068, item 17, Lord Selkirk to Foreign Office, 7 December 1962.
36During a press conference in Manila on 8 December Zaini, who had only "a pair 
of khaki pants and shirt" with him, related journalists of his narrow escape from 
Brunei after being "tipped off that he was going to be arrested for distributing 
'seditious' propaganda against suspension of the session of the Legislative Council". 
See: The Sunday Chronicle, 9 December 1962.
37CO 1030/1076, item 6, High Commissioner to Secretary of State 20 December
1962. See also CO 1030/1068, item 17, Lord Selkirk to London, 7 December 1962.
38Interview with Dato Marsal, May 1993.
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That evening, 7 December, the TNKU members and their commanders began 
to gather at various secret points in every town to await the start o f the revolt. In 
Brunei Town the focal point was Sumur, on the outskirts of the town. By mid-night 
several hundred TNKU members had gathered in silence in the dark in the mosquito 
infested forest. At exactly two o'clock on Saturday morning, 8 December 1962, 
Yassin Affandi (the Secretary-General of the PRB) in his capacity as the "Overall 
Commander" of the TNKU, read out a proclamation of independence in a simple 
ceremony in front of the TNKU members and some of the PRB leaders. The 
proclamation said:
"The acknowledged leaders of the people of Sarawak, Brunei and North 
Borneo, meeting in the name of Liberty, Justice and Humanity, have this day, 
December 8, 1962, solemnly proclaimed the absolute and complete 
Independence of Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara [the Unitary State of 
North Kalimantan] with Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin as the Constitutional and 
Parliamentary Head of State".39 
The proclamation signalled the start of the rebellion and all units of the TNKU in 
every town came out from hiding and simultaneously attacked local Police Stations 
as they had been instructed to do.40
By daylight all police stations in Brunei except those of Brunei Town and 
Panaga in Seria fell to the TNKU. The Seria Oil field was in the hands o f the TNKU
39The full text of the proclamation is found in Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, Partai 
Rakyat o f  Brunei: Selected Documents, Kuala Lumpur, INSAN, 1987, pp. 197-199.
^Interview with Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and June 1993; Jais bin Haji 
Karim, April 1993; and Mesir bin Keruddin, December 1992. During interviews many 
former leaders and members of the TNKU felt uneasy to refer to the 8 December 
incident as "a rebellion" but "a revolution" or "a war of independence".
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without a single shotk being fired.41 In Sarawak, after a bloody confrontation, the 
Limbang Police Station surrendered. A TNKU force numbering about three hundred, 
occupied Bekenu and Sibuti, the heartland of the movement in Miri district; but it was 
prevented from moving to Miri by a heavy deployment o f police in the town.42 In 
North Borneo the TNKU, numbering about sixty men, overran the Weston Police 
Station; but when they got ready to attack Jesselton they met with a counter-attack 
from the police and surrendered.43
While his men were fighting on the battlefield Azahari was campaigning for 
international support and recognition from Manila. In the morning of 8 December he 
sent a cable to U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, asking for 
recognition of the new state of Kalimantan Utara. He also sent a similar cable to the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in Colombo. He assured them of a 
peaceful takeover by the new Government. In the press conference which followed, 
he stated that a revolution had been successfully staged by his 30,000 members of the 
TNKU and that they effectively controlled twenty big towns in the three Borneo 
territories of North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei. He told the press that the members 
o f the TNKU, whom he described as "pure Bornean freedom fighters", had struck 
because of the tightening pressure by the British on the national movement: 
specifically the insistence o f the British on handing over the three Borneo territories
41 CO 1030/1068, item 24, Acting High Commissioner to Colonial Office, 8 
December 1962.
42CO 1030/1068, item 89, Governor of Sarawak to Secretary of State, 9 December
1962.
43CO 1030/1068, items 22 and 143, North Borneo to Colonial Office, 8 and 10
December 1962 respectively.
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of North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak to the Federation of Malaysia without granting 
the peoples in the three territories the right to self-determination; and the dissolution 
o f the Brunei Legislative Council when it was about to vote on a motion against the 
integration o f the Borneo territories with the Federation of Malaysia. He claimed that 
he had the support of the Sultan of Brunei, who had earlier appointed him as the 
Prime Minister, and as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence, 
of the Revolutionary Government of Kalimantan Utara.44
Azahari issued the manifesto of the Revolutionary Government, which among 
other things said:
It has agreed to accept the Sultan of Brunei as constitutional and parliamentary 
Head of State; it has formed its own army and is well prepared for the defence 
of the country; it will protect the interest of minorities; it will remain a 
member of the Commonwealth of Nations; it will apply for membership o f the 
United Nations; it will immediately seek closer economic, cultural and military 
relations with the Philippines and work for the immediate materialisation o f the 
idea o f the Confederation of Malaysia as proposed by President Diosdado 
Macapagal; its economic policy will be based on national interest and 
aspiration; it will protect the economic interests of both British and foreigners, 
provided they are not in conflict with the national interest; and it recognises 
the individual tight of enterprise.45 
The manifesto concluded with an appeal, in the name of humanitarianism, to the free 
world for assistance and recognition of the Revolutionary Government, which it
4AThe Sunday Chronical, 9 December 1962.
45Ibid.
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stressed was "formed by and for the people of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah (North 
Borneo)" and was "neither foreign-inspired nor influenced.46
8.2 The British Military Intervention
The British were not entirely in the dark of the plan for the rebellion, but they 
were caught by surprise at its speed and scale. On 10 December a Colonial Office 
official told the British Parliament:
"On a number of occasions we have had warnings and information of 
underground activities of various kinds and have also been warned of troubles 
that might break out. But previously these warnings have proved to be 
unfounded".47
In these circumstances Sir Anthony Abell had confidently left Brunei for a long 
holiday in London on 12 November, leaving in charge his A.D.C., W.J.Parks, who 
apparently had no "authority for liaison with the Sultan and the Government".48 
Nevertheless a contingency plan ("Plan Ale") had been in place in Singapore since late 
July 1961 when the High Commissioner had requested military assistance.49 Thus as 
soon as he arrived in Singapore from Brunei on the evening of 7 December after 
receiving information kof the impending rebellion, the Commissioner-General alerted
46Ibid.
47CO 1030/1069, item 209, Colonial Office to New York, 10 December 1962.
48CO 1030/1068, item 17, Commissioner-General to Foreign Office, 7 December 
1962.
49The plan was not put into effect because the emergency situation in Brunei was 
quickly evaporated. See pages 299-300.
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"Plan Ale"; and by morning a force was ready to be sent to Brunei.50 When a signal 
was received from the Menteri Besar, saying that the Sultan wished to invoke the 
protection of the British forces as provided for in the 1959 Agreement, two companies 
of Gurkhas and two minesweepers were immediately despatched to Brunei.51
There was some anxiety, however, about the political and international
I
implications of using British troops in suppression of the rebellion. Even before the 
troops had arrived in Brunei, the Acting High Commissioner had received a message 
from London stating that "the British forces should as far as possible avoid appearance 
of taking political action". They were specifically told that their role was "restoring 
order and protecting of Government".52 It was for this reason that, at the suggestion 
of Lord Selkirk, on 9 December Tunku Abdul Rahman sent a telegram to the Sultan 
"offering all kinds of assistance including military and police".53 Interestingly, after 
chairing an emergency meeting of his Cabinet the previous day, the Tunku, dissatisfied 
at the inability of the British to take adequate precaution measures despite his timely 
warnings, was poised to withdraw all Malayan officers from Brunei. When he was 
told that would cripple Brunei Government, "the Tunku said the Brunei Government 
was already discredited and it was up to the British Government to send British
50CO 1030/1068, item 16, Lord Selkirk to the Governor of Sarawak, 7 December 
1962.
51CO 1030/1068, items 73 and 75, Commander In Chief Far East to Ministry of 
Defence, London, 8 December 1962; ibid., items 26 and 30, Commissioner General 
to Colonial Office, 8 December 1962; ibid., item 150, Singapore to Bangkok, 10 
December 1962.
52CO 1030/1068, item 42, Colonial Office to Acting High commissioner, 8
December 1962.
53CO 1030/1068, item 93, Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth Relations Office, 9
December 1962.
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officers to take over key posts".54 The Sultan preferred police assistance, using a 
number of special branch officers only; but with regard to military assistance the 
Sultan referred the Tunku to the British.55 However, at a meeting in London the same 
day there were some doubts among Whitehall officials about the advisability of 
sending the Malayan troops to Brunei, because it might create anti-Malaya feeling 
locally and therefore work to the disadvantage of the formation of Malaysia 
Federation. It also might be used by the Philippines and the Indonesians to show that 
Malaysia was being forced upon the North Borneo territories without their consent. 
Lord Selkirk was advised to go to Brunei to form his own opinion and report back to 
London.56
However before the Commissioner-General was able to go to Brunei he had 
received news of "a fair number of Gurkha casualties". He told London:
"I am struck by the surprise and co-ordination achieved by the insurgent attack. 
They are trained soldiers and not rabble and obviously have a unified 
command. ...I see no reason for confidence that this will be a short struggle".57 
Consequently a decision was taken to send larger reinforcements to Brunei: no less
54CO 1030/1068, item 48, Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth Relations Office, 8 
December 1962.
55CO 1030/1068, item 93, Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth Relations Office, 9 
December 1962.
56CO 1030/1068, item 162, Minutes of a meeting on Brunei Disturbances at the
Colonial Office, 9 December 1962. The meeting was chaired by the Secretary of State 
for Colonies and attended by Chief of Air Staff, representatives of the Shell Oil 
Company, and members of the Commonwealth Relations Office, Foreign Office, 
Colonial Office and Ministry of Defence.
57CO 1030/1068, item 98, Commissioner-General to Colonial Office and Foreign
Office, 9 December 1962.
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than three battalions of soldiers which included Marine Commandos, a squadron of 
armoured cars and helicopters and light aircraft. By 15 December British troops sent 
to Brunei totalled about four thousand.58 Earlier Whitehall officials agreed that it 
would be "desirable to show more strength than was strictly militarily necessary in 
dealing with the situation".59
Under the weight of such a forceful and swift deployment o f British troops the 
TNKU resistance collapsed rapidly. Against the firepower of the professional British 
soldiers, the "crudely trained" TNKU members were no match, armed with a few rifles 
captured from various Police Stations, shotguns, swords, knives, axes, and amulets 
which supposedly made them invulnerable.
However it was not only the might of the British military which resulted in the 
rapid collapse of the rebellion. The rebellion itself had been launched hastily and 
prematurely, which resulted in confusion, and had no clear objectives other than 
raiding police stations for weapons. In the Brunei Town, apart from the power station, 
most key installations which were important from a military point of view were left 
intact. There was no determined effort to block the airfield, which made it possible 
to bring in a contingent o f the North Borneo Field Force pending the arrival o f the 
British force. The telephone system was working in perfect order, so that the Sultan 
was able to communicate with his advisers and the Commissioner of Police during the 
height of the rebellion.60
58CO 1030/1073, item 462, Ministry of Defence's Report for 15 December 1962.
59CO 1030/1068, item 162, Minutes of a meeting on Brunei Disturbances at the 
Colonial Office, 9 December 1962.
^Interviews with Pengiran Ali and Pengiran Yusuf, April 1993; with Dato Marsal, 
May 1993.
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But the mistake which cost the rebels dearly was leaving the radio station 
intact. Barely six hours after the rebellion had started, the Sultan was on the air 
condemning the rebels and appealing to the people to remain loyal to him and his 
Government. He denied that the rebellion had his support and denounced it as an 
attempt to stage a coup against his Government.61 Sir Dennis White, who returned to 
Brunei on the third day of the rebellion, had "little doubt that the rebels thought the 
Sultan was with them".62 He might be right. Just before the Sultan's radio broadcast,
I
Hapidz Laksamana, the deputy leader of the PRB, accompanied by Pengiran Metussin, 
a senior member of the Party (both of them Members of Legislative and Executive 
Council) had gone to the Palace to hand over the Proclamation of Independence for 
the Sultan to sign, and also the letter from the Kiram Corporation. But the Sultan 
refused to see them. They were asked to see Dato Marsal; when they did, the Menteri 
Besar ordered their arrest.63 Dato Marsal issued warrants for the arrest o f Azahari and 
Zaini for instigating armed rebellion in Brunei.64
The Sultan's broadcast had undermined the rank and file o f the TNKU who had 
believed that they were fighting for the Sultan. In Brunei Town, even before 
reinforcements arrived, a handful of Brunei Police under a British Police Chief 
(N.Outram) had disarmed a large number of the rebels who had neither the will nor
61 Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, Titah: 1959-67, Brunei, Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka, 
1971, pp.147-148.
62CO 1030/1076, item 6, White to Secretary of State, 20 December 1962.
63Interviews with Hapidz Laksamana, May 1993 and Yassin Affandi, December
1992 and June 1993.
64CO 1030/1068, item 26, Acting High Commissioner to Commissioner General,
8 December 1962.
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determination to fight. They were simply marched into a fenced tennis court not far 
from the Police Station and locked up. Only the hard core rebels put up a fight; but 
even they were hoping for the Sultan's support, which they believed would rule out 
any British military intervention and lead to negotiations.65
But once the Sultan called for military assistance the British launched a swift 
and decisive force to put down the rebellion as quickly as possible, in order to avoid 
any international complications. Once Brunei Town was fully secured, a battalion of 
soldiers moved on to relieve the Panaga Police Station at Seria and the Oil Field. 
Although the rebels had threatened to blow up the Oil Field if the British used force 
against them, it remained intact. Other than one killed and a few wounded, when the 
rebels, in their desperation to break the defence of the Panaga Police Station, used 
some of the prisoners from the Oil Company as human shields, most o f the European 
personnel were freed unharmed. Simultaneously the Kuala Belait Police Station was 
retaken. On 12 December the Marine Commandos stormed the stronghold o f the 
TNKU at Limbang. The TNKU put up a brief but sharp resistance which ended in 
ten British casualties - five killed and five wounded - and fifteen rebels killed and 
several wounded. Limbang was the last significant resistance of the TNKU. On 14 
December the Commandos moved to the last town to be relieved, Bangar Town in 
Temburong, without any incident. That signalled the Brunei Rebellion was virtually 
over.66
^Interviews with Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and June 1993; and Jais bin 
Haji Karim, April 1993.
^Interviews with Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and June 1993; and Salleh bin 
Sambas, April 1993. v Salleh bin Sambas was the TNKU Commander in Limbang 
district.
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A large number of the rebels had surrendered when they realised it was futile 
to resist. However, some had retreated into the jungle including the top leaders of the 
TNKU. They intended to escape to Kalimantan in Indonesia, but they had no maps 
or compasses to guide them through the jungle. Moreover they knew that the British 
had sealed off the border to prevent their escape. Thus like many others they hid in 
the jungle hoping that Azahari would be able to raise some support to turn events in 
their favour.67 Mopping up the rebels was the main preoccupation of the British 
troops until the middle of the following year, when all the rebels including Yassin 
Affandi, the "Overall Commander" of the TNKU, were captured. By the end of the 
year the total casualties of the TNKU were estimated at sixty-eight killed and 1,588 
captured; and on the British side seven killed and twenty wounded.68
8.3 Diplomatic Engagement
While combatting the rebellion on the military front, the British were also 
engaged in a swift and decisive diplomatic manoeuvre to counter Azahari's campaign 
for international support. The latter was planning to go to the United Nations on 11 
December, sponsored by the Philippines Government. It seemed that the Philippines 
Department of Foreign Affairs had already asked the American Embassy in Manila for 
visas for Azahari and Zaini.69 Anxious to avoid any complications to their Malaysia
67Interviews with Yassin Affandi, December 1992 and June 1993, Mesir bin 
Keruddin, December 1992 and Jais bin Haji Karim, April 1993.
68CO 1030/1075, item 613, Ministry of Defence's Report on 27 December 1962.
69CO 1030/1068, item 108, Manila to Foreign Office, 9 December 1962.
367
V
Plan, the British used every means to block Azahari's trip to the United Nations.
As soon as the rebellion broke out the British instructed their Ambassador in 
Manila to warn the Philippine Government that they would deplore any statement 
appearing to associate the Philippine Government with Azahari.70 On 9 December, 
Pelaez, the Vice President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, told the British 
Ambassador that his Government's policy was "one of caution and waiting and 
seeing".71 Late on the same day Pelaez issued a press statement that the Philippine 
Government had no official dealings with the "Brunei leaders", who he said were "in 
the Philippines reportedly in transit to the United Nations".72 The British Ambassador 
told London that Pelaez's statement was issued after the American Ambassador met 
President Macapagal and Vice President Pelaez "to urge caution". He added that the 
Ambassador obtained an assurance that they had not entered into any commitment 
with Sukarno.73 The British Ambassador also told London that Pelaez assured him 
that the Philippine Delegation at the United Nations would not help Azahari and his 
Party should they make their way to the United Nations.74
Hence the Philippines Government had reversed its policy towards Azahari. 
Apparently the volte-face was the result not only of the pressures put on them, but 
also because the Filipinos were looking for concessions from the British. In retrospect 
President Macapagal seems to have been calling for talks on the Philippines' claim to
70CO 1030/1068, item 52, Foreign Office to Manila, 8 December 1962.
71 CO 1030/1068, item 101, Manila to Foreign Office, 9 December 1962.
72CO 1030/1068, item 140, Manila to Foreign Office, 10 December 1962.
73CO 1030/1069, item 204, Manila to Foreign Office, 10 December 1962.
74CO 1030/1068, item 140, Manila to Foreign Office, 10 December 1962.
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North Borneo, but the British had consistently ignored him.75 However, on 11 
December, after a talk with President Macapagal, the British Ambassador advised 
London that:
"despite the embarrassing timing I should have thought we ought, after 
obtaining strong American support, to try the face saving talks, ...[with the 
Filipinos]. But I think we should take steps first to obtain firmest assurance 
to ourselves and the Americans that if we do, all involvement, however 
unofficial, in the Azahari affair must cease and that any contact with Indonesia 
over Borneo should be brought to an end".76 
Two days later London agreed to the demand for talks on the understanding:
"that in announcing talks we should make clear there would be no negotiations 
over Philippine claim; we make no move until Brunei rebellion is virtually 
over; Tunku would be again consulted before offer was made. ...we now think 
it most important to win Filipinos away from involvement with Indonesia 
against Malaysia".77
The offer for talks convinced the Philippines Government to shelve Azahari's request 
for recognition of Kalimantan Utara made on 16 December.78
75CO 1030/1068, item 138, Commonweal Relation Office to Canberra, 9 December 
1962.
V
76CO 1030/1070, item 273, Manila to Foreign Office, 11 December 1962.
77CO 1030/1072, item 374, Commonwealth Relations Office to Kuala Lumpur, 13 
December 1962.
78CO 1030/1073, item 440, Manila to Foreign Office, 17 December 1962 and CO 
1030/1074, item 552, Manila to Foreign Office, 19 December 1962.
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While disengaging the Filipinos the British were investigating Azahari's travel 
document and found out that he was holding a British passport, issued in Singapore 
in 1961. On 10 December 1962 the Foreign Office instructed its Ambassador in 
Manila to inform Azahari that his passport facilities had been withdrawn.79 Apparently 
the British had also requested the Americans to turn down Azahari's and Zaini's 
applications for a visa. But the American State Department had warned the British that 
its agreement with the United Nations placed it under an obligation to admit either 
Azahari or Zaini (or both of them) if a request should be made by an appropriate 
organ of United Nations.80
It was probably because of this possibility that the British launched a vigorous 
campaign against Azahari in the United Nations. On 10 December the British 
Ambassador in the United Nations was informed by London that Commonwealth 
Governments and the US Government were being asked to instruct their 
representatives to give appropriate support. The message added: "you will doubtless 
yourself do whatever lobbying you think fit".81 The line taken by the British had been 
that the rebellion was confined to Brunei; that it was not a case of the people o f a 
colonial territory trying to overthrow an alien administration; that the Malaysia 
proposals did not cover Brunei and that no pressure had been put on the Sultan to
79CO 1030/1068, item 158, Foreign Office to Manila, 10 December 1962.
80CO 1030/1070, item 270, Washington to foreign Office, 11 December 1962. The 
Malayan Embassy in Manila had also requested that Azahari and Zaini should not be
admitted to the United States.
81CO 1030/138, Foreign Office to New York, 10 December 1962.
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join.82 When some representatives of the Commonwealth countries expressed concern 
about the use of British troops to quell the rebellion, and were not convinced that it 
was not a "nationalist uprising", the British Ambassador wrote to London:
"Dato Ong [the Malayan representative who supported the British "vigorously"] 
and I have done our best to correct such false impressions, but I hope that 
Commonwealth Governments, particularly those in Africa, are being kept fully 
informed of the true position and to keep their representatives at the United 
Nations off this subject".83 
He also said that Ghana's representative had warned him that unless the Brunei issue 
was settled soon he might get instructions from his Government to raise it because 
David Marshall of Barisan Sosialis was constantly writing to Nkrumah about Malaysia 
and asking him to bring it up at the United Nations.84
Understandably, under such intense lobbying from the British, by the time the 
United Nations General Assembly adjourned on 21 December, Azahari had not 
received any reply from U Thant to the cables he sent appealing for an invitation to 
appear in the United Nations to present his case, and requesting recognition of his 
revolutionary government and the intervention of the United Nations in the Borneo 
crisis.85
82CO 1030/1073, jtems 419 and 435, New York to Foreign Office, 14 and 15 
December 1962 respectively.
83CO 1030/1073, item 419, New York to Foreign Office, 14 December 1962.
84CO 1030/1073, item 420, New York to Foreign Office, 14 December 1962.
85By 14 December Azahari had sent five cables to the United Nations. See: 
Chronical, 14 December 1962.
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The British were helped in their crusade by the disassociation of the Sultan and 
the leaders of the political parties in North Borneo and Sarawak from Azahari's 
campaign. The Sultan's broadcast denying support for Azahari and the rebellion, and 
his consent to seeking the assistance of British troops to quell the rebellion, were 
relayed to the British Ambassador in the United Nations.86 The political leaders in 
North Borneo and Sarawak agreed to make similar broadcasts disassociating their 
parties from the rebellion and declaring their support for their respective 
Governments.87 The SUPP of Sarawak, which had sent a joint appeal with Azahari 
to the United Nation^ against the Malaysia Plan, also distanced itself from the 
rebellion. Nevertheless the Party reaffirmed its anti-Malaysia sentiment and stated that 
it would go to the United Nations independently. But the Governor o f Sarawak 
informed London that:
"Steps [had been] taken to ensure that the delegation does not at present leave 
Sarawak. There is evidence that the CCO [Clandestine Communist 
Organisation] elements of the Party are secretly working against the Party's 
disassociation from Brunei revolt and I have decided that the leaders should 
be arrested and the CCO controlled press closed down".88 
Unlike the SUPP in Sarawak, Azahari (in Manila) had the advantage of having
V
access to a free press where he was reported widely in the major newspapers. This
86CO 1030/1068, item 128, Foreign Office to New York, 9 December 1962.
87CO 1030/1069, items 228 and 234, Governor of Sarawak to Colonial Office, 11
December 1962; CO 1030/1068, item 89, Governor of Sarawak to Colonial Office, 9 
December 1962; CO 1030/1070, item 261, Governor of Sarawak to New York, 11 
December 1962.
88CO 1030/1070, item 263, Governor of Sarawak to Colonial Office, 11 December
1962.
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prompted the British Ambassador to Manila, to advise London on 11 December:
"Seen from Manila it would seem essential that some action should be seen to 
have been taken by the Sultan of Brunei to counter Azahari's and Zaini's 
statement and machinations, and especially their telegram to U Thant".89 
Thus on 14 December, in a rare occasion, the Sultan flanked by his advisers (including 
the High Commissioner) faced the world press, which had congregated in Brunei 
because of the rebellion. The Sultan "related in most matter-of-fact terms how the
t
rebel army - Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara - had surrounded his palace and 
opened fire on it and then sent two high-powered emissaries to see him".90 The 
Sultan's press statement was flashed all over the world. The press in Manila, however, 
continued to be sympathetic to Azahari and viewed the rebellion as an "uprising of 
oppressed people seeking self determination". On 18 December the British 
Ambassador informed London:
"My press statements pointing out the fallacy of this have been published but 
without comment. I should be grateful for material such as signed articles 
which would: a. discredit Azahari personally; b. show that defences of region 
are being menaced and that Azahari, even if not personally a Communist, is 
playing Communist game; ...I could get such articles published here.91 
The Ambassador also asked for more information on Brunei, especially in respect of 
education and medical facilities. He added: "Dossiers on Azahari and Zaini would 
also be useful including especially details of Azahari's father, his Indonesian education
89CO 1030/1072, item 371, Colonial Office to Brunei, 13 December 1962.
90Straits Times, 15 December 1962.
91CO 1030/1073, item 465A, Manila To Foreign Office, 18 December 1962.
373
and army connections".92
However the support o f the media in Manila was not enough to make Azahari's 
"revolution" a success. On 11 December Azahari appealed to "Presidents Kennedy, 
Sukarno and Nasser and Prime Ministers Nehru, Ikeda and Ben Bella for immediate 
assistance towards a peaceful settlement of Borneo people (sic)".93 It is not known if 
any o f the world leaders other than President Sukarno of Indonesia responded to his 
appeal. On 20 December the Governor of North Borneo informed London that the 
President had "publicly called on the Indonesians to support [the] Brunei rebellion".94 
But it was thought rather strange that Indonesia was slow to react to the conflict. The 
British Ambassador in Jakarta observed that: "Until 10 December Indonesian public 
reactions to developments in Brunei had been cautious, doubtless awaiting a lead from 
the Indonesian Government".95 On the same day, at a State banquet for the visiting 
Vice President Kardelj o f Yugoslavia, President Sukarno made a single reference to 
Brunei, in which he said "that what was happening there had been something to do 
with the new emerging forces in the world". Following this comment, numerous 
political parties and mass organisations issued statements on 13 December expressing 
sympathy and support for the rebellion in "North Kalimantan".96
Probably the Indonesians were caught by surprise by the outbreak of the 
rebellion in Brunei as much as the British. The British suspected the Indonesians were
92Ibid.
93CO 1030/1069, item 219, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 11 December 1962.
94CO 1030/1074, item 531, North Borneo to Colonial Office, 20 December 1962.
95CO 1030/1072, item 383, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 14 December 1962.
96Ibid.
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behind the rebellion because of the Malaysia Plan. The British Ambassador in Jakarta 
believed that despite their official statements that Malaysia was not their concern, 
President Sukarno and his associates were hostile to the idea. He thought that their 
reasons were: a feeling that logically the three North Borneo territories should 
amalgamate in some form with the rest o f Kalimantan; concern that Chinese influence 
might eventually predominate in Malaysia, and thus in the three North Borneo 
territories; distrust of what they probably sincerely believed to be a neo-colonialist 
attempt to maintain British paramountcy in the area and encompass Indonesia's 
encirclement by it; and plain dislike of the Tunku and jealously of Malaya's growing 
prosperity.97
Tunku Abdul Rahman, who suspected Indonesian designs on the three Borneo 
territories, was convinced of Indonesian's direct involvement in the rebellion to 
frustrate the formation of Malaysia. He believed they were planning direct 
intervention either by regular forces or volunteers.98 His obsession about the 
Indonesian intervention, for which he attacked them publicly, led to a sharp reaction 
from Indonesia. On 15 December Dr.Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, 
warned that if the Tunku's offensive statements continued, some of which he 
considered "bordering on insults ...Indonesia would have no [other] choice than to 
meet the challenge".99 He stated:
"Indonesia is always supporting people who are struggling for independence
97CO 1030/1073, item 427, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 15 December 1962.
98CO 1030/1071, ifem 309, Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth Relations Office, 12 
December 1962.
99CO 1030/1073, item 437, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 16 December 1962; CO 
1030/1074, item 497, Singapore to Foreign Office, 19 December 1962.
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wherever and whoever they are. As often stated and re-stated Indonesia is not 
making any claim on the territory of British Borneo. ...if Malaya thinks she 
does not needkto restrain herself in her anti-Indonesia views, we cannot be 
blamed if  the relationship between Indonesia and Malaya becomes worse in the 
near future".100
On the same day President Sukarno expressed Indonesia’s sympathy with the struggle 
in Brunei, an attitude he said was dictated by the "ten principles of Bandung and the 
decisions of the Belgrade Conference of non-aligned States".101
Following this warning, Lord Selkirk and the British High Commissioner in 
Kuala Lumpur urged the Tunku to avoid provocative statements about Indonesia and 
suggested to him that "we should express gratitude that they had officially dissociated 
themselves from [the] Brunei revolt".102 Furthermore the British had failed to get any 
evidence of the Indonesian complicity from interrogation of the rebels and documents 
captured in Brunei.103 Lord Selkirk had earlier suggested to London that "it [is] best 
to avoid cornering them [Indonesians] but rather concentrate on Azahari by presenting 
[the] revolt as [the] biggest smash and grab raid ever attempted, and as intended to 
gain control by force of the reserve funds of Brunei, rather than being nationalist or 
anti-Malaysia in character".104
]00Ibid.
101 CO 1030/1073, item 437, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 16 December 1962.
I02CO 1030/10433A, Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth Relations Office, 15 
December 1962.
103CO 1030/1073, item 462, Ministry of Defence Report 15 December 1962.
104CO 1030/1071, item 306, Singapore to Foreign Office, 12 December 1962.
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When he did not receive any response from U Thant, Azahari realised that his 
campaign for a political solution to the Borneo crisis had been unsuccessful and 
therefore the only alternative left was to seek a military solution. On 13 December 
he decided to appeal for military assistance to "all freedom-loving peoples", including 
President Sukarno and President Nasser of Egypt. Azahari claimed that he had 
overwhelming support in this respect; he had received a cable from the Chairman of 
Partindo (Party of Indonesia) stating that volunteers from his party, from the Garwani 
(Women's Party) and from the Youth Council of Indonesia were ready to "help liberate 
Brunei".105 On 16 December Antara News Agency published a message from the 
Indonesian Embassy in Manila which was signed by the Veteran's Affairs Minister, 
Brigadier-General Sambas Atmadinata, and which gave an assurance that Indonesian 
veterans numbering some 800,000 were prepared to help the people of Brunei to gain 
their independence. The report also said that Sambas had instructed veterans all over 
Indonesia to make themselves ready for immediate assignment in connection with the 
Brunei uprising.106 On 17 December the Indonesian Aviation Workers Trade Union 
announced that it would boycott any British aircraft passing through Indonesia, and 
aircraft of other nations assisting the British if the latter did not cease their military 
actions against North Kalimantan. On the same day the Parliamentary Commission 
for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia passed a resolution declaring that
"the North Kalimantan revolution was a movement of the people there to free 
themselves from enslavement from colonialism and imperialism, an appropriate 
growth of the new emerging forces deserving the fullest support of all sections 
of Indonesian people".107
105CO 1030/1072, item 381, Manila to Foreign Office, 14 December 1962.
106CO 1030/1073, item 437, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 16 December 1962.
107CO 1030/1073, item 465, Jakarta to Foreign Office, 18 December 1962.
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Following this expression of support the Indonesian Government on 18 
December proposed an Afro-Asian move to press for United Nations intervention in 
Brunei and invited the Philippine Government to co-sponsor the move in the United 
Nations General Assembly which was in session. In the Philippines Azahari claimed 
to have overwhelming support from non governmental organisations including the 
President of the Philippine Association of Free Labour who promised to send a 1000 
man volunteer force from the ranks of Philippine labour to fight with the TNKU in 
Brunei.108 Azahari was also reported to have met a Sulu guerilla leader to seek 
support for the TNKU.109
Following these developments the British Ambassador in Manila called on 
Pelaez, on 18 December, "to ask him once again to exercise restraint". According to 
the Ambassador the Philippines Government would like to "get rid" of Azahari and 
Zaini because they kept on stirring up trouble locally and encouraging politicians to 
make rash statements for their own internal party political purposes. For this reason
he said, there was a temptation to the Philippines to see them off to the United
Nations. The Philippines Government would prefer to see them there rather than in 
Indonesia. The Ambassador told Pelaez: "We would prefer them [Azahari and Zaini] 
to let off steam here rather than intrigue in Indonesia and that we emphatically did not 
want them at the United Nations".110 But Pelaez told the Ambassador that he was 
anxious for the Tunku to come to the Association of Southeast Asia (A.S. A) meeting 
to be held in Manila on 11 January and that he felt he must get rid of Azahari and
V
108CO 1030/1073, item 469, Manila to Foreign Office, 18 December 1962.
109CO 1030/1073, item 466, Manila to Foreign Office, 18 December 1962.
110CO 1030/1073, item 471, Manila to Foreign Office, 18 December 1962.
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Zaini before then.111 Earlier the Foreign Office told its Ambassador in Manila that: 
"For your information, we and the Colonial Office would also prefer that 
Azahari remains in the Philippines. He could arouse a good deal of support 
from the Afro-Asians if he were to go to New York, while in Jakarta there 
would be every danger of his becoming the spearhead of serious Indonesian 
efforts".112
On 21 December a report appeared in the Manila press that Azahari was 
planning to return to Borneo. By then Azahari must have been told about the 
Philippine Government's decision not to help him in the United Nations and about the 
Government's plan to hold talks with the British Government on "security and stability 
of Southeast Asia" which included its claim on North Borneo. A Philippine 
delegation, led by Pelaez, departed for London on 28 December 1962.113 Let down 
by his host, the Philippine Government, and prevented by the British and Americans 
from going to the United Nations to present his case to the world, Azahari decided 
"personally to lead his men in their fight against the British".114 Meanwhile the British 
had issued a warrant for his arrest in Brunei. They, however, expected problems in 
that a trial and imprisonment of Azahari in Brunei "might be an embarrassment".115
111 Ibid.
ll2CO 1030/1073, hem 432, Foreign Office to Manila, 14 December 1962.
ll3Amold C.Brackman, Southeast Asia's Second Front, London, Pall Mall Press, 
1966, p. 176.
114CO 1030/1074, item 545, Manila to Foreign Office, 21 December 1962.
115CO 1030/1075, item 627, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Commissioner- 
General, 29 December 1962.
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Lord Selkirk preferred Azahari to be tried in Malaya, Kuching or Jesselton.116 
However the problem kwas solved when Azahari decided (reported on 29 December) 
to return to Jakarta via Cairo after attending the Afro-Asian Conference in Dar-es- 
Salam in January 1963.117
8.4 Return to Normalcy
The Sultan and his advisers were badly shaken by the rebellion. The Sultan 
had never expected the people in Brunei to take up arms against his authority. 
Although historically there were instances of intrigues over the throne, an uprising of 
the people against their rulers had never happened in the long history o f the Sultanate. 
It was probably for this reason that when the police showed him an army uniform 
recovered from Temburong, allegedly belonged to the TNKU, on 23 November the 
Sultan "appeared quite unperturbed and very interested in the uniform".118 This led 
to some suggestions that the Sultan was behind the rebellion. But after the rebellion 
had broken out Lord Selkirk said:
"He [the Sultan] left me in no doubt of his contempt of Azahari and all he 
stands for, root and branch, and was delighted to hear that we had withdrawn 
his passport, and the United States would probably refuse him a visa to enter 
their territory".119
116CO 1030/1075, item 609, Commissioner-General to Colonial Office, 26 
December 1962. 1
ll7CO 1030/1075, item 631, Singapore to Ministry of Defence, 29 December 1963.
118CO 1030/1068, item 14, Acting High Commissioner to High Commissioner (on
leave in London), 3 December 1962.
119CO 1030/1069, item 261, Commissioner General to Manila, 11 December 1962.
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As soon as the rebellion broke out the Sultan without any hesitation asked his 
Government to issue a warrant for the arrest of Azahari and Zaini for instigating the 
rebellion in Brunei.120
In order to assist the Sultan and his advisers to put down the rebellion Sir 
Dennis White broke his holiday in London and rushed back to Brunei on 10 
December. The High Commissioner immediately advised the Sultan to declare the 
PRB an illegal society. He also advised the Sultan to declare a state of emergency, 
to suspend the Constitution and to rule by decree until order had been reasserted.121 
Thus by exercising his powers under section 83 of the Constitution, the Sultan, on 10 
December, declared a state of emergency throughout the State o f Brunei. This was 
followed by the proclamation of Emergency Orders on 12 December to give wide 
powers to the Menteri Besar and the Police to deal with the security situation in the 
State.122
After a discussion between Lord Selkirk, the Commissioner-General, Sir 
Geoffery Tory, the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, Sir Dennis White, 
the High Commissioner for Brunei and the Sultan, it was agreed on 18 December that 
there was no need to suspend the Constitution. However it was necessary to suspend 
some sections of the Constitution as a result of the rebellion. On 19 December the
120CO 1030/1068, item 26, the Acting High Commissioner to Commissioner- 
General, 8 December 1962.
l21CO 1030/1069, item 230, High Commissioner to Commissioner-General, 11 
December 1962.
]22Brunei Government Gazette, Vol. I, No. 17, 22 December 1962. The 
Constitution (Section 83) provided for a Proclamation of Emergency must not be in 
force for more than two years without issuing another proclamation at or before the 
end of the period.
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Sultan dissolved the Legislative and Executive Councils and in their place an 
Emergency Executive Council was established. He also declared vacant all seats in 
the four District Councils which were dominated by the PRB. The Emergency 
Executive Council was presided over by the Sultan. It had fourteen members which 
included the High Commissioner and the principal officers of the Sultan.123 The 
Emergency Executive Council was the replica of the old State Council which 
combined the legislative and executive functions.
The scale and extent of the rebellion was beyond doubt. The Military 
estimated that the number of rebels under arms during the height of the rebellion was 
"approximately 2,250".124 The Borneo Bulletin quoting "reliable estimates" placed the 
strength of the rebels at" 80 per cent of the country's able-bodied young Malays".125 
When taking into account the popular support of the PRB, which claimed 20,000 in 
a total population of 83,000 (which included 20,000 Chinese and several thousand 
alien oilfield workers) the estimates were reliable. In retrospect the PRB had not only 
won the General Election in August 1962 by capturing all except one of the fifty-five 
District Council seats but had also so overwhelmingly defeated the other candidates 
that many lost their deposits. This makes it safe to assume that not less than three 
quarters of the 17,000 voters backed the PRB. During its six year existence the PRB 
had grown from a mere political party to a national movement, with members and 
supporters reaching to the remotest village in the State. Its influence penetrated so
123CO 1030/1074, item 491, Commissioner-General to Foreign Office, 19 
December 1962\ Brunei Annual Report, 1961-1962, p .92; Brunei Annual Report, 1963, 
p .13 and p.230.
124CO 1030/1075, item 613, Ministry of Defence's Report, 27 December 1962.
nsThe Borneo Bulletin, 22 December 1962.
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deep into the society that in some rural villages the PRB branch leaders often 
functioned as the link between the villagers and towns, and in some cases as 
arbitrators in domestic disputes.126 In such circumstances the crisis in Brunei could 
not be solved simply by suppression of the rebellion (with foreign troops) and then
expecting a rapid conversion of thousands of the PRB's members and supporters to the
\
administration. Both the Commissioner-General and the High Commissioner realised 
this problem.127
Lord Selkirk and Sir Geofrey Tory arrived in Brunei on 18 December to 
discuss with the Sultan and his advisers how to respond to the upheaval caused by the 
rebellion. Lord Selkirk emphasised the need for the Sultan and the Government to 
come to terms with the people. He believed that "with money available .some popular 
development projects could be undertaken with valuable public relations effect". In 
order to carry out such projects it was agreed to set up an Emergency Executive 
Committee, chaired by XhsMenteri Besar and comprising "six persons of authority and 
drive who would comipand respect throughout Brunei", which would include the High 
Commissioner or his representative. One of the first tasks of the Committee was to 
formulate and implement a plan of rural and welfare development.128
126Interviews with Yassin Affandi and Osman bin Latif, December 1992 and June 
1993; with various other people in Brunei, who want to remain anonymous, January - 
May 1993.
127CO 1030/1075, item 565, Singapore to Colonial Office, 18 December 1962.
I28C 0  1030/1074, item 491, Commissioner-General to Foreign Office, 19
December 1962.
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Both Lord Selkirk and Sir Dennis White persuaded the Sultan to adopt a policy 
of reconciliation and the maximum degree of clemency.129 One of the reasons for such 
a policy was that a large number of government servants were implicated in the 
rebellion. The Borneo Bulletin described the state of affairs two weeks after the 
rebellion: "The result is that, today, most of Brunei's young Malays are in the prison- 
pens, the Public Works Department was practically bereft of daily-paid workers and 
other government departments will have to recruit many young men in order to keep 
going".130 Sir Dennis White had earlier recommended "rigorous" punishment of the 
ringleaders, when they were caught and "uninhibited" clemency towards the rest.131 
This meant that except for the ring leaders, the rebels after reasserting loyalty to the 
Sultan and a short process of rehabilitation, might return to public life. The main aim 
was to encourage the rebels who had gone underground to surrender and thus prevent 
regrouping of the rebels under Azahari who was still campaigning for international 
support. For the same reason it was agreed to provide immediate relief for the 
dependents for those rebels who were killed or detained. In order to win back the 
confidence of the people the Sultan was advised to lead a service of thanksgiving in 
all mosques throughout Brunei intended as a "ceremonial act o f purification and 
rededication".132
]29Ibid.
U0The Borneo Bulletin, 22 December 1962.
131CO 1030/1075, item 565, Commissioner-General to Foreign Office, 18
December 1962.
132CO 1030/1074, item 491, Commissioner-General to Foreign Office, 19
December 1962. k
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Another objective of Lord Selkirk and Sir Geofrey Tory's mission to Brunei 
was to discuss the question of Brunei's entry into the Malaysia Federation. But if they 
had thought that the Sultan had been subdued by the rebellion, and that it would force 
him to make up his mind to join the Federation, they were to be disappointed. The 
Sultan told them that there were many factors to be weighed before he could decide 
whether it would be of benefit to Brunei, and if it was he would join Malaysia 
regardless of whether his people wanted it or not. After the meeting Lord Selkirk said 
the Sultan "clearly hankered after independence with a defence arrangement with the 
United Kingdom"133 or as Sir Dennis White put it: "independence with a British 
garrison".134
As Lord Selkirk and Sir Geofrey Tory left Brunei the Sultan received a letter 
from Tunku Abdul Rahman. The Tunku told the Sultan that he was "concerned over 
interference by Indonesia by way of pressing the United Nations to invite Azahari to 
submit the case for Brunei's independence". He urged the Sultan to clarify his attitude 
and stand on the issue. He advised the Sultan that:
"This was the most opportune time for Your Highness to make an 
announcement that a majority of [your] subjects have realised and regretted 
their great mistake. If Your Highness advised them they will treat your 
command as an antidote which will serve as a guide and will make them feel 
more loyal".135
]33Ibid.
134CO 1030/1076, item 6, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 20 December
1962.
135CO 1030/1074, item 553, Commissioner-General to Foreign Office, 21
December 1962.
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In fact the Tunku submitted a draft Press statement for the Sultan's consideration, and 
for the Sultan to release to the press and to print as his command to be distributed to 
the people in Brunei. It contained two alternatives: a. Brunei to become independent 
outside Malaysia; b. Brunei to become independent within Malaysia.136 Other than to 
distract attention from Azahari's plan to go to the United Nations, and to break 
Azahari's support in Brunei, the Tunku had never intended seriously to suggest that 
Brunei become independent outside Malaysia. He knew that it was not practical for 
Brunei, which he had remarked was smaller than Perlis, to become independent 
outside Malaysia. Besides, the British would not favour it, in view of the security of 
their economic interests in the State. However the Tunku had misread the Sultan's 
mind. Three days before the rebellion erupted a Colonial Official wrote to London: 
"The Tunku told me in Kuala Lumpur that, as a Malay, he understood how the 
Sultan's mind worked, and that provided that we assured His Highness of 
continued British protection he would come along in six months to ask for 
admission to Malaysia".137 
On one hand the Tunku was probably right. Barely three weeks after the rebellion the 
Sultan sent Pengiran Ali, the Deputy Menteri Besar, and Haji Jamil bin Umar, to 
Kuala Lumpur to hold preliminary discussions with the Malayan leaders with regard 
to Brunei's terms of entry into the proposed Malaysia Federation. On the other hand 
as the negotiations held in February-March and June 1963 revealed, the Sultan did not 
simply "ask for admission" without safeguards. When the Tunku could not fulfil
136CO 1030/1074, item 552, Commissioner-General to Colonial Office, 21
December 1962; See also item 551, Kuala Lumpur to Commissioner-General, 21 
December 1962.
I37C 0 1030/1071, item 294, Sir John Martin to W.I.J.Wallace, 5 December 1962.
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Brunei's demands the Sultan decided not to join the Malaysia Federation when the 
agreement was signed in July in London. As a result, Brunei remained a British 
Protected State until it resumed its full independence in January 1984. It is widely 
believed that the fundamental disagreement which contributed to the break down of 
negotiations between the Brunei and Malayan Governments was on the rights to the 
oil revenue, to which the Brunei Government wanted to maintain the exclusive rights 
in perptuity, whereas the Malayan Government only agreed to Brunei's control of 
revenue for a period of ten years; after which the Federal Government would exercise 
the right to levy and collect taxes on the oil. However it would be very interesting 
to see what official documents on the negotiations, which have yet to be released, 
reveal.138
Brunei's decision not to join Malaysia and the fact that Azahari remained at 
large and the threats to the State's security remained necessitated the retention of the 
state of emergency. Consequently the internal political development in the State was 
affected. In May 1963 the Sultan made several amendments to the Constitution. The 
two Wazir, Pengiran Bendahara, and Pengiran Pemanca ceased to become members 
of the Executive and Legislative Councils. The membership of the Executive Council 
was reduced from sixteen to twelve. But the membership of the Legislative Council 
was increased from 33 to 35, with six ex-officio members, ten Officials and 19 
Unofficial, and the elective element was suspended. The Legislative and Executive 
Councils were reconstituted in July 1963.
138For discussions on the Malaysia negotiations between Brunei and Malaya see 
D.S.Ranjit Singh, Brunei 1839-1983: The Problems o f  Political Survival, Singapore, 
Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 181-197.
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Following his talks with the British Government in London in November 1964 
the Sultan made further amendments to the Constitution. The Legislative Council 
became a 21-member Council with six ex-officio, five Nominated, and ten Elected 
members. The elected members were directly elected by secret ballot to the 
Legislative Council. Elections to the District and Legislative Councils were held on 
18 and 20 March 1965, respectively. In contrast to the 1962 Elections the 
Independent candidates captured almost all the seats in both Councils. For instance, 
out of ten elected seats in the Legislative Council, nine were won by Independents. 
Interestingly all the nine Independents were former members of the banned PRB. All 
the candidates of four political parties, Brunei United Party, Brunei National 
Organisation (the two old parties), Brunei Peoples Freedom Struggle, and Brunei 
Peoples Alliance (two new parties) were defeated.139
After the elections the Sultan announced the introduction of a ministerial 
system comprising four Assistant Ministers, two of whom were elected and two others 
were nominated members of the Legislative Council. They comprised the four 
Nominated members ovf  the Executive Council, which changed its name to Council of 
Ministers. All the four Assistant Ministers were responsible directly to the State 
Secretary and the Menteri Besar.uo This was a significant step towards a full 
democratic ministerial system of government. However, without any clear reasons, 
this experiment of a ministerial system together with the elections was discontinued 
when the five-year Legislative Council's life expired in 1970. The District Councils 
were abolished and the semi-elected Legislative Council was replaced by a wholly
U9The Borneo Bulletin, 27 March 1965. 
u0Pelita Brunei, 19 May 1965.
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nominated Council.141 But in the following year Brunei made further constitutional 
changes when it took over all internal responsibilities and left the High Commissioner 
exclusively responsible for external affairs and defence. When Brunei resumed its full 
independence on 1 January 1984 the Legislative Council was abolished and the 
Executive Council was replaced by a Cabinet whose members were appointed by the 
Sultan, who assumed the Prime Ministership.
141 The Borneo Bulletin, 11 April 1970.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has examined the political and constitutional developments in 
Brunei between 1944 and 1962. It has focused in particular on the introduction of a 
new constitution, the emergence of the Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB), and the plans for 
"closer association" between the three Borneo territories on one hand, and the 
Malaysia Federation, on the other, and also the outbreak of a rebellion at the end of 
1962. These inter-related developments had a strong impact on the shape o f the 
emerging state.
A blue print drawn up by the British Government in 1944 envisaged a gradual 
movement towards a democratic form of government replacing the autocratic system 
of government after British authority was reestablished in the Japanese-occupied 
territories. However by 1962, although it had achieved self-government, Brunei had 
not developed a democratic form of government as envisaged by the wartime British 
planners. The 1959 Constitution provided only a semi-elected Legislative Council, and
V
the first elections held in August 1962 were annulled following the outbreak of a 
rebellion in December.
Brunei's failure to develop a representative government could be attributed to 
several factors. After facing strong opposition to their Malayan Union Plan in Malaya 
and to the decision of Sir Vyner Brooke to cede Sarawak to the British Crown at the 
end of war the British decided to adopt a cautious policy in implementing its plan to 
promote political progress in the Borneo territories. In fact this led to the 
abandonment of their plan to acquire full jurisdiction from the Sultan of Brunei. As 
a result the British were unable to institute political reforms to promote political
390
Vprogress in the Sultanate. The restoration of the pre-war Residential System delayed 
political and social developments in Brunei. The system of administration established 
in 1906 was out of date and incapable of carrying out programmes essential for 
political and social progress.
The decision to associate Brunei administratively with Sarawak in 1948 further 
inhibited the political and social developments in Brunei. By placing the State under 
the jurisdictions o f a High Commissioner who was also the Governor o f Sarawak was 
too much of a burden particularly when both territories needed great physical 
reconstruction after three and half years of neglect under the Japanese occupation. In 
fact Sir Arden-Clarke, the first High Commissioner under the new arrangement was 
questioned by the Colonial Office seven months after he assumed his office about 
what plans he had for social and political progress for Brunei (see page 68). It was 
four years later (1953) that a proposal for constitutional changes was announced, and 
it took another six years (1959) before the Constitution was promulgated.
When a decision had been made to introduce a constitution there were 
differences between the Sultan and the British on the form of the constitution. Efforts 
on reaching agreements of these differences slowed down the promulgation of the 
constitution. The Sultan wanted an elaborate constitution which involved transfer of 
internal power and reorganisation of administration. On the introduction of the 
constitution the Sultan wanted to abolish the post of the British Resident which had 
limited his power in the internal affairs of his State. In the place of the British 
Resident he wanted to appoint a Menteri Besar, a model adopted from the system 
existing in the Malay States, who was to be responsible directly to him for running 
the Government. A new treaty was to be signed between Brunei and Britain whereby
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the powers of the High Commissioner were confined to external affairs and defence. 
Although he wanted a British Advisor to be created, unlike the British Resident, the 
Sultan did not want the acceptance of the advice be obligatory on him. The Sultan 
wanted to involve more people in his government who were nominated by him. In 
short the Sultan wanted an internal self-government run by him under the protection 
o f Britain.
The British however, felt that Brunei was not ready socially and politically for 
the form of constitution envisaged by the Sultan. They wanted to introduce less 
elaborate but progressive constitutional reforms which would eventually achieve a full 
representative government. To achieve that the British wanted to reform the outdated 
State Council by separating its executive and legislative powers between two different 
bodies. The main aim of the reform was to make the administration more efficient 
and effective so that social and political progress could be developed. As far as 
relations between Brunei and Britain were concerned the British wanted no change 
although their officials on the spot suggested the separation of the office o f High 
Commissioner from the Sarawak Governor. The post of the British Resident was to 
remain until the administrative system was established. Meanwhile the British wanted 
to establish local government bodies in order to give training and experience to the 
local people in administration and government. The local government bodies were to 
be introduced well ahead of the introduction of the constitution because it was 
intended that the unofficial members of the Legislative Council would be elected from
V
the various local government bodies. Unfortunately when the scheme was about to 
be introduced in 1956 it was overwhelmingly opposed by the people and it had to be 
abandoned. Attempts to replace the local government bodies scheme with a scheme
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which involved a reorganisation of the existing District Advisory Councils was not 
successful when the State Council rejected a plan to hold free elections at the end of 
1957 to elect members of the new District Councils. Therefore when the constitution 
was introduced in 1959 the preparations for the new changes were not ready and this 
eventually led to the deterioration in the administration and affected the political and 
social developments.
But fundamentally the emergence of the Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB) in early
1956 had the biggest impact on whole process of the constitutional development in
\
Brunei. The PRB's popularity and demands for radical constitutional and political 
changes alarmed the traditional elites. The latter saw the emergence of the Party, 
whose leadership and membership comprised mainly elements from the lower section 
of the society, as a threat to their influence and monopoly o f power. In fact the 
uncompromising attitude of the Sultan and his advisers during the constitutional 
negotiations was caused by fear of losing their influence and power to the new 
emerging force. Their demand for a provision for a Menteri Besar in the constitution 
and the delay in the elections by two years were a response to the PRB's demand for 
the institution of representative government based on free elections. The elites' fear of 
losing their influence ^nd power also resulted in the marginalisation of the PRB from 
all negotiations concerning the constitutional changes and Brunei's entry into Malaysia 
Federation.
The British recognised the danger of alienating the PRB, which had the support 
of a large section of society. Their attempts to bring the two groups together failed. 
However the British themselves distrusted the PRB for its left-wing inclination and 
pro-Indonesia attitude. They feared their economic and political interests in the State
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would be at risk if the PRB gained power. This was the main reason for the British 
policy of non-cooperation with the PRB. Instead the British bolstered the "Palace’s 
group" even though they had to give in to almost each demand of the group which 
eventually led to the introduction of a constitution which had no safeguards for 
assuring of the establishment of full representative government. In fact the
British had the influence if not power to guide the constitution to a more democratic 
form. But the events that followed the introduction o f the constitution effectively 
ruled out the British desire to be closely involved in the internal affairs of the State. 
The British policy during the period was best described by the High Commissioner's 
letter to the Colonial Office in August 1961 which stated that "every action and word 
has to be governed by need to retain the Sultan's goodwill and win back confidence 
in the British connection".1 In fact this explains the British acquiescence to the 
Sultan's desire of replacing almost all expatriates in his administration with officers 
from the Federation of Malaya as soon as the new constitution was promulgated. In 
effect a strong and effective administration was needed to handle the new changes 
brought about by the new Constitution, and the sudden replacement of experienced 
officers led to the deterioration in the performance of the new administration. The 
result was a widespread of disaffection among the people and effectively it helped the 
reemergence of the PRB after suffering a period of decline following a disastrous 
Merdeka Mission in 1957.
The two important external factors which influenced the political and 
constitutional development in Brunei during the period were the British plan to bring 
the three Borneo territories of Brunei, North Borneo, and Sarawak into a closer
k
'CO 1030/1448, item 14, White to Melville, 29 August 1961.
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political association; and the Tunku Abdul Rahman's plan to bring the Borneo 
territories and Singapore into the Federation of Malaya. In their endeavour to bring 
political and economic stability and security as well as to safeguard their political and 
economic interests in the three Borneo territories the British proposed plans to bring 
the three territories politically closer. In doing so the British took into account the 
political and constitutional changes they would like to introduce in the three territories 
so the plan could be compatible in the three territories. However the Borneo "closer 
association" failed because of the Sultan of Brunei's refusal to join on the grounds that 
his tiny rich Sultanate would be swamped by the two bigger neighbours, and moreover 
it would delay Brunei's progress towards independence. Thus he aligned his State 
with Malaya which had achieved its independence. Recognising the political 
complications brought about by a Brunei-Malaya closer association to the Borneo 
territories the British decided to consider the Tunku Abdul Rahman's Malaysia Plan 
as an alternative. The plan not only solved Brunei's problem but also ease the 
demographic factor that had been an obstacle to a Mai ay a-Singapore association. 
However, the Malaysia Plan was rejected by majority of the people in Brunei. But 
in spite of this the Sultan was determined to negotiate Brunei's entry into the 
Federation. The PRB, which was strongly against the Malaysia Plan because it was 
contrary to its own plan for an independent Kalimantan Utara comprising the three 
Borneo territories, became stronger. When elections were held in August 1962 the 
PRB swept to victory controlling all the four District Councils and all elected seats 
both in the Legislative and Executive Councils. Although the Constitution did not 
give the PRB power to form a government the results of the elections put the Party 
in a stronger position to influence the proceedings in the Legislative Council. The
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Party in fact submitted several anti-Malaysia motions to the Council in November 
1962 but they were rejected before being debated. The rejection of the motions and 
the discovery of the underground movement, Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara 
(TNKU), an underground movement established by the Party as a preparation to 
oppose the implementation of the Malaysia Plan towards the end o f November, 
sparked off the rebellion on 8 December 1962. The rebellion not only destroyed the 
PRB but also the 1959 Constitution.
Seen as a whole, the period between 1944 and 1962 marked the turning point 
in the constitutional and political development of Brunei. The struggle for political 
power and influence between the principal parties and the subsequent rebellion 
determined the form of government that Brunei adopted. The Sultan through a 
combination of political astuteness and diplomacy was able to entrench the position 
of the monarchy more firmly in the political system. By the end of the period Brunei 
determined to continue with its traditional form of government, a Malay-Muslim 
Sultanate.
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VAPPENDIX I
Biographical Notes of Selected Personalities.
Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin
b 1913; succeeded his father 1924 (Regency 1924 - 1931). First Sultan of Brunei to 
visit the United Kingdom, 1932 - 1933. Married Tengku Rohani, the daughter of the 
Sultan of Selangor 1^34; installed as Yang di Pertuan in 1940; celebrated Jubilee 
1949; died in Singapore on a journey to the United Kingdom in June 1950.
Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III;
b 23 September 1916 d 8 June 1986; educated at Malay College, Kuala Kangsar in 
Malaya, 1932 - 1936. Among the first three members of the Brunei Royal House to 
obtain formal education. A cadet in the Forest Department 1937; Administrative 
officer in the Magistrates' Department 1937 - 1941. Appointed Pengiran Bendahara 
in 1947; succeeded his brother 8 June 1950; awarded a CMG on his coronation 31 
May 1951 and a KCMB on the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II; abdicated in favour 
of his eldest son on 4 October 1967 and assumed the title Seri Begawan Sultan 
("retired Sultan"); became the Minister of Defence between 1984 to 1986. Author of 
several penning poems, inter alia, Syair Perlembagaan Negeri Brunei (1960); Syair 
Rampai Laila Syair (1966); Syair Asli Rajang Hari (1967); and Syair Kemerdekaan 
(1985).
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V
Abdullah bin Jaafar, Haji
b 1929; educated at Malay school, Brunei Town, clerk in the Post Office in 1946; a
V
founder member of Barisan Pemuda. Dismissed from his job for organising a protest 
with regard to BRUFICO in 1953. A leading member of the PRB and one of the 
leaders responsible to organise the underground movement TNKU. Captured in May 
1963 and detained for 23 years.
Abdul Wahab bin Toh Muda Abdul Aziz, Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang
b 1905 d 1959; graduated in law from London in 1930; inherited the title Dato Bukit 
Gantang from his grandfather, one of the eight Orang-orang Besar, Perak in 1936. 
Member of Perak State Council 1937 - 1941; leader of Persatuan Melayu (Malay 
Association) Perak 1939 -1940; Secretary General of UMNO 1946 - 1957; leader of 
Rulers' delegation in Merdeka Mission to London, 1956; resumed legal practice 1957; 
briefed by the Sultan of Brunei as a legal adviser during the London Constitutional 
Conference in 1959.
Abell, Sir Anthony Foster
b 1906 - d 1994. Colonial Service in Nigeria, 1929 - 1949. Governor of Sarawak and 
High Commissioner for Brunei, 1950 - 1959.
Ah Foot, George Newn
i
d 1987. A prominent Chinese Community leader; a member of the State Council 
September 1947 - September 1959; a Nominated member of Legislative Council until 
August 1962.
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A hm ad bin Daud, Pehin O rang Kaya Syahbandar
b in Labuan 1907; educated in English school, Labuan; appointed clerk in Customs 
Department 1925, District Officer of Temburong 1946 - 1947, Belait 1948 - 1956, and 
Brunei/Muara 1957 - 1960. A member of the Constitutional Advisory Committee 
1953; member the Sultan's Constitutional Delegation to London 1959; ''Observer'' 
April 1956 and an Unofficial member March 1957 - September 1959 of the State 
Council; Unofficial member Legislative and Executive Council 1959 - August 1962. 
Appointed Resettlement Officer 1961 - 1965. Appointed Traditional Minister, Pehin 
Orang Kaya Syahbandar, 1951. MBE 1954.
A zahari bin Sheikh M ahm ud, Sheikh
b in Brunei Town 1928; educated at Roman Catholic English school, Brunei Town, 
at English school, Labuan; sent to Bogor Indonesia by Japanese to study a veterinary 
Surgeon; involved in Indonesian war against the Dutch; returned to Brunei October 
1952; jailed for six mdnths over the BRUFICO affairs in 1953; founded PRB January 
1956; led aMerdeka delegation to London September 1957. A Nominated member of 
Legislative Council January to April 1962; Vice Chairman of Brunei-Malaysia 
Commission January - February 1962. Did not participate in the elections held in 
August 1962 because he refused to apply for citizenship under the Brunei Nationality 
Law of 1961; ordered the launching of a rebellion on 8 December 1962 rom Manila; 
formed Revolutionary Government based in Jakarta to fight for the independence of 
Brunei but failed to gain support from International Community; led a PRB delegation 
to United Nations in 1974 demanding that the British give independence to Brunei. 
Lives in exile at Bogor since the his Party's abortive rebellion in December 1962.
V
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Abdul Manan bin Mohammad, Pehin Pekerma Sura Haji
b September 1914; educated at Malay school, Tutong, 1925 - 1930; trained at SITC, 
1936 - 1939; taught at various schools in Tutong District until 1946 when he became 
a clerk in the Education Department; resigned in 1956. Chairman of PRB Tutong 
Branch 1956 - 1959. Appointed as an Unofficial member of Legislative Council in 
November 1959 - August 1960. Formed BNO in November 1960; defeated in August 
elections on pro-Malaysia manifesto; again defeated in 1965 elections.
Gilbert, John Orman, C.M.G.
b 1908; joined the Sarawak Civil Service as a Cadet in March 1928 and spent most 
of his thirty-year career in that State holding such posts as Acting Assistant District 
Officer, Rejang, District Officer, Kuching, and Acting Chairman of Kuching Municipal 
Board. He also saw service with H.M.Forces during the war. In 1948 he was 
appointed as a member of the Colonial Administrative Service and thereafter, among 
many positions, acted as Deputy Chief Secretary before being appointed as the 
Resident, Fourth Division. He was seconded to Brunei as the British Resident in June
1953 and left Brunei in July 1958.
\
Hapidz bin Pehin Laksama Abdul Razak, Dato Paduka Haji
b August 1930; educated at Malay school, Brunei Town. Came from a wealthy 
family. A member of Barisan Pemuda. Founded Persatuan Murid-Murid Tua or 
MUTU (Old Student's Association), 1947 with socio-cultural objectives. Elected as 
Treasurer of the PRB, 1956 - 1958; Deputy President, 1958 - 1962. Elected as a 
Legislative Councillor in August 1962 elections and nominated to the Executive
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Council in September 1962. Did not take part in the rebellion but was detained until 
late May 1963. Won a Legislative seat in 1965 elections as an Independent candidate. 
Became the President of Barisan Kemerdekaan Rakyat (BAKER) - People's 
Independent Front - in 1966. A successful businessman. Managing Proprietor o f the 
Malay Trading Company and Razak Holdings. Awarded "Dato Paduka" in 1984.
Hasbollah bin H aji Daud, Haji
His father was a rubber planter from Johore who was brought to Brunei by an 
European Rubber Estate Manager in c.1912. Educated in Victoria School, Singapore. 
Worked as a clerk in the British Resident's Office 1913 - 1923; subsequently spent 
most of his time in Malaya; formed BUP in November 1961 with objective of 
promoting the Malaysia Plan among the people in Brunei; defeated in 1962 and 1965 
elections. A prominent businessman.
Hashim bin Tahir, Dato Paduka
b 1928; educated at Malay school, Brunei Town; trained at SITC; a founder member 
of Barisan Pemuda; Chairman of the Brunei-Malaysia Commission in early 1962; 
Unofficial member of Legislative Council 1959 - 1962.
Hidup bin Awang Besar (known as H.B.Hidup)
educated at Malay schbol, Brunei Town; trained in SITC; Secretary-General of Barisan 
Pemuda; Deputy Secretary-General of PRB; described by Azahari as "one of the 
radical leaders" of his party; killed by security forces in May 1963
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Ibrahim  bin Jah far, Pehin Dato Perdana M enteri Dato Laila U tam a b in Labuan, 
1902 d 1971; educated at English school, Labuan; started as an office messenger in 
the British Resident's office in 1917; District Officer for Brunei/Muara, 1932 - 1935; 
Secretary to British Resident, 1935 - 1941; Administrative officer under the Japanese 
Administration, 1941 - 1945; a member of State Council, September 1947 - 1959; 
Private Secretary to Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin, 1951 - 1959; a member o f the Sultan's 
constitutional delegation to London in 1959; appointed as the first Menteri Besar in 
1959 and stepped down in August 1962 on medical reasons; appointed as Speaker of 
Legislative Council, 1965 - 1969. Appointed as a Traditional Minister - Pehin Datu 
Perdana Menteri in 1951; awarded Dato Laila Utama in 1959; OBE January 1948
Jais bin Haji K arim , Haji
b 1925; educated in Malay school, Kilanas. Joined Brunei Police force before the war 
and continued during the Japanese occupation. Reinstated in 1947. Sent to prison for
i
two years in 1953 for organising an underground movement to topple the British 
Administration in Brunei. A member of the PRB's Executive Council in 1956 - 1962. 
A member of a group in the PRB responsible for organising the PRB military wing, 
TNKU, in August 1961. The TNKU Commander who led the attack on the Police 
station in Brunei Town on 8 December 1962. Captured in May 1963 and kept under 
detention for 23 years.
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Jamil bin Begawan Pehin Udana Khatib Haji Umar, Pehin Jawatan Dalam Dato 
Seri Utama Haji
b 10 December 1921; educated at Malay school, Brunei Town, 1928 -1935; trained 
at SITC, 1939 - 1941; Japanese Military Training Camp, Kuching, 1944 - 1945; 
Agriculture College, Serdang (Malaya), 1950 - 1951; Teacher's Training College of 
City of Worcester, UK, 1956 - 1957; conferred Honorary Litt.D by the American 
Institute of Science Indiana, USA, 1968. He was a leading member o f Barisan 
Pemuda, 1946 - 1947' an Unofficial member of Legislative Council and Executive 
Council, 1959 - August 1962; an Official member of Legislative Council, 1965 - 1983; 
a member of Privy Council, 1959 until present day; a member of Brunei's delegation 
to various meetings on the formation of Malaysia Federation. He was an Education 
officer holding various appointments from 1951 to 1961 when he was appointed as 
Director of Language Board. He held the post when the Language Board became the 
Language and Literature Bureau (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka), 1965 - 1975; Chairman 
of Brunei Education Council, 1976 - 1983; Director of History Centre, 1984 - present. 
Author of several indigenous history books. Appointed as a Traditional Minister with 
the title Pehin Amar Di Raja, 1968; Pehin Jawatan Dalam, 1991.
V
MacBryan, Gerard
b 9 July 1902; joined Sarawak Civil Service as a cadet in 1920; held various 
Government appoints until he became the political adviser to Sir Vyner Brooke, the 
Third White Rajah of Sarawak, in 1930s; had ambition to succeed the heirless Rajah: 
not as a Christian king but a Muslim ruler. Thus he embraced Islam and went for 
pilgrimage to Mecca in 1936. But his ambition was unfulfilled when Vyner Brooke
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V
ceded Sarawak to the British Crown in 1946. This probably explains his involvement 
in the Brunei succession in 1950 by claiming to be the guardian to Princess Ehsan, the 
royal daughter of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin, with a responsibility to enthrone her as the 
female ruler of Brunei. But his claim was rejected by the Brunei Nobles.
M acDonald, Malcolm
b 1901 - 1981. Labour MP, 1925 - 1945; Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1935 
and 1938 - 1940; Minister of Health, 1940 - 1941; High Commissioner in Canada, 
1941 - 1946; Governor-General of Malaya, Singapore and British Borneo, 1946 - 
1948; Acting High Commissioner for Brunei, 1946 - 1948; Commissioner General for 
the United Kingdom ih Southeast Asia, 1948 - 1955; British High Commissioner in 
India, 1955 - 1960.
M arsal bin M aun, Dato Seri Paduka Awang Haji
b in Kampong Pintu Malim in Brunei Town in 1913; educated at Malay school, 
Brunei Town, 1923 - 1929; trained at SITC, 1930 - 1932. One of the first two Brunei 
students to graduate there. Teacher at Sekolah Melayu Jalan Pemanca until January 
1935 when he was appointed as the Superintendent of Malay Education. Recruited 
into the Japanese Propaganda Department; suspended by the BMA and British 
Residency until September 1946; worked as an Education adviser to the Assistant
V
British Resident at Kuala Belait; sent back to SITC, 1949 - 1950; reinstated as the 
Superintendent of Malay Education, the post he held until appointed as the Deputy 
State Secretary in May 1960. A member of Brunei/Muara District Advisory Council 
in 1954 - 1957; "Observer" of the State Council 1954 - 1957; Unofficial member of
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the State Council 1957 - 1959; an Unofficial member of Legislative' Council and 
Executive Council until August 1961. Appointed as Acting Menteri Besar in August 
1961 and Menteri Besar August 1962; retired in November 1968. A member of the 
Sultan's constitutional delegation to London in 1959. Referred to as one of the three 
"Musketeers" by a Colonial Office official; awarded "Dato Setia" in September 1960 
and "Tokoh Guru Berbakti" in 1991.
McAfee, Patrict G. (later Matnor McAfee)
b. in Labuan 1923 - d 1973; son of George McAfee, Chief Police Officer, Labuan 
1917 - 1920, Brunei 1921 - 1928; educated at English school, Labuan; appointed as 
administrative officer to various government departments; sent to UK to study a course 
on local government 1955 and given the task to prepare implementation of the Local 
Government Plan in 1956. But the plan was rejected by the people. Acting State 
Secretary May 1972 -‘February 1973.
M oham m ad bin Haji Manggol, Haji
b 29 November 1931. Son of a Penghulu of Kampong Kilanas. Educated at Malay 
school, Kilanas, 1936 - 1938, at English school, Labuan, 1939 - 1941, at Japanese 
school, Brunei Town, at Malay school, Sengkurong, 1946; trained at SITC, 1948 - 
1950. Imprisoned for three months for his role in the BRUFICO protest in March 
1953 and two years later found guilty of organising an underground movement to 
topple the British Administration in Brunei at the end of 1953. On his release in 
1955, sent by his father to study in India and returned to Brunei in early 1961. Sent 
to Jakarta by Yassin Affandi to receive TNKU members for training in mid-1962 but
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was detained by the Indonesian military authorities in Kalimantan. On his release in 
March 1963, Azahari appointed him as the Foreign Minister of his Revolutionary 
Government in exile. Fell out with Azahari in 1966 and left the party. Returned to 
Brunei two years ago and now lives in Kampong Kilanas.
Mohammad Taib bin Awang Besar, Dato Seri Laila Jasa
d 1974; educated at English school, Labuan. A clerk in the British Resident's office, 
1934 - 1940; Belait District Officer, 1941; Secretary to the British Resident, 1946 - 
1959; Clerk to the Legislative Council; 1959 - 1967; State Secretary, 1967 - 1969. 
Retired 1970. One of the officers to oversee the implementation of Local Government 
Plan in 1956. Awarded title Dato Seri Laila Jasa in 1968.
Pengiran Ali bin Pengiran Haji Mohd.Daud, Pengiran Pekerma Setia Di Raja 
syahibol Bandar Haji
b. 1918; educated at Malay school, Brunei Town, 1925 - 1930; trained at SITC, 1937 - 
1939; taught at various schools in Brunei. He was not involved in the activities of 
the Barisan Pemuda blit was a leading member of the Malay Teachers' Association; 
appointed as a member of the Constitutional Advisory Committee in 1953; elected 
Chairman of Brunei/Muara District Advisory Council; 1954 - 1957. "Observer" to the 
State Council, 1954 - 1957; Unofficial member of the State Council, 1957 - 1959; 
member of the Sultan's constitutional delegation to London in 1959; Unofficial 
member to Legislative and Executive Councils November 1959 - August 1962; 
referred to as one of the three "Musketeers" by a Colonial Office official. Head of 
Religious Affairs Department, 1961 - August 1962; Deputy Menteri Besar, August
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1962 until he resigned in 1965 to stand in District Council elections. He formed a 
political party, People's Progressive Party or PAKAR, to demand introduction of 
parliamentary government and independence after the elections. Became the chairman 
of BAKER, an alliance of four political parties in the following year in 1966; defeated 
in a by-election in 1968. Awarded "Dato Setia" in 1960 and appointed as one o f the 
senior Traditional Ministers with the title Pengiran Pekerma di Raja Sahibol Bandar 
in 1983. At present a member of Privy Council and a prominent businessman.
Pengiran Haji Mohammad Salleh bin Pengiran Haji Mohammad, Pengiran di 
Gadong
b. 1890 - d February 1969; a prominent religious figure; chief Kathi January 1940 - 
1966; member State Council July 1941, 1946 - 1959; Official member of Legislative 
Council and Executive Council 1960 - 1966; member of Religious Council 1955 - 
1969. Appointed as a Ceteria with the title Pengiran Syahbandar Sahibol Bandar 1958 
and promoted to a Wazir with the title Pengiran di Gadong in 1968.
Pengiran Pemanca Mohammad Alam bin Pengiran Bendahara Abdul Rahman
b 1918 - 1982; educated at Malay College, Kuala Kangsar, 1932 - 1936. Clerical 
officer in the Land Office 1937; Judicial Department 1940; Magistrate 1948. Became 
the second Wazir (the* Second Minister) 1950. State Custom, Religion and Welfare 
Officer 1955 - 1961; a member of the Sultan's constitutional delegation to London in 
1959; Speaker of Legislative Council 1970 - 1974.
407
Pengiran Maharaja Laila Muda Kahar bin Pengiran Bendahara Muda Hashim,
b 1919 - d 15 April 1957; educated at English school, Labuan; Malay College, Kuala 
Kangsar 1932 - 1936; appointed head of Ceteria (Third Minister) May 1951; member 
of the State Council July 1951; Chairman of the Constitutional Advisory Committee 
1953; member of the Sultan's Constitution Committee in 1959; held various posts in 
government departments; at the time of his death he was deputy Collector o f land 
revenue.
Pengiran Yusuf bin Pengiran Haji Abdul Rahman, Pengiran Setia Negara Dato 
Haji
b 2 May 1923; educated at Malay school, Tutong Town; trained at SITC, 1940 but 
interrupted by the Japanese invasion in late 1941; returned to Brunei in December 
1942 and entered a Japanese language class in Brunei Town and later in Kuching; 
selected with a few students from the Borneo territories to study in Japan towards the 
end of 1943; followed a language course in the Kokusai Gakuyukai International 
Institute, Tokyo; entered the Hiroshima University to study Education in 1945 but 
interrupted by the dropping of the first atomic bomb in Hiroshima City in August 
1945; returned to Brunei, March 1946; elected as the Deputy President of Barisan 
Pemuda in April 1946; sent back to SITC in 1947. Posted to Temburong District after 
returning to Brunei in 1949. A leading member of the Malay Teachers' Association. 
Appointed as the Secretary of the Constitutional Advisory Committee in 1953; 
transferred to the Information Department in 1954 and sent to UK to study a course 
in Public and Social Administration at South Devon Technical College, Torquay, 1954 
- 1957. On his return from the UK he was posted to Information Department. State
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Information Officer, 1959 - 1961; Deputy State Secretary and Director of Broadcasting 
and Information; August 1961 - 1964; State Secretary; 1964 - 1967; Menteri Besar, 
1967 - 1972; An Unofficial member of State Council, 1957 - 1959; an Official 
member of Legislative Council and Executive Council, 1959 - August 1962; a member 
of the Sultan's Constitutional Delegation to London in 1959; and referred to as one of 
the three "Musketeer" by the Colonial Office during the London Conference. A 
novelist and a poet; a Senior Traditional Minister with the title Pengiran Setia Negara; 
a prominent businessman and the Managing Director of Borneo Bulletin (a daily paper 
since 1992).
Salleh bin Haji Masri, Pehin Orang kaya Laila Wangsa Dato Paduka Awang Haji
(known as H.M.Salleh)
b. 26 June 1919; educated at Malay school, Bandar Seri Begawan, 1925 - 1930. An 
assistant teacher, 1934 - 1936. Trained at SITC, 1937 - 1940; began writing on 
nationalistic themes to Utusan Zaman (Singapore periodical) in 1937 and later to 
Utusan Melayu (Singapore newspaper) under pseudonym Putera Jati; formed Youth
V
Association at Kuala Belait in 1941; publicly welcomed the Japanese and worked in 
the Japanese Propaganda Department; sentenced to 18 months imprisonment for 
collaboration by the BMA but freed when Lord Mounbatten announced armistice; one 
of the leaders behind the Malay-Chinese clash in March 1946 and was jailed for three 
months for his role in the incident; elected as the President o f Barisan Pemuda, July 
1946 and held the position until the demise of the youth movement in 1948, Deputy 
President of PRB, January 1956 - August 1958; imprisoned for four months in 1958 
for perjury and subsequently resigned from the party. Identified as one of radical
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elements in the PRB. Appointed as Commissioner of Social Welfare in August 1961 - 
1974; member of Legislative Council 1963 - 1983 and Privy Council 1969 - present; 
appointed as a Tradition Minister with the title Pehin Laila Wangsa in 1969 and 
awarded Dato Paduka in 1986.
Scott, Sir Robert
b. 1905 - d 1982. Minister, British Embassy, Washington, 1953 - 1955; Commissioner 
General for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, 1955 - 1959; Commandant, 
Imperial Defence College, 1960 - 1961; Lord Lieutenant of Tweeddale, 1968 - 1980. 
Signed the Brunei-UK Agreement of 1959 on behalf of the British Government.
Selkirk, Lord
George Nigel Douglas-Hamilton, 10th Earl of Selkirk, b 1906 - 1994. Paymaster- 
General, UK, 1953 - 1955. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1955 - 1957. First 
Lord of the Admiralty, 1957 - 1959. UK Commissioner for Singapore and 
Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, 1959 - 1963.
Turnbull, Sir Roland Evelyn
b 1905 - d 1960; entered MCS in 1929. British Resident, Brunei, 1934 - 1937.
V
Colonial Office, 1937 - 1939; Colonial Secretary, British Honduras (Belize), 1940 - 
1943; War Office, 1943 - 1945; Colonial Secretary, Cyprus, 1945 - 1950; Chief 
Secretary, High Commission Territories, 1950 - 1953; Governor, North Borneo, 1954 -
1960.
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White, Sir Dennis Charles
b 1910 - d 1983; Joined the Service of His Highness Rajah o f Sarawak, 1932. Senior 
Resident in HM Overseas Service, 1955. Acting British Resident o f Brunei, June-
V
December 1956; British Resident, July 1958 - September 1959; British High 
Commissioner, September 1959 - 1963; Brunei Government Agent in UK, 1967 - 
1983. Knighted in January 1962.
Yassin Affandi bin Abdul Rahm an
b 19 May 1922; educated at Malay school, at Roman Catholic English school, Brunei 
Town. A clerk in the Japanese Administration in Miri, Sarawak. When the war ended 
he worked as a clerk under the BMA in Labuan. Involved in a Malay-Chinese clash 
in Labuan in March 1946. Returned to Brunei in July; worked in the National 
Registration Department and in the Supply Depot. Started as a Store Keeper in 
BMPC in Seria towards the end of 1947 became a senior local staff by middle of 
1948. Elected as General Secretary of Barisan Pemuda Belait/Seria Branch. Elected 
as the General-Secretary of PRB, 1956 - 1962. A member of PRB's Merdeka 
delegation to London in September 1957. Given responsibility for organising the 
TNKU in August 1961 and held several secret discussions with Indonesian politicians 
in Jakarta. Elected as a District Councillor in August 1962 elections. The "Overall 
Commander" of TNKU who read the declaration of independence of Kalimantan Utara 
which signalled the beginning of the rebellion on 8 December 1962. Captured in May 
1963; detained as a political prisoner until he escaped with six other top PRB's leaders 
in mid-1974. A member of PRB's delegation under the sponsorship of Malaysian 
Government to the United Nations demanding independence for Brunei in 1976. Now
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lives in exile in Kuala Lumpur.
Zaini bin Haji Ahmad, Haji
b 21 January 1935; educated at Roman Catholic English school, Brunei Town, at 
Victoria school, Singapore, at St. Thomas, Kuching, at the London School of 
Economics, 1958 - 1960. Son of Pehin Orang Kaya Syahbandar Haji Ahmad bin
V
Daud, a member of the State Council and the Sultan's Constitutional Delegation to 
London in 1959 (see above). A member of Executive Committee of the PRB 1956 - 
February 1958. Selected as a member of the PRB's Merdeka Mission to London in 
September 1957 and Azahari's delegation to Manila in 1962. On his return from 
London in 1960 he established his own weekly newspaper, Suara Bakti but by the end 
of 1961 it was forced to close by the authorities because of its anti-government stance. 
Attempted to form his own political party in December 1961 but then decided to 
rejoined the PRB. Elected as District Councillor in the August 1962 elections. When 
the rebellion broke out in Brunei he was in Manila with Azahari on a journey to the 
United Nations to stdp the formation of Malaysia. He surrendered to the British 
authorities in Hong Kong in 1963 hoping to be given leniency but was sent back to 
Brunei and detained without trial until his escape to Malaysia in mid-1974. A 
member of the PRB's Mission to United Nations in 1976 demanding independence for 
Brunei. Recently returned to Brunei and is still in detention.
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APPENDIX II
List of Members of Executive Council October 1959
President 
The Sultan
Ex officio Members 
High Commissioner - Dennis White 
Pengiran Bendahara Haji Hashim 
Pengiran Pemanca Mohammad Alam 
Menteri Besar - Dato Haji Ibrahim bin Jahfar 
State Secretary - Wan Ahmad bin Wan Omar 
Attorney-General - Ali bin Hassan 
State Financial Officer - M.D.Graham
Religious Advisor - Pengiran Syahbandar Sahibolbandar Haji Mohammad Salleh 
Unofficial Members
Pengiran Yusuf bin Pengiran Abdul Rahim 
Pengiran Ali bin Pengiran Mohammad Daud 
Marsal bin Maun
Pehin Orang Kaya Syahbandar Haji Ahmad 
Pengiran Abu Bakar bin Pengiran Mohammad Salleh 
Jamil bin Umar
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Nominated Member
R.E.Hales - Managing Direcror of BSPC 
Source: Minutes of State Council Meeting
V
I
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kAPPENDIX III
List of Members of Legislative Councils November 1959
Ex officio Members
Menteri Besar - Dato Haji Ibrahim (Speaker)
Pengiran Bendahara Haji Hashim bin Pengiran Abdul Rahman 
Pengiran Pemanca Mohammad Alam bin Pengiran Abdul Rahman 
State Secretary - Wan Ahmad bin Wan Omar 
Attorney-General - Ali bin Hassan 
State Financial Officer - M.D.B.Graham
Religious Advisor - Pengiran Haji Mohd.Salleh bin Pengiran Haji Mohammad 
Official Members
Idris bin Babjee - State Education Officer 
Hamidon bin Awang Damit - State Agriculture Officer
D.B.Petherick - Commissioner of Labour
k
Pengiran Abdu Bakar bin Pengiran Omar - District Officer of Belait 
Pengiran Ahmad bin Pengiran Anak Mohd.Yassin - District Officer Temburong
Unofficial Members
Pengiran Yusuf bin Pengiran Abdul Rahim 
Pengiran Ali bin Pengiran Mohammad Daud
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Marsal bin Maun
Pehin Orang Kay a Syahbandar Haji Ahmad 
Pengiran Abu Bakar bin Pengiran Mohammad Salleh 
Jamil bin Umar
Pehin Jawatan Dalam Haji Awang Mohammad Noor
Pehin Orang Kay a Laksamana Haji Mohammad Taha
Pengiran Besar bin Pengiran Sabtu
Pengiran Bahar bin Pengiran Syahbandar Anak Hashim
Pengiran Jadid bin Pengiran Nasaruddin
Hashim bin Tahir
Abdul Man an bin Mohammad
Shahbuddin bin Salleh
Haji Awang Tengah bin Awang Daud
Ghazali bin Umar
Mohammad Idris bin Imam Said
George Newn Ah Foot - Chinese Community Representative 
R.E.Hales - Managing Director of BSPC
Source: Minutes of State Council Meeting
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APPENDIX IV
List of Members of Executive Council after 1962 Elections
President 
The Sultan
Ex officio Members
High Commissioner - Dennis White
Pengiran Bendahara Haji Hashim bin Pengiran Abdul Rahman 
Pengiran Pemanca Haji Mohd.Alam bin Pengiran Abdul Rahman 
Menteri Besar - Dato Marsal bin Maun 
Deputy Menteri Besar and Religious Adviser - Pengiran Ali 
State Secretary - Raja Azam bin Raja Kamarulzaman 
Attorney-General - Dato Abdul Aziz bin Mohammad Zain 
State Financial Officer - M.D.B.Graham
Nominated Members
Hapidz Laksama - Brunei/Muara District*
Mahmud bin Mohammad Salleh - Brunei/Muara District*
Pengiran Yusuf bin Pengiran Mohammad Limbang - Brunei/Muara* 
Mohammad Deli bin Matassim - Belait District*
Mohammad Akip bin Imam Abdul Ghani - Tutong District*
Misir bin Keruddin - Temburong District*
V
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FPengiran Kerma Indra Haji Mohammd bin Pengiran Piut
Source: Minutes of Executive Council 
Note: * Members of PRB
i
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APPENDIX V
List of Members of Legislative Council after 1962 Elections
Speaker
Pengiran Haji Abu Bakar bin Pengiran Haji Mohd.Salleh 
Ex officio Members
Pengiran Bendahara Haji Hashim bin Pengiran Abdul Rahman
Pengiran Pemanca Haji Mohammad Alam bin Pengiran Abdul Rahman
Menteri Besar - Dato Marsal bin Maun
Deputy Menteri Besar and Religious Adviser - Pengiran Ali
State Secretary - Raja Azam bin Raja Kamarulzaman
Attorney-General - Dato Abdul Aziz bin Haji Mohd.Zain
State Financial Secretary - M.D.B.Graham
Official Members
Chief Kathi - Pengiran Haji Mohd.Salleh bin Pengiran Haji Mohammad 
Education Officer - Malcolm Maclnnes
Deputy State Secretary - Pengiran Yusuf bin Pengiran Abdul Rahim
State Welfare Officer v- Salleh bin Masri
Commissioner for Development - Sa'ad bin Marzuki
Director of Language and Literature Bureau - Haji Jamil bin Haji Umar
Controller of Customs and Exercise - Othman Chua Kong Soon
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Controller of Telecommunications - Pengiran Kerma Indra pengiran Haji Mohammad 
bin Pengiran Piut
Nominated Members k
Managing Director of BSPC - P.M.Linton
Kapitan China - Pehin Temenggong Lim Cheng Choo
Elected Members*
Hapidz Laksama
Pengiran Metussin bin Pengiran Lampoh 
Mahmud bin Mohd.Salleh 
Othman bin Latif 
Tengah bin Hasip
Pengiran Haji Yusuf bin Pengiran Haji Mohd.Limbang
Yassin Affandi bin Abdul Rahman
Zaini bin Ahmad
Mohd.Deli bin Matassim
ibrahim bin Ghani
Lamzi bin Idris
Momin bin Ahmad
Mohd.Akip bin Imam Abdul Ghani
Mohd.Idris bin Imam Mohd.Said
Abdul Wahab bin Mohd.Safar
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Misir bin Keruddin
Source: Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting 
* All Members of PRB
\
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Selected List o f  Persons Interviewed between December 1992- July 1995
Abdullah bin Jaafar, member of Executive Council of PRB and TNKU.
Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud, President of PRB
Raja Azam bin Raja Kamarulzaman, State Secretary (1962-1964).
Arshad bin Marsal, President of Brunei Labour United Front (1960-1962).
Baha bin Momin, TNKU recruit sent to Kalimantan for training in 1962.
Garip bin Haji Manggol, commander of TNKU in Tutong District.
Hamid bin Mohammad, commander of TNKU.
Dato Hashim bin Tahir, Secretary of Brunei-Malaysia Commission.
Dato Hapidz bin Laksamana Abdul Razak, Deputy President of PRB 
R.H.Hickling, was Deputy Sarawak Attorney-General (1952-1954).
Jais bin Haji Karim, member of Executive Council of PRB and commander of TNKU. 
Pehin Jawatan Dalam Haji Jamil bin Haji Omar, Director of History Centre, Brunei. 
Orang Kaya Lukan bin Uking, Dusun Chief.
Mesir bin Keruddin, commander of TNKU.
Mohammad bin Haji Manggol, leader of TNKU; Foreign Minister of Brunei 
Revolutionary Government in exile (1962-1966).
Momin bin Ahmad, commander o f TNKU in Belait district.
Dato Marsal bin Maun, was Menteri Besar.
Pehin Khatib Haji Moksin bin Othman, was Ketua kampong o f Burong Pingai Ayer. 
Othman bin Latif, member of Executive Council of PRB 
Sir Dato W.I.J.Peel, British Resident (1946 -1948).
Lady Datin R.Peel.
Pengiran Setia Negara Dato Haji Yusuf bin Pengiran Abdul Rahim, was Deputy State 
Secretary (196J-1964); State Secretary (1964-1967); Menteri Besar (1967- 
1972).
Pengiran Pekerma Setia Di Raja Syahibol Bandar Haji Ali bin Pengiran Haji 
Mohd.Daud, Deputy Menteri Besar (1962-1965).
Pehin Laila Wangsa Dato Paduka Haji Salleh bin Masri, Deputy President of PRB 
(1956-1958).
Salleh bin Sambas, commander of TNKU in Limbang district.
Sheikh Salleh bin Sheikh Mahmud, member of TNKU.
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Samat bin Jamaluddin, TNKU recruit sent for training to Jakarta.
Yassin Affandi bin Abdul Rahman, Secretary-General of PRB and "Overall 
Commander" o f TNKU.
Yusuf bin Ibrahim, TNKU recruit sent for training to Jakarta.
Zaini bin Haji Ahmad, member o f Executive Council o f PRB.
Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid, academician; was interpreter of the Sultan during the 
London Conference 1959.
430
